PWQs

[BillyTK]

Re: Re: A puzzled kat writes...

Hi Ian

One set represents the external world and the other set represents qualia which are generated internally. A case of a former would be a family of our PWQ's which we label a particular table. Now if we both viewed this table from the same distance away and from the same perspective we would experience very similar PWQ's. On the other hand my experiencing a particular emotion of some kind is something you would ned to infer from my bodily behaviour. So basically PWQ's constitute an objective external world, where as other mental events generated wholly internally are irreducibly subjective. For example no-one else can literally experience my pain.

I'm going to seem like a troll for the way I keep banging on about meaning--sorry! On the one hand I can accept the existence of the physical world as illustrated by physics'n'stuff. On the other, I carnt experience it directly because my experience is mediated by language. Without language my world is literally meaningless, a chaotic jumble of sensation with no understanding of what those sensations are. So this is where I kinda fall over with the separation of sensory impression and emotional state qualia and to some extent even with the separation between internal mental states and the external physical world. My PWQs are wholly internally generated because they depend on the meanings I've learnt to attribute to them. So for instance, I carnt experience your pain, but you know you have pain because you understand the concept of pain; you can communicate that concept to me and I can empathise with your position because I understand that concept... but if you didn't have the concept of pain, then what would you be experiencing?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

On what grounds do you assert that they are "distinct"? Certainly you can divide up the qualia into these two groups, but that doesn't mean that they are really distinct in any meaningful way.
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I assert they are distinct on the grounds that one of them (the PWQs) are a representation of a percieved external reality and the other are not. How can you claim this distinction is 'not meaningful'? Nobody would claim fear and elation as being qualia that represent part of the external reality (oops...I forgot....materialists in the house....liable to claim all sorts of patent absurdities..... )

First of all, your entire argument seems to be based on a rejection of the notion that our perceptions are perceptions of an external reality, in which case this distinction becomes meaningless. Secondly, it is certainly the case that things like fear and elation have an effect on, and are effected by, this external physical world of ours, so the idea that they are, in fact, a part of it, hardly seems to me to be a patent absurdity.

You might be able to draw a theoretical, indirect connection between internal emotional states and the physical world, but you would have to be pretty desperate to claim there is a direct connection as there is in the qualia associated with directly representing the external world. Are you that desperate?

Why would that be desperation? I think the evidence with regards to how chemicals affect emotional states, and how emotional states affect brain chemistry, is pretty compelling.

Sure. Science provides a model for our experiences. But that model implicitely includes the assumption that our experiences are interactions with an objective reality.
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Slow down.....let us examine this closely. First you say "Science is a model for our experiences - our 'physical world qualia'." Then you say But that model implicitely includes the assumption that our experiences are interactions with an objective reality.

Yes.

There is a difference between objectivism and materialism. All you are claiming here is that the model of our experiences is common to all of us - that the same model seems to work for your experiences as works for my experiences - that is what makes it objective.

no, that is not all I am claiming. I am also claiming that the reality which I am experiencing is the reality which you are experiencing.

The only conclusion/assumption required here is that solipsism is false and the laws of physics describe everybodies PWQs with equal accuracy. Yes?

For one thing, the scenario you have just presented is not even coherent. In order for me to say that science describes other peoples experiences as well as mine, I must assume that there are, in fact, other people. That is the rejection of Solipsism. Science also requires the assumption that we are all experiencing the same objective reality, as I mentioned above.

There is a word for this 'objective reality' - and the word is 'noumenon'. Can we use this word?

I don't care what you call it, as long as you don't attach a bunch of meaningless metaphysical baggage to it.

What problems are you referring to? If you are referring to the problem of how these "PWQ's" work, then they most certainly don't melt away. No matter what philosophical approach you choose to use, the question of how consciousness actually works remains.
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No, I am not referring to the question of how the "PWQ's" work. That is the job of physicists and/or neuroscientists. I am referring to the question of the relationship between TLOP, PWQs and the noumenon i.e. the Hard Problem and all of its manifestations rather than 'the Easy Problems'.

Under the scientific axioms, these relationships are fundamentally no different than any other physical relationships. If you a-priori assume that this is false, of course you are going to have a problem. But unless you can demonstrate that your assumption is correct, that is your problem, not science's.

And the fact remains that under Idealism, you cannot explain how consciousness produces the physical reality that we experience.

This has nothing to do with ontology. The assumption that reality is objective is a necessary assumption of the scientific method. It is also an assumption of Idealism. It is, in fact, nothing more than a rejection of Solipsism.
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A lot of people get solipsism confused with idealism. Can we just both agree that solipsism has been rejected? The only solipsist round here is Franko.

I thought we could, but then you objected to the scientific assumption that there is an external reality that we experience. If you are accepting this assumption, then your entire argument against attempting to scientifically understand consciousness falls apart.

If you read this post carefully you will see that I have not rejected the concept of a shared objective noumenon. Therefore the scientific method is not under threat. The question I am raising is whether the noumenon itself exists independently of the realm of mind (Not YOUR mind or MY mind, but Mind). Ths is a very important distinction, and if you want me to clarify it I will.

That question is meaningless, unless you can define what it means to say that reality exists in the realm of "MIND". I know what "my mind" and "your mind" mean. I have no idea what "MIND" means. In any event, I do not assume that reality exists independently of this "MIND", or anything else. I simply don't assume that it is dependent on any such thing. I assume nothing about it that cannot be inferred from reliable scientific evidence.

I re-iterate my position : TLOP are a model of the behaviour of PWQs. This is not an assumption of idealism - it is a basic statement of the truth. You have experiences of a physical world. Physics provides a model of the behaviour of those experiences (you already agreed to this). If we reject solipsism we have to accept the existence of a shared noumenon that behaves according to objectively verifiable mathematical laws. NO OTHER ASSUMPTIONS are neccesary. Specifically NO ASSUMPTIONS about the primacy of mind or matter are neccesary at this point in our reasoning. If you disagree please explain PRECISELY why.

I agree completely. What you have just described is scientific materialism. What I do not understand is (a) Why you insist that materialists are assuming anything more about the nature of reality than what you have just described, (b) Why you think that any of this implies that it is not possible for the mind itself to be understood scientifically, (c) Why you think that any of this implies that the mind itself cannot be a physical process, and (d) Why you choose to make the additional assumption that physical reality is created by some "mind" of some sort.

Why assume a self-existing mental world either?
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I haven't. I am merely observing that the mental world does exist, and that TLOP is a model of the behaviour of those aspects of the mental world which appear to be representations of a physical world. I have not assumed a self-existing mental world and I have not assumed a self-existing physical world. All I have done is observe the relationship between the mental world, TLOP and the noumenon.

The why do you claim that the mental world cannot be a subset of the physical world? The hypothesis that consciousness is a physical process in the brain, and that our experiences are interactions between our brains (which are part of the physical world) and the rest of the physical world, is perfectly consistent with the scenario you have just described.

You are correct in claiming that ontological materialism makes no sense. What you don't seem to understand is that ontology makes no sense. Idealism is just as meaningless as ontological materialism, and for exactly the same reasons.
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Why?

Because ontological existence cannot be coherently defined.

The reason materialism makes no sense is because it is an attempt to put the thing being modelled into the model.

I don't know what kind of materialism you are referring to, but this certainly isn't the case for scientific materialism.

Idealism is simply the abscense of an attempt to put the thing being modelled into the model. So idealism does not fall foul of the same problem at all.

Idealism makes the assumption that physical reality is produced by minds. That is an unnecessary and unjustified assumption. It is also one which I have never seen anybody manage to define coherently.

There is still a very hard problem. What is the nature of consciousness? Why is it there to begin with? What are the logical rules that describe it? You are essentially sweeping all these questions under the rug.
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No - I am quite happy to discuss these things, but only when we are in agreement at how I got there. In other words I can examine these problems and provide answers, but the answers will only make sense to a person who has already accepted my line of reasoning up to this point. Otherwise they keep on thinking about it like an ontological materialist and find it very difficult to understand and accept the rest of the reasoning.

Scientific materialism provides a method for determining how consciousness arises from the physical. Sure, this method depends on the assumption that it does arise from the physical to be true, in order to work, but that is trivially obvious.

Idealism, however, provides no method for determining how the physical World arises from the mind. It does not even attempt to provide a method. On the contrary, it defines itself in such a way that no reliable method for doing this could, even in principle, exist.

Saying that consciousness doesn't arise from matter, but instead that matter arises from consciousness, doesn't eliminate any questions that need to be answered, nor does it answer them.
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It totally changes the them. It replaces one set of questions with another set.

And in doing so, it replaces a set of questions which are, at least in principle, answerable, into a set of questions which are not, even in principle, answerable. It turns a difficult problem into an impossible one.

You constantly criticize materialists for not being able to explain to you how consciousness arises from matter, but can you explain how matter arises from consciousness?
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I can. Whether or not I should is another question.

I would love to hear a description of the method by which you would attempt to find the answer.

Can you describe, in terms of logical rules, how the mind produces the physical world?
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For a start get rid of 'the mind' because you are thinking about 'your mind'. You are picturing lots of seperate minds somehow 'creating' a shared objective reality, which is of course illogical. I said 'Mind' not 'the mind'.

Well, I am afraid that until you explain what you mean by "Mind" I cannot make any sense of your claims.

Again, this can be done, but to do so would involve making claims that many people here would find very difficult to accept, and if previous experience is anything to go by they will continue to think like materialists and I will just end up repeating the first part of my reasoning over and over again. If you can cope with discussing this having accepted the first part of my line of reasoning then I will go on. This is VITAL. I had to accept the problems with materialism FULLY before I was able to accept the mechanism by which Mind creates matter.

I am perfectly happy to consider your line of reasoning from within whatever logical framework you choose to present it, but first you must provide that logical framework. Attempting to point out flaws with materialism accomplishes nothing in this regard. Start with the axioms and definitions of your framework, and go from there.

What the current scientific theories state is that consciousness is a physical process in the brain,
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That is materialism, not science....come on Stimp....

It is a scientific theory, and one for which there is considerable supporting evidence. Materialism only assumes that consciousness is physical. It makes no a-priori assumptions beyond that. It leaves it up to the scientific method to determine what its specific characteristics and mechanisms are.

If the process of perception is a physical process, then it can, and indeed must, be explainable within that model.
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And this is a unneccesary and meaningless piece of materialist dogma tacked onto the end of a correct statement. It amounts to "If materialism is true then materialism is true." What is the point in even saying this? You are saying "If materialism is true then we can put the thing being modelled into the model". Since this is ABSURD, then materialism must be false. It is no good saying "I don't care if it is absurd, if materialism is true then we must be able to do this".

you have not explained why it is absurd, you have merely asserted that it is. My point is that it is only absurd if you make assumptions that materialism does not make.

Notice the emphasis. If your position is correct, then at least one of the axioms of science are wrong.
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Yikes!

First, if I am not correct then you need to explain why I am wrong.

I have not claimed that you are not correct. It is entirely possible that the axioms of science are wrong. I am simply saying that you have not established that you are correct. I have no reason to believe that you are.

Secondly, you need to explain which axiom of science I have rejected. If it is that the noumenon is objective then you are wrong, because I have accepted that the noumenon is objective.

The axiom of science you have rejected is the axiom which states that physical reality is causally closed. If this axiom is true, then consciousness must be physical. The idea that our minds are not physical, but yet that they interact with the physical, is a blatant rejection of the axioms of science.

We are modelling our experiences. We experience wind. We would not try to put the wind we experience into a mathematical model of wind behaviour, because that would be silly.

We are modelling our experiences. We experience PWQs. We would not try to put the PWQs into a mathematical model of PWQ behaviour, because that would be silly.

I still don't see how this has anything to do with what materialists are doing. We are attempting to model physical reality. Physical reality is what we experience. Clearly the fact that we experience physical reality, and how we experience it, are going to have to be explained by that model.

What we are attempting to do is model the physical World.
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Really?

Earlier in your post you agreed that "Science provides a model for our experiences."

So which is it?

A) Does science provide a model for our experiences?
B) Or does science provide a model for the physical world?

Here is the source of your confusion. The true situation is (A). You want to claim (B), but have no basis for making the claim. As a result you end up claiming both interchangeably and do not even realise you are doing it.

No, I claimed that science attempts to model the physical World that we experience. In doing so, it provides a model for our experiences. I made that very clear when I stipulated that science provides a model for our experiences, but that in doing so it makes the implicit assumption that what we are experiencing is an external objective reality.

The distinction becomes moot within the framework of the scientific method, because the scientific method assumes that the physical world is what we experience, and in doing so, assumes that the process of experiencing is, in fact, a physical process, and thus part of what we are attempting to model.

You can reject the assumption of objectivity if you want to, but when you do so, you are rejecting the scientific method too.
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The scientific method is a tool for investigating the behaviour of PWQs. It is a tool for investigating the behaviour of an objective shared noumenon. It DOES NOT require that the noumenon is the prime reality and that PWQs are an epiphenomen. That is materialism, not science.

That is ontological materialism, which I agree is an incoherent position. Science also does not require that physical reality be an aspect of mind. It does require that the process of experiencing physical reality be a physical process, though.

Your claim that science cannot be used to model consciousness can not be derived from the axioms of science. on the contrary, that claim is inconsistent with the axioms of science. All these arguments about Materialism and Idealism are irrelevant, because the only philosophical framework that has ever been demonstrated to be a reliable tool for understanding reality, is the scientific method. I call that philosophical framework "scientific materialism". You can call it physicalism, or scientism, or whatever you want to call it. It doesn't make any difference.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Win]

UCE:

Nevertheless, simple rejection of solipsism, and acceptance of an "objective noumenon," doesn't answer my first question: How can you know that the "physical world qualia" associated with Fluffy are the same for me as for Fluffy's owner?

 

[Guest]

Nonsense. I can walk up to a large dog and pat it on the head. Someone else sees the same dog and is instantly afraid. Why? Because that person had bad experiences with dogs in the past. Those sensory experiences got wired up as fear. When they are repeated, they are again experienced as fear.

Yes, initially all information comes to us through our senses. Some of it then gets stored and processed. Then we cogitate on our stored information and create new information "dogs are scary". Then when we see a dog we access that stored information, and feel fear. The fear is triggered by the PWQ of the dog, but it would not exist without the internally stored information about past bad experiences with dogs. The PWQ itself does not depend on any internally stored information. Even if you have never seen a dog before, you still get the same PWQ of the dog.

And I still don't understand why the distinction is interesting.

It is interesting because I am trying to establish what it is that the laws of physics are a model of. I am claiming that in actual fact they are a model of the behaviour of PWQs - i.e. of the experienced physical world.

 

[Guest]

Win

UCE:

Nevertheless, simple rejection of solipsism, and acceptance of an "objective noumenon," doesn't answer my first question: How can you know that the "physical world qualia" associated with Fluffy are the same for me as for Fluffy's owner?

I can't.

But the fact that we can do objective science and different people get the same verifiable results provides evidence for a shared objective reality. Whether or not I see the same red as you doesn't really matter.

I'm not really sure what you're aiming at here....

...and I'm off to the aquarium shop to buy some Fluffy Barbs.

 

[Keneke]

I've read this whole thread, and after much thought, have finally understood the position. Maybe. Interesting theory, UCE, you're separating realityand PWQs from TLOP, I guess that's pretty cool. Let me go through and ask a few questions of you, UCE.

Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'.

Do the materialists claim it is because of matter? Or is it because of reality, existence, and/or spacetime? Isn't matter just one part of reality?

This is claiming a very different relationship between PWQs and TLOP. In effect it amounts to a claim that PWQs belong in the model, as a small subset of the model.

Maybe someone stated that along the way, but I know the difference between how reality behaves and our estimation of how it behaves.

Eliminative materialism claims that TLOP isn't a model of PWQs at all - it claims that TLOP are a model of the behaviour of a directly-unknowable self-existing (mind-independent) physical world, and that PWQs arise from this unknowable self-existing physical world and it is therefore possible to place PWQs within the model!

Er, ok. The way I see it: Reality is a mental patient. PWQs are his symptoms and behavior. TLOP is his diagnosis. Therefore, PWQs are included in models only in the sense that they are the inputs, the raw data. So yeah, I guess what you say makes sense. The problem is this: your "eliminative materialists" see the behavior (qualia) as part of the reality, not a separate entity of itself. Are we dealing with too many variables? I'd say no, that the qualia is only perception, and therefore possibly deviant from reality.

Yet, every time a materialist claims that "there is no reason to believe that subjective experiences are not fully explicable as physical brain activity" they are making precisely this claim - that PWQs are just another part of the abstract model we call 'the material world'. I stand by my assertion that it is prima facie absurd. "Hard Problem" is an understatement.

Materialists claim experiences are physical brain activity, then. Hm, ok. But, qualia and experience is separated. If a tree falls and no one hears it, the tree still falls, according to materialists. The fact that you have separated reality from PWQ doesn't change that fact. They are both outside the observer, they are both what is perceived. What does PWQs, since you assume objective reality, have to do with a person's mind?

 

[c0rbin]

UCE,

I pat Dr Stupid's back to cut down on redundancy and unnecessary repetition. Also because what he said made perfect sense, whereas the metaphysical pontification issuing from your post does not.

I am not trying to be rude, but it seems to me you are trying to add complexity to a potentially cut-and-dry explanation of the universe.

I understand that the universe is largely untouched by our perception, but there is no need to jump any guns by assuming demons live in the darkness.

And replies like this:

I can. Whether or not I should is another question.

To questions like this:

You constantly criticize materialists for not being able to explain to you how consciousness arises from matter, but can you explain how matter arises from consciousness?

Only deepens my skepticism of your assertions

And to Interesting Ian,

Why would there ever be a cat's grin without a cat?

 

[Guest]

Stimp

First of all, your entire argument seems to be based on a rejection of the notion that our perceptions are perceptions of an external reality, in which case this distinction becomes meaningless.

Not really. One set of qualia refer to a shared objective noumenon, the other refer to our internal state.

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You might be able to draw a theoretical, indirect connection between internal emotional states and the physical world, but you would have to be pretty desperate to claim there is a direct connection as there is in the qualia associated with directly representing the external world. Are you that desperate?
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Why would that be desperation? I think the evidence with regards to how chemicals affect emotional states, and how emotional states affect brain chemistry, is pretty compelling.

You cannot seriously be claiming you don't know the difference between PWQs and internal emotional states......

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There is a difference between objectivism and materialism. All you are claiming here is that the model of our experiences is common to all of us - that the same model seems to work for your experiences as works for my experiences - that is what makes it objective.
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no, that is not all I am claiming. I am also claiming that the reality which I am experiencing is the reality which you are experiencing.

...that there is a shared objective noumenon.

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The only conclusion/assumption required here is that solipsism is false and the laws of physics describe everybodies PWQs with equal accuracy. Yes?
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For one thing, the scenario you have just presented is not even coherent. In order for me to say that science describes other peoples experiences as well as mine, I must assume that there are, in fact, other people. That is the rejection of Solipsism. Science also requires the assumption that we are all experiencing the same objective reality, as I mentioned above.

And I have granted that assumption as part of my rejection of simple solipsism. All I am doing is pointing out that what we call 'the material world' is strictly speaking an abstract mathematical model of PWQs. Those PWQs are subjetive interpretations of a shared objective noumenon. What I reject is the assumption that the shared objective noumenon neccesarily exists independently of the general realm of Mind. Berkeleys position is that the noumenon exists in a 'Metamind'. It is exactly the same position as yours except that rather than positing a self-existing prime reality made of matter from which qualia 'arise' I am suggesting that this shared objective noumenon exists in a higher mental realm. It's (normal) behaviour remains the subject of scientific study exactly as does under materialism.

And the fact remains that under Idealism, you cannot explain how consciousness produces the physical reality that we experience.

How do you know I can't?

I can, but I'm only willing to do it in another thread where materialism is temporarily banished and we think about the question from the point of view of some form of mentalism.

I thought we could, but then you objected to the scientific assumption that there is an external reality that we experience.

I made no such objection. I objected to the assumption it was self-existing and primary over mind. Not YOUR mind. The Noumenon is external to Stimpson J Cats mind (as Stimpson J Cats mind currently is).

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If you read this post carefully you will see that I have not rejected the concept of a shared objective noumenon. Therefore the scientific method is not under threat. The question I am raising is whether the noumenon itself exists independently of the realm of mind (Not YOUR mind or MY mind, but Mind). Ths is a very important distinction, and if you want me to clarify it I will.
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That question is meaningless, unless you can define what it means to say that reality exists in the realm of "MIND". I know what "my mind" and "your mind" mean. I have no idea what "MIND" means.

It means I am taking the position Erwin Shroedinger did. It means that fundamentally all consciousness is linked - there is only one consciousness and the seperation between minds, as most of us experience it most of the time, is illusory. Think of your mind and my mind as leaves on a branching tree structure.

In any event, I do not assume that reality exists independently of this "MIND", or anything else. I simply don't assume that it is dependent on any such thing. I assume nothing about it that cannot be inferred from reliable scientific evidence.

Then don't assume anything at all. I merely pointing out some possinilities because you claimed my position was incoherent. I am demonstrating it is not incoherent, not claiming scientific proof.

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I re-iterate my position : TLOP are a model of the behaviour of PWQs. This is not an assumption of idealism - it is a basic statement of the truth. You have experiences of a physical world. Physics provides a model of the behaviour of those experiences (you already agreed to this). If we reject solipsism we have to accept the existence of a shared noumenon that behaves according to objectively verifiable mathematical laws. NO OTHER ASSUMPTIONS are neccesary. Specifically NO ASSUMPTIONS about the primacy of mind or matter are neccesary at this point in our reasoning. If you disagree please explain PRECISELY why.
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I agree completely. What you have just described is scientific materialism. What I do not understand is (a) Why you insist that materialists are assuming anything more about the nature of reality than what you have just described,

They also assume that the noumenon pre-exists PWQs. They do this because they are still thinking about time froim the point of view of materialism. To go further we have to think about how time relates to materialism and consciousness.

(b) Why you think that any of this implies that it is not possible for the mind itself to be understood scientifically,

I didn't even neccesarily claim that. My claim is that science cannot explain how self-existing matter, independent of Mind can produce qualia, since the matter is in fact an abstract model of the qualia.

(c) Why you think that any of this implies that the mind itself cannot be a physical process,

In a way, it is. But that is only half of the story.

and (d) Why you choose to make the additional assumption that physical reality is created by some "mind" of some sort.

That is a conclusion rather than an assumption.

The why do you claim that the mental world cannot be a subset of the physical world?

For all the reasons highlighted over and over again by the manifestations of Chalmers Hard Problem. Right now I am trying to present the scenario which has given rise to the problem, rather than the Problem itself - which has already been discussed at great length.

The hypothesis that consciousness is a physical process in the brain, and that our experiences are interactions between our brains (which are part of the physical world) and the rest of the physical world, is perfectly consistent with the scenario you have just described.

No it isn't. That would be the same as claiming that the winds themselves, the winds we experience are part of the model of the behaviour of the winds.

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The reason materialism makes no sense is because it is an attempt to put the thing being modelled into the model.
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I don't know what kind of materialism you are referring to, but this certainly isn't the case for scientific materialism.

Not until scientific materialism makes the claim that qualia are solely dependent on matter. As soon as it does that it is attempting to place the thing being modelled (PWQs) into the model.

Idealism makes the assumption that physical reality is produced by minds. That is an unnecessary and unjustified assumption.

The is debatable, which is why we are debating it.

Scientific materialism provides a method for determining how consciousness arises from the physical. Sure, this method depends on the assumption that it does arise from the physical to be true, in order to work, but that is trivially obvious.

Idealism, however, provides no method for determining how the physical World arises from the mind. It does not even attempt to provide a method. On the contrary, it defines itself in such a way that no reliable method for doing this could, even in principle, exist.

This is true. If materialism is false then science may have ot accept certian very specific limitations. I believe those limitations are unavoidable and inherent in the system though - so whether or not it limits science in this one specific area is irrelevant.

And in doing so, it replaces a set of questions which are, at least in principle, answerable, into a set of questions which are not, even in principle, answerable. It turns a difficult problem into an impossible one.

From the point of view of scientism. There is an assumption that subjective knowledge cannot be obtained directly - and if all consciousness is indeed linked then it is indeed possible that subjective knowledge can be obtained directly - in other words your objection is itself dependent on materialism being true.

I would love to hear a description of the method by which you would attempt to find the answer.

If you want to discuss this I want to do it in a different thread where materialistic objections are void.

I am perfectly happy to consider your line of reasoning from within whatever logical framework you choose to present it, but first you must provide that logical framework. Attempting to point out flaws with materialism accomplishes nothing in this regard. Start with the axioms and definitions of your framework, and go from there.

Well we have already started by accepting the existence of PWQs, and an shared objective noumenon. The framework also requires a 'trunk' metamind of which all other minds are branches or leaves i.e. they are all ultimately part of the same Mind.

It is a scientific theory, and one for which there is considerable supporting evidence. Materialism only assumes that consciousness is physical. It makes no a-priori assumptions beyond that.

That one assumption is the one I am challenging.

you have not explained why it is absurd, you have merely asserted that it is. My point is that it is only absurd if you make assumptions that materialism does not make.

Which are?

I have not claimed that you are not correct. It is entirely possible that the axioms of science are wrong.

The axioms of MATERIALISM, Stimp.....

The axiom of science you have rejected is the axiom which states that physical reality is causally closed.

Nope Stimp - that is an axiom of materialism, not science.

If this axiom is true, then consciousness must be physical.

You are now trying to claim that the science claims conscious as physical as part of its axioms.

You know that isn't true. You know the difference between science and materialism.

The idea that our minds are not physical, but yet that they interact with the physical, is a blatant rejection of the axioms of science.

I don't think you understand the alternative model being proposed. It is a limitation of science, not a contradiction of its axioms.

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We are modelling our experiences. We experience wind. We would not try to put the wind we experience into a mathematical model of wind behaviour, because that would be silly.

We are modelling our experiences. We experience PWQs. We would not try to put the PWQs into a mathematical model of PWQ behaviour, because that would be silly.
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I still don't see how this has anything to do with what materialists are doing. We are attempting to model physical reality. Physical reality is what we experience.

Then you are attempting to model what you experience!

You just said it!

Try to seperate your experiences from the model of the behaviour of your experiences.

No, I claimed that science attempts to model the physical World that we experience. In doing so, it provides a model for our experiences.

It is DIRECTLY a model of our experiences. It is first and foremost a model of our experiences.

I made that very clear when I stipulated that science provides a model for our experiences, but that in doing so it makes the implicit assumption that what we are experiencing is an external objective reality.

Again, I ask you to examine the word 'external'. External to an individual human mind - not neccesarily external to Mind itself. Science does not require the noumenon to exist independently of a higher mental realm. It makes no claim about the mode of existence of the noumenon. Only ontological materialism makes that claim.

quote:
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You can reject the assumption of objectivity if you want to, but when you do so, you are rejecting the scientific method too.
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The scientific method is a tool for investigating the behaviour of PWQs. It is a tool for investigating the behaviour of an objective shared noumenon. It DOES NOT require that the noumenon is the prime reality and that PWQs are an epiphenomen. That is materialism, not science.
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That is ontological materialism, which I agree is an incoherent position. Science also does not require that physical reality be an aspect of mind. It does require that the process of experiencing physical reality be a physical process, though.

NO NO NO. That is Materialism Stimp. You cannot defend materialism by lamenting the fact that idealism LIMITS science in one critical respect. Science has no right to claim domain over every question in existence.

.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Yes, initially all information comes to us through our senses. Some of it then gets stored and processed. Then we cogitate on our stored information and create new information "dogs are scary". Then when we see a dog we access that stored information, and feel fear. The fear is triggered by the PWQ of the dog, but it would not exist without the internally stored information about past bad experiences with dogs. The PWQ itself does not depend on any internally stored information. Even if you have never seen a dog before, you still get the same PWQ of the dog.

Of course PWQ depends on stored information! That's the problem with the Knowledge Argument. Everyone seems to forget that my perception of color depends on all sorts of neural wiring that I've developed by actually seeing color. And other wiring developed by learning about color (e.g., the word red).

When I see a photo of the ocean, I smell a particular shoreline in southern Rhode Island. Waves of emotion roll over me from spending childhood summers there. It's all of a piece.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Keneke

I've read this whole thread, and after much thought, have finally understood the position. Maybe. Interesting theory, UCE, you're separating reality and PWQs from TLOP, I guess that's pretty cool. Let me go through and ask a few questions of you, UCE.

Well the word 'reality' is at the centre of the troubles I think.

quote:
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Originally posted by UndercoverElephant
Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'.

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Do the materialists claim it is because of matter? Or is it because of reality, existence, and/or spacetime? Isn't matter just one part of reality?

Depends what you mean by 'reality'. I would agree that what we call 'matter' is just one part of reality.

quote:
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This is claiming a very different relationship between PWQs and TLOP. In effect it amounts to a claim that PWQs belong in the model, as a small subset of the model.
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Maybe someone stated that along the way, but I know the difference between how reality behaves and our estimation of how it behaves.

The question really amounts to "what 'reality' actually is". I assume you are talking about the noumenon - the shared objective reality. In which case the laws of physics are our estimation of how it behaves, its behaviour is its actuall behaviour, and what it actually is - its means of existence is an open question.

quote:
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Eliminative materialism claims that TLOP isn't a model of PWQs at all - it claims that TLOP are a model of the behaviour of a directly-unknowable self-existing (mind-independent) physical world, and that PWQs arise from this unknowable self-existing physical world and it is therefore possible to place PWQs within the model!
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Er, ok. The way I see it: Reality is a mental patient. PWQs are his symptoms and behavior. TLOP is his diagnosis. Therefore, PWQs are included in models only in the sense that they are the inputs, the raw data.

They are the data whose behaviour is being modelled.....?

So yeah, I guess what you say makes sense. The problem is this: your "eliminative materialists" see the behavior (qualia) as part of the reality, not a separate entity of itself. Are we dealing with too many variables? I'd say no, that the qualia is only perception, and therefore possibly deviant from reality.

Qualia are just a mental representation of the noumenon. I think we need to be careful about the word 'reality' and what we mean.

Materialists claim experiences are physical brain activity, then. Hm, ok. But, qualia and experience is separated. If a tree falls and no one hears it, the tree still falls, according to materialists.

And to the idealists also....the only difference is the claim that it falls in the metamind rather than in a mind-independent self-sustaining physical reality.

The fact that you have separated reality from PWQ doesn't change that fact. They are both outside the observer, they are both what is perceived. What does PWQs, since you assume objective reality, have to do with a person's mind?

Well, they are one of the main consituents of a persons mind.

I get the feeling I'm missing something in your post.....have I answered your questions...?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Not until scientific materialism makes the claim that qualia are solely dependent on matter. As soon as it does that it is attempting to place the thing being modelled (PWQs) into the model.

What does this mean? What can you model that doesn't have this supposed problem?

~~ Paul

 

[c0rbin]

UcE said:

All I am doing is pointing out that what we call 'the material world' is strictly speaking an abstract mathematical model of PWQs.

This is the glove and hand bit. Shouldn't this statement be the other way around?

IE "It is possible to make an abstract mathmatical model of the material world."

 

[Loki]

uce,

(uce wrote ) : The eliminative materialist position is not so simple. Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'.

(Stimpy wrote) : I know of nobody who claims this.

(uce wrote ) : Loki does.

First, I doubt that I'm an eliminative materialist - well, maybe just a little, early in the mornings.

Second, when I first read this I though "I wonder if he's basing this rather strange statement on the conversation we had a few weeks back". Now I know - you are!

Third, that's not what I said! We were discussing a statement you made that "qualia have *no* evolutionary benefit". I'd dispute this, but since this point was already being covered, I offered a second possibility - that qualia are a necessary 'side-effect' of brain processing. Your argument seemed to be proceeding along the lines :

1. All human physical attributes are the result of evolutionary pressures;
2. Qualia have no evolutionary value;
3. Therefore, qualia cannot be physical.

All I was saying was that one possible counter argument is that some things are 'necessary' to achieve another goal, but may not be themselves beneficial.

Anyway, just wanted to clear up this small confusion - continue with your main discussion.

 

[Loki]

uce,

Slightly more on topic...

Eliminative materialism claims that TLOP isn't a model of PWQs at all - it claims that TLOP are a model of the behaviour of a directly-unknowable self-existing (mind-independent) physical world, and that PWQs arise from this unknowable self-existing physical world and it is therefore possible to place PWQs within the model!

TLOP - What is actually there (not directly knowable to humans)
PWQ - Human perception of TLOP (directly knowable to humans)

One thing that weakens your position (well, for me) is that the current understanding we have of TLOP strongly suggests that TLOP has been around far longer than PWQ - in other words, we humans are receiving information (via PWQ) that suggests that TLOP predates us. Can this be proven to be true? Not that I can see - however, rejecting this current information seems to involve either some form of Young Earth Creationism, or even a return to your theory of last year that the past doesn't exist until some human looks at it (fossils don't exist until archeologists look for them - isn't that how you proposed it works?).

TLOP - 20 billion years old
PWQ - 10,000 years old.

Which came first?

 

[Guest]

We might also consider Bells Theorem and quantum entanglement. These things suggest the whole of the material world is somehow connected directly at a deeper level of reality - that the Universe is non-local. If the noumenon is a self-existing reality then this is a big mystery. If it exists in a metamind then non-locality and 'faster than light' connections suddenly make a bit more sense.

 

[Peskanov]

UCE;

----
quote:
My position is very simple, and seems to me to be an accurate reflection of the true situation - that we find ourselves experiencing PWQs and we build an abstract model we call the laws of physics to describe the behaviour of these PWQs. Therefore the relationship between PWQs and TLOP is very simple - PWQs are the thing being modelled and TLOP is a mathematical model describing its behaviour. There is no question about 'how qualia arise from matter', because 'matter' is just part of the model of qualia. No Hard Problem. No assumptions. A simple accurate statement of the way things actually are.
-----

No assumptions?
Yes, there are. You have forgotten a very important thing in this model.
You have forgotten that part of these PWQ is the feeling of presence on it!
I feel I am positioned where my eyes are; I feel my body is myself or at least part of me; I feel the chair and the table here are not part of me.
You are assuming these feelings are unnacurate or at least incomplete.
Your strong assumption implies that the presence of the body, (which is controled by the mind in both models!), cannot be described in the terms of TLOP because TLOP describe the PWQ. As you assume the mind that controls this body is external to the PWQ and creates it (the body), TLOP couldn't exaplain it.
In other words: You are assuming that the PWQ can NOT contain all relevant information about the source of our actions.

And this assumption is every day more close to be shown wrong, as the study of the brain advances in the description of how our body is controled ( that is, a functional model of how the brain control our actions).

----
quote:
Eliminative Materialists position :

The eliminative materialist position is not so simple. Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'. This is claiming a very different relationship between PWQs and TLOP. In effect it amounts to a claim that PWQs belong in the model , as a small subset of the model.
----

But this model does not make your strong assumption depicted before...

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

First of all, your entire argument seems to be based on a rejection of the notion that our perceptions are perceptions of an external reality, in which case this distinction becomes meaningless.
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Not really. One set of qualia refer to a shared objective noumenon, the other refer to our internal state.

OK, but it is still a bit presumptuous to claim that they are truly distinct. To do so implies the assumption that your internal states are not, themselves, part of this shared objective reality. Note that saying that they are part of the shared objective reality does not in any way imply anything absurd like that one person should be able to experience another person's emotions.

Why would that be desperation? I think the evidence with regards to how chemicals affect emotional states, and how emotional states affect brain chemistry, is pretty compelling.
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You cannot seriously be claiming you don't know the difference between PWQs and internal emotional states......

No, what I am saying is that I don't think the distinction is as clear-cut as you are presenting it. Both types of "qualia" have clear physical conotations, whether you choose to believe that they are "physical correlates", or take the more parsimonious approach of assuming that they are physical processes.

For one thing, the scenario you have just presented is not even coherent. In order for me to say that science describes other peoples experiences as well as mine, I must assume that there are, in fact, other people. That is the rejection of Solipsism. Science also requires the assumption that we are all experiencing the same objective reality, as I mentioned above.
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And I have granted that assumption as part of my rejection of simple solipsism. All I am doing is pointing out that what we call 'the material world' is strictly speaking an abstract mathematical model of PWQs. Those PWQs are subjetive interpretations of a shared objective noumenon. What I reject is the assumption that the shared objective noumenon neccesarily exists independently of the general realm of Mind. Berkeleys position is that the noumenon exists in a 'Metamind'.

But look at what you are saying here. You are "rejecting the assumption that the shared reality exists independently of the general mind". What mind? Who has made that assumption? How can I assume that objective reality exists independently of something that I don't even have any idea what it is? Obviously I do not assume that objective reality is part of some general mind, because I have no idea what that even means!

It is exactly the same position as yours except that rather than positing a self-existing prime reality made of matter from which qualia 'arise' I am suggesting that this shared objective noumenon exists in a higher mental realm.

Once again, you are mistaking my position for ontological materialism. i don't believe in any mysterious ontological material realm. I make no assumptions about the nature of objective reality. I leave it to science to tell me what those characteristics are.

My belief that human consciousness arises from physical brain activity is not a metaphysical assumption. It is a conclusion based on substantial scientific evidence. I make no claim either way about this "MetaMind" that you speak of, because I have no idea what it is. I will not deny the possibility that physical reality is a part of some more fundamental "realm". I simply do not assume that it is, nor do I assume anything about what the nature of that realm must be.

The question is, why do you?

It's (normal) behaviour remains the subject of scientific study exactly as does under materialism.

Which raises another question. You have made it clear that this "Metamind", or "mental realm" of which you claim physical reality is a part, is not simply my mind, or yours, or even a conglomeration of human minds. In fact, so far you haven't explained what it is at all, or how it relates to human minds. So why does any of this have any relevance to the question of human consciousness? In fact, it seems perfectly conceivable to me that physical reality could be a component of some "MetaMind", with human minds still being purely physical processes taking place in our physical brains.

And the fact remains that under Idealism, you cannot explain how consciousness produces the physical reality that we experience.
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How do you know I can't?

Well let me put it this way. I know that you cannot do it under Berkely's Idealism, because he has defined it in such a way that such an explanation is not possible, even in principle.

I can, but I'm only willing to do it in another thread where materialism is temporarily banished and we think about the question from the point of view of some form of mentalism.

I have already told you that I am perfectly happy to look at your claims from within the framework of whatever system it is you are proposing. All you have to do is state your axioms and definitions, and present your argument.

That question is meaningless, unless you can define what it means to say that reality exists in the realm of "MIND". I know what "my mind" and "your mind" mean. I have no idea what "MIND" means.
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It means I am taking the position Erwin Shroedinger did. It means that fundamentally all consciousness is linked - there is only one consciousness and the seperation between minds, as most of us experience it most of the time, is illusory. Think of your mind and my mind as leaves on a branching tree structure.

Analogies are great for getting an idea across, but I still need a formal definition. How are all consciousnesses linked? What characteristics does this MetaMind possess that individual consciousnesses do not? How does this MetaMind produce the physical world?

And of course, what possible logical reason could you have for believing this MetaMind exists?

In any event, I do not assume that reality exists independently of this "MIND", or anything else. I simply don't assume that it is dependent on any such thing. I assume nothing about it that cannot be inferred from reliable scientific evidence.
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Then don't assume anything at all. I merely pointing out some possinilities because you claimed my position was incoherent. I am demonstrating it is not incoherent, not claiming scientific proof.

So far, your position does seem to be incoherent. But that is beside the point. My point is that without these extra ontological assumptions you have been talking about, there is absolutely no reason to believe that human consciousness cannot simply be a physical process in the brain. All of your arguments against this hypothesis have been based on your ontological assumptions about the relationship between consciousness and the physical World.

I agree completely. What you have just described is scientific materialism. What I do not understand is (a) Why you insist that materialists are assuming anything more about the nature of reality than what you have just described,
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They also assume that the noumenon pre-exists PWQs.

We don't assume that. It is a very obvious conclusion drawn from our observations. All of the scientific evidence indicates that the Physical World was around before people, and all of the scientific evidence indicates that human minds do not exist without human brains.

You can create ad-hoc hypotheses for how human minds could have been around before human brains, but there is no reason to believe that any of them are true.

They do this because they are still thinking about time froim the point of view of materialism.

We think about time from the point of view of the way science describes it, which is the only meaningful way we can think about it. To think about it any other way would be blind speculation.

To go further we have to think about how time relates to materialism and consciousness.

Thinking about it isn't enough. If it is going to be meaningful, it has to be scientifically verifiable.

(b) Why you think that any of this implies that it is not possible for the mind itself to be understood scientifically,
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I didn't even neccesarily claim that. My claim is that science cannot explain how self-existing matter, independent of Mind can produce qualia, since the matter is in fact an abstract model of the qualia.

Science does not assume that matter is self-existing. It just doesn't assume that it is not. And as I said before, the matter is an abstract model for the shared reality, not for the qualia. The qualia are simply our experience of the reality which, as I have already explained, science must assume is an interaction between the shared reality and our mind. I see no reason why this would rule out the possibility of science being able to describe the qualia themselves. On the contrary, it seems clear to me that if the axioms of science are valid, then it must be possible to do so.

(c) Why you think that any of this implies that the mind itself cannot be a physical process,
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In a way, it is. But that is only half of the story.

It's the whole story, until you start adding additional assumptions like MetaMinds. Operating strictly from within the philosophical framework of science, there is no reason to think that there is anything more to it than that.

and (d) Why you choose to make the additional assumption that physical reality is created by some "mind" of some sort.
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That is a conclusion rather than an assumption.

It certainly isn't a conclusion that can be drawn from the assumptions of science, or from any scientific evidence. On what basis do you draw this conclusion. What additional assumptions do you have to make (in addition to the axioms of science) in order to draw this conclusion? And why do you make those assumptions?

The why do you claim that the mental world cannot be a subset of the physical world?
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For all the reasons highlighted over and over again by the manifestations of Chalmers Hard Problem. Right now I am trying to present the scenario which has given rise to the problem, rather than the Problem itself - which has already been discussed at great length.

But as I already pointed out, operating strictly within the framework of science, there is no Hard Problem. The Hard Problem only arises when you make additional ontological assumptions about the relationship between the physical World and human consciousness, whether they take the form of ontological materialism, dualism, or idealism. All three yield equally "Hard Problems".

The hypothesis that consciousness is a physical process in the brain, and that our experiences are interactions between our brains (which are part of the physical world) and the rest of the physical world, is perfectly consistent with the scenario you have just described.
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No it isn't. That would be the same as claiming that the winds themselves, the winds we experience are part of the model of the behaviour of the winds.

What is the inconsistency? Your wind analogy means nothing to me. Explain in logical terms exactly what the contradiction this produces is.

I don't know what kind of materialism you are referring to, but this certainly isn't the case for scientific materialism.
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Not until scientific materialism makes the claim that qualia are solely dependent on matter. As soon as it does that it is attempting to place the thing being modelled (PWQs) into the model.

As I have pointed out several times already, the experiences are not what science tries to model. Science tries to model objective reality. The experiences are our source of information about that reality. There is absolutely nothing wrong with suggesting that the mechanism by which our minds acquire information about objective reality cannot also be explained by our model.

Idealism, however, provides no method for determining how the physical World arises from the mind. It does not even attempt to provide a method. On the contrary, it defines itself in such a way that no reliable method for doing this could, even in principle, exist.
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This is true. If materialism is false then science may have ot accept certian very specific limitations. I believe those limitations are unavoidable and inherent in the system though - so whether or not it limits science in this one specific area is irrelevant.

First of all, what I, and most modern materialists, call materialism is nothing more than the philosophical framework of science, meaning that if it is false, then the scientific method is invalid. Second, science does have limitations. I just don't see any reason why I should believe that the inability to scientifically study the mind should b one of them.

And in doing so, it replaces a set of questions which are, at least in principle, answerable, into a set of questions which are not, even in principle, answerable. It turns a difficult problem into an impossible one.
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From the point of view of scientism. There is an assumption that subjective knowledge cannot be obtained directly - and if all consciousness is indeed linked then it is indeed possible that subjective knowledge can be obtained directly - in other words your objection is itself dependent on materialism being true.

No, it isn't. Even if Materialism is false, even if the scientific method is invalid, you still have the verification problem. Idealism does not provide any reliable way to verify the validity of knowledge. You can argue that under Idealism it is possible to have direct subjective access to knowledge, but you have no way to determine its validity. You have no way to rule out subjective bias. In short, you have no way to distinguish between reality and fantasy. That way lies madness.

I would love to hear a description of the method by which you would attempt to find the answer.
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If you want to discuss this I want to do it in a different thread where materialistic objections are void.

Fine with me.

am perfectly happy to consider your line of reasoning from within whatever logical framework you choose to present it, but first you must provide that logical framework. Attempting to point out flaws with materialism accomplishes nothing in this regard. Start with the axioms and definitions of your framework, and go from there.
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Well we have already started by accepting the existence of PWQs, and an shared objective noumenon. The framework also requires a 'trunk' metamind of which all other minds are branches or leaves i.e. they are all ultimately part of the same Mind.

That's where I have problems. I still don't have any idea what that means. Remember, we are talking about a formal logical framework here. I need formal definitions and axioms, not vague analogies.

It is a scientific theory, and one for which there is considerable supporting evidence. Materialism only assumes that consciousness is physical. It makes no a-priori assumptions beyond that.
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That one assumption is the one I am challenging.

I don't see how you can challenge it without rejecting science. Science defines the word "physical" in terms of interactions. If A interacts with B, and A is physical, then so is B. There is no question that consciousness interacts with the physical world. This is true from mundane things like the fact that we can experience the physical worlds, and the fact that mental states affect our actions, to more subtle things like the impact of chemicals on mental states, and the affect of mental states on brain chemistry.

The interaction is definitely there. This makes consciousness every bit as deserving of the label "physical" as anything else that interacts with other physical stuff.

The only way consciousness could be non-physical would be if the physical World is not causally closed. And that is a direct rejection of a basic axiom of science.

you have not explained why it is absurd, you have merely asserted that it is. My point is that it is only absurd if you make assumptions that materialism does not make.
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Which are?

All that MetaMind stuff.

I have not claimed that you are not correct. It is entirely possible that the axioms of science are wrong.
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The axioms of MATERIALISM, Stimp.....

The axioms of scientific materialism are the axioms of science. As I said before, I define scientific materialism to be nothing more than the philosophical basis of the scientific method. If you want to argue about the validity of ontological materialism, you will have to find somebody who believes in it first. Good luck.

The axiom of science you have rejected is the axiom which states that physical reality is causally closed.
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Nope Stimp - that is an axiom of materialism, not science.

No, that is clearly an axiom of science. If the physical World is not causally closed, then no logical conclusions can ever be drawn from scientific evidence, because there is always the possibility that some "non-physical" influence could have skewed the results.

After all, if the physical World is not causally closed, then we cannot reject the possibility that Satan just put those fossils there to trick us into believing that the Earth is older than it really is...

If this axiom is true, then consciousness must be physical.
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You are now trying to claim that the science claims conscious as physical as part of its axioms.

No, science claims that anything that has an effect on something physical is also physical. The fact that consciousness has an effect on the physical world is a trivial observation. From this observation I conclude that if the axioms of science are valid, then consciousness must be physical.

I still don't see how this has anything to do with what materialists are doing. We are attempting to model physical reality. Physical reality is what we experience.
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Then you are attempting to model what you experience!

That's right, I am trying to model what I experience, not the experiences themselves. I am trying to model objective reality.

Try to seperate your experiences from the model of the behaviour of your experiences.

I am not modeling the behavior of my experiences, I am modeling objective reality, based on the behavior of my experiences. I have absolutely no problem with the idea that the mechanism by which I experience objective reality can also be modeled by my model of objective reality.

No, I claimed that science attempts to model the physical World that we experience. In doing so, it provides a model for our experiences.
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It is DIRECTLY a model of our experiences. It is first and foremost a model of our experiences.

No, it isn't. If that were the case, then we wouldn't be going to all the trouble of ruling out subjective bias. After all, such biases are a part of our experiences. They are not, however, included as part of the model.

Clearly what we are attempting to model is the objective reality itself. Our experiences are simply our source of information about it.

I made that very clear when I stipulated that science provides a model for our experiences, but that in doing so it makes the implicit assumption that what we are experiencing is an external objective reality.
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Again, I ask you to examine the word 'external'. External to an individual human mind - not neccesarily external to Mind itself.

Once again, I have no idea what this MetaMind is. Nor is this MetaMind in any way a part of the philosophical framework of science, nor is it in any way implied by scientific evidence.

Science does not require the noumenon to exist independently of a higher mental realm. It makes no claim about the mode of existence of the noumenon. Only ontological materialism makes that claim.

And Idealism, and Dualism. All three are making unnecessary and unjustified assumptions about the nature of reality. That is why I reject them all.

I will just stick with science, thank you very much.

We might also consider Bells Theorem and quantum entanglement. These things suggest the whole of the material world is somehow connected directly at a deeper level of reality

That depends on what you mean by "suggest". They may intuitively suggest those things to you, but they do not in any way logically suggest them at all.

that the Universe is non-local. If the noumenon is a self-existing reality then this is a big mystery.

It's a big mystery either way. Fact: we don't understand it. Making up metaphysical fantasies about it isn't going to change that fact.

If it exists in a metamind then non-locality and 'faster than light' connections suddenly make a bit more sense.

Maybe intuitively, but not logically. you still don't understand the mechanism. You still can't make any more testable predictions then you could before. All you have done is added some metaphysical icing to the cake, to make it taste better. Unfortunately, it is low-fat sugar-free icing, and adds no nutritional value.

See, I can play the analogy game too.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Guest]

Your strong assumption implies that the presence of the body, (which is controled by the mind in both models!), cannot be described in the terms of TLOP because TLOP describe the PWQ.

The body is also part of PWQ. If you drill a hole in your head you can see your own brain in a mirror. But the body also exists in the noumenon, and the part of the body called the brain is closely correlated to the mind itself.

Stimpson :

I think I explained this beofre but I'll say again - I think science stops being useful after we stop talking about the workings of material reality. The methods of science aren't so easily applicable to the investigation of the metaphysical laws underlying physical reality. If you want to stop where science stops then that is your choice, and I have no intention of trying to show how scientific methods can be applied to metaphysics.

quote:
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that the Universe is non-local. If the noumenon is a self-existing reality then this is a big mystery.
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It's a big mystery either way. Fact: we don't understand it. Making up metaphysical fantasies about it isn't going to change that fact.

It's only as mystery if you are a materialist. It doesn't seem like much of a mystery to me. Under mentalist metaphysics it's almost predictable.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If it exists in a metamind then non-locality and 'faster than light' connections suddenly make a bit more sense.
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Maybe intuitively, but not logically. you still don't understand the mechanism.

I haven't ever really explained it in detail. I'd probably end up like Franko if I did.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

I think I explained this beofre but I'll say again - I think science stops being useful after we stop talking about the workings of material reality.

Of course.

The methods of science aren't so easily applicable to the investigation of the metaphysical laws underlying physical reality.

They aren't applicable to metaphysics at all.

If you want to stop where science stops then that is your choice, and I have no intention of trying to show how scientific methods can be applied to metaphysics.

I don't see any alternative to stopping where science stops, since no other philosophical framework seems to be able to provide a method for going any further.

With respect to the current topic, though, I think that the issue is not about how to go beyond where science can go, but rather to establish whether the workings of human consciousness are beyond where science can go, or not. I still don't see any reason why I should that it is.

It's a big mystery either way. Fact: we don't understand it. Making up metaphysical fantasies about it isn't going to change that fact.
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It's only as mystery if you are a materialist. It doesn't seem like much of a mystery to me.

You don't understand it any better than any materialist does. Your metaphysical beliefs my give you an intuitive way of looking at it, but it does not, and can not, provide any actual understanding of it.

Under mentalist metaphysics it's almost predictable.

Almost predictable? Is that anything like being unpredictable? Are you claiming that the nonlocal, possibly non-deterministic, and definitely non-temporally causal, nature of QM can be inferred from Mentalism? This is a perfect example of an ad-hoc hypothesis, and post-hoc reasoning. You are looking at a phenomenon that you would never have predicted from your metaphysical beliefs, and saying "oh yeah, that is obviously exactly what we should expect to see under Idealism".

If it exists in a metamind then non-locality and 'faster than light' connections suddenly make a bit more sense.
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Maybe intuitively, but not logically. you still don't understand the mechanism.
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I haven't ever really explained it in detail. I'd probably end up like Franko if I did.

It's not even a question of whether you can provide an explanation of the mechanism involved. What is at question is whether you have any reliable method for establishing that your explanation is the correct one.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Lucifuge Rofocale]

It seems to me that this is precisely what the laws of physics model - we have no direct access to atoms or quantum waves - we have direct access only to PWQs.

"When are we sure that the meaning of a question is clear? Obviously if and only if we are able to exactly describe the conditions in which it is possible to answer yes, or, respectively, the conditions in which it is necessary to answer with a no. The meaning of a question is thus defined only through the specification of those conditions...
The definition of the circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly equivalent to the definition of its meaning.
... a statement has a meaning if and only if the fact that it is true makes a verifiable difference.
(M. Schlick, 'Positivismus und Realismus' in Erkenntnis, 3, 1932).
Metaphysical statements are thus forbidden: they are meaningless. Also the traditional philosophy is indeed meaningless, and the only role of philosophy is the clarification of the meaning of statements. "



Now, Mr Elephant, where is the verifiable difference?