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Cont: The Trials of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito: Part 32

How could I have missed that?!!


Knox c. Italy II is already communicated!
 
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How could I have missed that?!!


Knox c. Italy II is already communicated!
Thanks, euroneighbour, for finding this Communication! I had not even thought to look for it, since the ECHR processes can be so slow.

The new Knox v. Italy application is number 24153/25. It was lodged with the ECHR on 4 August 2025, was communicated to Italy on 3 November 2025, and published on 24 November 2025.

Since the text of the Communication provides a framework for the subsequent ECHR judgment, which may be reached years from now, I will provide relevant quotes from the Communication text here; text in square brackets are my clarifying additions.

First, the Subject Matter:

The case concerns the applicant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a) of the Convention, namely in the context of the newly established European revision mechanism. Following a legislative reform of 2022 (riforma Cartabia), Article 628-bis was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing for the possibility of lodging an appeal before the [Italian] Supreme Court [of Cassation] and to request, inter alia, the revocation of convictions which were rendered in violation of the Convention.

The present application stems for the previous case Knox v. Italy (no. 76577/13, 24 January 2019), where the Court [ECHR] examined the criminal procedure for slander [false accusation made to the legal/judicial authorities, calunnia] instituted against the applicant and found a violation of: (i) Article 3 of the Convention, under its procedural limb, concerning the lack of an effective investigation concerning the applicant’s possible degrading treatment during preliminary investigations, (ii) Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), due to the absence of legal assistance during the applicant’s interrogation at 5.45 a.m. of 6 November 2007; and (iii) Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (e), on account of the fact that the applicant’s interpreter had also acted as a mediator, trying to establish a personal and emotional connection with the applicant, while she was providing her version of the facts [during the interrogation leading to Knox's 1:45 am statement].

Following the legislative reform of 2022, the applicant then lodged an appeal under Article 628-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking a revocation of her conviction.

By judgment no. 47183 of 12 October 2023, the Supreme Court ordered the revocation of the final conviction for slander with regard to the violations found by the Court under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (e) of the Convention, namely concerning the applicant’s statements of 6 November 2007. At the same time, the Supreme Court found that a further element should be considered, i.e. the memorandum (memoriale) handwritten by the applicant of her own will a few hours after her statements and then brought to the attention of the police. It then remitted the case to the Assize Court of Appeal warranting a new examination of the case in order to assess: (1) whether the said memorandum should be considered as the means for the commission of the offence (corpo del reato) or [(2)] as an element carrying a sole evidential value (2) [this numeral is misplaced] as to the memorandum’s content, whether it should be considered as containing false accusations or as a retraction.

The Assize Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, considering that the memorandum could be used to ground the conviction and contained false accusations.

The applicant appealed on points of law complaining that the Assize Court failed to comply with the instructions given by the Supreme Court and that the case concerned a new charge, different from the one brought against her within the original proceedings. The applicant also relied on judgment no. 395 of 2016 of the Florence District Court by which she was acquitted of slander against the police officers who had interviewed her on 6 November 2007, on the ground of the severe stress experienced owing to the officers’ conduct in that context. Against this background, she complained that the memorandum had been considered as a means to commit the slander without duly assessing the context in which it had been written.

By judgment no. 13512 of 23 January 2025, the [Supreme] Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld her conviction.

The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention in that her conviction was upheld based on the memorandum which was not part of the original charge brought against her within the original proceedings. She also alleged that the authorities failed to duly consider the context in which it was written, also in the light of the conclusions of the Court in the case Knox v. Italy (no. 76577/13, 24 January 2019) and of the meaning attributed to the memorandum by the Court in the said judgment. The applicant also claimed that her conviction was pronounced in breach of the principle of equality of arms.
Here is the text of the Questions to the Parties:

1. Does the Court [ECHR] have jurisdiction to deal with the application without encroaching on the Committee of Minister’s [typo for: Ministers'] prerogatives under Article 46? In particular, in relation to Knox v. Italy (no. 76577/13, 24 January 2019), does the present application raise a “new issue” (Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], no. 19867/12, § 47, 11 July 2017; Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 3324/19, §§ 54 and 56-57, 13 February 2024)?

2. If so, did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charge against her, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?

In particular, did the domestic authorities duly consider the context in which the memorandum was written, in the light of the issue of the parallel proceeding for slander (judgment no. 395 of 2016 of the Florence District Court), the conclusions of the Court in the case Knox [v. Italy] (cited above) and of the meaning attributed to the memorandum by the Court within the said judgment?

Has the principle of equality of arms been breached in the present case?

3. Was the applicant informed in sufficient detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, as required by Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention?

I believe that our discussions here have anticipated some of the questions, but perhaps not the "equality of arms" and "informed in sufficient detail" questions. I suggest that the issue of "presumption of innocence" should have been explicitly included in the questions; I am not sure if the issue of "equality of arms" is meant to include that issue.
 
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One or two thoughts on the new Knox v. Italy Communication discussed above.

The "informed in sufficient detail" issue could in part revolve around the issue of the timing of the prosecution's use of the "new" Memoriale evidence in relation to the date of the original charge of calunnia and, perhaps, the statute of limitations timing or similar time-dependent factor.

The "presumption of innocence" issue would relate to the actual apparent ambiguities in the text of the Memoriale, and these ambiguities and how they were evaluated by the Italian court could also fall under the "equality of arms" issue. That is, the text of the convicting judgment may indicate that the prosecution's view was adopted without an adequately reasoned rebuttal of the defense's view of the text of the Memoriale. "Without an adequately reasoned rebuttal of the defense's view" means, insofar as I recall the Italian court's MR, no reasoned rebuttal.
 
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This new youtuber has a 4 part series on the Knox case (guilter) and she's pretty hardcore.
I tried helping her out by posting the link here, but I think YT deletes the link/comment, anyone else have this issue?
 
One or two thoughts on the new Knox v. Italy Communication discussed above.

The "informed in sufficient detail" issue could in part revolve around the issue of the timing of the prosecution's use of the "new" Memoriale evidence in relation to the date of the original charge of calunnia and, perhaps, the statute of limitations timing or similar time-dependent factor.

The "presumption of innocence" issue would relate to the actual apparent ambiguities in the text of the Memoriale, and these ambiguities and how they were evaluated by the Italian court could also fall under the "equality of arms" issue. That is, the text of the convicting judgment may indicate that the prosecution's view was adopted without an adequately reasoned rebuttal of the defense's view of the text of the Memoriale. "Without an adequately reasoned rebuttal of the defense's view" means, insofar as I recall the Italian court's MR, no reasoned rebuttal.

From the ECHR Communication to Italy:
3. Was the applicant informed in sufficient detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, as required by Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention?

The background for question #3 may include this ECHR case law relating to Convention Article 6.3a (from the ECHR Knowledge Sharing on Article 6, Criminal Limb):

427. The accused must be duly and fully informed of any changes in the accusation, including changes in its “cause”, and must be provided with adequate time and facilities to react to them and organise his defence on the basis of any new information or allegation ....

428. Information concerning the charges made, including the legal characterisation that the court might adopt in the matter, must either be given before the trial in the bill of indictment or at least in the course of the trial by other means such as formal or implicit extension of the charges. ....

430. In the case of reclassification of facts during the course of the proceedings, the accused must be afforded the possibility of exercising his defence rights in a practical and effective manner, and in good time ....

The CSC ruling reopening the calunnia case, after quashing the first final conviction, ordered a new trial at the Court of Appeals level to determine whether or not some aspect of the Memoriale was evidence of calunnia. IIRC, it did not specify what aspect of the text of the Memoriale constituted calunnia. Thus, there would have been an uncertainty for the defense as to what specific content of the Memoriale was considered a criminal false accusation, perhaps up to their receipt of the text of the Court of Appeal's Motivation Report justifying the provisional conviction. This would likely be a violation of Convention Article 6.3a and/or 6.3b.

See: https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng
 
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Now that I have been learning about forensic chemistry for a few years, I can say that some cases are hard because the police mishandled the crime scene (the murders of Martha Moxley, JonBenet Ramsey, and Jodie Jones come to mind). Some cases are hard because the bodies may have been found at a secondary crime scene (the murder of Jodie Jones and the three young victims in the West Memphis Three case are examples). Some cases are hard because of...unprofessional...actions by the police (Steven Avery). But a few cases are easy: the Duke Lacrosse case and the Knox/Sollecito case admit of no ambiguity concerning guilt or innocence. Maybe because of this difference (or maybe because I am becoming curmudgeonly), I could only stand to watch a few minutes of Jamie Lynn's smirking.
 
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I don't understand. The link is fine.
He meant he tried to post a link to the discussion here on ISF in the comments to the video on YouTube, but YT removed the link. I had that happen once when I referenced a website that a video creator had recommended in his video in my comment. It's just a blanket anti-spam feature. Again, I think the channel owner is allowed to approve comments with URLs, but I'm not certain of this.
 
From the ECHR Communication to Italy:


The background for question #3 may include this ECHR case law relating to Convention Article 6.3a (from the ECHR Knowledge Sharing on Article 6, Criminal Limb):



The CSC ruling reopening the calunnia case, after quashing the first final conviction, ordered a new trial at the Court of Appeals level to determine whether or not some aspect of the Memoriale was evidence of calunnia. IIRC, it did not specify what aspect of the text of the Memoriale constituted calunnia. Thus, there would have been an uncertainty for the defense as to what specific content of the Memoriale was considered a criminal false accusation, perhaps up to their receipt of the text of the Court of Appeal's Motivation Report justifying the provisional conviction. This would likely be a violation of Convention Article 6.3a and/or 6.3b.

See: https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng
On the other hand, if the prosecutor had identified specific wording in the Memoriale considered to be calunnia prior to the new trial and notified the defense of those specifics, then it would be less likely that the ECHR would consider that there had been a violation of Convention Article 6.3a.

However, that would not eliminate the other issues of alleged unfairness in the new conviction.
 
Thanks, euroneighbour, for finding this Communication! I had not even thought to look for it, since the ECHR processes can be so slow.

The new Knox v. Italy application is number 24153/25. It was lodged with the ECHR on 4 August 2025, was communicated to Italy on 3 November 2025, and published on 24 November 2025.

Since the text of the Communication provides a framework for the subsequent ECHR judgment, which may be reached years from now, I will provide relevant quotes from the Communication text here; text in square brackets are my clarifying additions.

First, the Subject Matter:


Here is the text of the Questions to the Parties:



I believe that our discussions here have anticipated some of the questions, but perhaps not the "equality of arms" and "informed in sufficient detail" questions. I suggest that the issue of "presumption of innocence" should have been explicitly included in the questions; I am not sure if the issue of "equality of arms" is meant to include that issue.o
The 24 November 2025 ECHR Communication to Italy on the new application, 24153/25, is an important step in the progress of Knox v. Italy (No. 2) towards leading to justice by a rightful exoneration of Knox for the re-conviction for calunnia against Lumumba. However, the path forward will likely take some significant time. The publication of the ECHR judgments in the cases cited in the Communication, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (No. 2) and Mehmet Zeki Dogan v. Turkiye (No. 2) each took over 5 years from the time each was lodged, and the time required for a respondent state to take measures to comply with an ECHR judgment is difficult to predict. Thus, the resolution of Knox's wrongful re-conviction may not occur until sometime in the decade of the 2030s.

It's not clear what measures Italy will take in an attempt to resolve Knox v. Italy (No. 1), currently before the CoM. I suspect Italy will claim to the CoM that the resolution has been established by the quashing of Knox's first conviction for calunnia against Lumumba, and that the subsequent re-conviction is not a matter for the CoM to consider at this time, because it is a "separate" new case that has not yet been adjudicated by the ECHR.
 
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The 24 November 2025 ECHR Communication to Italy on the new application, 24153/25, is an important step in the progress of Knox v. Italy (No. 2) towards leading to justice by a rightful exoneration of Knox for the re-conviction for calunnia against Lumumba. However, the path forward will likely take some significant time. The publication of the ECHR judgments in the cases cited in the Communication, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (No. 2) and Mehmet Zeki Dogan v. Turkiye (No. 2) each took over 5 years from the time each was lodged, and the time required for a respondent state to take measures to comply with an ECHR judgment is difficult to predict. Thus, the resolution of Knox's wrongful re-conviction may not occur until sometime in the decade of the 2030s.

It's not clear what measures Italy will take in an attempt to resolve Knox v. Italy (No. 1), currently before the CoM. I suspect Italy will claim to the CoM that the resolution has been established by the quashing of Knox's first conviction for calunnia against Lumumba, and that the subsequent re-conviction is not a matter for the CoM to consider at this time, because it is a "separate" new case that has not yet been adjudicated by the ECHR.
I won't attempt to guess what response the CoM will have to Italy's quashing Knox's conviction for calunnia and then re-convicting her based on apparently ambiguous statements of uncertainty in her retraction Memoriale. The CoM might take no publicly disclosed action, or it might lodge a complaint with the ECHR alleging a violation of Convention Article 46 by Italy. Here's some information about the ECHR case law for the latter possibility, from the ECHR Knowledge Sharing website on Article 46:
29. The question of compliance by the Contracting States with the Court’s judgments falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction unless it is raised in the context of the “infringement procedure” provided for in Article 46 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention (Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 102). Rather, under the second paragraph of Article 46, the function of supervising the execution of judgments is entrusted to the Committee of Ministers.

30. Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. .... It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant’s evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155).3
3 As to the competence of the Committee of Ministers to take account, when supervising the execution of a judgment, post-judgment developments even where these form the basis of a new application to the Court, see CM/Notes/1383/H46-17.
Here are relevant summaries and excerpts of the text of the CoM (CM) note cited in footnote reference 3 in the excerpt above. In the following excerpts, text in square brackets are my clarifications. I have deleted the footnotes and footnote numbers in the excerpts for brevity.

Cases against Russia relating to measures taken by the Russian authorities against a religious organization (Jehovah's Witnesses) and some members of that religious group (including their imprisonment) came before the ECHR. Russia was found to have violated Convention articles in those cases.

The Russian authorities completed individual and general measures that satisfied the CoM as the CoM indicated in a 2017 Final Resolution.

However, in 2017 the Russian authorities (in a Supreme Court judgment) banned the Jehovah's Witnesses organization, banned its activities, and confiscated its property.

The [Russian] authorities insist that the Committee [of Ministers] has no competence to assess this ban, because it is a new issue currently under consideration by the Court in the context of a fresh application (Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Russia and Kalin v. Russia, No. 10188/17). They underline that the restriction being currently contested in the Court concerns another applicant and has different grounds.

In particular, the grounds of the 2017 ban (allegations of extremist activity in the form of inciting religious discord) differ from those of the 2014 ban (allegations that the Jehovah’s Witnesses forced families to break up, infringed the rights and freedoms of its members and third parties, incited its followers to commit suicide and to refuse medical care, impinged on the rights of non-Witness parents or their children and encouraged members to refuse to fulfil their civil duties established by law). In addition, they consider that the 2017 ban is a new issue because it does not concern the religious organisation “Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow”, which was the applicant in the earlier Court judgment, but another applicant - the all-Russian religious organisation “Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia”.

The authorities accordingly reported that all necessary information concerning the 2017 ban had already been transmitted to the Court in the framework of the proceedings pending before it in the case of Administrative Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses of Russia and Kalin v. Russia (No. 10188/17). The authorities also pointed out that the Committee’s request for the relevant information and its assessment violate the rights of the Russian Federation as a party within the adversarial proceedings. They therefore declined to provide information to the Committee concerning the 2017 ban.

The [Russian] authorities insist that both cases should be closed with regard to both individual and general measures.

The European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, in accordance with Rule 9, complained to the CoM about the new ban and its consequences, which included numerous police raids, arrests, and detentions, and suggested that the CoM initiate infringement of Article 46 proceedings.
Analysis by the Secretariat [of the Committee of Ministers]

Competence of the Committee [of Ministers]

It is recalled that in December 2017 and September 2019 the Committee [of Ministers] expressed its disagreement with the [Russian] authorities’ position that the Committee is not competent to examine the situation after the 2017 ban. In view of the authorities’ insistence, however, it appears necessary to explain in more detail the scope of the Committee’s competence.

As the Grand Chamber of the Court has underlined, it is the Committee’s role within the Convention system and in particular under Article 46 of the Convention, to assess whether the measures taken are sufficient to put an end to the violation and prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

That means the Committee has jurisdiction and is competent to examine any situation (including new factual developments) which risks prolonging a violation or causing violations ‘similar’ to those in the case pending before it.

In assessing whether a new development risks causing ‘similar violations’, the Committee must take into account factors including the nature of the new factual developments and the case-law of the European Court. As the Committee recalled at its 1355th meeting (23-25 September 2019) developments which are relevant for the proper execution of a specific judgment by the European Court have always been considered to come within the scope of the Committee’s supervision.

In some cases, while the Committee is making its assessment under Article 46, the Court is also seised with a new application concerning the same factual developments that the Committee is examining. Provided the Court is satisfied that those developments raise a new issue not previously decided by it, it has competence to examine them. In some circumstances, the Court may decide that protection for human rights does not require it to carry out that examination, in light of the Committee’s supervision work; in others it may go ahead with its assessment. Such situations are not uncommon and neither approach by the Court affects the continuing competence of the Committee to examine those same developments under Article 46 of the Convention.

The Committee’s decision to wait for the Court to pronounce itself in such circumstances is a strategic and procedural choice which has no impact on the Committee’s continuing competence and jurisdiction under Article 46 of the Convention. As the Committee has previously stressed, its supervision of execution of the Court’s judgments in no way prejudges the Court’s different mission to examine possible complaints arising out of subsequent developments under the substantive articles of the Convention (see its decision at the 1355th meeting (23-25 September 2019). And, as the Court has repeatedly found, the question of compliance by the High Contracting Parties with its judgments falls outside its jurisdiction.

For these two cases, this means that the Committee is competent to assess whether the new ban risks causing violations similar to those in the present cases and this competence is not affected by the fact that the European Court is also seised with a case concerning the new ban. Given the Court’s findings in the first case that a blanket ban of Jehovah’s Witnesses is disproportionate to any aim pursued, and its well-established case-law that the Jehovah’s Witnesses have a right to practice their religion, it appears clear that the new ban may cause “similar violations” to those found by the Court in the present cases.

As the Committee’s role is to ensure that similar violations are prevented, it may thus find it highly regrettable that the authorities decline to provide the relevant information to the Committee, as needed to enter into a genuine dialogue.
Sources:


 
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If readers wish to see the latest CoM document (from 2021) on the Jehovah's Witnesses v. Russia case discussed above, see:


The most significant development appears to be that the Russian Supreme Court in a ruling by its plenum has decided that a person attending or participating in a religious function of a banned religious organization is not subject to criminal punishment, even if that organization is declared extremist and banned. There's no mention of an Article 46 infringement issue.
 
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One general conclusion about the ECHR and CoM approaches to cases is that the ECHR is in some ways a "splitter" while the CoM is a "lumper".*

That is, the ECHR will define a case such as Knox v. Italy (No. 2) as "new" under its case law because, for example, there was a new trial using "new" evidence (not used against Knox in the first trial), while the CoM will view Knox v. Italy (No. 2) as a continuation of the first case, because it is "similar" - the new violations are based on an extension of the old violations. The interrogation contained events that were an integral part of the violations of the Convention as found by the first ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy. Knox wrote the Memoriale subsequent to the violations of the interrogation and thus the Memoriale reflects her interrogation experience and is a product of those violations (in American legalese, "the fruit of the poisoned tree").

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lu mpers_and_splitters
 
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Readers interested in ECHR case law may find some approximate similarity in Knox v. Italy (No. 2) and the recently published ECHR judgment Aykac v. Turkiye 31226/09.*

Aykac was arrested by Turkish authorities under suspicion of being a member of a terrorist organization; under interrogation without a lawyer, he admitted to that and to certain related criminal acts. Based on that evidence, and certain written statements from witnesses his defense was not allowed to question, he was convicted.

Aykac applied to the ECHR to find that his rights to a fair trial had been violated. The government of Turkiye offered a unilateral declaration acknowledging the violations, indicating that under Turkish legal reforms, a re-trial in accordance with the Convention would take place if requested by Aykac. (Therefore, there was no ECHR judgment issued.) However, in direct contradiction to written Turkish law, the Turkish courts in a final decision denied Aykac's request for a retrial.

Aykac re-applied to the ECHR after the final denial of his request for a retrial. Here are some excerpts from the ECHR judgment (my emphasis in bold):

55. Accordingly, and bearing in mind that very strict scrutiny applies in cases where there were no compelling reasons to restrict an applicant’s right of access to a lawyer, the Court finds that the Government failed to discharge their burden to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant was not irretrievably prejudiced by the statutory restriction placed on his right of access to a lawyer and the subsequent use of his statements in the absence of a lawyer to convict him. On that account, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.

58. In the Court’s view, the domestic courts’ decisions on this subject – which provided no relief to the applicant, who had been imprisoned for more than eighteen years at the time of his request – were based on a manifest factual or legal error, resulting in a denial of justice (see Moreira Ferreira, cited above, § 85). The Court also notes that the Constitutional Court failed to address this crucial shortcoming (see Çelebi v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 55657/09, 25 June 2024, where the Court found that an application to the Constitutional Court was an effective remedy that had to be exhausted in cases where applicants complained of the domestic courts’ failure to comply with undertakings contained in the Government’s unilateral declarations in respect of applications that had been struck out of the Court’s list of cases on the basis of such declarations)

The ECHR found Turkiye in violation of Articles 6.1 with 6.3c and 6.1 with 6.3d.

* https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-247426
 
Here's an ECHR case of how an Italian investigation into a violent death can be apparently intentionally mishandled by the Italian authorities:

INTRANUOVO v. ITALY 46569/19 11/12/2025 (text is in English).*

An Italian army corporal was found dead in the yard of his barracks; there was an open bathroom window on the second floor of the barracks. The death was ruled a suicide. However, among the many questionable investigative issues, autopsy data (pulmonary edema, back injuries) and forensic evaluation suggested that the corporal's body had injuries not attributable to a fall (but consistent with having been hit by a large blunt object, such as a shovel), the relevant video surveillance record of the courtyard was never (officially) viewed or entered into evidence, several soldiers resident in the barracks who had been on leave at the relevant time, but but only one present on the premises at the relevant time, were questioned, no supervisory officers were questioned, and the deceased corporal's email had been accessed, without any explanation, after his death but before the official seizure of his computer. The authorities only hypothesized that the death was due to suicide:

123. Fourthly, the Government emphasised that, in the second discontinuance request, the prosecutor had set out what they considered to be several compelling arguments as to why the attack hypothesis was implausible and the suicide hypothesis was more convincing (see paragraph 61 above). The Court notes that the prosecutor framed his conclusions as hypotheticals as well, and ultimately conceded that there remained “more uncertainties than certainties” regarding the manner in which the incident occurred (see paragraph 63 above). The Court further notes that, upon closing the investigation, the preliminary investigations judge did not engage with the prosecutor’s assessment of the plausibility of the various explanations and his arguments on that matter, nor did the judge take a stance on which hypothesis appeared more convincing, simply concluding that the circumstances surrounding the incident could not be determined with certainty (see paragraph 75 above). It is therefore difficult to accept the findings of the investigative authorities at the closing of the investigation as providing a sufficient explanation for the dynamics of the incident in question.

The ECHR found violations of Convention Article 2 in its procedural and substantive limbs in the Intranuovo v. Italy case.

The incompetence or misconduct in the investigation of the corporal's death may be suggestive of broader issues in how Italian authorities may handle investigations.

* https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-247440
 
How could I have missed that?!!


Knox c. Italy II is already communicated!
Sorry, the link doesn't work any more for me and leads to a decided case "Seyhan v. Turkey"! Can anybody help with a replacement of the access to Knox v. Italy II?
 
Sorry, the link doesn't work any more for me and leads to a decided case "Seyhan v. Turkey"! Can anybody help with a replacement of the access to Knox v. Italy II?
I hope this link remains stable:


Another way to get to this Communicated case is to use the HUDOC database and search for Knox v. Italy or case 24153/25 in the Communicated Cases.
 
Let's attempt to analyze whether it's reasonable to expect a judgment in the ECHR case Knox v. Italy (No. 2) by the end of 2026.

Here's one approach:

Knox v. Italy (No. 1) was lodged with the ECHR on 24 November 2013, communicated to Italy on 29 April 2016, and the judgment was published 24 January 2019. That is, the Communication step required about 2 years and 5 months, while the Judgment step took about 2 years and 2 months.

Knox v. Italy (No. 2) was lodged with the ECHR on 4 August 2025 and communicated to Italy on 3 November 2025; this step took about 3 months. So the timing of the publication of the judgment is, perhaps, likely to be less than that for Knox v. Italy (No. 2). Several factors may influence the timing of the publication step, including but not necessarily limited to: how quickly Italy responds to the ECHR communication questions, the case backlog and workload burden on the ECHR, the degree of complexity of the case relative to ECHR case law, and the priority the ECHR assigns to the case (considering that it is a case that in effect challenges the functioning of the Convention system).

Based on my subjective view of the above factors, I guess that a publication of the ECHR judgment before the end of 2026 or 2027 is not unreasonable. The relatively quick communication of the case to Italy influences my view. On the other hand, we are still awaiting a judgment in the ECHR case Sollecito v. Italy, a case lodged with the ECHR on 22 December 2017 and communicated to Italy on 1 February 2022 (after about 4 years and 2 months; the communication was about 3 years and 11 months ago). The Sollecito v. Italy case, however, did not challenge the functioning of the Convention system.
 
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Let's attempt to analyze whether it's reasonable to expect a judgment in the ECHR case Knox v. Italy (No. 2) by the end of 2026.

Here's one approach:

Knox v. Italy (No. 1) was lodged with the ECHR on 24 November 2013, communicated to Italy on 29 April 2016, and the judgment was published 24 January 2019. That is, the Communication step required about 2 years and 5 months, while the Judgment step took about 2 years and 2 months.

Knox v. Italy (No. 2) was lodged with the ECHR on 4 August 2025 and communicated to Italy on 3 November 2025; this step took about 3 months. So the timing of the publication of the judgment is, perhaps, likely to be less than that for Knox v. Italy (No. 2). Several factors may influence the timing of the publication step, including but not necessarily limited to: how quickly Italy responds to the ECHR communication questions, the case backlog and workload burden on the ECHR, the degree of complexity of the case relative to ECHR case law, and the priority the ECHR assigns to the case (considering that it is a case that in effect challenges the functioning of the Convention system).

Based on my subjective view of the above factors, I guess that a publication of the ECHR judgment before the end of 2026 or 2027 is not unreasonable. The relatively quick communication of the case to Italy influences my view. On the other hand, we are still awaiting a judgment in the ECHR case Sollecito v. Italy, a case lodged with the ECHR on 22 December 2017 and communicated to Italy on 1 February 2022 (after about 4 years and 2 months; the communication was about 3 years and 11 months ago). The Sollecito v. Italy case, however, did not challenge the functioning of the Convention system.
For another approach to the timing of the anticipated judgment, the timing of a relevant previous judgment serves as a (more pessimistic) guide:

Mehmet Zeki Dogan v. Turkiye (No. 2) 3324/19, cited in the Knox v. Ital (No. 2) communication to Italy, was lodged with the ECHR on 26 December 2018, communicated to Turkiye on 28 August 2019 (8 months after being lodged), and the judgment was published 13 February 2024 (4 years and about 4.5 months after the communication).

Again, using largely subjective reasoning, the Dogan v. Turkiye (No. 2) case timing suggests that a judgment for Knox v. Italy (No. 2) could be published as late as about 4.5 years after the communication (no later than the end of 2030) or, scaling by the (approximate) ratio of the time from lodging to communication, no later than about April, 2027.
 
The ECHR has a priority policy that was revised in 2017:


Here are summaries of the priority levels:

Priority I are Urgent applications. These include cases where there is a risk to the life or health of the applicant, the applicant is deprived of liberty as a direct result of an alleged violation of Convention rights, or the welfare of a child is at risk.

Priority II are applications where the case raises a question that may impact the effectiveness of the Convention system or the legal systems of CoE states.

Priority III are applications alleging, in their main complaints, violations of Convention Articles 2, 3, 4, or 5.1, and the case involves direct threats to the physical integrity or dignity of persons.

Priority IV are well-founded applications based on Convention Articles not specified in the higher priorities.

Priorities V, VI, and VII include applications on issues already dealt with in a leading case or pilot judgment, having problems with admissibility, and manifestly inadmissible, respectively.

Thus, Knox v. Italy (No. 1) would have fallen into Priority III (because it included an Article 3 allegation) while Knox v. Italy (No. 2) would be Priority II because the case raises a question of Italy challenging the Convention system.
 
If Amanda eventually has the calunnia conviction overturned, I don't see any reason why she shouldn't sue Rudy for calunnia. After all, he's the one who falsely said Amanda was 100% there at VDP7. If the calunnia is overturned, there will be nothing to uphold Rudy's accusation. The problem, of course, is that Rudy probably doesn't have any money, but it means he's exposed even more as a liar.

Hoots
 
If Amanda eventually has the calunnia conviction overturned, I don't see any reason why she shouldn't sue Rudy for calunnia. After all, he's the one who falsely said Amanda was 100% there at VDP7. If the calunnia is overturned, there will be nothing to uphold Rudy's accusation. The problem, of course, is that Rudy probably doesn't have any money, but it means he's exposed even more as a liar.

Hoots
If and when she gets the calunnia re-conviction quashed, she will be lawfully entitled to seek compensation for wrongful conviction (miscarriage of justice) from Italy. Of course, Italy may create some new barrier, as it did in response to Sollecito's request for compensation for unjust detention.
 
Italy had to pay Lumumba compensation for his 10-day stint in detention, but Amanda was still accused of calunnia against him and charged separately. I don't see why it would be any different with Amanda and Rudy.
 
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Italy had to pay Lumumba compensation for his 10-day stint in detention, but Amanda was still accused of calunnia against him and charged separately. I don't see why it would be any different with Amanda and Rudy.
You may not be taking into account the intentional dysfunctions or arbitrary actions sometimes taken by the Italian courts.
 
According to Nina Burleigh, he already cashed in when he was paid by the Daily Mail for his provably lie-riddled story:

"Lumumba, when a British tabloid paid him 70,000 euros for an interview in 2008 (and again after getting 20,000 euros from an Italian television show), said that Amanda had swanned into his pub alone on Halloween, started downing his free red wine, and cozied up in a back corner..."

You can bet the PGP won't say a word about how he's cashing in while condemning Knox for casing in, just like they were silent about Mignini writing his book. Such hypocrites.

I wonder if PL will go into how 'well' he was treated by the police when they interrogated him. :sarcasm:
 
If Amanda eventually has the calunnia conviction overturned, I don't see any reason why she shouldn't sue Rudy for calunnia. After all, he's the one who falsely said Amanda was 100% there at VDP7. If the calunnia is overturned, there will be nothing to uphold Rudy's accusation. The problem, of course, is that Rudy probably doesn't have any money, but it means he's exposed even more as a liar.

Hoots
Not worth it.
 
A media article from 9 April 2024 includes this comment from an Italian lawyer:

Lauria Baldassare, an Italian lawyer who founded the Innocents Project, said the topic of wrongful convictions in Italy is starting to “create social alarm as it assumes important dimensions."

He cited 10 cases of defendants being paid damages for wrongful convictions over the last decade, but said they faced difficulty in escaping the stigma of their initial guilty verdict — much like Knox.

“There is still part of the public opinion that does not accept the Court of Cassation’s decision, and these debates become a sport,’’ said Baldassare, whose organization is independent from the Innocence Project that Knox works with. ”Italy does not have the maturity to accept an exoneration, because social prejudices are stronger than the finding."

Source: https://www.courthousenews.com/aman...ould-remove-the-last-legal-stain-against-her/
 
”Italy does not have the maturity to accept an exoneration, because social prejudices are stronger than the finding."
It's not just social prejudices, but individuals who just cannot admit being wrong for some psychological reason. Narcissists and other very emotionally/psychologically insecure people see admitting error as a weakness. They must be right at all costs.
 
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It's not just social prejudices, but individuals who just cannot admit being wrong for some psychological reason. Narcissists and other very emotionally/psychologically insecure people see admitting error as a weakness. They must be right at all costs.

Yup, the first thing I learned in psychology is that the mind will do almost anything to keep the ego safe. including lie to itself.

It's actually the basis behind most psychological disfunctions.
 
Yup, the first thing I learned in psychology is that the mind will do almost anything to keep the ego safe. including lie to itself.

It's actually the basis behind most psychological disfunctions.

TBH, I also get that way sometimes, but while working at Fred Hutch (Cancer Research Center) I met this guy who was crazy about following the rules and would give us crap when we deviated from them even a little bit. He always used to piss me off, and I always had some choice words to use on him. POS jackass were some of them.

That is until he died (he was only in his 40s), and I found out it was from lung cancer, and that's when I understood why he was that way, and it shamed me to my very core.

Ever since, I've always tried to remember that just because I think I'm right, doesn't mean I always am.
 
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"Arrest by Analogy," Lumumba's book on the Kercher murder, is published.​

Looks like Lumumba is cashing in now.

Why in the world would anyone buy this book? I mean, he only met Meredith in passing, didn't know Guede or Raffaele, had nothing to do with the crime and has no more insight into what happened than I do, perhaps less. I suppose we can assume he'll point the finger at Amanda, not that he would have any way of knowing that, so it will likely be the pro-guilt who buy it. Me - like a bad movie, I'll wait till some poor sucker who wasted their money provides a 'review', so I can confirm I made the wise decision to ignore the book.
 
Why in the world would anyone buy this book? I mean, he only met Meredith in passing, didn't know Guede or Raffaele, had nothing to do with the crime and has no more insight into what happened than I do, perhaps less. I suppose we can assume he'll point the finger at Amanda, not that he would have any way of knowing that, so it will likely be the pro-guilt who buy it. Me - like a bad movie, I'll wait till some poor sucker who wasted their money provides a 'review', so I can confirm I made the wise decision to ignore the book.
But the title has artful alliteration.
 

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