Philosophical conceptions of the self and cognitive science

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And yes, you cant see. Is that offensive? Im deeply sorry! Its not your logic what fails here, but you are not interested in more.

 

[chriswl]

At this point I depart company with Gallagher, but not Strawson. The phenomenological subject is certainly void of personality. It has no identity. As already described, our sense of personal identity is maintained by the narrative self, so the minimal self, the subject, has no history of its own. But it is momentary only in the sense that Tolle describes it as momentary – for the minimal self it is always now. But to say it is “without long-term continuity’ would be to make a serious mistake. On the contrary, it is the sole continuity which unifies our entire experience of reality, from the moment we are born to the moment we die.

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together. My feeling of continuity is the feeling that I am the same person as the person who features in my memories and is the subject of those memories - my narrative self. That is the only way in which it makes sense to say that I am the same person today that I was yesterday. I only know that there was a minimal-self me yesterday because I remember the experiences it had - but my memories are part of my narrative self.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together.

Why pluralise "now" at all? There are not many "nows". There is one continuous "now". It's always "now" for my cat, but he has no narrative self.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together. My feeling of continuity is the feeling that I am the same person as the person who features in my memories and is the subject of those memories - my narrative self. That is the only way in which it makes sense to say that I am the same person today that I was yesterday. I only know that there was a minimal-self me yesterday because I remember the experiences it had - but my memories are part of my narrative self.

I added a bit to my essay in response to your question. Thanks for actually reading what I wrote and responding constructively, you are helping to improve my grade.

Added section (at the end):

Perhaps the view of the matter which I have described above can help to answer the first of Gallagher’s outstanding questions. He asks “What relationship exists between the minimal self and the narrative self? Is one generated from the other? DO they operate independently of each other?”
According to Gallagher there are a whole series of minimal selves, associated with unique experiences. Presumably these are held together by the narrative self. But once more we have lost sight of the subject and of subjectivity. I would argue that the true relationship is the other way around. The subject of experience occurs even in animals – my cat does not require a load of concepts in order to be able to perceive fishes. What the cat lacks is not a subject for his experiences but self-consciousness and a narrative self. Self-consciousness requires conceptual and reflexive thought. Only once this level of awareness is achieved (and one assumes this is restricted to human beings), then the creation of a fictional narrative self will surely follow. From that moment on it seems quite natural to conflate the narrative self with the minimal self, because both of them are referred to by the first-person pronoun “I”. When we say “I” we tend to mean both “this human being, with his own history and projected future” as well as “the conscious subject which is perceiving you now”. So the answer to Gallagher’s question is that the minimal self was the original self, and that the narrative self appears both evolutionarily and developmentally later, and only after the establishment of fully reflexive self-consciousness. Once we are aware that we are aware, we can start weaving stories about whoever it is who is aware that he is aware. Without it, it is forever "now" and that is all there is to be said.

 

[chriswl]

Why pluralise "now" at all? There are not many "nows". There is one continuous "now".

Clearly different moments have different conscious content. I assume that what prevents these different moments form being different "nows" for you is that the same "you" is experiencing them. But what does that mean and how do you know it?

What, apart from common sense, makes you sure that your (minimal) conscious experiences yesterday didn't take place from the viewpoint of someone else's body, that the real "you" inhabited a different body? You wouldn't have any memories of being someone else, because those memories were left behind in the other person's brain and now contribute to his narrative self. And your narrative self relies on the memories in your brain, even if you weren't the one who had the conscious experiences associated with them. If the minimal self has a continuity that is seperate from memory then we can never know that this is true. In fact I'd argue that this concept of "continuity" is incoherent.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I agree that's how we normally think of things. But we can't justify that claim. Our narrative self is the only thing that ties the "nows" experienced by the minimal self together. My feeling of continuity is the feeling that I am the same person as the person who features in my memories and is the subject of those memories - my narrative self. That is the only way in which it makes sense to say that I am the same person today that I was yesterday. I only know that there was a minimal-self me yesterday because I remember the experiences it had - but my memories are part of my narrative self.

Absolutely. This "minimal self" (the name itself is wrong, there is no self that has no self so to speak) is not separable and would not belong to time. Memories, continuity, are part of the narrative self, beyond that, it is simply not "a self".

Maybe if we cut off the "minimal self" and exchange it for another word, the problems will disolve themselfs.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Absolutely. This "minimal self" (the name itself is wrong, there is no self that has no self so to speak) is not separable and would not belong to time. Memories, continuity, are part of the narrative self, beyond that, it is simply not "a self".

Maybe if we cut off the "minimal self" and exchange it for another word, the problems will disolve themselfs.

That may depend on what other word you want to change it too. Specifically, it had better not be a word which eliminates all references to subjectivity and the subject itself.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Clearly different moments have different conscious content.

Sure, but they have one and the same subject of experience.

I assume that what prevents these different moments form being different "nows" for you is that the same "you" is experiencing them. But what does that mean and how do you know it?

That is what the reference to the immunity principle is about. It is something I cannot be wrong about. I might be wrong about the content, but I cannot be wrong about the "I".

What, apart from common sense, makes you sure that your (minimal) conscious experiences yesterday didn't take place from the viewpoint of someone else's body, that the real "you" inhabited a different body? You wouldn't have any memories of being someone else, because those memories were left behind in the other person's brain and now contribute to his narrative self.

Nothing. If all I have is a minimal self then I have no individual identity and no real sense of past or future. I am just being me, now. EDIT: and I have no concept of other people as subjects of experience.

And your narrative self relies on the memories in your brain, even if you weren't the one who had the conscious experiences associated with them. If the minimal self has a continuity that is seperate from memory then we can never know that this is true. In fact I'd argue that this concept of "continuity" is incoherent.

Why?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

That may depend on what other word you want to change it too. Specifically, it had better not be a word which eliminates all references to subjectivity and the subject itself.

I see your point. Somehow, this "minimal self" has to be the foundation of the "narrative self". Yes, it is interesting, now I understand better why they used that term.

Advaita Vedanta, and even Zen have their own words for that purpose, which I consider more appropriate, but it could be just because Im feel more familiar with them.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I see your point. Somehow, this "minimal self" has to be the foundation of the "relational self" (sorry, its my own word, I forgot the one you used). Yes, it is interesting, now I understand better why they used that term.

Advaita Vedanta, and even Zen have their own words for that purpose, which I consider more appropriate, but it could be just because Im feel more familiar with them.

The opening post makes clear that I am adopting Galen Strawsons's concept as the minimal self as the subject of conscious experience. It has many names. Hinduism calls it "Atman", and insists that you must strip down the narrative self before you can be properly "aware" of it.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The opening post makes clear that I am adopting Galen Strawsons's concept as the minimal self as the subject of conscious experience. It has many names. Hinduism calls it "Atman", and insists that you must strip down the narrative self before you can be properly "aware" of it.

Thats what is puzzling for me, regarding you this is. You have the intelligence but I somehow see that you lack the will to "reach" it. Maybe you dont want, but then again, that doesnt mean you should be upset with me, does it?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Thats what is puzzling for me, regarding you this is. You have the intelligence but I somehow see that you lack the will to "reach" it. Maybe you dont want, but then again, that doesnt mean you should be upset with me, does it?

There is no way for me to respond to this apart from this:

If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Have you?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And yes. So, no more to say in this respect.

Can you recommend me more to read about the subject? I have not read the work of any of them.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And yes. So, no more to say in this respect.

Can you recommend me more to read about the subject? I have not read the work of any of them.

Not read the work of any of who? Are you talking about Hindu philosophers or modern philosophers of mind?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Contemporary, alive philosophers. What were you thinking? Google helps of course, but as you are a philosopher I guess you know them personally, so you seem to be a reliable source of info regarding who is doing seriours work.

Still angry or something???

 

[chriswl]

That is what the reference to the immunity principle is about. It is something I cannot be wrong about. I might be wrong about the content, but I cannot be wrong about the "I".

The immunity principle says that what you are experiencing at this very moment is your experiences, no one else's. It doesn't guarantee that the experiences that you remember having were really yours. What can it mean anyway, to say that the minimal self that experienced the things you remember is the same minimal self that is experiencing things right now? How do you make the comparison. Minimal selves aren't personal in that way, they only seem to be defined by what they experience.

Chris: If the minimal self has a continuity that is separate from memory then we can never know that this is true. In fact I'd argue that this concept of "continuity" is incoherent.

Geoff: Why?

Because I think all the feeling of continuity comes from the narrative self, not the minimal self which as you said "has no real sense of past or future".

Put it this way, continuity implies that the minimal-self experiences events that are ordered in a particular sequence. If it makes as much sense to say that we subjectively experienced our lives backwards instead of forwards (or even that we experience days in a random order) then our intuition of continuity would be in doubt. But actually, I think we can claim that the "real" experienced order of events is arbitrary.

Imagine experiencing a world where time ran backwards. Actually, we couldn't tell the difference if everything was reversed. The way we can tell the past from the future is that we have memories of one and not the other. At any given moment we would have knowledge of the (actual) past and ignorance of the (actual) future. Whether the "next" moment in line to be experienced was from the past or the future would make no difference to how we experienced the "now". We can imagine consciousness alighting on these nows in any order, perhaps experiencing some repetitively, and avoiding others completely. We can never know anything about the particular sequence of experiences. We can't actually experience the sequence, just the individual moments, so in what sense can the sequence be said to be real? There are just moments, linked by memory and other psychological states.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Contemporary, alive philosophers. What were you thinking? Google helps of course, but as you are a philosopher I guess you know them personally, so you seem to be a reliable source of info regarding who is doing seriours work.

Still angry or something???

I am not sure whether you are asking me to point you to spiritual teachers or philosophers. If it is the former, then go here:

http://www.well.com/~jct/

If the latter, go here:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195056442/102-2832524-8208962?v=glance&n=283155

or here:

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/DRPC.htm

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The immunity principle says that what you are experiencing at this very moment is your experiences, no one else's. It doesn't guarantee that the experiences that you remember having were really yours. What can it mean anyway, to say that the minimal self that experienced the things you remember is the same minimal self that is experiencing things right now? How do you make the comparison. Minimal selves aren't personal in that way, they only seem to be defined by what they experience.

I still don't understand why there need be more than one minimal self. My minimal self is not defined by what it experiences. It is defined as the thing which is the subject of those experiences. There are not the same.

Because I think all the feeling of continuity comes from the narrative self, not the minimal self which as you said "has no real sense of past or future".

Put it this way, continuity implies that the minimal-self experiences events that are ordered in a particular sequence. If it makes as much sense to say that we subjectively experienced our lives backwards instead of forwards (or even that we experience days in a random order) then our intuition of continuity would be in doubt. But actually, I think we can claim that the "real" experienced order of events is arbitrary.

This doesn't invalidate the idea of a continuous minimal self. What you are talking about is central to Kant's theory of causality - that we have to experience empirical causality, that time is a mode of our cognition. I don't see what it has to do with the fact that there is always a subject of experience.

Imagine experiencing a world where time ran backwards. Actually, we couldn't tell the difference if everything was reversed. The way we can tell the past from the future is that we have memories of one and not the other. At any given moment we would have knowledge of the (actual) past and ignorance of the (actual) future. Whether the "next" moment in line to be experienced was from the past or the future would make no difference to how we experienced the "now". We can imagine consciousness alighting on these nows in any order, perhaps experiencing some repetitively, and avoiding others completely. We can never know anything about the particular sequence of experiences. We can't actually experience the sequence, just the individual moments, so in what sense can it be said to be real? There are just moments, linked by memory and other psychological states.

I think you are confusing the first and third person perspective. If you try to objectify the self, then you will see it as a series of events existing in time. But from the first-person perspective itself, there is merely an ever-present NOW. Even when we are thinking about the past, it is NOW that we are doing the thinking. Therefore even at this point, it is the narrative self that constructs the sense of the past and the future - but nothing changes the continuousness of the minimal self. When is it not present?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Spiritual teachers???? LOL thanks! Yes, I dont know anything about anything, thanks for the vote of confidence!!!

Or were you trying to be sarcastic? I have problems to understand that humor. Your last link is something like what I was asking anyway, so thanks.