Transporter Philosophy

[Just thinking]

I'd still like to see your answer to my question of why you would regard a copy as different from the original when there is no conceivable way to distinguish between them.

Because you create a contradiction -- if the original is destroyed you claim it is the same person. If the original is not destroyed you claim they are two different people.

 

[toddjh]

Because you create a contradiction -- if the original is destroyed you claim it is the same person. If the original is not destroyed you claim they are two different people.

No, I said they are two copies of the same person for a fraction of a second. Their physical state will begin to diverge wildly almost immediately. They can't be considered the same person after that.

 

[jmercer]

If I duplicated the Mona Lisa using a transporter, which version would be treated as the original, the "real" Mona Lisa or the exact duplicate?

The first one.

Why? Because if you were able to view it in four dimensions (time being the fourth dimension), you'd see a worm-like trail leading back through the centuries beginning at the point of the paintings creation. The original would have been touched by Leonardo Da Vinci, not to mention it would have literally gone through all of the history it was involved in. The copy, however, would start a new trail at the moment of transport/duplication, and would not have had any such encounters.

The same goes for humans. Duration is a part of what makes us who we are - literally. Each moment of our existence is a trail leading up to "now". Duplicating us simply creates a second, separate trail, totally disconnected from the first one. If the first one ends, then that person has ended in spite of the duplicate having it's own trail starting from it's creation.

You only get one existence. Duplication merely adds a new existence to the world; it doesn't replace an existing one.

 

[Just thinking]

No, I said they are two copies of the same person for a fraction of a second. Their physical state will begin to diverge wildly almost immediately. They can't be considered the same person after that.

For whatever time period you allow, you have two of the same person which I believe cannot exist -- soul or no soul.

 

[Just thinking]

Well, "kill" implies a permanent destruction. Does a surgeon "kill" a patient when he stops the patient's heart during a transplant? Maybe in a strict biological sense, temporarily, but in the sense we normally mean, then no. Ditto in this situation. The information to recreate the person still exists. His physical situation (or lack thereof) may not allow for him to be aware at that particular moment, but same with a person under general anesthesia. Temporary interruptions of consciousness do not necessarily imply permanent death.

This is vastly different than totally destroying a person and then making a copy. The physical makeup of the person (that which enables consciousness and all else) never stopped existing.

Then you believe in a soul.

No -- I don't.

If you don't, then you must admit that it is the physical configuration of the person's brain which defines who he is. Impose that same configuration on a separate but equivalent substrate and you've recreated the person -- atoms have no hair, remember.

And if that physical makeup is destroyed, why can't that person experience death like anyone else?

 

[Just thinking]

If I duplicated the Mona Lisa using a transporter, which version would be treated as the original, the "real" Mona Lisa or the exact duplicate?

The first one.

Why? Because if you were able to view it in four dimensions (time being the fourth dimension), you'd see a worm-like trail leading back through the centuries beginning at the point of the paintings creation.

Good point -- their world-lines are different. Why haven't I seen that all along?

 

[toddjh]

For whatever time period you allow, you have two of the same person which I believe cannot exist -- soul or no soul.

Why do you believe two instances of the same person cannot exist?

This is vastly different than totally destroying a person and then making a copy. The physical makeup of the person (that which enables consciousness and all else) never stopped existing.

And if the physical makeup of the person is recreated exactly, right down to the atomic level, what's the difference? Atoms have no hair...

And if that physical makeup is destroyed, why can't that person experience death like anyone else?

What does it mean to "experience death?" Who is doing the "experiencing?" You're invoking a soul again -- consciousness independent of a functioning brain.

Now, a person might be able to experience the process of dying; that is, the set of events leading up to what he or she thinks will be death. But no one can experience death itself, since by definition if a person is dead there is no one there to do the experiencing. You might as well say that a person "experiences nonexistence" before he or she is born.

 

[Just thinking]

Why do you believe two instances of the same person cannot exist?

See above regarding world-lines.

And if the physical makeup of the person is recreated exactly, right down to the atomic level, what's the difference? Atoms have no hair...

But they do have world-lines. Those would not be identical.

What does it mean to "experience death?" Who is doing the "experiencing?" You're invoking a soul again -- consciousness independent of a functioning brain.

I simply meant "to die".

Now, a person might be able to experience the process of dying; that is, the set of events leading up to what he or she thinks will be death. But no one can experience death itself, since by definition if a person is dead there is no one there to do the experiencing. You might as well say that a person "experiences nonexistence" before he or she is born.

You read too much into what I meant -- I hope I clarified it.

 

[toddjh]

See above regarding world-lines.

Irrelevant. You can't tell an object's world-line by examining it. We come back to atoms not having hair...

In case you don't know what that means, it's talking about the fact that there's no way to distinguish one set of atoms from another, identical set. They are interchangeable.

I simply meant "to die".

In that case, I would argue that death did not occur at all since the information which created that person was preserved.

I suppose you could argue that the person would be "dead," in the sense of not existing at that point in time, but it's no different than if you froze someone and then revived him later. Both involve temporarily suspending consciousness and then restoring it by means of a physical process later.

 

[jmercer]

Irrelevant. You can't tell an object's world-line by examining it. We come back to atoms not having hair...

In case you don't know what that means, it's talking about the fact that there's no way to distinguish one set of atoms from another, identical set. They are interchangeable.



In that case, I would argue that death did not occur at all since the information which created that person was preserved.

I suppose you could argue that the person would be "dead," in the sense of not existing at that point in time, but it's no different than if you froze someone and then revived him later. Both involve temporarily suspending consciousness and then restoring it by means of a physical process later.

There is a difference, and histories matter. If the original had committed premeditated murder, would both the original and the copy be tried? No. In fact, under the law, neither could be tried unless there were some way to clearly identify the original vs. the copy because the law would view them as different people... one who committed murder, and one who didn't.

If that's not enough, what about previous marital and financial arrangements? Who's married to the spouse? Who owns the house? The car? Who promised to pay back the loans?

The original.

To suggest there is no difference - that they are one and the same - is simply incorrect.

 

[Just thinking]

Irrelevant. You can't tell an object's world-line by examining it. We come back to atoms not having hair...

That doesn't mean it doesn't (or didn't) exist. This makes them different in some way.

In case you don't know what that means, it's talking about the fact that there's no way to distinguish one set of atoms from another, identical set. They are interchangeable.

In the present text, yes -- but not in the particle's history and the effects it had on other particles.

In that case, I would argue that death did not occur at all since the information which created that person was preserved.

One world-line will cease to exist and another will begin -- to me, those are different entities.

I suppose you could argue that the person would be "dead," in the sense of not existing at that point in time, but it's no different than if you froze someone and then revived him later. Both involve temporarily suspending consciousness and then restoring it by means of a physical process later.

Now it is you claiming that something can be carried over to another physical body

 

[toddjh]

That doesn't mean it doesn't (or didn't) exist. This makes them different in some way.

Not in any detectable or relevant way. If you put the original and the copy side by side, there would be absolutely no test you could perform which would determine which is which. So on what grounds do you claim they should be treated differently?

In the present text, yes -- but not in the particle's history and the effects it had on other particles.

A particle's history would be "hair." Atoms have no hair. You can't tell a particle's history by examining it. You can determine its electric charge, its mass, its momentum, and a few other physical properties, but that's it.

One world-line will cease to exist and another will begin -- to me, those are different entities.

Then you're back to the soul. You're invoking an ineffable, undetectable property -- a "world-line" -- to say that one physical object is different from another identical physical object. No test can confirm the existence or nature of this "world-line," yet you're ascribing value to it.

Now it is you claiming that something can be carried over to another physical body

I don't follow. Can you rephrase?

 

[Just thinking]

Not in any detectable or relevant way. If you put the original and the copy side by side, there would be absolutely no test you could perform which would determine which is which. So on what grounds do you claim they should be treated differently?

They have different histories -- each is a 4-dimensional entity that differs in its 4-dimensional past. Your tests, no doubt, would only be 3 dimensional, since as you claim, atoms have no hair. Also, other atoms that interacted with the original at some point in the past were affected by the original, not the copy -- even though they are identical; only one atom did the interacting, not both. Knowing this, we can be certain that these histories are different. Now, even if the two get mixed up and I can no longer tell which was which, that doesn't make them the same -- there are still two atoms where there was once only one. (Two copper atoms are identical in all physical respects -- but they are two different atoms; they occupy different coordinates in space-time.) Placing black and white pawns in identical boxes and then making it impossible to tell which was placed in which box does not make each box contain a pawn that is 50% black and 50% white. Each box contains a pawn -- one box black and one white, even if I never get to tell which is which.

A particle's history would be "hair." Atoms have no hair. You can't tell a particle's history by examining it. You can determine its electric charge, its mass, its momentum, and a few other physical properties, but that's it.

That doesn't mean it didn't have one.

Then you're back to the soul. You're invoking an ineffable, undetectable property -- a "world-line" -- to say that one physical object is different from another identical physical object. No test can confirm the existence or nature of this "world-line," yet you're ascribing value to it.

So a world-line for a particle doesn't exist? The history of something doesn't exist if you can make an identical copy? I doubt you are saying that. And BTW, a history does not equal a soul.

I don't follow. Can you rephrase?

Because if you can equate the continued existence of someone who comes out of anesthesia to one that is created out of re-integration, then what continues in the doctor's office must also continue from disintegration to re-integration.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

This comes back to the main question I keep asking though. See my post above for the whole thing. Instead of looking from the outside, look from the inside.

Who's eyes do you see out of if you make a clone? The person cloned or the clone? Who's eyes exactly? It can't be "both" because the two brains are not interconnected. Any awareness aware of both at the same time can't exist unless information is being transferred between them.

Make a bunch of clones, randomly assign yourself to see out the eyes of one of them (that IS what we are talking about, the actual state of that actually happening to you), now kill yourself. Do you "hop" to the next one in line?

 

[Badger]

I could use a couple of clones about now.

If suddenly there were several "me's", I know we could work it out amongst ourselves. I'm pretty easy going. (I wonder if I would get to be Hondo.....I've always been partial to that name. We'd probably have to flip for it....and the landcruiser.)

And I think that "we'd" be like twins from the moment of the split on. Shared past, but different futures.

 

[Just thinking]

This comes back to the main question I keep asking though. See my post above for the whole thing. Instead of looking from the outside, look from the inside.

Who's eyes do you see out of if you make a clone? The person cloned or the clone? Who's eyes exactly? It can't be "both" because the two brains are not interconnected. Any awareness aware of both at the same time can't exist unless information is being transferred between them.

Make a bunch of clones, randomly assign yourself to see out the eyes of one of them (that IS what we are talking about, the actual state of that actually happening to you), now kill yourself. Do you "hop" to the next one in line?

This is essentially the problem I have with the whole concept of being able to transport consciousness (self-awareness) as opposed to matter.

A similar problem arises with the following scenario ... imagine one places a turntable into a transporter with the platter set in motion, and it remains spinning while the transportation process occurs. When it materializes is the platter still spinning as it was before it transported? If so, then you have not only transported matter, but angular momentum as well -- is this possible?

The problem is not looking at the copy that came out of the transporter and checking to see if it is identical to the person that walked in -- the problem is finding out if the person that walked in felt as if no time had passed during the transport and that they felt a continuous line of consciousness. This may prove an impossible test to anyone other than the person that walked in. (Note: Even if they claim it to be so, that is exactly what the copy would say -- so you would have to try it yourself to find out.)

Also, I do not believe that repeated copies would have the same person "looking out of their eyes" that walked in -- they would be individuals as clones are today, identical twins. Each brain would have its own consciousness to itself -- the big question again being if the person that walked in felt as if they just continued existing.

Personally, I doubt it. Because if all the other copies do not have his continued existence in them, why should the first one?

 

[Starthinker]

Wasn't this like a 20-page thread a couple of months ago?

 

[jmercer]

Just Thinking - one of the issues with this discussion is the concept that consciousness is being "transported".

From a purely materialistic perspective, that's not the case; if consciousness is a combination of processes, quantum states, etc., then a "transported" person's consciousness isn't actually being transported - it's being duplicated. Even destroying the original during the process wouldn't make the copy become the original. It would simply terminate the existence of the original while starting a brand new existence of a second person. The fact that the copy would believe itself to be the original - and even have all the original's memories - simply means that the illusion of being the original is perfect for the copy.

If you set up a camera that recorded the transfer (assume that the sending and receiving stations are merely a few meters apart), the entire cycle of destruction/creation could be recorded... and the copy could be shown the video as proof they weren't the original, no matter how they feel about it. And if the original wasn't destroyed... well, there you have it. Replication is not continuance of the original.

From a non-materialistic perspective, it's simply impossible to do at all. From this viewpoint, consciousness would be independent from the physical state of being. Since our hypothetical "transporter" supposedly only reconstructs the physical and quantum state, the "self" would be lost in the translation. In this case, you'd end up with a comatose body that was never self-aware to begin with.

 

[Ladewig]

Wasn't this like a 20-page thread a couple of months ago?

Yes, but in transporting that thread into the present it was destroyed and this thread was created in its place.


http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=55355

 

[jmercer]

Wasn't this like a 20-page thread a couple of months ago?

Yeah, but I think it was more than a couple of months ago... unless I missed one. It's one of those subjects that crops up periodically in Science or Religion from time-to-time.