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Materialism

Okay...in E-Prime.

The word "ontology" means the study of the nature of existence and the relationship between the nature of the existence of mental things and the nature of the existence of physical things.
 
Paul,

UcE makes his broader claim about E-prime in this quote:
Whatever we are discussing E-Prime forces descriptions from the subjective perspective - and in doing so forces language to conform with our subjective perspective. So in E-Prime we cannot disagree.

UcE,

As we continue this discussion, please remain in E-prime.

Cheers,
 
UcE said:
They can't disagree about ontology, because ontology is about the nature of Beingness and E-Prime stops you using to be. You are prevented form assuming things about the nature of being.
So instead you assume things about the nature of existence. The philosophical disagreements across the ages do not evaporate because you stop using a certain verb. Although many of them might evaporate if we could just agree on the definitions of some other words.

~~ Paul
 
UndercoverElephant said:
Paul

The primary definition of "subjective" mean "in a mind" i.e. it has no meaning to anyone but the subject. It is only true for you. Things in your mind are only true for you, because they are in your mind. Things in your brain are true for everybody because, unlike your mind, your brain is available in objective reality for anyone to examine.

How could it be any clearer?
I'm not sure what the true in "true for you" and "true for everybody" means. The mind is the "behavior" of the brain. We can certainly observe the behavior of others' brains, and it certainly will not have direct control of our behavior. But as a thought experiment, you could wire more and more direct connections between two brains and eventually, yes, they would "experience" the same things (at least, this is what I would guess would happen).

Remember the split brain experiments? Essentially two "minds" in one head. We normally don't notice any conflict because the two sides of our brain are in constant communication.

Anything which exists in the physical world MUST BE objective. You are saying it is 'per person' because it is part of your body - but your body is itself part of the objective physical world. Your mind is subjective because it does not matter how carefully anyone disects your brain they will not gain access to your mind!

This is SO SIMPLE! :rolleyes:
In what sense does a song exist in the physical world? At any "instant" in time, there is no song. The song does not exist in the atoms, or the instruments, or the sheet music. The song is a process that plays out over time. The mind is the behavioral process of the brain that plays out over time.

You can definitely dissect the brain (at least metaphorically, with a super fMRI++ of the future, for instance) and understand how it works and observe the behavior of someone reacting to a particular stimulus.

You will not "experience" what someone else is experiencing if you look at their fMRI++ because that does not have direct internal connections to your brain.

I read your second to last sentence as "Your mind is subjective because it does not matter how carefully anyone disects your brain their brain will not behave identically to your brain!", which is true. Probably the only way to "have access to" someone else's mind is to have your mind wired exactly like theirs, but then you would be a copy of that other person. I'm not sure in what other sense you could "have access to" someone else's mind... the whole "what is it like to be a bat" thing.
 
BillHoyt said:
Paul,

UcE makes his broader claim about E-prime in this quote:


UcE,

As we continue this discussion, please remain in E-prime.

Cheers,

In E-Prime the materialist claim that "Qualia ARE brain processes" cannot be used, so we must explicitly declare what replaces the word ARE in this sentence in materialism.

Some suggestions :

Brain processes correlate with qualia.
Brain processes cause qualia.
Brain processes differ in no way from qualia.
The meaning of the term "Brain process" does not differ from the meaning of the term "qualia"
Qualia have no existence at all, only brain processes exist.
Brain processes exist in the physical world and qualia exist in the mental world.

edit to remove the last two for closer examination :
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
UcE said:
So instead you assume things about the nature of existence.


You can't do that either. You must specify the relationship between their respective ways of existing, or you cannot use them in the same sentence together.

The philosophical disagreements across the ages do not evaporate because you stop using a certain verb.

They are one hell of a lot easier to comprehend.
 
UndercoverElephant said:


In E-Prime the materialist claim that "Qualia ARE brain processes" cannot be used, so we must explicitly declare what replaces the word ARE in this sentence in materialism.

Do I already see a violation?

Cheers,
 
We build a conceptual model of the physical world to describe the behaviour of an external reality we perceive within the mental world, and we test our model with science.


Materialism :

We build a conceptual model of the mental world to describe the behaviour of an internal reality we have posited exists within the physical world which we originally perceived in the mental world. Stimpson has posited that it exists withing the physical world so that we can test this assertion with the scientific method. Can we test it with the scientific method? If we cannot test it with the scientific method then how do we justify positing that it exists within the physical world which we originally perceived within the mental world?
 
UcE said:
We build a conceptual model of the physical world to describe the behaviour of an external reality we perceive within the mental world, and we test our model with science.
I presume this is the definition of mental monism or some such. What are the assumptions of science here?

We build a conceptual model of the mental world to describe the behaviour of an internal reality we have posited exists within the physical world which we originally perceived in the mental world.
You lost me, but perhaps you mean:

We build a conceptual model of the internal world that arises from the brain that we know exists within the physical world that we perceive with that brain, and we test everything with science.

~~ Paul
 
UndercoverElephant said:
If it means "is identical to" then your statement is clearly wrong, since the experience itself and the correlating process clearly have completely different descriptions.
I guess I don't see why this follows. Certainly things can be described in multiple ways, especially if those descriptions address different aspects of the same thing.
Materialism must claim that the experience and the physical process are both the same thing and different things. Are they the same process? Are they 'different processes'? The problem for materialism is that they are the same process, but viewed from two completely perspectives, but that this perspective shift is totally unaccountable within materialism.
Why?

But at any rate, allow me to be more precise.

Elecromagnetic radiation with a wavelength of approximately 700 nm enters my eye. It strikes a receptor cell. This receptor triggers a nerve cascade. This nerve cascade triggers portions of the visual cortex. Other portions of my brain process the information and do things like distinguish objects from the background and recognize faces. This approximately describes, in terms of the physical events occurring in my brain, the experience of seeing red.
 
Rusty,

Surely you are not going to assert that Physicalism claims that everything is information? That the description is the reality?

That position is easily refuted, and you don't need Mary to do it. You are attacking a strawman here. Physicalism only claims that everything can be mathematically described in terms of our perceptions.
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No I am not asserting that physicalism claims everythign is information. I am asserting that the reduction process reduces everything to the point where I will call it information. I did this to define information because you did not. This was in response to you claiming that perceivable things are not knowledge.

So things that are mathematically described are not information?

Of course they are not. The mathematical description is information.

Wrong. The memory was not included in the book. A description of the memory was included in the book. You can no more include the memory in the book than you could include Mary's brain in the book. The book only contains descriptions.
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Physicalism states that the totality of everything that is the memory can be reduced to a state where it can be perceived. We all of that down and we have written down everything that memory is.

Once again, you are using the word "reduced" in a completely different way than the physicalists. All the above means, within the context of physicalism, is that a complete description can be made of the memory, in terms of percievable things.

If we cannot write it all down then physicalism is rendered false.

Again, to make it clear, physicalism asserts that everything is reducable to a state where it is perceived.

We can write down everything we perceive.

We can write down everything about that memory. Everything that it is.

You can assert that this is physicalism all you want, but this is not what any physicalist believes or claims. You are attacking a strawman based on a misunderstanding of the description of physicalism you read.

Do you acknowledge that there is a difference between a thing, and the description of that thing? Do you acknowledge that Physicalism does not claim that things are equivalent their descriptions? If you do not acknowledge these two points, then we have nothing to discuss.
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Physicalism claims that everything can be reduced to the point where it can be perceived. Everything.

So the reduced state (which I am calling information) must be equal to the original state, otherwise we have not included everything!

Jesus Christ, Man! Can't you just answer the question? Would you at least acknowledge that we disagree about what physicalism claims, rather than just repeating what you think it claims over and over again like a broken record?

I understand that physicalism does not claim that things = information. I am claiming that if you have the totallity of information about a thing then it logically follows that you have all the information that there is about that thing.

Well duh, but having all the information is not the same as having the thing.

So how can Mary gain more?

She can gain the thing itself.

It is really simple. Mary cannot learn everything there is to know about seeing red by reading a book. This fact does not contradict Physicalism, because Physicalism in no way claims that she should be able to. Physicalism only claims that a complete description of the process of seeing red should be possible. It in no way implies that knowing that description is equivalent to knowing what it is like to see red.
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Uh, no actually we already agreed that physicalism claims that everything is reducable to the point where it can be perceived. We can write down what we perceive. Everything about red can be written down in the book. Mary learns everything in the book. Mary learns everythng about red.

We agreed on that first statement, but we do not agree on what it means, or on any of the conclusions you have drawn from it.

She can learn it. She just can't learn it by reading a book. The book only contains a description of the brain state. For her to learn it, she must acquire that brain state. Physicalism only requires that we be able to describe the brain state. It does not require that we be able to give somebody that brain state.
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No, the book contains all the perceivable information about the memory. All the perceivable information is in the book. All of it. And everything is reducable to perceivable information.

You are misrepresenting physicalism, plain and simple.

You defined knowledge as the physical state of the brain. So what you are asking me is this:

"Do you understand that to perceive Mary's physical state of her brain when she see's red is not the same as to have the physical state of Mary's brain when she see's red."

Correct. But everything is reducable to perception, and if you have all of that perception then you have the thing.

Once again, you are using a different meaning of the word reducible than the physicalist are. Why won't you acknowledge this?

If Mary's "knowledge" consists of 5 brain dots, and you gain a perception of those 5 brain dots, then you gained Mary's "knowledge".

Obviously not. If you gain perception of those five dots, then that is what you have. you do not have the five dots.

If Mary's "knowledge" is more then the 5 brain dots in any way that cannot be reduced to a perceivable state then physicalism is false.

Mary's knowledge is not more than the 5 brain dots. But since those 5 brain dots are percievable, this is perfectly fine.

In the first case, I am able to perceive her brain state. The "reduction" that you are talking about is nothing more than a description of her knowledge of what it is like to see red in terms of that brain state.
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Again, you defined knowledge as brain state. So let us re-write your sentance to see what you are truly saying:

"The "reduction" that you are talking about is nothing more than a description of her brain state of what it is like to see red in terms of that brain state."

According to physicalism there can be nothing more then that brain state. So if I fully learn and understand a description of everything there is then how can I learn MORE when I see the thing?

Because you can also have the brain state itself. I have already explained this.

If I give you a complete description of a dog, then you still don't have a dog. If I give you a real dog, you have still gained something.

You are attributing things to Physicalism that it does not say, because you are misunderstanding what it means to say that everything is reducible to a state where I can perceive it. This only means that I can, in principle, describe everything in terms of my perceptions.
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No we still agree. It means that we can describe EVERYTHING. So we reduce and describe everything about red, memory of red, knowledge Nth of red, etc.. Mary learns and understands it all. She has now learned and understood everything about red etc.. but when she see's red she learns something MORE.

Why is this a problem!?!?!

Before she sees red she has a complete description of what it is like to see red. After she sees red she has the memory of actually having seen red. What is the problem?

Why do you insist that she should be able to acquire the memory of having seen red just by reading a description of it?

This is not what any person who calls himself a physicalist is claiming. You are attacking a nonsensical strawman. No physicalist would claim that you can transform a dog into perceivable information. They would only claim that you can provide a description of the dog in terms of perceptions.
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Exactly, a complete description of everything that dog is. So if we replace dog with red and say that we can provide a complete description of everything that red is then Mary learns that description of what red is then how can she learn something more when she see's red.

The same way you get something more when you get the real dog. As I already explained, the description can only give her abstract knowledge. Actually seeing read gives her empirical knowledge. Absatract and empirical knowledge are two physically different things, which are acquired through different physical processes. Why is this so difficult for you to understand?

The things that we perceive objectively exist. We describe them in terms of our perceptions. Those descriptions are information. The things being described are not. Is that clear enough?
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The descriptions are information. Correct. As you progress through your rebuttal we agree again.

Mary possesses all the information about red etc.. but see's red and gains something more. Hence we must discard physicalism.

What she gains is not information about red. What she gains is the memory of having seen red. Memories are not information, remember?

I only objected when you made it clear that by "reduced to a physical fact" you meant something more than just "described in terms of physical facts".
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Wait, now you are saying that a description of the physical fact is different from a physical fact? Those two are the same thing.

I didn't say anything about a description of the physical fact. I said "described in terms of physical facts".

I object to your use of the word "reduced". You are clearly using it to mean something different than what physicalists mean by it.
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No I mean what physicalists mean.

Reduced = Rendered

Reduced to a state where any human can perceive = Rendered to a state where any human can perceive.

That is not what physicalists mean by it. Physicalists mean that it can be described in terms of our perceptions.

This is clearly going nowhere. From now on, I am not going to use the word "reduced". It is ambiguous and unclear. I hereby deny that Physicalism claims that anything can be reduced to physical facts, in the sense that you are using the term.
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You are changing physicalism!

No, I am not. I am clarifying it. The problem is that you do not know what physicalism is. All you know is your misconception of it. And for some reason that I cannot fathom, you refuse to allow actual physicalists to correct your misconceptions. Instead you insist that your definition of it is the correct one, even though nobody who calls himself a physicalist believes what you are claiming it means.

Ok, now we need to come up with something that will allow a non-physical "agent".

Go for it. I suggest you start by coming up with a coherent definition of "agent", and a logical reason to believe it exists. Good luck.

, of course, am using physical to mean both caused and causal.

This doesn't surprise me in the slightest, given that physicalists don't define physical that way either. :rolleyes:

Physicalism only claims that everything can be described in terms of our perceptions. It does not claim that objects can be transformed into perceptions, or that objects are perceptions, or that objects are information.
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Yes, exactly. It is the claim that everything can be 'described'. It is described by rendering it to such a state that it can be perceived. We describe the perceptions.

No, we describe the object in terms of our perceptions.

No. Our brains can turn information into abstract knowledge. It cannot turn information into empirical knowledge.
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So there are two types of knowledge? Are they both brain-states?

Of course. I already explained that. Abstract knowledge is the memory of abstract facts (information). Empirical knowledge is the memory of an experience.

Into abstract knowledge. She only has the abstract knowledge. The only (natural) way for her to get the empirical knowledge is to actually see red. In principle, it may be possible to artificially give her this empirical knowledge, but reading a book isn't going to do it.
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If knowledge is a brain state and the brain state can be completely described and placed in the book then she can gain that knowledge by learning and understanding the description in the book.

No, she cannot. The brain state can be completely described, and that description can be placed in the book, but all Mary will get by reading that book is the information. It will not give her the brain state. She will have abstract knowledge of the description of the empirical knowledge, but she will not have the empirical knowledge.

If you can only gain the knowledge by seeing red then you can not reduce that knowledge to a complete description.

If you can only gain a scar by being cut, then you cannot reduce the scar to a complete description.

See the problem with your argument yet?

Reading about being cut isn't going to give you a scar. Reading a complete physical description of the scar isn't going to give you one either. All it gives you is abstract knowledge of the scar.

You are not using the word "reduced" the way it is used in the definition of Physicalism. You are attacking a strawman.
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No, you are changing physiclism which is exactly what I want to do. Hooray.

Your arrogence amazes me. You are not a physicalist. You are basing your arguments entirely on a brief, one-line description of physicalism, and your own interpretation of what was meant by it, and yet you presume to tell people who are physicalists, and who know the complete formal definition of it that leads to the brief one-line description you were told, that they are wrong about what it is.

Just to reiterate. I claim that everything can be described in terms of our observations. I call this claim Physicalism. you can assert that physicalism claims that everything can be transformed into information. I agree with you that such a claim is nonsensical. What I don't understand is why you would assert that this is what physicalism claims?
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It is what you are claiming.

Anything + perception = description.

That is not what I am claiming. The two sides of your equation are not equal. The proper operator would be an arrow, meaning implication, not equality.

Anything can be rendered into a description.

Meaning that a description of anything can be constructed.

Descriptions are information.

They are information about the thing being described.

Anything can be rendered into information.

Anything can be described. That does not mean that it is the description, or that it is equivelent to the information.

It seems awfully conceited for you (who are not a physicalist) to be deciding what Physicalism means, and to be telling other people that they are not physicalists because they don't believe what you say they should.

Did it ever, even once, occur to you that maybe you have misunderstood the definition of Physicalism? That maybe the physicalists who wrote down that definition meant something different by it than what you originally thought?

Did it ever occur to you, when you realized that what you thought it meant was incoherent, to ask the physicalists to clarify what they meant, rather than just assuming that they did mean something incoherent?

Dr. Stupid
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Yes, we are redefining physicalism. I will continue to press for the redefinition of physiclism until it is such that it will accept the "agent".

Am I to assume then that your answers the above questions are "no"? :rolleyes:

If it feeds your ego to believe I am redefining physicalism, rather than simply clarifying that what you thought it was is not what it is, that's fine. Either way, I expect that from now on you will not claim that I, or any other physicalist, is claiming anything other than what they say they are.

I find it particularly tellig that throughout this entire discussion, you never once asked any of the physicalists to explain what they think physicalism means, or even what they think the description of physicalism you posted means.


Ian,

There seems to be a lot of confusion and talking at cross purposes here. The information isn't literally the dog. That the mistake central state materialism makes (identity theory). Rather the dog is a function of that information. The information entails the dog. Once you are acquanited with that information, and if you're a functionalist (which most materialists are), it should in principle be possible to work out what the dog looks like, and is thinking, purely from the information. Is that correct?

Exactly. It certainly doesn't mean that just because I could, in principle, work out what the dog is thinking, that I could somehow experience the dog's thoughts.

I wouldn't say that the dog is a function of the information, though. I would say that the information is a description of the dog. Depending on what precisely you mean by "function", this may or may not be OK.

Oh my gosh, yet another one: entail. Ian said:
Which of the following definition of entail from Webster's are you using?

"1 : to restrict (property) by limiting the inheritance to the owner's lineal descendants or to a particular class thereof
2 a : to confer, assign, or transmit as if by entail : FASTEN *entailed on them indelible disgrace Robert Browning* b : to fix (a person) permanently in some condition or status *entail him and his heirs unto the crown Shakespeare*
3 : to impose, involve, or imply as a necessary accompaniment or result *the project will entail considerable expense"

I suspect you might be able to work out what the dog is like, but I doubt you could experience what it's like to be a dog.

~~ Paul
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In which case what it is LIKE to be a dog cannot be derived from the totality of physical facts about the world. If it cannot be derived how can you therefore claim reductive materialism is true?

Not true. What it is like to be a dog can be derived from the totality of physical facts about the World. Experiencing what it is like to be the dog would be a physical process occuring in your brain. A process which is not physically possible, because you are not a dog.

The fact that you can completely describe the physical state of a dog's ass doesn't mean that your ass could ever be in that state. Why should the fact that you can completely describe the state of a dog's brain imply that your brain could ever be in that state?

Dr. Stupid
 
...referee blows whistle...

UcE Claimed:
They can't disagree about ontology, because ontology is about the nature of Beingness and E-Prime stops you using to be. You are prevented form assuming things about the nature of being.
UcE Defined:
The word "ontology" means the study of the nature of existence and the relationship between the nature of the existence of mental things and the nature of the existence of physical things.
I declared the rules of the game, E-prime only, and shot the starter's pistol.
Uce then asserted:
We build a conceptual model of the mental world to describe the behaviour of an internal reality we have posited exists within the physical world which we originally perceived in the mental world.
To which Paul posted:
We build a conceptual model of the internal world that arises from the brain that we know exists within the physical world that we perceive with that brain, and we test everything with science.
Exercise over. In e-prime, they just discussed an ontological issue. In e-prime, they just disagreed.


Cheers,
 
Paul :

quote:
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We build a conceptual model of the physical world to describe the behaviour of an external reality we perceive within the mental world, and we test our model with science.
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I presume this is the definition of mental monism or some such.

You presume wrongly. I have merely stated the facts. We use words to conduct debates. Those words represent concepts. We then use language to express ideas about these concepts. Ultimately, all concepts refer to things which you have experienced in the mental realm, including the concept of the physical world. The process of science involves inventing models to describe the relationships between those concepts and testing them agains the behaviour of the things those concepts refer to.

What are the assumptions of science here?

Science assumes a shared objective reality which behaves according to logical rules.

You lost me, but perhaps you mean:

We build a conceptual model of the internal world that arises from the brain that we know exists within the physical world that we perceive with that brain, and we test everything with science.

Then I would have to ask you why you have stated that the internal world arises from the brain (not that it matters for the KA).

We aim to discover whether the knowledge argument succeeds of fails to falsify materialism. To do this we must ask the following questions :

Do brain processes differ from qualia in anyway?
If they do, then how do they differ?
By what means do we gain knowledge of facts about qualia?
By what means do we gain knowledge of facts about brain processes?
Do the answers to these questions clarify the validity of the KA?
 
The fact that you can completely describe the physical state of a dog's ass doesn't mean that your ass could ever be in that state. Why should the fact that you can completely describe the state of a dog's brain imply that your brain could ever be in that state?
I just read a big thick book on dogs and I could feel my ass start to twitch. I feel confident that if I could read a more complete book, my ass would turn into a dog's ass. Perhaps they're right, Stimpy.

~~ Paul
 
me:
Maybe I can state this differently. Think again about how the eyes rotate left 20 degrees when the head rotates right 20 degrees. There is essentially a "gain factor" between the rotation sensors in my ear and the eye muscle control. I am not aware of that gain factor. I cannot directly control that gain factor. In that sense it is subjective.

Yet, someone could go poking and proding in my brain and determine that in fact that gain factor exists, and could show the physical process that the neurons perform to implement that gain factor. In that sense it is objective.

So you cannot "self reflect" on this gain factor (treating your brain as a "black box"), yet it is absolutely scientifically accessable (it is objective).

Does that clarify it?
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Originally posted by Rusty_the_boy_robot


It certainly clarifies that you don't know what subjective and objective mean.

Subjective does not require that you 'directly control' something.

There are many things I do not directly control, have they all become subjective?
Thank you, I probably should have said that you don't have direct "access" to that gain factor, not "control". You are not consciously aware of the gain factor. Yet it is in there controlling the movement of your eyes, controlling your behavior. In that sense it is subjective. It is personal to you. Until, that is, we allow the poking and prodding of your brain, then we can describe it objectively in terms of the workings of the neurons. Until then, we can only speculate as to why your eyes move opposite your head.
 
UcE said:
Then I would have to ask you why you have stated that the internal world arises from the brain (not that it matters for the KA).
I was just trying to understand what you said. Please rephrase if I am wrong.

And the fact that I wrote it in E-prime was an accident! I didn't even know we were in E-prime mode.

We aim to discover whether the knowledge argument succeeds of fails to falsify materialism. To do this we must ask the following questions :
Oh, it's not anywhere near that hard. All we have to do is agree on whether Mary can get her brain in the has-seen-red state by reading books and/or undergoing operations, then agree that if she can, we have no idea what happens when she walks out of the room.

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:

And the fact that I wrote it in E-prime was an accident! I didn't even know we were in E-prime mode.

~~ Paul

Ah, the sweet irony of it all. And still you managed to demonstrate that the claimed inability to disagree is a boojum.

Cheers,
 

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