Is Subjective Idealism compatible with Evolution?

[Interesting Ian]

Put five minutes effort into answering my two questions (numbered 1. and 2. many posts back), instead of just saying, "I don't know", and then I'll tell you. So far, we effectively have this situation:

ceptimus: What do you think about this, Ian?

Interesting Ian: I don't know.

The answer to the first one is insufficient data in order for me to reach a conclusion. The answer to the second one is no.

 

[hammegk]

The same way we can figure out what a circuit does even if we aren't given access to its output: by constucting a model that represents the structure of the circuit.

OK. Which human prototype-model shall we look at first?

Why don't you synthesize "life" before we work up to human complexity. And circuits are evaluated by rules derived from the observation of the behavior of actual circuits.

 

[ceptimus]

The answer to the first one is insufficient data in order for me to reach a conclusion. The answer to the second one is no.

You need to explain your answer, 'No', to the second question.

Premise: All animals are either sentient or not.
Premise: All animals evolved from bacteria.
Premise: Bacteria are not sentient.
Premise: Some animals are sentient.

Conclusion: At some stage of evolution, a sentient creature must have had non-sentient parents (or parent, if this occured to a non-sexually reproducing creature).

OK. Which point do you disagree with?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

OK. Which human prototype-model shall we look at first?

I would suggest staring by decoding the genetic code. We can work our way up from there.

Why don't you synthesize "life" before we work up to human complexity.

We'd have to define life, first - at task that is at least as hard, and probably even harder, than defining consciousness.

And circuits are evaluated by rules derived from the observation of the behavior of actual circuits.

Yes indeed. But they run according to eternal principles.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You need to explain your answer, 'No', to the second question.

Premise: All animals are either sentient or not.
Premise: All animals evolved from bacteria.
Premise: Bacteria are not sentient.
Premise: Some animals are sentient.

Conclusion: At some stage of evolution, a sentient creature must have had non-sentient parents (or parent, if this occured to a non-sexually reproducing creature).

OK. Which point do you disagree with?

Some creatures can be very very slightly sentient don't forget. There need not be any sharp dichotomy as you imply.

 

[ceptimus]

Some creatures can be very very slightly sentient don't forget. There need not be any sharp dichotomy as you imply.

It's you who has the problem here Ian. You said that if a creature is sentient, the soul attaches at some point between conception and birth.

I already said I don't have any problem. Remember the music analogy and all that other stuff?

So Ian, how will you rescue your metaphysic from this dilema?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


There are different types of idealism and their meanings vary. I really don't think it has much meaning denying the existence of an "external world". Could you define what precisely you mean?[/I]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I said that philosophical idealism doesn't assume that an external world exists, which means that its existence is not known for certain, not that it doesn't exist.

Subjective idealism explicitly denies the existence of a mind-independent reality. Berkeley argued it was unintelligible.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian


On the other hand other idealist positions hold that although the external world is mental, it exists independently of any minds. [/i]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



What do you mean by "the external world is mental"? Do you mean that the external world is only perceived mentally? If so, that really doesn't sound like idealism. It sounds more like representative realism. How would idealists justify the existence of this independent, external world? This is the problem of correspondence that idealists have to deal with. Berkeley thought that it was God who created the correspondence between our sense impressions. Any better ideas?

I don't want to talk about other idealist positions. I haven't read up enough on them. Yes Berkeley thought it was God who directly conveys to us our sensory experiences. This explains their order so that we see discrete physical objects rather than a chaotic jumble of sensory impressions. Do you find this unsatisfactory?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

As I say you need to be clear about what you mean by an external world. What does it mean to say that we don't have bodies?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



See above. It doesn't mean that bodies are not there, just that our understanding of bodies are through experiences (which may or not be "correct").

OK

Which is why what I really want to see is how an idealist defends how their view doesn't slide to solipsism. If the external world is the product of minds (and presumably other minds exist independently from each other), then how can idealism justify the existence of other minds?

Berkeley argued that it is merely what we call the physical world which is simply patterns in our sensory experiences. He said there are selves and their ideas. Selves are not constituted by ones sensory experiences. How could they be?

Idealists infer the existence of other people in the same way as interactive dualists do. Basically by analogy. I know I have a mind, and that my bodily behaviour is partially due to that mind. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that other peoples bodily movements are caused by other minds.

 

[Mercutio]

As I say, the words "private behaviour" are a contradiction in terms.

As are the words "positive punishment", in colloquial speech. However, both "positive punishment" and "private behavior" are well defined terms within the vocabulary of radical behaviorism. I would think you would appreciate this--you, for instance, are quite adept with a philosophical vocabulary which, to the average person, is complete gibberish. That you are not as adept with the vocabulary of radical behaviorism is nothing to be ashamed of, but for you to claim that a specific, well-defined phrase is "a contradiction in terms" smacks of hubris.

I think you're using a differing definition of "observe" as well. I mean by observe to take note of ones environment through the 5 physical senses. Do you understand it as meaning something else?

Those senses are wonderful for observation of public behavior, but for private behavior? Certainly, some of the same brain areas are used--the occipital lobe lights up not only when we see something with our eyes, but when we see something without them. The neat thing is, our level of analysis is behavior, not the physiological underpinnings of it. Can those things be examined? Certainly--that's how we know about the occipital lobe stuff just above. But our interest is only that when I dream, I observe this dream even though you cannot. It is something that I do (thus a behavior), but something that you cannot, even in principle, observe (thus, private).

Now, earlier posts of yours might lead me to suggest that you would think a behaviorist might deny dreams at all, since they cannot be observed by a third party. Of course, we do dream; of course, we (and only we, never a third party) "observe" our dreams; of course, no behaviorist would deny this, and of course, this is private behavior.

Anyway, I find it rather implausible that I have been using the word behaviour in an improper meaning for the totality of my life. Moreover, if it doesn't mean what I think it means, what could it possibly mean? One cannot have private anything without rejecting materialism. This is absolutely clear.

You are quite wrong here, of course. I'll bet you have used the word "charmed" in a manner quite unlike the folks examining quarks. The word is used both colloquially and technically. You have not been using the word "behavior" improperly all your life. You have, however, been using the word "behavior" improperly when engaged in serious discussion about the philosophy of radical behaviorism. The two contexts (your regular life, and a discussion of radical behaviorism) require two different definitions of the word.

 

[Interesting Ian]

It's you who has the problem here Ian. You said that if a creature is sentient, the soul attaches at some point between conception and birth.

I already said I don't have any problem. Remember the music analogy and all that other stuff?

So Ian, how will you rescue your metaphysic from this dilema?

What problem do I have? Remember it isn't simply just the soul which determines ones degree of awareness, but ones state of brain as well. The soul operates and gets "filtered" through the brain remember. Also all souls certainly need not be on a equal level.

 

[Interesting Ian]

As are the words "positive punishment", in colloquial speech. However, both "positive punishment" and "private behavior" are well defined terms within the vocabulary of radical behaviorism. I would think you would appreciate this--you, for instance, are quite adept with a philosophical vocabulary which, to the average person, is complete gibberish. That you are not as adept with the vocabulary of radical behaviorism is nothing to be ashamed of, but for you to claim that a specific, well-defined phrase is "a contradiction in terms" smacks of hubris.
[/b] Those senses are wonderful for observation of public behavior, but for private behavior? Certainly, some of the same brain areas are used--the occipital lobe lights up not only when we see something with our eyes, but when we see something without them. The neat thing is, our level of analysis is behavior, not the physiological underpinnings of it. Can those things be examined? Certainly--that's how we know about the occipital lobe stuff just above. But our interest is only that when I dream, I observe this dream even though you cannot. It is something that I do (thus a behavior), but something that you cannot, even in principle, observe (thus, private).

Now, earlier posts of yours might lead me to suggest that you would think a behaviorist might deny dreams at all, since they cannot be observed by a third party. Of course, we do dream; of course, we (and only we, never a third party) "observe" our dreams; of course, no behaviorist would deny this, and of course, this is private behavior.
You are quite wrong here, of course. I'll bet you have used the word "charmed" in a manner quite unlike the folks examining quarks. The word is used both colloquially and technically. You have not been using the word "behavior" improperly all your life. You have, however, been using the word "behavior" improperly when engaged in serious discussion about the philosophy of radical behaviorism. The two contexts (your regular life, and a discussion of radical behaviorism) require two different definitions of the word. [/B]

Bad mood huh? You need to define private behaviour. Under materialism you cannot have private anything because only the physical world exists, and the physical world by definition is publically observable. If one cannot observe something (through the 5 senses), not even in principle, then it is not physical

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Excellent post, Mercutio. I must disagree with you in regards to dreams, however - the fact that someone is dreaming seems to be objectively verifiable from eye movements alone.

I see no reason to assume that dreams are truly "private" phenomena, or that there is such a thing in the first place.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Think I'll have a pint of blackcurrent cordial

 

[Interesting Ian]

Excellent post, Mercutio. I must disagree with you in regards to dreams, however - the fact that someone is dreaming seems to be objectively verifiable from eye movements alone.

I see no reason to assume that dreams are truly "private" phenomena, or that there is such a thing in the first place.

You think that people can read your thoughts?

 

[Mercutio]

Excellent post, Mercutio. I must disagree with you in regards to dreams, however - the fact that someone is dreaming seems to be objectively verifiable from eye movements alone.

I see no reason to assume that dreams are truly "private" phenomena, or that there is such a thing in the first place.

Thanks Wrath...let me be a bit more specific. You may, of course, measure REM, or occipital lobe activity, or any number of things. But you may not observe my actual dream. Only I have access to this (I am willing to be proven wrong, but I believe that even the most astounding leaps in neurology may not ever give us the ability to actually play a dream like a videotape). It is this, the actual dreaming as experienced, that is a private behavior.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Bad mood huh? You need to define private behaviour. Under materialism you cannot have private anything because only the physical world exists, and the physical world by definition is publically observable. If one cannot observe something (through the 5 senses), not even in principle, then it is not physical

Actually, I am in a great mood. You cannot know that, of course, because it is private . I have, of course, defined private behavior, and defined it perfectly adequately. It is behavior (anything that you do) that cannot, even in principle, be observed by another person. This is the definition we have used for decades, Ian, and it works just fine. Your objections would indicate that your view of behaviorism is what we call methodological behaviorism, which J. B. Watson favored. That is part of our history, Ian, not part of our present. Once again, you (the subjective idealist) are trying to tell me how I must define my (radical behaviorist) terms. I humbly suggest that you do not know radical behaviorism well enough to do this.

Of course, using the definitions we actually do use--instead of the ones you wish to impose on us--might have an impact on your arguments. You may have to rethink your proofs. Hey, take your time. My world-view is very different from yours; I cannot expect you to truly understand it at the drop of a hat.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I'm not so sure that your "private behavior" is actually different from Ian's "nonphysical events". I suppose it depends on how literally we take the statement "cannot be observed by others, even in principle".

 

[Interesting Ian]

Thanks Wrath...let me be a bit more specific. You may, of course, measure REM, or occipital lobe activity, or any number of things. But you may not observe my actual dream. Only I have access to this (I am willing to be proven wrong, but I believe that even the most astounding leaps in neurology may not ever give us the ability to actually play a dream like a videotape). It is this, the actual dreaming as experienced, that is a private behavior.

Actually, I am in a great mood. You cannot know that, of course, because it is private . I have, of course, defined private behavior, and defined it perfectly adequately. It is behavior (anything that you do) that cannot, even in principle, be observed by another person. This is the definition we have used for decades, Ian, and it works just fine. Your objections would indicate that your view of behaviorism is what we call methodological behaviorism, which J. B. Watson favored. That is part of our history, Ian, not part of our present. Once again, you (the subjective idealist) are trying to tell me how I must define my (radical behaviorist) terms. I humbly suggest that you do not know radical behaviorism well enough to do this.

Of course, using the definitions we actually do use--instead of the ones you wish to impose on us--might have an impact on your arguments. You may have to rethink your proofs. Hey, take your time. My world-view is very different from yours; I cannot expect you to truly understand it at the drop of a hat.

No need to rethink my proof. You've admitted that no-one can observe your dreams. Your position is simply incompatible with materialism. Here is the proof.

1. Everything physical can in principle be observed, either directly or indirectly, by anyone with unimpaired senses and with the appropriate instruments.
2. Your dreams cannot be so observed by anyone.
3. Therefore your dreams are not physical
4. Therefore there exist some things which are not physical
5. Therefore materialism is refuted.
   [/list=1]

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'm not so sure that your "private behavior" is actually different from Ian's "nonphysical events". I suppose it depends on how literally we take the statement "cannot be observed by others, even in principle".

I don't see how they're different at all.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Although Ian is wrong is claiming that physical things need to be detectable with any one of the "traditional" five senses, his argument is actually valid for once.

It's one thing to say that dreams are private in practice. It's quite another to claim that no one else can ever access them. That would indeed require that some aspect of the dream take place outside this universe. That would also mean that your discussion of that aspect is necessarily incorrect, as you're inside this universe and therefore cannot interact with something outside it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Although Ian is wrong is claiming that physical things need to be detectable with any one of the "traditional" five senses, his argument is actually valid for once.

I said with appropriate instruments and also mentioned indirect observations.

I must admit I'm a bit perplexed by Mercutio's stance here though

Doesn't seem like materialism to me!

 

[Mercutio]

I said with appropriate instruments and also mentioned indirect observations.

I must admit I'm a bit perplexed by Mercutio's stance here though

Doesn't seem like materialism to me!

You got me, Ian! I am not a materialist, but a pragmatist. I came into this argument simply to correct your use of vocabulary--if I ended up defending materialism, it was only a by-product.

Wrath:

It's one thing to say that dreams are private in practice. It's quite another to claim that no one else can ever access them. That would indeed require that some aspect of the dream take place outside this universe. That would also mean that your discussion of that aspect is necessarily incorrect, as you're inside this universe and therefore cannot interact with something outside it.

I absolutely do not follow you when you say that some aspect of the dream is outside this universe just because a second person cannot witness it. That seems to me either an inadequate definition of either "access" or "universe". I am quite puzzled by this, and look forward to your clearing it up. Please, why does my view imply to you that some aspect of my dream is outside the universe? I mean, it is part of my behavior, and I am part of the universe--what more do you need?