Materialism

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

Do brain processes and qualia differ?
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Qualia are a type of brain process. Not all brain processes are qualia. The brain processes which are qualia clearly do not differ from qualia, because they are qualia. How much more explicit do you want me to be?
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So you are saying that qualia and brain processes both differ and do not differ at the same time.

No, clearly I am not.

You have specified that there are two different types of brain process, one of which is objective/non-empirical/abstract and the other of which is subjective/empirical/non-abstract, but you are also claiming that the subjective/empirical/non-abstract brain processes are simultaneously objective/non-empirical/abstract.

This is false. Brain processes are neither empirical nor abstract. They are physical processes. Knowledge can be empirical/direct, or abstract/indirect. This is a statement about how the knowledge was acquired. The knowledge itself is simply a memory. Whether it is empirical or abstract simply depends on what it is a memory of.

You are claiming that qualia are both subjective and objective at the same time, both abstract and empirical at the same time. THIS IS INCOHERENT.

No, I am not. Not at all. First of all, qualia are not knowledge. Qualia are experiences. They are neither abstract nor empirical. Those qualifiers only apply to knowledge.

Just to clarify, experiences are a physical process. Memories are a physical state. Experiences cause memories. Those memories can be direct memories of the experience (empirical knowledge), or indirect memories of facts (abstract knowledge). In fact, any given memory is a combination of both.

You have already claimed there are two different sorts of knowledge. You are now claiming that qualia qualify as both sorts at the same time. You are a type 2 (incoherent) materialist.

Qualia are not knowledge. It is your attempt at an argument that is incoherent.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE, you need to be clearer about your objection to Stimpy's description of qualia. Your objection appears to me to be nothing more than wordplay.

When we (if I may) say that there are two different flavors of brain process, abstract and empirical, you appear to immediately partition them into some kind of dualist framework, ignoring the fact that any brain process falls in a spectrum from completely abstract (thinking about math) to completely empirical (the function of the eardrum). The experience of red involves many brain processes, some largely abstract (knowledge of light) to others largely empirical (the light spectrum arrayed out in the visual cortex). Other processes are some of both (the assocation between the light spectrum and the word red).

What you seem to think is that as soon as something falls anywhere other than at the extreme ends of the spectrum, it is violating this dualist requirement you've established.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ah, I see that Stimpy doesn't want to think of processes as abstract or empirical. It is strictly true that the qualifiers can only be applied to memories, but they seem to make sense with processes that largely use/affect abstract or emprical memories. Stimpy, do you think it's "dangerous" to apply those qualifiers to processes?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Stimpson

Brain processes are neither empirical nor abstract.

All information about brain processes has meaning only within the context of the abstract physical model we build to describe a proposed objective reality.

All information about qualia comes directly to us via phenomenal consciousness without needing to be placed in the context of the abstract physical model.

Physicalism claims that everything which exists can be placed within the physical model, including the qualia (if they exist).

In order to defend physicalism you must therefore claim you can place qualia in the model (if they exist).

If "qualia and brain process" are synonyms then qualia is a redundant term and you are an eliminative materialist.

If "qualia and brain process" are not synonyms then even if you want to make the nonsense claim that "qualia are a type of brain process" you STILL need two different 'slots' your in 'physical' model to account for these two different things (simultaneously subjective/objective brain processes and solely objective brain processes). That makes you a property dualist.

The fact that you can't actually specify what your position is without talking self-refuting dictionary-busting gibberish means you are actually hovering between eliminative materialism and property dualism and you are a type-2 (incoherent) materialist.

 

[BillHoyt]

Bill,

Ad Hominems = No response from UCE.



Geoff.

No, Geoff, pointed questions = no response. Shall I trot out all the examples of you suddenly going silent when backed against a wall to prove that point? How about the "no disagreement" claims you continue to make about e-prime?

Cheers,

 

[Guest]

Bill,

This is about the fourth time you have tried this. You fill up your posts with foul-mouthed abuse, mixed with a couple of questions I am perfectly capable of answering. Then, when I refuse to respond to a person who cannot treat me with respect you try to claim I am afraid of answering your questions. Do you think anyone buys this?

I am not interested in discussing this with you. I have given you plenty of chances to control your temper and your mouth. You can't do it. If your arguments stand up then you don't need to be foul-mouthed and abusive. If you need to be foul-mouthed and abusive then I see no need to take any notice of you.



Geoff.

 

[BillHoyt]

Bill,

This is about the fourth time you have tried this. You fill up your posts with foul-mouthed abuse, mixed with a couple of questions I am perfectly capable of answering. Then, when I refuse to respond to a person who cannot treat me with respect you try to claim I am afraid of answering your questions. Do you think anyone buys this?

I am not interested in discussing this with you. I have given you plenty of chances to control your temper and your mouth. You can't do it. If your arguments stand up then you don't need to be foul-mouthed and abusive. If you need to be foul-mouthed and abusive then I see no need to take any notice of you.



Geoff.

Geoff,

Puh-leeze. "Foul-mouthed"? I didn't cuss - not once. "Control [my] temper?" You're the one stomping out of here. You started this ("bill's here, time to go") before I really engaged you here. Go back to that post and review... Then answer these questions:

1. Do you or do you not acknowledge that you claimed it was not possible to disagree in e-prime and that you have twice engaged in e-prime disagreements?

2. Do you have a revision to your faulty defintions you proffered before?

Cheers,

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Paul,

Ah, I see that Stimpy doesn't want to think of processes as abstract or empirical. It is strictly true that the qualifiers can only be applied to memories, but they seem to make sense with processes that largely use/affect abstract or emprical memories. Stimpy, do you think it's "dangerous" to apply those qualifiers to processes?

Only in the sense that UCE has made it abundantly clear that he will use any impreciseness or ambiguity of language in order to construct semantic arguments.


UCE,

Brain processes are neither empirical nor abstract.
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All information about brain processes has meaning only within the context of the abstract physical model we build to describe a proposed objective reality.

Yeah, so? Brain processes are not information.

All information about qualia comes directly to us via phenomenal consciousness without needing to be placed in the context of the abstract physical model.

Qualia do not exist (see your other thread). Information about phenomenal experiences come to us the same way any other and information does: Through the context of an abstract physical model. The memory of the phenomenal experience is direct empirical knowledge, but as I have stated several times before, knowledge and information are not the same thing.

Physicalism claims that everything which exists can be placed within the physical model, including the qualia (if they exist).

Physicalism claims that everything which exists can be described by the physical model. Qualia do not exist, because you have defined them to be impossible to physically model. Qualia are not phenomenal experiences. phenomenal experiences can be described by the physical model.

In order to defend physicalism you must therefore claim you can place qualia in the model (if they exist).

They don't.

If "qualia and brain process" are synonyms then qualia is a redundant term and you are an eliminative materialist.

I guess I am an eliminative materialist.

The fact that you can't actually specify what your position is without talking self-refuting dictionary-busting gibberish means you are actually hovering between eliminative materialism and property dualism and you are a type-2 (incoherent) materialist.

The fact that the only types of arguments you can present amount to either circular reasoning, question begging, or pure semantic nonsense, indicates that you not only don't understand what Physicalism is, but don't really understand your own position either.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

If "qualia and brain process" are not synonyms then even if you want to make the nonsense claim that "qualia are a type of brain process" you STILL need two different 'slots' your in 'physical' model to account for these two different things (simultaneously subjective/objective brain processes and solely objective brain processes). That makes you a property dualist.

Please explain. If I say that qualia are a type of brain process involving both abstract and emprical memory, why does that make me a property dualist?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I wonder what would happen if UcE and most of the other philosophers of the world would stop throwing around incomprehensible philosophical terminology and actually discuss the facts of the matter? I know the Knowledge Argument would get a lot simpler. I bet other arguments would, too.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
Please explain. If I say that qualia are a type of brain process involving both abstract and emprical memory, why does that make me a property dualist?

~~ Paul

You are describing a position where under the umbrella of 'brain process' exist some things which are purely abstract/physical/objective and some things which as well as being abstract/physical/objective they are also empirical/mental/subjective then you cannot be a materialist. That is a form of property dualism.

I wonder what would happen if UcE and most of the other philosophers of the world would stop throwing around incomprehensible philosophical terminology and actually discuss the facts of the matter? I know the Knowledge Argument would get a lot simpler. I bet other arguments would, too.

Actually, the problem is that most non-philosophers have not examined their own definitions and terminology properly, have not examined their own assumption properly and as a result end up with positions that they think are simple, but are in fact simply illogical. Only after you understand and think about how and why you constructed your belief system do you realise why the philosophers say what they say. Most of the people on this board regard the whole rich history of non-materialistic philosophy as meaningless. It's their loss, really it is.

 

[Lucifuge Rofocale]

Most of the people on this board regard the whole rich history of non-materialistic philosophy as meaningless. It's their loss, really it is.

But what can we do if they are indeed meaningless? "I'm friend of Plato but even more friend of truth"

 

[BillHoyt]

Actually, the problem is that most non-philosophers have not examined their own definitions and terminology properly, have not examined their own assumption properly and as a result end up with positions that they think are simple, but are in fact simply illogical.

First case in point:

They can't disagree about ontology, because ontology is about the nature of Beingness and E-Prime stops you using to be. You are prevented form assuming things about the nature of being.

Cheers,

 

[ChuckieR]

The KA is talking about the context within which different facts have meaning. Subjective facts about red only have meaning to Mary because they come to Mary directly. It does not matter how you create the situation where the subjective knowledge of red comes to Mary, all that matters is that it comes to her directly and not via the abstract physical model.

If it comes to her via the physical model then it is objectively verifiable and physical.

If it comes to her directly then is subjective (not objectively verifiable) and mental.

UCE, I think I am seeing the problem. I have re-read your posts from yesterday, slowly, carefully, and a few times each. I realize that I keep responding to the philosophical arguments with scientific responses, but I think this has a direct implication for this particular thought expt.

Your statement: "If it comes to her directly then it is subjective" is a problem. In order for something to "come to her directly", the brain must have specific, physical wiring in order to interpret it. In order to "see red" as something different, she must have physical brain wiring that allows her to distinguish between red, green, and blue. Distinguishing between colors is not completely subjective in some magical way. It requires proper physical brain wiring.

That is where the physical meets the subjective.

I think we can all agree that people with specific physical brain deficits are unable to process certain types of information.

The problem with the KA thought experiment we are discussing is that it apparently assumes that Mary, who is raised from birth in a colorless world, will posess the proper brain wiring to differentiate between red, green, and blue; i.e, that her visual processing "hardware" will be like a "normal" adults. This is highly doubtful.

The way we gain the ability to differentiate between different colors as adults is by exposure to different colors as infants. It is the exposure to different colors during childhood that causes the brain to wire itself so that it can differentiate between colors.. That is why we give little babys all of those brightly colored toys to play with.

This is not a trivial point that "can be safely ignored for the purposes of discussion". This is the heart of the matter. Exposure to different colors in childhood causes objective, measurable, physical changes in the brain, not just subjective, personal changes.

Mary will not have had any exposure to different colors as a child, so it is highly unlikely that she will be able to distinguish between colors as an adult, even after she is let out of the room.

Of course, no one has ever done this experiment in a human, so it may be an interesting scientific question as to what will happen. But this, I believe, is not what they had in mind when this thought expt. was proposed.

Geoff, can you address this issue and maybe explain why you think it can be overlooked, and if it is still possible to use this particular thought expt?

There may very well be a good thought expt. relating to the KA, but I really don't believe that this is it.

 

[Guest]

But what can we do if they are indeed meaningless? "I'm friend of Plato but even more friend of truth"

I wish I could telepathically communicate to you the profundity of the writings of Hegel. Hegel even went to the lengths of writing from the perspective of two different Hegels, leaving you to try to figure out which one is the real Hegel, and which one is the imposter. Somehow you eventually manage to grasp that each Hegel needed the other Hegel, and that the real Hegel is somehow a synthesis of both Hegels.......meaningless?....I don't think so.

 

[Guest]

Hello ChuckieR

Your statement: "If it comes to her directly then it is subjective" is a problem. In order for something to "come to her directly", the brain must have specific, physical wiring in order to interpret it. In order to "see red" as something different, she must have physical brain wiring that allows her to distinguish between red, green, and blue. Distinguishing between colors is not completely subjective in some magical way. It requires proper physical brain wiring.

Well...I'm not sure we understand enough about this scientifically to say for sure. We know there are limitations in the retina as to how many colors we percieve but with a new retinal pigment who can say that the brain would not learn to see a new colour? The brain is very good at learning to interpret new sorts of information. I don't actually think that any of this really has much bearing on the situation though. It does not matter how the physical system is specified and how the physical mechanisms work - it remains true that everything that comes to Mary directly into her phenomenal consciousness must be subjective. It may well be closely correlated with physical things, it may even depend on physical things, but the things which come directly are always subjective. You will never EVER be able to verify whether your red is the same as my red. EVER. It will always be subjective. Stimpson claims it is 'actually objective' as well. He can't defend that, apart from to say that it must be in order to defend materialism. It doesn't actually make any sense.

The problem with the KA thought experiment we are discussing is that it apparently assumes that Mary, who is raised from birth in a colorless world, will posess the proper brain wiring to differentiate between red, green, and blue; i.e, that her visual processing "hardware" will be like a "normal" adults. This is highly doubtful.

I think this may be a practical consideration, but I don't see what it has to do with the guts of the problem itself. I don't think it matters whether in reality the lack of red stimulation means bits of her brain don't develop properly - it doesn't effect the thought experiment. Schroedingers cat experiment is cruel to cats - that doesn't make it any less effective a thought experiement.

This is not a trivial point that "can be safely ignored for the purposes of discussion". This is the heart of the matter.
Exposure to different colors in childhood causes objective, measurable, physical changes in the brain, not just subjective, personal changes.

Fair enough, I understand what you are saying, but I can't accept that it is the heart of the thought experiment. What you are saying is true - exposure to different stimuli do indeed cause physical changes in the brain. But it doesn't mean that the absolute difference between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge goes away.

Geoff, can you address this issue and maybe explain why you think it can be overlooked, and if it is still possible to use this particular thought expt?

OK, imagine we find a drug which keeps Marys brain in the state where it is receptive to new colour impressions even when she is old enough to have learned everything about physics. It's a thought experiment - if we can posit someone can learn everything there is to learn about red then we can posit their brain can stay in 'plasticised' mode - these are side-issues, IMO.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE, these are not side issues. If this thought experiment was about Marymorg from the 19th dimension, then they would be side issues. But the KA is about the real world.

To see the problem, you could answer this simple question without resorting to issues of subjectivity or qualia or consciousness or any of those annoying terms:

After Mary learns everything about color from her books, is her physical brain "wiring" equivalent to that of a normal seeing person, or is it not?

This is simply a question we need to answer to establish the meaning of the first premise of the thought experiment.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

To see the problem, you could answer this simple question without resorting to issues of subjectivity or qualia or consciousness or any of those annoying terms:

After Mary learns everything about color from her books, is her physical brain "wiring" equivalent to that of a normal seeing person, or is it not?

This is simply a question we need to answer to establish the meaning of the first premise of the thought experiment.

No two people have the same 'wiring' in their brains. I can't answer your question because I have no idea what you think is implied by 'wiring'. I am deeply suspicious of your assumptions, Paul - that is why I went to such great lengths last night to provide clear definitions, which you seem to have ignored. Perhaps if you tell me why you are asking the question it might help, but I fear you are just going back to what you said last night about "getting her brain into the has-seen-red state", in which case I ask you to go to the bother of reading the lengthy posts I made last night directly as a response to this question, and give me a response to them instead of just complaining that they were too complicated for you. I know you think that answering this question makes it easier to understand, but I don't think you thought properly about how we get information.

PLEASE read my definitions and tell me what is wrong with them.

 

[ChuckieR]

Hello ChuckieR

Well...I'm not sure we understand enough about this scientifically to say for sure. We know there are limitations in the retina as to how many colors we percieve but with a new retinal pigment who can say that the brain would not learn to see a new colour? The brain is very good at learning to interpret new sorts of information.

If you patch an eye throughout childhood, the child/adult will remain blind in that eye, and will never "learn" to see out of that eye, and will never have subjective experience through that eye. The brain is apparently only "plastic" to a point.

I don't actually think that any of this really has much bearing on the situation though.

I guess we disagree here. I think it is the situation.

We "learn" all of these things in early childhood, before we can form any real "memories" as such that we can remember as adults, which is probably why it all seems so magical to us. We can't remember what it "is like" to not be able to differentiate between red, green, and blue. All of these "skills" that we have as adults (differentiating between colors, standing up w/out falling) are learned in childhood and create permanent physical changes in our brains. It is only through stimulation of our senses that our brain becomes wired properly.

It does not matter how the physical system is specified and how the physical mechanisms work - it remains true that everything that comes to Mary directly into her phenomenal consciousness must be subjective.

But she can only have these subjective experiences because of the physical wiring that occured in her brain as a child, when she was initially exposed to these experiences.

You will never EVER be able to verify whether your red is the same as my red. EVER. It will always be subjective.

But we can objectively determine whether you can distinguish between different colors. I am suggesting that it is likely that Mary cannot distinuish between colors. So what does it matter if she sees "red". It will probably look the same as blue and green to her. She will not "experience red, green, or blue" in the same way that you and I will (Colorblind people can't distinguish between certain colors, and we can objectively determine that the colors "look the same" to them. We can even experience their frustration by wearing color filtered glasses). If she could differentiate between the colors, then I would have to scratch my head and agree that the thought experiment is valid (and I'd love to have a look at her brain to determine how she is able to distinguish between colors w/out having being exposed to different colors early on), but I really doubt that she will be able to.

I think this may be a practical consideration, but I don't see what it has to do with the guts of the problem itself. I don't think it matters whether in reality the lack of red stimulation means bits of her brain don't develop properly - it doesn't effect the thought experiment. Schroedingers cat experiment is cruel to cats - that doesn't make it any less effective a thought experiement.

But if she can't distinguish between colors, then it isn't very interesting any more to discuss how red appears to her.

Fair enough, I understand what you are saying, but I can't accept that it is the heart of the thought experiment. What you are saying is true - exposure to different stimuli do indeed cause physical changes in the brain. But it doesn't mean that the absolute difference between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge goes away.

But to acquire indirect knowledge, our brain has to be wired in a specific, physically measurable way. For me that is the heart of the problem and the misunderstanding.

OK, imagine we find a drug which keeps Marys brain in the state where it is receptive to new colour impressions even when she is old enough to have learned everything about physics. It's a thought experiment - if we can posit someone can learn everything there is to learn about red then we can posit their brain can stay in 'plasticised' mode - these are side-issues, IMO.

I don't understand what you mean by "keeps Mary's brain in the state where it is receptive to new colour impressions". In order to keep it in that state, it has to get in that state. In order to get in that state, it has to be exposed to different colors during its developmental phase.

A new thought experiment might be to have Mary exposed to colors only very early on in childhood while her brain is developing, then to isolate her in black and white. But then the problem becomes much less interesting because she has experienced different colors already. So we can't say that she is experiencing red for the first time when she leaves the room.

Maybe we can "fix" this thought experiment, but as stated now I don't believe it properly separates subjective and objective.

 

[ChuckieR]

OK, imagine we find a drug which keeps Marys brain in the state where it is receptive to new colour impressions even when she is old enough to have learned everything about physics. It's a thought experiment - if we can posit someone can learn everything there is to learn about red then we can posit their brain can stay in 'plasticised' mode - these are side-issues, IMO.

I don't think I answered this well in my last post. Parts of the brain are very plastic early in childhood, then they apparently solidify somewhat. If they never solidified, we could never learn anything. If Mary takes this drug, nothing she experiences will ever "stick".

But let's say we can magically somehow only keep the visual portion of the eye/brain in "plastic" mode (I'm not sure this is possible since there is so much cross wiring in the brain, but whatever...). Mary will be effectively blind during this period. Everything she can learn about "red" will have to be "read" to her (pardon the near-pun). Then when she stops taking the drug, her visual system will start to "learn" as if she was an infant.

But this isn't exactly what the KA folks have in mind either, I think. Because Mary would just go through the same learning experience a child would go through. Yes, when red first hits her retinas, it will be a new "experience", but she will not be able to "see" things like an adult. She will have to "learn" how to see first, which will take awhile. It would be interesting to have an adult perspective on how this process feels, but there would be nothing physically unexplainable. As she learned, her brain would slowly become wired to differentiate between colors.

I think I can now state this in a single statement that sums up my objection to this particular thought experiment: We cannot separate learning how to see red from experiencing red. (except by some difficult surgery which simply wires our brain as if we had already learned how to see red, but this is trivial and uninteresting).

If you can come up with a thought experiment where we can separate the learning process from the "experiencing" process, then we could stop this scientific inquiry and return to our regularly scheduled philosophical discussion. But I think it will be very difficult because the way we learn to differentiate is by exposure to stimulus. Is there a way out of this box?