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Philosophical conceptions of the self and cognitive science

I think this is the essence of the difficulty that materialists have in accepting the possiblity that materialism might be false. It looks like consciousness is a property of evolved creatures, therefore non-physical explanations for the mind are unintelligable. I believe there are other ways to look at the situation.

Why do you think that playing word games is a better way to understanding than science?
 
There's no "of course" about that. You have made a claim which would be disputed by most cognitive scientists and most philosophers.
Just no cognitive scientist I have ever heard of. I don’t know of any cognitive scientist who ignores the rather obvious truth that when we remember or plan to perform some physical action we do not do so verbally, but with remembered sense data.
Well let me ask you to plan to go and eat your favourite meal. What is the word or phrase that adequately describes the experience that you are about to have? Does “yummy” do it for you? What about “scrummy”? No?

If you cannot supply that adequate word or phrase then the most important part of your narrative is non-verbal. On the other hand if there is some word or phrase that adequately describes the experience of your favourite meal then you really need to get out more.
But you could plan a complete evening only with remembered sense data, without using a single verbal construct. But it would be impossible to plan a complete evening with only verbal constructs.
Sometimes we do not even "think". When an ant pushes along a morsel of food, does it think "Here's some food, I'll push it home."? I doubt it. And when I see a scantily clad young lady walk past, I don't think "There's a cute young thing." - I react on the level of the ant instead. But that isn't part of the narrative.
Most likely you will imagine yourself in some situation involving her. If narrative means anything at all then this must be a narrative. And I seriously doubt that there is any verbal construct that can adequately encompass this narrative. The verbal narrative is at best secondary.

Someone who fumbles for the right word for any situation has as rich a narrative as the greatest poet in the world. The poet is simply better at verbalising the narrative.
Sure, no narrative self involved. I am certain that cats, dogs and pigs all dream, for the reasons you stated.
Dreams aren’t narrative? Do you mean that only the “now” is encompassed in dreams?
No, the cat has merely got a memory. So has an ant.
I don’t know if an ant has a memory. But a cat has a narrative in addition to a memory as I have shown. Sure a cat’s narrative is not as complex as our own, but a narrative nonetheless.
 
Do we really have to have a rerun of the thread where all the materialists flap around trying to define "physical" without denying their minds exists and merely succeed in tying themselves in logical knots for 45 pages?

Again, there are no materialists in the forum! You should wake up from this cruzade of yours. Ian attempts to do the same all the time, true, without a single good argument, but still he fights the same war you are trying to fight; One without oponents!!!

People in here deals with the logic of your arguments, and confront you with classical arguments regarding some materialists claims. But no one, not a single individual has claimed to be "a materialist".

Wake up! :D
 
I don’t know if an ant has a memory. But a cat has a narrative in addition to a memory as I have shown. Sure a cat’s narrative is not as complex as our own, but a narrative nonetheless.

Geoff:

You should be able to explain why a cat has no narrative, otherwise, you are falling in to a wishfull thinking, and not doing philosophy.
 
My definition of physical isn't the problem. It is the physicalists definition of physical which has got problems - because they cannot define it. I spent 45 pages demonstrating that physicalists can't coherently define physical and also define anything mental.
I have spent many more than 45 pages arguing exactly the same thing. But the problem is that this does not just mean that materialism is meaningless but also that the term “dualism” is meaningless. Also “Idealism”. In fact it appears to render any metaphysics whatsoever rather pointless.
You tell me what your definition of physical is and I'll tell you why it doesn't work unless you are going to deny the existence of minds. I think we may have been here before......
Well I have asked the question many times and most people seem to think that it has something to do with those phenomena that are amenable to study by science.

Now if this is so then it would have to be some theoretical situation in which all the science that can be done has been done. And any such convergence of science would mean that there was a mathematical model for any phenomenon that was capable of being described by a mathematical model. Now science also allows that some phenomena might be genuinely arbitrary.

So from this a working definition of physical might be:

Code:
Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )

(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).

This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.

Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.

Now it would be simply impossible to do something complex like “think” unless there was some underlying order to our minds. So whatever stuff our minds are made of we know at least that it has order.
Do we really have to have a rerun of the thread where all the materialists flap around trying to define "physical" without denying their minds exists and merely succeed in tying themselves in logical knots for 45 pages?
No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy. It is perfectly reasonable for me to ask you what you believed physical means in this context.
If you admit they are possible, I think you are in logical trouble.
I don’t see how. In fact it appears possible that we will be able to manufacture p-zombies in the not-too-distant future.
At least that is the mistaken belief of just about every materialist I talk to. They appear to be quite incapable of figuring out that is they and not I who have assumed their conclusion. I have assumed NOTHING.
You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.
Yep - you just go ahead.

Define:

Objective
Subjective
Physical
Mental

I cannot believe I am having to do this all over again. Anyone who understood that monster thread will surely not be silly enough to make the same mistakes all over again? Or would they?
It seems that you used these terms before I did. So why is it my job to define them? My position is that there is no “hard problem of consciousness”, only an “imprecisely defined problem of consciousness”. The fact that the problem is defined in terms of these words and you agree they have no precise meaning seems to suggest there is no hard problem of consciousness.

Only a semantic confusion.
 
I have spent many more than 45 pages arguing exactly the same thing. But the problem is that this does not just mean that materialism is meaningless but also that the term “dualism” is meaningless. Also “Idealism”.

No, just because materialism is incoherent, it does not follow that all metaphysics is incoherent. Physicalists cannot define physical. It does not follow that dualists cannot define physical. They can.

In fact it appears to render any metaphysics whatsoever rather pointless.

No, it renders some metaphysics incoherent.

Well I have asked the question many times and most people seem to think that it has something to do with those phenomena that are amenable to study by science.

Well then, "most people" don't understand the philosophical difficulties in defining what "science" means. It's not this easy.

Now if this is so then it would have to be some theoretical situation in which all the science that can be done has been done. And any such convergence of science would mean that there was a mathematical model for any phenomenon that was capable of being described by a mathematical model. Now science also allows that some phenomena might be genuinely arbitrary.

So from this a working definition of physical might be:

Code:
Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )

(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).

This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.

What you are describing is naturalism, not materialism.

Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.

Except we have a definition of "physical" which doesn't mean physical. Sure, if you define "physical" to mean "everything" and "everything" includes "minds" then "minds are physical". This demonstrates nothing but the benefit of assuming ones conclusion.

Now it would be simply impossible to do something complex like “think” unless there was some underlying order to our minds. So whatever stuff our minds are made of we know at least that it has order.

Minds supervene on matter. Matter is orderered.

No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy. It is perfectly reasonable for me to ask you what you believed physical means in this context.

"Physical" is used by physicalists to mean two different things. It doesn't matter whether I use it to define either one of these things, there will be a contradiction. If one uses it to define both of them then you are left with a false equivocation.

I don’t see how. In fact it appears possible that we will be able to manufacture p-zombies in the not-too-distant future.

You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.

I am mightily tired of being told I am assuming my conclusion by a bunch of people who are congenitally incapable of realising that they do this continually and I do it almost never at all. :(

I know you *think* I am assuming my conclusion. I hear you *accusing* me of assuming my conclusion. I have not assumed my conclusion. All I have done is refuse to assume yours.
 
Says who?

Says anyone who has tried to do it?

"Mind-body problem? What mind-body problem? We see no mind-body problem!"

Saying there isn't a problem is like trying to argue you didn't eat the chocolate bar when there is chocolate all over your face. You might want to argue that there is a materialistic solution, even though it's not obvious. But don't try to argue that the solution is obvious, because then you would just be being ridiculous.
 
Why do you think that playing word games is a better way to understanding than science?

I think that sorting out semantic and conceptual problems is more than playing word games. And it is not "better than science". Science investigates empirical problems. Philosophy investigates conceptual ones.
 
I think this is the essence of the difficulty that materialists have in accepting the possiblity that materialism might be false. It looks like consciousness is a property of evolved creatures, therefore non-physical explanations for the mind are unintelligable. I believe there are other ways to look at the situation.
But you need a way of explaining why mental events are correlated with certain physical world observations (i.e. activity of brains) and not others (activities of weather systems or computers). Otherwise, you have just got rid of an apparently intractable problem by accepting an unsolvable mystery in its place.
 
... So from this a working definition of physical might be:

Code:
Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )

(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).

This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.

Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.

Exactly, its more a semantic problem than a real problem. Wittgenstein anyone!?

No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy.

The same point several of us made since the begining. In order to be a problem you have to start from a dualist point of view. But I have yet to find a dualist (and a materialist for that matter) in the forum.

You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.

Yes. Geoff, you seem the only one unaware of this.

Only a semantic confusion.

Indeed! Thats why we can call physical or mental. Its the same stuff, and Im certain that, in the end, what we think about it its irrelevant (unless we could jump from just words to a shift in perspective).

Mmm, but nevertheless is fun! ;)
 
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I am mightily tired of being told I am assuming my conclusion by a bunch of people who are congenitally incapable of realising that they do this continually and I do it almost never at all. :(

Ian could say EXACTLY the same (smiley and everything). Everyone is wrong except him. Right. Why is this a pattern? (yes, remember Iacchus, Lifegazer and the rest).

Maybe, just maybe, could you be wrong about this? Like you are when assuming that people disussing with you IS materialist??

I know you *think* I am assuming my conclusion. I hear you *accusing* me of assuming my conclusion. I have not assumed my conclusion. All I have done is refuse to assume yours.

But stating constantly that it is wrong. So you are the one assuming that our conclusions are wrong, even when you are unaware of them! You point all the time that the materialists of the forum are wrong, when no one, not a single individual has claimed to be a materialist! You even have accused me of not being a Buddhist and not even knowing about what Buddhism is!!! :D
 
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Cats cannot talk!!!!!! :D
But they certainly can communicate.

I like the way you define a cat's experience as you wish, then use that experience to support your contentions. I believe you did the same with australopithecus, a page ago. I don't know whether you or Robin are right about cat narratives. I certainly would not use such a thing as an argument, though. You say that a narrative must necessarily be verbal. Fine. This assumption will lead inexorably to the conclusion you wish. I will define flight as requiring feathers, and it will lead to my conclusion that bats, insects, and airplanes do not fly.

Oh, let's see, there was one other thing I wanted to address, where was it?

Ah, yes..."Sure, but they have one and the same subject of experience." (in response to "Clearly different moments have different conscious content.") It seems very clear that there are two very different conclusions one could reach from this--A) yours, or B) the "same subject of experience" is something which we can only infer, not know directly. It is an hypothesis, one that works nicely to tie these discrete experiences into a coherent package.

Anyway...I don't think I will dive into this thread.
 
Cats cannot talk!!!!!! :D

How do you know? Are you certain in that cats do not have propositional attitudes? IMO, the way to answer this is to perform a series of experiments, this would be an empirical question, not metaphysics involved. Merely stating your opinion is useless, wont you agree?
 
How do you know? Are you certain in that cats do not have propositional attitudes? IMO, the way to answer this is to perform a series of experiments, this would be an empirical question, not metaphysics involved. Merely stating your opinion is useless, wont you agree?


OK, cats can actually talk and coffee machines can actually hate me..... :rolleyes:
 
So you are the one assuming that our conclusions are wrong......

AAAARRRRRRGGGGGGGHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!

NO! I have not done this. I have provided numerous arguments as to why materialism is wrong. None of them involved assuming my conclusion. All they involved was the lack of an a priori assumption that materialism is true. Yet it seems that every materialist on this board, including the ones who don't admit to being materialists, cannot distinguish my refusal to assume materialism is true from an assumption that it is false.
 
But you need a way of explaining why mental events are correlated with certain physical world observations (i.e. activity of brains) and not others (activities of weather systems or computers). Otherwise, you have just got rid of an apparently intractable problem by accepting an unsolvable mystery in its place.

I never said the mystery was unsolvable. It's very hard to solve, but not neccesarily impossible. Yes, we need an explanation of why mind supervenes on matter and whether it merely supervenes on brain or supervenes more widely ("the extended mind").
 
OK, cats can actually talk and coffee machines can actually hate me..... :rolleyes:

Mm no need to jump to the opposite conclusion. Im just stating that you cant offer an "absolute answer" for the question, so your answer is merely your opinion, an act of faith, an hypothesis, and nothing else.
 

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