I really think this question doesn't pose a problem for materialists. I view 'consciousness' as a measure of 'computing power' if you like, and I can easily posit a whole string of machines from zero computing power, up to a modern supercomputer. For example a very simple machine might have two valves, one after the other, on the same length of pipe, and water could only flow through the pipe if both valves are open at the same time. I think we also mentioned the thermostat last time we went down this road.Interesting Ian said:
Any metaphysical system has many difficulties. I'm not sure why you think this poses no difficulty for materialism at all. You are saying that there is an organism which is completely lacking in consciousness, but its offspring is very slightly conscious? What is the crucial difference which leads to this conscious awareness?
This question however DOES pose a problem to your sort of idealism, I think, simply because you believe there is the event of the consciousness attaching to the brain. So it either does do that, or it doesn't.
Maybe you could get around it by having a universal consciousness, that attaches in different degrees to different things. I think the problem with your form of idealism results from the 'either sentient or not' property, with no in-between.
Edit: typo. I had 'materialism' instead of 'idealism' Oops!