Transporter Philosophy

[Dilb]

I am basing all my reasoning on nothing but observed physical behaviour and processes of life.

No you're not. The materialist position has been worked out quite well. Even Interesting Ian agreed with the logic of it, if not the axioms. Let me state things clearly:

1) Everything which can have any actual effect on the universe is a material thing
2) People exist in the universe, and we can recognize them as such based on their behaviour's. People are nothing but physical processes.
3) Every physical law ever devised does not depend on the absolute time of the universe. Any testable truth today will be the same tomorrow, if all variables are accounted for
4) The collection of physical processes known as a person are therefore independent of time.

You are arguing that there is something that depends on the absolute time of the universe. In your particular case, it depends on the state of thing before now, but in general, that's just a condition on the absolute time of the universe. I can tell you with no doubt whatsoever that that is not and has never been a factor. over the entire period of human existence.

If you are going to start painting me as something other than what I have repeatedly argued against (not just by saying so) you are going to present yourself as a troll.

I'm terribly sorry if it sounds like an insult, but it's just a statement of fact. Your feelings, and the arguments you are developing to support them, are not consistent with materialism.

Now, your assertion is that my points are not substantiated by any physical theory, right? If so, then by what process or theories do you point to to indicate that fully developed life can come into existence without going through all the pre-individual-life stages? Or that a fully developed mature consciousness can come about in the same way?

The teleporter sidesteps all that by copying the stuff that already occurred. I can use Maxwell's equations despite the fact that I didn't develop them, just as a duplicate of a person can use the consciousness of the person without independently developing their own.

Well, since all life as we know it goes through a series of physical processes in reproduction (continuation) I don't think of that as a trivial argument. At what point does the offspring in a mammal become the offspring with its own self awareness?

That's irrelevant, because people are not duplicates of their parents. I agree, for a person to generate their own novel personality; by means of the biological processes which have historically been used, the person actually has to grow up. But we aren't using biological processes to develop a mind, we've got the transporter and a blueprint from someone who's already gone through the tedious parts.

At the moment of conception? I doubt it -- especially without a developed brain. All I'm saying is that the physical processes that occur in the development of any living organism may be necessary in order for it to become self aware (if not even alive) -- and having all these processes start at the same time (as in materialization) may not yield the desired results. There is nothing non-materialistic about that.

But the process of developing a brain wouldn't start at the teleporter: they'd be put in the position to 'jump straight into action'.

It's like a pendulum. If you want it to achieve a certain speed at the bottom, you could pull it up to the appropriate height, give it the right potential energy, and let it go. If you always do that, it will always take a certain amount of time for the pendulum to reach the point where it's achieved that speed. But that doesn't mean you can't just kick it when it's already at the bottom to get it going. And afterwards, the kicked pendulum is indistinguishable from the pendulum that was dropped. That is what I mean when I say the history of a material thing is irrelevant.

 

[Just thinking]

I know where several of you are going with my arguments -- in that in a purely physical universe an identical copy of a person would already have all the developed areas of his brain (and hence thought) in place as to not introduce problems with coming into consciousness at the moment of integration (re-assembly). And that this should be rather straight forward and clear-cut. But also, in our physical universe we know of no life ever coming into existence in such a manner; although that certainly does not prohibit it. We also know, that if we destroy the continuation of life from parent to offspring, we pretty much have stopped life from continuing along that same lineage. (Taking any organism to individual atoms will destroy any known form of life.) Placing all the parts back together again as if nothing ever happened and expecting the organism to be as was does tend to run against what we know so far in how life behaves -- and because of this I am not totally convinced that such a procedure (if possible) would work.

I simply have my doubts.

 

[Just thinking]

The teleporter sidesteps all that by copying the stuff that already occurred. I can use Maxwell's equations despite the fact that I didn't develop them, just as a duplicate of a person can use the consciousness of the person without independently developing their own.

How? That consciousness stopped the moment the person was disintegrated. To expect it to once again start up in another body (duplicate) is a form of dualism. The "self" has now gone from one body to another -- something non-physical into something physical.

 

[Dilb]

How? That consciousness stopped the moment the person was disintegrated. To expect it to once again start up in another body (duplicate) is a form of dualism. The "self" has now gone from one body to another -- something non-physical into something physical.

I honestly don't understand how you can see it that way. My concept of 'self' is a purely physical thing: the arrangement of atoms in the brain. It can be abstracted, turned into information to be assembled later, but it will always have a physical meaning.

Again, it's no different from a pendulum. I might describe the swinging of a pendulum as something that happens through time, dynamically, that isn't really a material part of the system. But I can hold a pendulum, and when I let it go, it resumes swinging. I can hold a pendulum, destroy it, make an exact copy, and that exact copy has the same swinging. Consciousness, as materialist see it, is nothing but a very complex swinging. There's no reason to think an exact copy would swing in a different way, so there's no reason to think an exact copy of a person would have a different consciousness.

 

[Dilb]

Placing all the parts back together again as if nothing ever happened and expecting the organism to be as was does tend to run against what we know so far in how life behaves -- and because of this I am not totally convinced that such a procedure (if possible) would work.

But it doesn't run against what scientists know about life. No one has ever made a credible attempt to do so. No one has ever come close to recording all the information in a being, and making an exact copy. The main reason being that it would be utterly impossible from an engineering perspective. Stuffing organs back into a corpse and thinking you've recreated a human is like dumping all the components of an engine into a car and expecting it to run. Most of life is really in the fine details.

 

[Hellbound]

I know where several of you are going with my arguments -- in that in a purely physical universe an identical copy of a person would already have all the developed areas of his brain (and hence thought) in place as to not introduce problems with coming into consciousness at the moment of integration (re-assembly). And that this should be rather straight forward and clear-cut. But also, in our physical universe we know of no life ever coming into existence in such a manner; although that certainly does not prohibit it. We also know, that if we destroy the continuation of life from parent to offspring, we pretty much have stopped life from continuing along that same lineage. (Taking any organism to individual atoms will destroy any known form of life.) Placing all the parts back together again as if nothing ever happened and expecting the organism to be as was does tend to run against what we know so far in how life behaves -- and because of this I am not totally convinced that such a procedure (if possible) would work.

I simply have my doubts.

Well, if you're arguing from a standpoint of the limits of technology, I'd agree. However, the transporter scenario inplicitly assumes that every particle is recreated in the exact loaction, with all quantum attributes exactly the same, the exact same velocities, etc, etc, etc.

Under that assumption, thinking there would be a difference assumes an underlying dualism.

 

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Let us say that Star Trek style transporter tech is invented and people start beaming around here and there. The impression of this technology is that people or items are converted to energy which is sent to the destination and reformed into matter. What was discovered after the technology was in use for a while was that the original was destroyed and a copy was made at the destination. This was discovered when glitches in the system cause multiple copies of people to be created and each of these copies is identical and believes themselves to be the original person.

My question is, would this matter to you?

Would you be okay with transporting yourself or your loved one if you knew it wouldn't be the same person, just something exactly like the same person?

What might the large scale reactions of religious and non-religious people be?

You've asked four questions ( the second question is really two) here.

1. It matters to me. Say I haven't stepped into the machine yet, but I'm thinking about it. It may not matter to the person who steps out of the machine, but he, trivially (" the original was destroyed"), is someone else.

2. (a) See 1, above.
(b) See 1, above. I love Lady Muck, not her clone. The fact ( and I am happy to accept that it is a fact) that I can be fooled into mistaking a clone for her is neither here nor there. If Lady Muck has stepped into that machine, she is dead. And the fact that someone who could be mistaken for me ( if I have perished in the machine) can be fooled into mistaking her clone for her is equally irrelevant.

3. I really don't know. All I can suggest is this: in a world in which this technology was widely used, people would be dying in their millions every day. Many would, however, have learned to treat death as no great thing. Bonkers, IMO, but there you are.

As to the distinction between the religious and the irreligious, I have to say that I think it is irrelevant. What matters here is the answer to the question: Is this the same person?

 

[Vox Humana]

I know where several of you are going with my arguments -- in that in a purely physical universe an identical copy of a person would already have all the developed areas of his brain (and hence thought) in place as to not introduce problems with coming into consciousness at the moment of integration (re-assembly). And that this should be rather straight forward and clear-cut. But also, in our physical universe we know of no life ever coming into existence in such a manner; although that certainly does not prohibit it. We also know, that if we destroy the continuation of life from parent to offspring, we pretty much have stopped life from continuing along that same lineage. (Taking any organism to individual atoms will destroy any known form of life.) Placing all the parts back together again as if nothing ever happened and expecting the organism to be as was does tend to run against what we know so far in how life behaves -- and because of this I am not totally convinced that such a procedure (if possible) would work.

I simply have my doubts.

JT, if you sent a computer running a program through the teleporter, what would the state of the cloned computer be as soon as it appeared on the other side? Would the program on the cloned computer be running as if there had been no discontinuity?

 

[Just thinking]

JT, if you sent a computer running a program through the teleporter, what would the state of the cloned computer be as soon as it appeared on the other side? Would the program on the cloned computer be running as if there had been no discontinuity?

Well, if you're arguing from a standpoint of the limits of technology, I'd agree. However, the transporter scenario inplicitly assumes that every particle is recreated in the exact loaction, with all quantum attributes exactly the same, the exact same velocities, etc, etc, etc.

Under that assumption, thinking there would be a difference assumes an underlying dualism.

But it doesn't run against what scientists know about life. No one has ever made a credible attempt to do so. No one has ever come close to recording all the information in a being, and making an exact copy. The main reason being that it would be utterly impossible from an engineering perspective. Stuffing organs back into a corpse and thinking you've recreated a human is like dumping all the components of an engine into a car and expecting it to run. Most of life is really in the fine details.

OK, let's examine a totally physical (non-living) transportation. We will place inside the transporter a small bomb -- a hand grenade, for example. Somehow, with all this technology, we are able to begin the transportation right after the explosion begins; if we were able to see it in this state it would appear as if the explosion was frozen in time, but at a point after all the chemical reactions for exploding were completed, all that's left are fragments frozen in space from flying apart. When re-integrated do we get the grenade in a state of continued explosion, or will the pieces (fragments) simply re-materialize and fall to the ground? To accept a continued explosion would require transporting more than the physical material -- you would have to transport each particle's momentum as well. But guess what ... momentum is a purely relative quantity. How would the transporter deal with that? Could it ever deal with such a quantity? If it would have problems with such a transport, why could it not also have problems with all the complex processes of the brain involved with consciousness. Just as the explosion is a process of very complex reactions (having to occur in specific timed sequences) the same could be said for consciousness, or perhaps even life itself. Also, notice that we are still able to physically reproduce each and every atom (molecule) exactly as it was (and where it was relative to all the others) prior to the transport -- but serious issues still remain. Starting up the explosion may be analogous to starting up life (and consciousness.)

As for the computer program -- I must say that no one can at this time be certain. Also, I did bring this issue up in an earlier post regarding a turntable.

 

[Hellbound]

Just Thinking:

Sorry, but momentum is a physical quality, as well as being relative. ne does not preclude the other. I would assume the momentum would be relative to the machine. Given the assumptions of the problem as is, you'd get the explosion continuing.

However, I agree that it's not possible in reality. Simply because first, no scan can be instantaneous, so changes would happen from the start of the scan to the finish. Second, uncertainty principles would garauntee that even an instantaneous scan could not exactly reproduce everything.

I understand what you're saying, I'm just not seeing how, if you ignore the uncertanty and instant scan problems, the machine could not maintain momentum and such. We're assuming that the copy has everything the original had, including momentums and such. You have to assume everything gets translated; otherwise, it's a meaningnless thought experiment for the exploration of identity.

 

[Dilb]

But guess what ... momentum is a purely relative quantity.

Well here's your problem then. Momentum isn't a relative quantity. Momentum is exactly and instantaneously defined just as much as position is. You can change reference frames and get different momentums, but you can change reference frames and get different positions too. That doesn't actually represent a change, it simply represents a change in the way that momentum is labelled. I can say "that person is moving at 60 mph, relative to the ground" or "that person is moving at 0 mph, relative to the car they're driving" and they mean the exact same thing.

 

[Just thinking]

Just Thinking:

Sorry, but momentum is a physical quality, as well as being relative. One does not preclude the other. I would assume the momentum would be relative to the machine. Given the assumptions of the problem as is, you'd get the explosion continuing.

A) Nowhere did I say (nor imply) that momentum is not a physical quantity -- it is a relative quantity. The root of the problem is how does the transporter differentiate between atoms having different amounts of momentum. To be able to say that it can do so because of the assumptions of the problem, is identical to saying that the machine can allow a consciousness to arise in the duplicate because it can do so.

B) The scenario I presented is to emphasize that perhaps not all physical quantities are transportable through teleportation.

However, I agree that it's not possible in reality. Simply because first, no scan can be instantaneous, so changes would happen from the start of the scan to the finish. Second, uncertainty principles would guarantee that even an instantaneous scan could not exactly reproduce everything.

Thank you.

I understand what you're saying, I'm just not seeing how, if you ignore the uncertainty and instant scan problems, the machine could not maintain momentum and such. We're assuming that the copy has everything the original had, including momentums and such. You have to assume everything gets translated; otherwise, it's a meaningless thought experiment for the exploration of identity.

Not exactly -- and it could very well be because I'm not explaining myself clearly enough ... trust me, it wouldn't be the first time.

The problem is (getting back to the explosion) we have a physical event that if transported as I described, may not end up as it would have had it not transported. We broke up the continuity of the explosion into two separate space-time world lines; normally there would have been only one. And we can see that it may very well be possible to end up with two very different outcomes, explosion-wise. Unlike transporting a cardboard box from one space to another where the duplicate box is easily indistinguishable from the original, the lack of a continued explosion would be quite different.

Now, if we assume that everything comes out exactly as the original we are sort of ignoring the OP's premise -- the philosophy of teleportation -- and turning it into the philosophy of "the self". I am simply offering arguments in support of why whatever comes out of the transporter wouldn't be the continued living consciousness that walked in ... a continuation of thought lead me to start thinking if anything alive might even emerge. And I am thinking it through by using purely physical reasoning. But given that living beings do emerge, can we be certain that if one walked in they would feel as if life continued for them with them walking out? As I said before, I have my doubts.

 

[Just thinking]

Well here's your problem then. Momentum isn't a relative quantity. Momentum is exactly and instantaneously defined just as much as position is.

How can momentum not be relative if velocity certainly is? Plus, isn't position also relative?

You can change reference frames and get different momentums, but you can change reference frames and get different positions too. That doesn't actually represent a change, it simply represents a change in the way that momentum is labelled. I can say "that person is moving at 60 mph, relative to the ground" or "that person is moving at 0 mph, relative to the car they're driving" and they mean the exact same thing.

Yes, but the momentum of the car to the person in the car as opposed to a person standing alongside the road is quite different. The car has two relative quantities of momentum at the same time at the same location. When a transporter disintegrates matter, the momentum of that matter may become lost information; thus when reintegrated there may be no physical way to reproduce everything exactly as it was.

 

[Rasmus]

When a transporter disintegrates matter, the momentum of that matter may become lost information; thus when reintegrated there may be no physical way to reproduce everything exactly as it was.

Well, then we have a transporter that would most likely not be save for transporting humans. Never mind conciousness, but if I stopped working entirely for even a second, chances are I would simply drop dead.

My heart wouldn't be beating, and it is possible that it never would start again after the transport. (Someone correct me if i am wrong - the heart keeps itself beating by generating an electric impulse with every beat that will then trigger the next beat. So I could easily be transported during a beat, in the window where the last impulse has done its duty, and the next impulse hasn't been generated yet.)

I have no idea how much cells depend on motion, or, indeed, if molecules or atoms wouldn't simply collapse without it ...

So, basically, I agree that your objections simply do not have anything to do with the scenario as given. The transporter you are looking at simply doesn't work - discussing it would be very interesting in a debate about what a transporter would have to be able to do. (After all, even the example with the bomb or grenade seems anything but trivial to me.)

 

[Dilb]

How can momentum not be relative if velocity certainly is? Plus, isn't position also relative?

No. Position and velocity are exact values. In our description of them we can choose different system, and assign them different values, but the actual meaning of that description does not change. The fact that relativity says we can use any frame of reference we like does not mean that the values are meaningless.

Yes, but the momentum of the car to the person in the car as opposed to a person standing alongside the road is quite different. The car has two relative quantities of momentum at the same time at the same location. When a transporter disintegrates matter, the momentum of that matter may become lost information; thus when reintegrated there may be no physical way to reproduce everything exactly as it was.

No it doesn't. The car has the same momentum in either case, once the people correct for their different frames. It's position and it's momentum have a definite meaning, that anyone, moving at any velocity, from anywhere else, can determine and agree with.

Suppose the transporter teleports a moving car forward 10m. If the car continues moving forward at 100 km/h, both people agree it has the same momentum as before. If the car is teleported so that it's stopped, both will agree it's momentum has changed.

Now for a person you obviously don't want to keep the the overall momentum the same, as if you teleport them far enough they'll be moving very quickly relative to the floor of their destination. But you can define the momentum of a person's atoms relative to the person's average momentum just as well, and different observers will agree if those values change.

If you lose the information about the momentum of each piece, you might as well lose information about where the arms attach. It's equally bad to have an arm moving up at 20 m/s relative to your torso as it would be to have an arm that's floating 5 cm to the left of where it should be. In either case the teleportation process obviously hasn't worked correctly.

 

[jmercer]

You're confusing my statement.

One consciousness does not exist in both simultaneously....both are identical consciousnesses (at least at the point of duplication...they differ from there). However, neither has any more or less claim to be the original than any other.

It's not an extraordinary claim, I'm just not apparently communicating myself well. I'm not saying you'll have "ome person seeing out of two bodies" or any of the other, similar nonsense that gets passed around.

I'm saying that both copies are you.

ALL the arguments put forth against this presuppose something that is "you" beyond the physical..a soul or consciousness that is seperate from the physical body and brain.

Unfortunately, your argument doesn't address my main point. The original is the one whose existence has been continuous from point of birth; the duplicate (or replicant) is the one created at the moment of "transport".

It's that simple. It has nothing to do with anything beyond the physical; in point of fact, I've taken a purely materialistic approach to this, and I'm even generously assuming that the replicant is created with a consciousness - as opposed to a body where the "lights are on, but nobody's home." (The latter - a body without consciousness - would be a perfectly valid challenge to your position as well, btw. I'm not using it because I don't really have to. )

The idea that both the replicant and the original would be the same person - including the consciousness - is an extraordinary claim, because it presupposes something that has yet to be defined. In order to make such a statement, you would have to fully define exactly what consciousness and "self" consist of. Since we don't know that, your statement is extraordinary.

 

[toddjh]

Unfortunately, your argument doesn't address my main point. The original is the one whose existence has been continuous from point of birth; the duplicate (or replicant) is the one created at the moment of "transport".

Why is that relevant? You can distinguish which copy has the original atoms and which is made of new atoms, but does that matter? Atoms have no hair. No physical process will proceed differently based on which atoms it's made of, as long as the configuration is the same.

I've taken a purely materialistic approach to this

If you believe that two completely identical physical systems are different in some measurable way, then that is absolutely not a materialistic approach.

 

[Just thinking]

... Suppose the transporter teleports a moving car forward 10m. If the car continues moving forward at 100 km/h, both people agree it has the same momentum as before. If the car is teleported so that it's stopped, both will agree it's momentum has changed.

Yes ... but it is still a relative quantity to the teleportation system. Why? Because the instant the car is disintegrated there is no car and hence no momentum ... both physical quantities must be reintegrated. But how does one recreate momentum into mass? Give it extra energy? Sounds good, but energy is not a vector quantity -- momentum is. Now, given that the re-integration device is at a different location (or even the same one for that matter) it will have a slightly different momentum than the first disintegration device had. Why? Because unless they're in space in the same inertial frame of reference, it is not in the same location as it was at the moment of disintegration, especially if they are on a planet revolving around a star. Their angular momentum may be constant, but their linear momentum is not, yet you wish to re-establish the car's linear momentum. So in that brief time, the momentum of the car relative to the teleportation device has changed and must now somehow be adjusted to a new relative frame of reference -- new momentum and all.

 

[Rasmus]

Yes ... but it is still a relative quantity to the teleportation system. Why? Because the instant the car is disintegrated there is no car and hence no momentum ... both physical quantities must be reintegrated. But how does one recreate momentum into mass?

One doesn't. We don't really have working teleporters, you know. This is just a thought experiment. You haven'+t established yet why it is okay to assume that one could build an almost working teleporter but then shouldn't be able to get it right where momentum is concerned.

I still think that if you don't get the momentum right, you don't have a teleporter. After all, you seem to assume that recreating momentum would only fail on some sort of undefined macro-level.

Give it extra energy? Sounds good, but energy is not a vector quantity -- momentum is. Now, given that the re-integration device is at a different location (or even the same one for that matter) it will have a slightly different momentum than the first disintegration device had.

Momentum compared to what?

Why? Because unless they're in space in the same inertial frame of reference, it is not in the same location as it was at the moment of disintegration, especially if they are on a planet revolving around a star.

So?

Their angular momentum may be constant, but their linear momentum is not, yet you wish to re-establish the car's linear momentum. So in that brief time, the momentum of the car relative to the teleportation device has changed and must now somehow be adjusted to a new relative frame of reference -- new momentum and all.

I don't see the problem there, either. You have a device for the disintegration. Momentum is measured and preserved relative to that device.

Then you have a device for reconstruction. This may or may not be the same device, and it may or not may move like the first device. All you do then, is create the teleported object relative to the second device.

 

[Just thinking]

I don't see the problem there, either. You have a device for the disintegration. Momentum is measured and preserved relative to that device.

Then you have a device for reconstruction. This may or may not be the same device, and it may or not may move like the first device. All you do then, is create the teleported object relative to the second device.

Well, first of all that would violate conservation of momentum; second, the disintegration for any quantum of mass of the original would take place instantaneously -- the gathered information of that would be a snapshot of its mass-energy state (not so easy to do according to some quantum theory by a Mr. H.). But let's say it somehow can be done. This is not a vector quantity -- to then somehow assign a vector quantity to it in the re-integrator would mean you have somehow acquired this information. And not only do you now have to re-assign it, you must do so relative to the re-integrator's frame of reference as adjusted to the dis integrator's frame at the moment of disintegration.

But even if you could somehow do all the above, please remember that my initial assertion is that only copies of the original can walk out of the re-integrator. I do not think that whoever walks in will continue to think of himself as continuing to exist as the person walking out. (That sentient entity will have ceased to exist.) This is not the same as believing the person (copy) walking out would think of himself as the person walking in, with no loss of continued existence in his mind.

I also do not believe that if one could somehow preserve the individual atoms of a person after completely dispersing them and then perfectly reassembling them, it would again be the same sentient being. I think it would be the same scenario as a teleported copy described above.

I also believe that just because something cannot be measured in any physical way, does not preclude it from existing -- world-lines or histories, for example. The paths that two atoms take to a given potential energy state do not make any difference to those energies; and, as it's been said many times, atoms don't have hair -- so there is no way to know which atom went through which path. But that does not mean they went through the same path, or that no difference from that point forward means that the paths didn't happen -- they did. That's lost information. Now, one may argue that this lost information is irrelevant, as from this point on both atoms are identical -- yes, but they are still not the same atoms with identical world-lines. If one argues that consciousness should continue from the original to the copy, that is in effect a duality of mind/body, and I don't buy that. Why? Because if it can go from the original to the first copy, why not then to each successive copy? You can also imagine one disintegrator and a dozen re-integrators with each getting the same information on what to re-assemble (at the exact same moment). To which device does the sentient being that stepped into the disintegrator believe they will walk out of? All 12 all at once? I doubt it. Each would be a sentient copy at his moment of disintegration, but I don't think that he (as he believed himself to be) would feel as if he continued to exist once the disintegration took place.