My definition of physical isn't the problem. It is the physicalists definition of physical which has got problems - because they cannot define it. I spent 45 pages demonstrating that physicalists can't coherently define physical and also define anything mental.
I have spent many more than 45 pages arguing exactly the same thing. But the problem is that this does not just mean that materialism is meaningless but also that the term “dualism” is meaningless. Also “Idealism”. In fact it appears to render any metaphysics whatsoever rather pointless.
You tell me what your definition of physical is and I'll tell you why it doesn't work unless you are going to deny the existence of minds. I think we may have been here before......
Well I have asked the question many times and most people seem to think that it has something to do with those phenomena that are amenable to study by science.
Now if this is so then it would have to be some theoretical situation in which all the science that can be done has been done. And any such convergence of science would mean that there was a mathematical model for any phenomenon that was capable of being described by a mathematical model. Now science also allows that some phenomena might be genuinely arbitrary.
So from this a working definition of physical might be:
Code:
Physical(x) <=> ( ~Mathematisable(x) => Arbitrary(x) )
(Where “Mathematisable” means that there is a mathematical model that describes x).
This, as I say, from the general consensus of the immaterialist, materialists and others in this and other forums.
Now it appears to me to be perfectly coherent that the mind might contain only elements that can be described by some mathematical model and elements that are arbitrary and nothing else besides, so from this definition a purely physical mind does not involve any contradiction at all.
Now it would be simply impossible to do something complex like “think” unless there was some underlying order to our minds. So whatever stuff our minds are made of we know at least that it has order.
Do we really have to have a rerun of the thread where all the materialists flap around trying to define "physical" without denying their minds exists and merely succeed in tying themselves in logical knots for 45 pages?
No. I asked you what you understood by the term “hard problem of consciousness”. You defined it in terms of the physical/mental dichotomy. It is perfectly reasonable for me to ask you what you believed physical means in this context.
If you admit they are possible, I think you are in logical trouble.
I don’t see how. In fact it appears possible that we will be able to manufacture p-zombies in the not-too-distant future.
At least that is the mistaken belief of just about every materialist I talk to. They appear to be quite incapable of figuring out that is they and not I who have assumed their conclusion. I have assumed NOTHING.
You have assumed that there is a dichotomy between the physical and the mental.
Yep - you just go ahead.
Define:
Objective
Subjective
Physical
Mental
I cannot believe I am having to do this all over again. Anyone who understood that monster thread will surely not be silly enough to make the same mistakes all over again? Or would they?
It seems that you used these terms before I did. So why is it my job to define them? My position is that there is no “hard problem of consciousness”, only an “imprecisely defined problem of consciousness”. The fact that the problem is defined in terms of these words and you agree they have no precise meaning seems to suggest there is no hard problem of consciousness.
Only a semantic confusion.