PWQs

[Win]

UCE:

It seems to me you are complicating something that is actually very simple. It's simple because the relationship between PWQs and the laws of physics is very simple. We experience PWQs. We create a mathematical model called TLOP which describes their behaviour. Simple. Why complicate it?

Strictly, I'd have to say: because it is more complicated. There are qualia. Some of those qualia, taken together, have a content that can be decribed with TLOP.

It's not that TLOP describes the behaviour of qualia; it's that TLOP describes the content of some qualia.

 

[Guest]

Re: Re: Re: Re: A puzzled kat writes...

Win :

Strictly, I'd have to say: because it is more complicated. There are qualia. Some of those qualia, taken together, have a content that can be decribed with TLOP.

It's not that TLOP describes the behaviour of qualia; it's that TLOP describes the content of some qualia.

If I said "TLOP describes the behaviour of the content of some qualia (PWQs)" would this really be any different to saying "TLOP describes the content of some qualia"?

Sometimes subtle differences are more relevant than you initially think they are, and I'm willing to believe this is true here, but I'm yet to be convinced.

Does "describes the content" and "describes the behaviour of the content" differ relevantly?

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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On what grounds do you assert that they are "distinct"? Certainly you can divide up the qualia into these two groups, but that doesn't mean that they are really distinct in any meaningful way.
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UCE
I assert they are distinct on the grounds that one of them (the PWQs) are a representation of a percieved external reality and the other are not. How can you claim this distinction is 'not meaningful'? Nobody would claim fear and elation as being qualia that represent part of the external reality (oops...I forgot....materialists in the house....liable to claim all sorts of patent absurdities..... )
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Stimpy replying to UCE
First of all, your entire argument seems to be based on a rejection of the notion that our perceptions are perceptions of an external reality, in which case this distinction becomes meaningless.

How did you manage to discern this meaning? Substantiate with relevant quotations.

Stimpy replying to UCE
Secondly, it is certainly the case that things like fear and elation have an effect on, and are effected by, this external physical world of ours, so the idea that they are, in fact, a part of it, hardly seems to me to be a patent absurdity.

Oh? Well that's curious. So with my hope that my next electricity bill will not be to high, the hope itself might actually consitute part of the furniture of the world?? LMAO!

 

[Win]

UCE:

Does "describes the content" and "describes the behaviour of the content" differ relevantly?

Yes, in that I don't think that qualia can be said to have "behaviours."

The content of some qualia, taken together, can be interpreted as an external world, which has certain features. Among those features are entities with behaviours.

Unless you accept that the qualia just are one of those features, or arise from those features, I think your position breaks down.

 

[Guest]

Win

Yes, in that I don't think that qualia can be said to have "behaviours."

Why not?

The content of some qualia, taken together, can be interpreted as an external world, which has certain features. Among those features are entities with behaviours.

Hmmmm......

Unless you accept that the qualia just are one of those features, or arise from those features, I think your position breaks down.

This seems like turning something on its head for no good reason.

I don't understand why qualia can't be said to have behaviour?

I really don't understand why I have to accept qualia are part of an abstract external world.

I still thinking you are adding a completely unneccesary level of complexity, for no apparent reason.

 

[Keneke]

DAMMIT! I had a nice sized post in response, posted it, came back this morning, and it's nowhere to be found!

Mods, please check up on this. Disappearing posts anger me.

 

[Win]

UCE:

I still thinking you are adding a completely unneccesary level of complexity, for no apparent reason.

OK. Perhaps we should turn it around. What is the extra level of complexity I'm adding?

 

[Keneke]

In essence, the big long post that never was (grrrrr) said that UCE's theory of PWQs can co-exist with a materialistic outlook, because our subjective experiences or reality (qualia) have nothing to do with the assumption that the universe exists and behaves in a materialistic fashion. Shall we go from there?

 

[Guest]

UCE:

OK. Perhaps we should turn it around. What is the extra level of complexity I'm adding?

You claiming that the behaviour I perceive to be occuring in qualia cannot be said to be behaviours of the qualia. This is the bit I don't understand. WHY can't qualia be said to have behaviour?

I am aware that because I have rejected solipsism and accepted the meaningfulness of science that there must be a shared objective noumenon, but I do not understand why qualia must be thought of as properties of the noumenon. The behaviour of the qualia infers behaviour inherent in the noumenon itself, but why does this mean that qualia cannot be said to have behaviour and why does it mean that qualia have to be considered as properties of the noumenon. I am missing a piece of your line of reasoning.

 

[Interesting Ian]

UCE
There is a difference between objectivism and materialism. All you are claiming here is that the model of our experiences is common to all of us - that the same model seems to work for your experiences as works for my experiences - that is what makes it objective.
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Stimpy

no, that is not all I am claiming. I am also claiming that the reality which I am experiencing is the reality which you are experiencing.

My PWQ's cannot literally be the same as your PWQ's. Therefore you must hold the position that our PWQ's refer to something other than our PWQ's. In which case, despite your denials, you are involved in ontological speculation.

 

[Win]

UCE:

You claiming that the behaviour I perceive to be occuring in qualia cannot be said to be behaviours of the qualia. This is the bit I don't understand. WHY can't qualia be said to have behaviour?

Ultimately, what you are saying is that part of the content of qualia can be interpreted as entities which exhibit regular behaviour. This says nothing about qualia. It only says something about the content of qualia, interpreted in such a way as to give entities, which can have behaviours.

Qualia exist, and have content. That's all, until you start to build up an explantion for the content. Once you have an explanation of the content, you can start talking about "behaviour."

But building up an explanation, and what that explanation should be, is what we've all been arguing about for so long.

Your position depends on the assumptions and conclusions that get made in the "building up an explanation" stage. So, it can't be used to answer the ultimate question, because it is posterior to it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The axiom of science you have rejected is the axiom which states that physical reality is causally closed.

And who gets to decide that it is an axiom? Why does it need to be an axiom?

If this axiom is true, then consciousness must be physical.

Not at all. It just means that our non-physical consciousness is not causally efficaceous.

The idea that our minds are not physical, but yet that they interact with the physical, is a blatant rejection of the axioms of science.

Well that one axiom yes. but why is that axiom necessary?

 

[Guest]

In essence, the big long post that never was (grrrrr) said that UCE's theory of PWQs can co-exist with a materialistic outlook, because our subjective experiences or reality (qualia) have nothing to do with the assumption that the universe exists and behaves in a materialistic fashion. Shall we go from there?

This is basically correct. As far as the physical world is concerned, materialism still operates exactly the same. The only difference occurs when we look at questions like "Why does the Universe exist at all"/"What is the metaphysical support for the Universe", questions surrounding the relationship between the mental and physical realms and certain issues regarding the nature of time. All of those questions are arguably philosophical questions in the first place anyway. As far as materialistic science is concerned the only difference is that the specific question about why a 1st-person perspective exists at all has been removed, because under my metaphysics it is no longer a question that needs answering. But again - I don't see this as any great loss to science since as far as I am concerned science is condemned to be unable to answer that question anyway. All my metaphysics really does is open the door to new theoretical possibilities regarding what sort of phenomena are actually possible. I've said this before - materialism renders several whole classes of phenomena theoretically impossible - but if you look closely enough this actually includes subjective consciousness. If you modify your metaphysics so you can acount both for an 'external' world that behaves as if it was made of matter and 1st-person consciousness then those classes of phenomena are no longer impossible. More importantly for me, it opens up the possibility of making some sort of sense of some the biggest questions I have spent my whole life asking myself, questions for which science has not been able to provide much in the way of answers, mainly because of its perceived dependence on materialism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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What the current scientific theories state is that consciousness is a physical process in the brain,
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That is materialism, not science....come on Stimp....
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It is a scientific theory,

If you think this you clearly don't understand what science means. Quite bad considering you claim to be a scientist. FYI it is a metaphysical theory, and an impressively stupid one at that.

and one for which there is considerable supporting evidence.

There is no evidence whatsoever. How many times do you need to be told this???

 

[Win]

Stimp:

What the current scientific theories state is that consciousness is a physical process in the brain,

I noticed this, via Ian, and I'd be interested to know exactly what the content of the theory is.

 

[Interesting Ian]

[
And to Interesting Ian,

Why would there ever be a cat's grin without a cat? [/B]

There wouldn't.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Secondly, it is certainly the case that things like fear and elation have an effect on, and are effected by, this external physical world of ours, so the idea that they are, in fact, a part of it, hardly seems to me to be a patent absurdity.
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Oh? Well that's curious. So with my hope that my next electricity bill will not be to high, the hope itself might actually consitute part of the furniture of the world?? LMAO!

Does your hope affect your actions? Does it affect your brain chemistry? Clearly it does. The very fact that you are able to physically say "I hope..." proves this.

no, that is not all I am claiming. I am also claiming that the reality which I am experiencing is the reality which you are experiencing.
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My PWQ's cannot literally be the same as your PWQ's. Therefore you must hold the position that our PWQ's refer to something other than our PWQ's. In which case, despite your denials, you are involved in ontological speculation.

It is not ontological speculation, because I am not attributing any characteristics to this external reality that cannot be empirically verified. It is an epistemological position, not an ontological assumption.

The axiom of science you have rejected is the axiom which states that physical reality is causally closed.
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And who gets to decide that it is an axiom?

Whoever it is that is responsible for deciding what the word "science" means. I am telling you what I think the word "science" means, so I guess I do. Of course, the fact that these are the same definitions and axioms that the entire scientific community uses, should count for something.

Why does it need to be an axiom?

Because without it the scientific method is not logically valid. If you allow for influences which don't obey physical laws to influence things which do, you can no longer claim that those things do.

Look at it this way. If the physical World is the set of all things which obey physical laws, then it must be causally closed. If it is not causally closed, then that implies that there are physical things which can be affected by things which do not obey physical laws. This in turn implies that these physical things do not function according to physical laws, nor does anything physical which they interact with. The entire framework falls apart!

As a practical example, consider the mind. Clearly the mind has an effect on the brain. If the mind does not obey physical laws, then the brain cannot either. The brain affects the rest of the body. Our bodies have the potential to affect pretty much anything else. The entire scientific method falls apart.

Science simply isn't a coherent framework without the axiom that the Physical World is causally closed.

If this axiom is true, then consciousness must be physical.
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Not at all. It just means that our non-physical consciousness is not causally efficaceous.

Which is a trivially false statement.

What the current scientific theories state is that consciousness is a physical process in the brain,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That is materialism, not science....come on Stimp....
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It is a scientific theory,
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If you think this you clearly don't understand what science means. Quite bad considering you claim to be a scientist. FYI it is a metaphysical theory, and an impressively stupid one at that.

What is metaphysical about it? It is a falsifiable hypothesis, and the most parsimonious falsifiable hypothesis that is consistent with the available data.

and one for which there is considerable supporting evidence.
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There is no evidence whatsoever. How many times do you need to be told this???

You can tell me this as many times as you like. Until you actually provide some sort of reasonable argument to back up this claim, you are just blowing hot air. Your "that isn't consciousness, that is just the neural correlate" argument holds no water, because at the very least, it begs the question.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Win]

Stimp:

Which is a trivially false statement.

No it isn't. It isn't even false.

 

[Guest]

UCE:



Ultimately, what you are saying is that part of the content of qualia can be interpreted as entities which exhibit regular behaviour. This says nothing about qualia. It only says something about the content of qualia, interpreted in such a way as to give entities, which can have behaviours.

Qualia exist, and have content. That's all, until you start to build up an explantion for the content. Once you have an explanation of the content, you can start talking about "behaviour."

But building up an explanation, and what that explanation should be, is what we've all been arguing about for so long.

Your position depends on the assumptions and conclusions that get made in the "building up an explanation" stage. So, it can't be used to answer the ultimate question, because it is posterior to it.

I still don't really understand.

Which assumptions?

 

[Win]

UCE:

Which assumptions?

Well, assumptions, or conclusions, like certain of the contents of qualia are "objects," these "objects," properly defined, persist over time, and, again over time, these "objects" do the same sorts of things when in the presence of other "objects," giving rise to the concept of "behaviour."