Transporter Philosophy

[Just thinking]

Just Thinking - one of the issues with this discussion is the concept that consciousness is being "transported".

From a purely materialistic perspective, that's not the case; if consciousness is a combination of processes, quantum states, etc., then a "transported" person's consciousness isn't actually being transported - it's being duplicated. Even destroying the original during the process wouldn't make the copy become the original. It would simply terminate the existence of the original while starting a brand new existence of a second person. The fact that the copy would believe itself to be the original - and even have all the original's memories - simply means that the illusion of being the original is perfect for the copy.

Yes -- I believed this to be the case all along:

I find it hard to reject that if clones are possible, then the original cannot be transported, only a duplicate can come out of the other end -- even if only one person is materialized. Once disintegrated, I am essentially dead, and whatever comes out the other end is a copy ...

For whatever time period you allow, you have two of the same person which I believe cannot exist -- soul or no soul.

... the problem is finding out if the person that walked in felt as if no time had passed during the transport and that they felt a continuous line of consciousness. This may prove an impossible test to anyone other than the person that walked in.

Personally, I doubt it.

If you set up a camera that recorded the transfer (assume that the sending and receiving stations are merely a few meters apart), the entire cycle of destruction/creation could be recorded... and the copy could be shown the video as proof they weren't the original, no matter how they feel about it. And if the original wasn't destroyed... well, there you have it. Replication is not continuance of the original.

Agreed.

From a non-materialistic perspective, it's simply impossible to do at all. From this viewpoint, consciousness would be independent from the physical state of being. Since our hypothetical "transporter" supposedly only reconstructs the physical and quantum state, the "self" would be lost in the translation. In this case, you'd end up with a comatose body that was never self-aware to begin with.

Yes ... being somewhat analogous to transporting momentum.

 

[Hellbound]

Placing black and white pawns in identical boxes and then making it impossible to tell which was placed in which box does not make each box contain a pawn that is 50% black and 50% white. Each box contains a pawn -- one box black and one white, even if I never get to tell which is which.

I just want to touch on this a bit, to explain my view.

Yes, they'd be different entitites. But they would be the same person.

Sounds confusing, but any insistence that they are different people is based on assumptions not in evidence.

The pawn example is perfect. Yes, one pawn is black and one white in your example. But the situation is slightly different. You find two boxes. You can do all the tests you want, but there's no possible way to test for color. How do you know one is black and one is white? How do you determine which is which?

And back to the people example...how do you determine which person is the "real" you? How do you determine which one has the continual worldline, and which does not? There's no concievable physical test that could tell the difference. Thus, the two entitites are identical. Both are the same person, even if they are seperate entitites.

To address a few more examples:

If you commit murder then get duplicated, both of you are guilty. Both are copies of the person who committed the murder. Likewise in regards to debts...each person is the same person who entered into those agreements, so each shares responsibility. THey'd differ in actions taken since the duplication, but both are just as responsible as each other for actions taken before.

That's a materialistic view.

Each answer here saying "they're different" is partly right, but goes the extra step to assume something intangible and use this as a discriminatory device. Each assumes uniqueness of the individual. Each assumes, without stating it, that a person cannot be copied, or that the copy is a different person from the one it was made from.

Take a hypothetical example. You go in for a cloning process. During the process, the machine malfunctions. THe lab fills with smoke, so no one has a clear view of what happened.

After the process, you wake up in a room with four identical copies. How can you tell one from the other?

And that's it. Each is an individual entity with it's own consciousness, but at the same time each one is you. Underlying all the objections is still a belief that "you" are unique, and unduplicable. An assumption that presumes its conclusion. Scientifically, if no test can determine the difference between two objects, then those objects are identical. If a=b and c=b then a=c. No one would assume that a and c are identical, they are difference variables. However, both are equivalent, representing the same values.

Same idea here.

 

[chriswl]

Just Thinking - one of the issues with this discussion is the concept that consciousness is being "transported".

From a purely materialistic perspective, that's not the case; if consciousness is a combination of processes, quantum states, etc., then a "transported" person's consciousness isn't actually being transported - it's being duplicated. Even destroying the original during the process wouldn't make the copy become the original. It would simply terminate the existence of the original while starting a brand new existence of a second person. The fact that the copy would believe itself to be the original - and even have all the original's memories - simply means that the illusion of being the original is perfect for the copy.

But its no more an illusion than you waking up in the morning and supposing that your consciousness is the "same" consciousness you had yesterday. Continuity of consciousness is a meaningless concept. Continuity comes from memory.

From a non-materialistic perspective, it's simply impossible to do at all. From this viewpoint, consciousness would be independent from the physical state of being. Since our hypothetical "transporter" supposedly only reconstructs the physical and quantum state, the "self" would be lost in the translation. In this case, you'd end up with a comatose body that was never self-aware to begin with.

You wouldn't, because comatose bodies are physically different from conscious ones. A perfect physical copy of a person would act exactly like that person. Although, from a non-materialist perspective, the copy could be a p-zombie.

 

[Just thinking]

I just want to touch on this a bit, to explain my view.

Yes, they'd be different entitites. But they would be the same person.

Sounds confusing, but any insistence that they are different people is based on assumptions not in evidence.

If I can duplicate an atom of Carbon to now having two identical atoms of Carbon, I now have two different atoms of Carbon that are identical in all physical ways. No one would insist that they are the same atom, even though no test could tell them apart. Why would this not hold true for two clones -- no test could tell them apart, yet no one would say they are the same person as each would have its own being of self-awareness and be able to identify itself as separate from the other clone.

The pawn example is perfect. Yes, one pawn is black and one white in your example. But the situation is slightly different. You find two boxes. You can do all the tests you want, but there's no possible way to test for color. How do you know one is black and one is white? How do you determine which is which?

You don't have to -- not knowing does not change that one is black and the other white. Now, one can address the probability of one being black or white and come up with 50/50 for each, but that doesn't change what's actually in the box.

And back to the people example...how do you determine which person is the "real" you? How do you determine which one has the continual worldline, and which does not? There's no concievable physical test that could tell the difference. Thus, the two entitites are identical. Both are the same person, even if they are seperate entitites.

Just because you can't test which has the longer worldline doesn't mean neither one does (or both do) -- only one has it. If you walk into a room and find a light on and have no way to determine how long it's been on, that doesn't mean it only came on upon your entering the room. It may have no different effect as just coming on -- but that's not the same thing. How long it's been on may have affected many other things that you may never be able to test for -- so its history is not dependent on your experience.

To address a few more examples:

If you commit murder then get duplicated, both of you are guilty. Both are copies of the person who committed the murder. Likewise in regards to debts...each person is the same person who entered into those agreements, so each shares responsibility. THey'd differ in actions taken since the duplication, but both are just as responsible as each other for actions taken before.

Here we would part ways, as believing you did something is not sufficient to be guilty of it. Again, each person is different -- even you agree with that -- so each has its own history; one murdered and one only believes he murdered.

Each answer here saying "they're different" is partly right, but goes the extra step to assume something intangible and use this as a discriminatory device. Each assumes uniqueness of the individual. Each assumes, without stating it, that a person cannot be copied, or that the copy is a different person from the one it was made from.

Take a hypothetical example. You go in for a cloning process. During the process, the machine malfunctions. THe lab fills with smoke, so no one has a clear view of what happened.

After the process, you wake up in a room with four identical copies. How can you tell one from the other?

Again, one doesn't have to test who is who to know that each one would consider himself different from the others.

And that's it. Each is an individual entity with it's own consciousness, but at the same time each one is you. Underlying all the objections is still a belief that "you" are unique, and unduplicable. An assumption that presumes its conclusion. Scientifically, if no test can determine the difference between two objects, then those objects are identical. If a=b and c=b then a=c. No one would assume that a and c are identical, they are difference variables. However, both are equivalent, representing the same values.

Same idea here.

I must again repeat that a test is not the definitive answer.

Record a football game on a VCR and play it back to someone who knows nothing of the outcome of the game -- but you obviously do. There is no test that the person watching the game (as you did when it was live) can perform that will indicate how it turned out, yet you know the result. The result is fixed and cannot change -- even though to him it is no different than watching the game live. It's a clone of the live game in every detail -- but unlike the live game, its outcome is fixed. Identical, yet different in some untestable quantity (to him) that makes watching the taped game (to you) not the same as it is for him. So not being able to come up with a test (even in theory) does not qualify as the be all and end all in differentiation.

 

[Just thinking]

Continuity of consciousness is a meaningless concept. Continuity comes from memory.


You wouldn't, because comatose bodies are physically different from conscious ones.

Aren't these two statements somewhat contradictory?

The first one claims consciousness is essentially from memory and the second one indicates it as something physical unto itself. If there is a thing as consciousness it must have some degree of continuity/existence -- even if from just one microsecond to the next. How can something exist and not be even the slightest bit continuous?

 

[Hellbound]

Just thinking:

You've missed my point, it seems.

I agree that they are two seperate entities, or seperate people, but I disagree in that that seperation only occurs from the duplication process onward.

And even as theese two seperate people, both are "you", in any sense that identity has any meaning.

As for the murder bit, I must disagree with you. Say we have the duplicate and original, made shortly after the original committed murder. A trial occurs, one is sent to jail.

The duplicate just got away with murder. Depending on circumstance, murder may be something he's prone to, and now has just had reinforced. Of course, this would then get into what the purpose of our justicve system is, and similar.

Let's take your two carbon atoms. Yes, they are two atoms. But both are carbon, with identical properties. Likewise, two people, but both are versions of the same person.

That a seperate example to see how it will play. Let's say we have a traditional transporter. It breaks you down, essentially destroying you. THen recreates you at another location. Using your logic, after going through this process, you are no longer the person you were before the transport. You are a new person, recreated, identical to the old, but not the old. SO, if I murdered someone, then transported...by your logic, I am not the person that committed the murder, and should not be sent to jail. Likewise, I'm released from any debts I may have had.

Now, let's say the transporter makes two copies of me, through some malfunction or whatever. Which one is me? Which one goes to jail for murder? WHich one is responsible for my debts?

What if the system breaks you apart, and rebuilds you with the same atoms?

What if it rebuilds two copies, each with half your original atoms?

The only consistent way to look at it is as if they are one person up to the duplication event, and seperate people only thereafter.

 

[Just thinking]

... As for the murder bit, I must disagree with you. Say we have the duplicate and original, made shortly after the original committed murder.

Aha! ... we cannot have both the original and a duplicate -- only one or more duplicates; the original got destroyed in the transporter. He is essentially dead -- what you have at best is someone who believes he committed murder but in actuality didn't. Until we get past our differences of whether or not the original survives, we will never agree on such a scenario.

A trial occurs, one is sent to jail.

One of the duplicates went to jail -- see the problem?

The duplicate just got away with murder. Depending on circumstance, murder may be something he's prone to, and now has just had reinforced. Of course, this would then get into what the purpose of our justice system is, and similar.

The murderer never got to trial -- he died in the transporter. You put two duplicates on trial; neither of which committed murder.

Let's take your two carbon atoms. Yes, they are two atoms. But both are carbon, with identical properties. Likewise, two people, but both are versions of the same person.

And both are duplicates of an original that no longer exists.

That a separate example to see how it will play. Let's say we have a traditional transporter. It breaks you down, essentially destroying you. Then recreates you at another location. Using your logic, after going through this process, you are no longer the person you were before the transport. You are a new person, recreated, identical to the old, but not the old. SO, if I murdered someone, then transported...by your logic, I am not the person that committed the murder, and should not be sent to jail. Likewise, I'm released from any debts I may have had.

Sure ... why not? That person who stepped in is now gone.

Now, let's say the transporter makes two copies of me, through some malfunction or whatever. Which one is me? Which one goes to jail for murder? Which one is responsible for my debts?

Neither is you that you now believe to be you. That person is dead (no offense). Neither goes to jail or has your debts. Why should it matter if duplicates of you exist or not -- the duplicates did not do what you did.

What if the system breaks you apart, and rebuilds you with the same atoms?

I've got some breaking news -- we're all built with the same atoms. Oh, wait -- you mean the exact same atoms that were disintegrated? How? They were ... well, disintegrated. At best only copies of those atoms (or ones just like them) can be used. So if atoms just like the ones that made up the murderer can be held liable for his crimes, why can't you be liable for my crimes? Doesn't sound fair, does it? Would a duplicate person feel any different about it?

What if it rebuilds two copies, each with half your original atoms?

No can do ... see last answer.

The only consistent way to look at it is as if they are one person up to the duplication event, and separate people only thereafter.

Yes ... and none of them are the same person that stepped in.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

After the process, you wake up in a room with four identical copies. How can you tell one from the other?

That's not my problem. My problem is, WHICH ONE did I wake up in, or did "I" cease to exist when the experiment occured? The ONLY thing I care about is if I still exist, not "I", but I! The part that's AWARE! That hard to describe actually being aware, unless you're some robot wrapped in flesh who has no idea what that's actually like .

 

[chriswl]

Aren't these two statements somewhat contradictory?

No, I don't think so.

The first one claims consciousness is essentially from memory

No, I said that the only continuity is the continuity of memory, meaning physical memory.

and the second one indicates it as something physical unto itself.

Uh? I was arguing against the claim that non-materialists would expect a perfect physical copy, which lacked consciousness to behave like it was in a coma. To argue this would be to argue that the non-materialist thinks that consciousness, or lack of it, manifests itself as something physical (i.e. being or not being in a coma). I'm arguing that this is incompatible with the non-materialist position.

said that If there is a thing as consciousness it must have some degree of continuity/existence -- even if from just one microsecond to the next. How can something exist and not be even the slightest bit continuous?

Well, what does it mean to say that the consciousness I experience now is the same as the consciousness I experienced an hour ago? What qualities do the two moments of consciousness have in common that leads us to label them as the "same"?

One thing that connects them is the fact that they occur in the same physical person. But people change physically without losing who they are. I would still be me if I lost both my legs in a traffic accident. I suggest that what gives us a feeling of continuity of consciousness is that our memory ties our conscious experiences together. If we had the mythical goldfish three-second memory would we really have continuity of consciousness between now and an hour ago?

 

[jmercer]

I just want to touch on this a bit, to explain my view.

Yes, they'd be different entitites. But they would be the same person.

Sounds confusing, but any insistence that they are different people is based on assumptions not in evidence.

Actually, Huntsman, I believe you have this backward. The claim that there can be two entities that are the same person is not self-evident - nor are there any examples existing in nature that you can point to. Granted, the circumstances being discussed are unique, but that doesn't change any of that.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof... and stating that a single person would exist simultaneously in two entities is quite an extraordinary claim. Having said that, the insistence that they are different people is based on direct and existing evidence that is all around us. Any other conclusion is the one that requires evidence.

I maintain that there will be two different people and two entities; albeit both versions will believe that they are the original, only one will be - that's by law, by custom - and as far as I am concerned - by actuality as well.

So you're going to have to show how a single person can exist in two entities simultaneously; not an easy task, and I don't envy you it.

 

[jmercer]

Aha! ... we cannot have both the original and a duplicate -- only one or more duplicates; the original got destroyed in the transporter. He is essentially dead -- what you have at best is someone who believes he committed murder but in actuality didn't. Until we get past our differences of whether or not the original survives, we will never agree on such a scenario.

I'd like to make a point, if I may. In this scenario, the original isn't "essentially" dead; he is as dead as any other human being in the history of mankind who has died.

A murder (or perhaps suicide, since the original was supposedly willing) has been committed. The duplicates - regardless of their beliefs - were not willing participants in the process; in fact, they didn't even exist at the time.

Bottom line is that each duplicate - one or one thousand - represent new individual lives and separate people - not "The same person in multiple bodies".

(JT, I know you and I agree on this, but your post was phrased in such a way that made it easy for me to use - I'm just being lazy. )

 

[Just thinking]

... Well, what does it mean to say that the consciousness I experience now is the same as the consciousness I experienced an hour ago? What qualities do the two moments of consciousness have in common that leads us to label them as the "same"?

You might solve problems in similar (if not identical) manners, or have the same taste in foods, music, art, people ... etc., behave the same as you did hours ago, have the same inclinations toward crime or the law --- and so on. Now, some (if not all) that I just mentioned do require memories to understand and appreciate them, but clearly more than memory is needed to acquire tastes for certain things, no? If so, what? And no two people will have the same feelings toward everything -- so whatever conscious thought is needed to produce these feelings, to find them continuing (for the most part) throughout one's life to me pretty much indicates a continuousness of consciousness to some degree.

One thing that connects them is the fact that they occur in the same physical person. But people change physically without losing who they are. I would still be me if I lost both my legs in a traffic accident. I suggest that what gives us a feeling of continuity of consciousness is that our memory ties our conscious experiences together. If we had the mythical goldfish three-second memory would we really have continuity of consciousness between now and an hour ago?

Well, we do change, even mentally. As we mature our tastes do change, and perhaps we do become "someone else" over time. But it's very gradual ... and I doubt ever totally complete (except perhaps in some mentally afflicted individuals). Even our laws allow for this, in treating the minor as different from the adult. So, even though I believe you have some valid points, I don't believe it to be so cut and dry.

 

[Just thinking]

(JT, I know you and I agree on this, but your post was phrased in such a way that made it easy for me to use - I'm just being lazy. )

I'll take that as a compliment.

 

[Brainache]

This is a very interesting discussion so I'd like to butt in here with one thought: If I have a disc with a computer program on it, which I copy to another disc, I have two programs.(two copies of the same program if you like).

If I then destroy the original disc(or better for this discussion to say that the act of copying destroys the first disc), what I am left with is a duplicate. Not the original disc. It contains the same software, but the hardware is different. It may be identical hardware, but it is not the same disc.

Am I being naive to think that this analogy would apply to humans? The transported individual would have been destroyed by the act of transporting them. No matter(hur hur) how identical the copy is, the original has ceased to exist. He is no more, bereft of life, he's had his lot, has run down the curtain and joined the choir invisible. He F**King snuffed it!(sorry got carried away).

My point is I agree with the guys saying that a copy does not have the same world line as the original, whether or not the copy believes they do.

 

[chriswl]

You might solve problems in similar (if not identical) manners, or have the same taste in foods, music, art, people ... etc., behave the same as you did hours ago, have the same inclinations toward crime or the law --- and so on. Now, some (if not all) that I just mentioned do require memories to understand and appreciate them, but clearly more than memory is needed to acquire tastes for certain things, no?

Yes, you're right its more than just memory. But all these things you mention are encoded in our brains. They depend on physical things. The copy that steps out of the transporter has a copy of your brain so he has your exact same character, dipositions, preferences, opinions etc. So he has everything that would normally be thought to guarantee continuity of consciousness.

Only if consciousness is something mysterious, unconnected with physical brain states, can we sat that there is no continuity between the original and its identical copy but that there is continuity between me from one moment to the next.

 

[jmercer]

I'll take that as a compliment.

It is.

 

[Hellbound]

Actually, Huntsman, I believe you have this backward. The claim that there can be two entities that are the same person is not self-evident - nor are there any examples existing in nature that you can point to. Granted, the circumstances being discussed are unique, but that doesn't change any of that.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof... and stating that a single person would exist simultaneously in two entities is quite an extraordinary claim. Having said that, the insistence that they are different people is based on direct and existing evidence that is all around us. Any other conclusion is the one that requires evidence.

I maintain that there will be two different people and two entities; albeit both versions will believe that they are the original, only one will be - that's by law, by custom - and as far as I am concerned - by actuality as well.

So you're going to have to show how a single person can exist in two entities simultaneously; not an easy task, and I don't envy you it.

You're confusing my statement.

One consciousness does not exist in both simultaneously....both are identical consciousnesses (at least at the point of duplication...they differ from there). However, neither has any more or less claim to be the original than any other.

It's not an extraordinary claim, I'm just not apparently communicating myself well. I'm not saying you'll have "ome person seeing out of two bodies" or any of the other, similar nonsense that gets passed around.

I'm saying that both copies are you.

ALL the arguments put forth against this presuppose something that is "you" beyond the physical..a soul or consciousness that is seperate from the physical body and brain.

Let's take a system that dissasembles a person (to the atomic level) and reassembles them. Is this a "new" person? Or the same one?

Leave aside the matter of duplicates, and just assume transportation. Is the person at the other end of the "transporter" the same person? Should he be held responsible for anything that happened before transportation?

What about a situation where the original is destroyed, and everything produced is duplicates? Which is the original? Is life insurance paid?

Does this mean that every few years part of me is a new person, as new atoms are incorporated into my being and old ones removed? If my left arm is removed, does this mean I'm no longer responsible for anything my left arm did?

It is a unique situation, which is why I say we need to look at ALL the extremes of it to find a reasonable answer. I'm arguing from a materialistic viewpoint. There is no soul. Consciousnes is , essentially, an illusion produced by brain process. "You" is simply a shorthand for the construct that maintains a certain recognizeable identity (something that is intact in duplicates of transported beings).

 

[Hellbound]

Aha! ... we cannot have both the original and a duplicate -- only one or more duplicates; the original got destroyed in the transporter. He is essentially dead -- what you have at best is someone who believes he committed murder but in actuality didn't. Until we get past our differences of whether or not the original survives, we will never agree on such a scenario.

Assuming a scenrio that doesn't destroy the original, just copies it. I'm looking at multiple differing scenarios.

One of the duplicates went to jail -- see the problem?

Again, my scenario implicitly assumes one is the original and one the duplicate.

The murderer never got to trial -- he died in the transporter. You put two duplicates on trial; neither of which committed murder.

I intended to use a slightly altered scenario, with both the original and duplicate surviving.

And both are duplicates of an original that no longer exists.

You're answering a different question than what I asked.

Sure ... why not? That person who stepped in is now gone.

So, then, what is the purpose of jail in the first place? ANy argument you could make for jaoil and a legal system would apply as well to the duplicate as to the original (deterrence, rehabilitation, seperation) or would be illogical. I'm not seeing the reasoning here.

Neither is you that you now believe to be you. That person is dead (no offense). Neither goes to jail or has your debts. Why should it matter if duplicates of you exist or not -- the duplicates did not do what you did.

Well, since you answered no to the first one, we can ignore this one. It was a continuation

I've got some breaking news -- we're all built with the same atoms. Oh, wait -- you mean the exact same atoms that were disintegrated? How? They were ... well, disintegrated. At best only copies of those atoms (or ones just like them) can be used. So if atoms just like the ones that made up the murderer can be held liable for his crimes, why can't you be liable for my crimes? Doesn't sound fair, does it? Would a duplicate person feel any different about it?

I'm modifying the scenario to bring out different aspects of my thinking. You're twisting my arguments into strawmen. I meant, rather obviously, a dissassembly into component atoms and reassembly.

If it's the exact same atoms and molecules, why wouldn't it be the same? Your argument rests on the worldline as a determinant, in this case the worldline had direct continuance from the original, for all parts and pieces. Also, this same logic yo're displaying implies that each day my debts and liability for my actions shoud decrease, as atoms in my body are being continually replaced by others. They aren't the same atoms, differing worldlines, difffering person? Are are you arbitrarily drawing a distinciton between the worldline of the whole person and the worldline of components?

No can do ... see last answer.

Yes, I see you avoided the scenrio modifications I was addressing to test the limits of the theory.

Yes ... and none of them are the same person that stepped in.

But why not is the question?

Seriously, I'm not trying to trick you, I came to my answer precisely by stertching the boundaries of the hypothetical to look at different areas. What is the determining factor on identity? WHat happens if the scenario is modified so that that factor is kept, but other things are changed? I'm testing the theories to see if they hold up.

 

[Hellbound]

Bottom line is that each duplicate - one or one thousand - represent new individual lives and separate people - not "The same person in multiple bodies".

And I agree completely, for any and all events after duplication.

Before the duplication, each was the same person. They only diverge after duplication.

That is my point.

New and seperate, yes, yet sharing a common history. The worldlines of the orginal and the duplicate do intersect at some point (they must), so one can even trace the worldines together and easily as one traces, say, fingerprints to a murder weapon.

Heck, let's take an example of a duplicator that does not destroy the original. A person is copied, and botht he original and the copy go on to live their lives. A few weeks later, a body is found. The person was killed the day before the duplication. All evidence points to the person who was duplicated.

Who goes to jail? You can't distinguish between the original and the duplicate. Both give detailed accounts of the events of the murder. Both confess to the crime. Physical evidence implicates both. Both show guilt and/or remorse. Yet, according to theories I hear here, only one needs to go to jail.

By this argument, I would argue that no one, duplication or not, shoudl ever be imprisioned. Whatever reason you choose for the justice system (punishment, rehabilitation, seperation of dangerous individuals) the argument applies equally to both the duplicate and the original.

 

[Hellbound]

Let’s see if I can break things down. Doing the question & answer for a topic this complex seems to be leading all of us into blind alleys and miscommunications. Hopefully I can explain myself a bit better.

I’m trying to get to the root question of identity, because that’s really what these types of questions are about. What makes “you”, “you”. What is consciousness?

The way I see it, we can immediately separate into two categories:

1. Non-physical. “You” are the product of some soul, spirit, anima, or consciousness that is not based in the physical world. I think we all reject this viewpoint.
2. Physical: “You”, your consciousness, or the part of you that makes you “you”, is physical. It is based in the physical structure, or properties of the brain and/or body. I think we’re all in this camp (I include memory and experience and similar things here, as these cause physical changes in order to “store” the information, etc.).

The problem is in differing opinions of category 2. Let me posit these subcategories:

1. Physical structure and/or form.
a. This view (my own) holds that identity, the “you”, is an emergent process based on the physical structure. If the physical structure is identical, and identical “you” is produced. This does not mean one consciousness sharing multiple bodies, or that they are not separate physical/mental beings. But that both are equally “you”.
2. Continuity
a. This seems to be where jmercer and Just Thinking are (please correct me if I misstate). In this view, it’s the continual nature of the structure or consciousness that matters. As long as it’s continuous, with no gaps, it’s the same. The physical structure is important, but only to the extent that it connects to the one before it without abrupt changes.

And my problem with 2 is that it arbitrarily draws a line. How much change makes it no longer “you”? If 1% of your brain is replaced by computer chips each week, how long until you are no longer you? What if that 1% is replaced by stem cells? What if it’s replaced by transplants from another brain?

What if it’s not a transporter, but an atom scrambler that separates your specific atoms and re-assembles them? What if it does this to your brain only? Your body only? What if it cuts you in half and creates a duplicate of your right side to replace the parts it cut off? Uses each half, left intact, to create a duplicate that is ½ the original you and ½ copy?

Under 2, these questions lead to contradictions, or entanglements, or the need for an arbitrary cut-off point. Using my definition (1), it’s a simple answer.

Hope that’s a bit clearer .