Philosophical conceptions of the self and cognitive science

[UndercoverElephant]

Who is a materialist in the forum?

Well, that's a damned good question. You, for example, defend materialism all the time. But when pushed, you won't claim to be a materialist. Same goes for Paul.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You say that a narrative must necessarily be verbal. Fine.

A narrative is a story. I guess you can have some sort of non-verbal story, as in a cartoon strip with no words. Possibly even cats and australopithecines may have had a non-verbal beginnning of a narrative self, but only in humans does it reach the full-blown proportions of a full narrative self.

Ah, yes..."Sure, but they have one and the same subject of experience." (in response to "Clearly different moments have different conscious content.") It seems very clear that there are two very different conclusions one could reach from this--A) yours, or B) the "same subject of experience" is something which we can only infer, not know directly. It is an hypothesis, one that works nicely to tie these discrete experiences into a coherent package.

Anyway...I don't think I will dive into this thread.

I'm not sure A and B make that much difference. What reason would we have for believing this minimal self was anything but the same thing at all times. Nobody has provided any reason why we should think this.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Well, that's a damned good question. You, for example, defend materialism all the time. But when pushed, you won't claim to be a materialist. Same goes for Paul.

Yes. And I believe I have stated clear, even in personal messages to you, that I do it because I want to see how do you answer to common questions. I hope this is the last time I have to explain it to you!

That said, even if Im not a physicalism (nor anything that can be put in words and concepts) I have also told you that I recon the explicative power of this "doctrine". Thats all. Whats wrong about using it for daily living?

Quantum mechanics works. No doubt about it. General relativity works, again, no doubt. Still, both are irreconciliable against each other. Does that render obsolete one of the two or even both?

No.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

A narrative is a story. I guess you can have some sort of non-verbal story, as in a cartoon strip with no words. Possibly even cats and australopithecines may have had a non-verbal beginnning of a narrative self, but only in humans does it reach the full-blown proportions of a full narrative self.

That much appear to be correct. Still, one cannot state "what is like to see the world from a cat's view" that will simply not run. And even when I have proposed myself a model which resembles the narrative and minimal selfs, I can also see that the model is still very limited and speculative.

 

[chriswl]

I never said the mystery was unsolvable. It's very hard to solve, but not neccesarily impossible. Yes, we need an explanation of why mind supervenes on matter and whether it merely supervenes on brain or supervenes more widely ("the extended mind").

But, in the absence of that explanation, why are you so confident (or are you?) that you will discover that minds cannot supervene on computers? Or indeed that they do supervene on all human brains?

 

[Robin]

Cats cannot talk!!!!!!

A narrative does not have to be verbal!!!!!

 

[Robin]

A narrative is a story. I guess you can have some sort of non-verbal story, as in a cartoon strip with no words. Possibly even cats and australopithecines may have had a non-verbal beginnning of a narrative self, but only in humans does it reach the full-blown proportions of a full narrative self.

No, this is pure foolishness. You dodged my questions to you about this. Do you have words or phrases that are adequate to express the important experiences of your life? Do you have a word or phrase that is adequate to express the experience of a good meal (let alone something like love)?

If you cannot answer a confident "Yes" to this question then you must accept plain logic and concede that our verbal narrative is at best a very poor and inadequate approximation of our self as expressed in remembered sense data and emotion. It cannot even begin to compare.

To call the verbal narrative 'full-blown' or 'full' is to ignore all evidence and reason.

Our real narrative is non-verbal.

 

[Robin]

No, just because materialism is incoherent, it does not follow that all metaphysics is incoherent.

It naturally follows that if “physical” does not have (as you sometimes agree) a precise meaning then any position that defines itself in terms of physical is incoherent

Physicalists cannot define physical. It does not follow that dualists cannot define physical. They can.

Well why don’t they then? Seriously, what is this mysterious definition that you claim exists but that you won’t share?

No, it renders some metaphysics incoherent.

It renders the very concept incoherent. You can have “after the Physic” or “beyond the Physic” unless you have at least a shard of an idea of what the hell the Physic is.

Well then, "most people" don't understand the philosophical difficulties in defining what "science" means. It's not this easy.

The process of deriving testable models that reliably describe rigorous objective observation. That is the easiest part to define.

What you are describing is naturalism, not materialism.

So what is it that you think materialism is? Just what is this philosophy that you accuse us all of holding?

Except we have a definition of "physical" which doesn't mean physical.

This statement must then mean that you have a definition of physical – so what is it?

Sure, if you define "physical" to mean "everything" and "everything" includes "minds" then "minds are physical". This demonstrates nothing but the benefit of assuming ones conclusion.

Except that I didn’t define “physical” to mean “everything”.

There are many in this forum (for example Bri, Interesting Ian and ceo_esq and just about all defenders of the concept of libertarian free will) who will argue that there can be a third way between mathematisable and arbitrary.

It is common for people in this forum to claim, for example, that a free choice is not predictable in the scientific sense, but also not arbitrary.

If the above definition of “physical” means “everything”, then let’s face it, the free will debate is over.

Minds supervene on matter. Matter is orderered.

And you know this how? You claim not to be making any assumptions, but “minds supervene on matter” looks suspiciously like an assumption to me.

By the way, do you think you could ever find a physicist that will venture an opinion on what matter is?

"Physical" is used by physicalists to mean two different things. It doesn't matter whether I use it to define either one of these things, there will be a contradiction. If one uses it to define both of them then you are left with a false equivocation.

And yet when I ask what you mean when you use the word “physical” you point blank refuse to tell me (but instead ask me for a definition, which you then say is wrong).

So finally tell me – what are these definitions that physicalists allegedly use?

I am mightily tired of being told I am assuming my conclusion by a bunch of people who are congenitally incapable of realising that they do this continually and I do it almost never at all.

You claim for example that there is some reason why mental events cannot be physical, but then refuse to give the definition of physical you are using and the argument you are following.

So either you have this definition and argument and for some reason are not sharing it with us or you have simply assumed it.

Now put yourself in our position and ask which of these would you judge to be the correct evaluation.

And by the way, just what conclusion do you imagine I have assumed?

 

[Robin]

Yes. Geoff, you seem the only one unaware of this.

Or he is and does not want to concede the point. After all, if there were no mind/body problem then most, if not all, Geoff's arguments in this forum would be rendered meaningless.

 

[rocketdodger]

I am inclined to support chriswl over geoff. Here is why: too much "star trek."


What that means is that my notions of just what exactly my minimal and narrative self must be were pretty much thrown out the window when I imagined the following scenario:

Suppose you are stranded in space in a particularly dark area, thus the only objects you can use to get a frame of reference are the lights on your own space suit. The Enterprise, from out of your sight, tries to beam you aboard, but there is a malfunction and instead they place an identical copy of you right in front of you. Is there any way to tell, from your perspective, whether you are the original or the copy?

Without any external references that could be accessed to determine who is the original, I say no. But this seems to contradict the notion of a true continuity in the self.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, that's a damned good question. You, for example, defend materialism all the time. But when pushed, you won't claim to be a materialist. Same goes for Paul.

I don't defend materialism, I simply ask people why their preferred metaphysic is any better. They take this as a defense of materialism. I presume this is because down deep inside they are shouting "Oh God, anything but materialism!"

If two metaphysics explain reality equally well, then I propose that they are probably equivalent. If the nonequivalence is brought about by introducing someone's favorite "other thing," then I ask for an experiment to distinguish the two.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

Suppose you are stranded in space in a particularly dark area, thus the only objects you can use to get a frame of reference are the lights on your own space suit. The Enterprise, from out of your sight, tries to beam you aboard, but there is a malfunction and instead they place an identical copy of you right in front of you. Is there any way to tell, from your perspective, whether you are the original or the copy?

Without any external references that could be accessed to determine who is the original, I say no. But this seems to contradict the notion of a true continuity in the self.

I suppose you could argue that both astronauts experience continuity - it's just that the "minimal self" splits in two, both of whom can be said to share the previous past.

I think a good test case is reincarnation. Not the question of whether it could actually happen but whether it is a conceiveable idea at all. For reincarnation to make sense I am supposed to believe that there could be a continuity of consciousness from me to my next life but with no continuity of memory or any other psychological traits. Does it actually make sense to say that the old me and the new me are in any sense the same person? To claim that it could relies on the idea of there being a continuity of consciousness that is independent of anything physical and even independent of any functional equivalence. The only thing the old me and the new me have in common is the possession of consciousness and the suggestion is that this is, in some way, the "same" consciousness.

The idea is that I am about to die, then, instead of all my conscious experience just ceasing I am suddenly aware of being in a different body, although the "I" that is now aware of this has no memories in common with the previous "I" he was and need not have any similarities in personality to his previous incarnation. It strikes me that the highlighted then in the previous sentance is unwarranted - what actually happens is one person dies and an other (different) person is born and there could be no sense in which they are the same person. The continuity of our consciousness is entirely dependent on acual physical or functional continuities. Otherwise, any of us could become anyone else at any moment.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Otherwise, any of us could become anyone else at any moment.

Thats a common argument regarding the "ultimate" state for some eastern traditions. If we all Brahman in the end, why cant this instance (Atman) of Brahman experience the life of another instance? In the end, there should be just one Brahman experiencing all, and so, the (supposedly) independent Atman's would be connected at some point.

 

[rocketdodger]

I suppose you could argue that both astronauts experience continuity - it's just that the "minimal self" splits in two, both of whom can be said to share the previous past.

I agree but my point was that while both astronauts would experience continuity, their minimal selves wouldn't seem to be continuous in a mathematical sense, which is what I assumed geoff was arguing. Or at least, the dopleganger wouldn't be continuous, since it materialized out of nowhere in an instant.

The idea is that I am about to die, then, instead of all my conscious experience just ceasing I am suddenly aware of being in a different body, although the "I" that is now aware of this has no memories in common with the previous "I" he was and need not have any similarities in personality to his previous incarnation. It strikes me that the highlighted then in the previous sentance is unwarranted - what actually happens is one person dies and an other (different) person is born and there could be no sense in which they are the same person. The continuity of our consciousness is entirely dependent on acual physical or functional continuities. Otherwise, any of us could become anyone else at any moment.

I agree. In fact the first time I thought of this was what I consider the beginning of my path to enlightenment, because it was the first time that I really realized I don't quite know wtf is going on lol.

I didn't want to go to sleep that night because it seemed to me that since there is no continuation of consciousness during sleep, falling asleep could basically be the same as dying. The next morning when you wake up, a new consciousness starts up based on the memories up to that point, and dies that night. And on and on.

That really scared me for awhile but then I concluded that there must be a subconscious part of us that contributes to the narrative self and its perceived continuity, and this part probably exists continually, even during sleep, so I am not as paranoid as I used to be.

Of course, since I am such a lazy arse, these theories of mine didn't cause me to loose much sleep...

 

[Robin]

"Mind-body problem? What mind-body problem? We see no mind-body problem!"

Saying there isn't a problem is like trying to argue you didn't eat the chocolate bar when there is chocolate all over your face.

No it is more like arguing there isn't a Loch Ness Monster or bigfoot. I am perfectly willing to concede I am wrong when I am introduced to said creature. People with pictures of floating logs or men in gorilla suits need apply.

You have completely misunderstood. I am not saying "What mind-body problem?" because I see a solution. I am saying it because I have never seen the problem yet.

If there is a mind-body problem I would like to see it stated. That is all. If it depends on the concept of physical I would need to see what definition of physical is being used.

You might want to argue that there is a materialistic solution, even though it's not obvious.

Not saying there is a solution. I am saying there is no problem.

But don't try to argue that the solution is obvious, because then you would just be being ridiculous.

Same goes for this sentence. No, I am not arguing that the solution to the problem is obvious, because I have yet to see the problem stated.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I agree. In fact the first time I thought of this was what I consider the beginning of my path to enlightenment, because it was the first time that I really realized I don't quite know wtf is going on lol.

Well, you are not alone. No one knows, we are really just starting to apply science to this field, all we have, for now, are a bunch of confusing beliefs and concepts.

I have to point out that there are other "paths" that lead to other ways of knowledge but the problem is to make those paths compatible with scientific knowledge, and this seems so far impossible.

That really scared me for awhile but then I concluded that there must be a subconscious part of us that contributes to the narrative self and its perceived continuity, and this part probably exists continually, even during sleep, so I am not as paranoid as I used to be.

This is an example of the speculative paraphernalia that we use to try to "explain" what goes on. When I compare this speculations to astronomy, I believe we are still in the pre Copernican era.

 

[rocketdodger]

This is an example of the speculative paraphernalia that we use to try to "explain" what goes on. When I compare this speculations to astronomy, I believe we are still in the pre Copernican era.

Yep. Thats why Q always makes fun of us.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Yep. Thats why Q always makes fun of us.

What a great character, btw.