Is Subjective Idealism compatible with Evolution?

[hammegk]

I disagree. Body implies at 100% probability that life springs from non-life and atheism -- real, hard, atheism -- is absolutely correct.

Mind opens a multitude of other doors. I have 1 single, truly objective, data point: "thought exists". Nihilism & solipsism are meaningless so here we are by gentlemans agreement. *You* think, and *I* think.


Science works equally well under choice of either body or mind; 'objective' meaning that "reality" of unknown ontology exists independent of any specific "mind", humans currently having the most advanced one we identify (via 3rd person perception).

 

[Mercutio]

I disagree. Body implies at 100% probability that life springs from non-life and atheism -- real, hard, atheism -- is absolutely correct.

Mind opens a multitude of other doors. I have 1 single, truly objective, data point: "thought exists". Nihilism & solipsism are meaningless so here we are by gentlemans agreement. *You* think, and *I* think.

Those aren't doors. They look like doors, but none of them actually open. If they did, then there would be a difference between the monisms, and our pragmatic approach would lead us to pick the approach that more nearly fits what we see. But then we would not have stretched this thread out so many pages.

A door which cannot be opened is just a neat design on a wall.

 

[hammegk]

As I've said before, only the logic you employ as you analyse the 2 different choices can provide any difference.

If you find a stance that has the 100% probablity that actual, hard, atheism is "what-is" best suits your wordview, that is your choice. My logic and analysis vis-a-vis my worldview leads me to the other choice.


How do you determine if a doorway is paint on the wall, or a real door? If it opens even once for a specific person at a specific time, then what? You of course can contend all such experiences are hallucinatory; people who have had them may be less sure of your diagnosis.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:
How do you determine if a doorway is paint on the wall, or a real door? If it opens even once for a specific person at a specific time, then what? You of course can contend all such experiences are hallucinatory; people who have had them may be less sure of your diagnosis.

I don't have to contend that they are hallucinatory. I only have to contend that they do not require some magical attribute of the single existent that can only be provided by a mentally-flavored existent and not a physically-flavored existent. And since we have no idea what those experiences actually are, it is premature to even worry about it. Your "logic" consists of assuming that certain events in the world require attributes that can only be provided by one flavor of existent, even though you have no way to show that the other flavor cannot handle those events.

Here's a third possibility: The fundamental existent is the existon. Depending upon how it vibrates, it gives rise to all the particles we know, all the force carriers, and also the psion. The psion is the source of what we call consciousness, and coexists with the other particles and force carriers in various combinations that give rise to various levels of consciousness. A fifth force carrier, the extremely subtle P vector boson, sometimes transfers force between psions and other particles, giving rise to psi effects. We have not detected the psion and P yet because of their extremely erratic behavior.

There you go, a third fundamental existent.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II

Subjective idealism explicitly denies the existence of a mind-independent reality. Berkeley argued it was unintelligible.[/i]
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EU
Fair enough. For subjective idealists, then, shouldn't they distinguish between "having no justification for an external world" and "explicit denial of an external world"? It seems that the latter is too extreme. If all we have to go by are our experiences, then we really can't say for certain if these experiences are caused by something external to the mind.

I'm really not happy with this "external world" business. So instead I'm going to refer to it as MIR (mind-independent reality).

Now, if we have no justification for the existence of a MIR, then why believe in it? But Berkeley went beyond this. He maintained the notion of an MIR is unintelligible. If there is a MIR chair for example, then what is it like? I mean is the real material chair similar to the experienced chair? Is the real material chair (external to all minds) brown in color? Note that we're talking about brownness as perceptually experienced. So can this non-experienced reality be exactly like our experiences? I don't know what Berkeley's arguments exactly were (I can't remember) but it is a completely unnecessary duplication. Why is there a need for a material chair which is exactly like the perceived chair? And it's opposed to what science says anyway. This brings us to the consideration that the material chair is quite unlike our perceptual experiences of it. But if the material chair is quite unlike the perceived chair, then what it is exactly like must forevermore remain unaccessible to us (like Kant's nounema). Again, why suppose the existence of a wholly, in principle, unknowable reality?

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Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I don't want to talk about other idealist positions. I haven't read up enough on them. Yes Berkeley thought it was God who directly conveys to us our sensory experiences. This explains their order so that we see discrete physical objects rather than a chaotic jumble of sensory impressions. Do you find this unsatisfactory?
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EU
Well, he is using a claim which may or may not be true (the existence of God) to support his version of idealism, so probably not.

He infers the existence of God. Our sensory perceptions are ordered into certain familes we call physical objects. But we could have existed in a Universe where our sensory perceptions were completely random, and chaotic, and unpredictable. So there must be intelligence behind the order we see. Basically he is inferring the mind of God in much a similar way to which we infer the minds of other people. Just as other peoples bodies act in a way suggestive of purpose, so does the Universe as a whole act in such a way to suggest purpose (and therefore a mind responsible).

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Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Berkeley argued that it is merely what we call the physical world which is simply patterns in our sensory experiences. He said there are selves and their ideas. Selves are not constituted by ones sensory experiences. How could they be?
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EU
First, how can he even talk about 'sensory experiences" if there is no external world to "sense"? At least, with an explanation that doesn't include God.

The name is unimportant. Call it qualia, perceptual experiences or whatever. Actually he uses the term "idea", but the meaning of this term has slightly changed since Berkeley's time.

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Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Idealists infer the existence of other people in the same way as interactive dualists do. Basically by analogy. I know I have a mind, and that my bodily behaviour is partially due to that mind. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that other peoples bodily movements are caused by other minds.
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EU
I still do not know how idealism, which denies an external world, can not lead to solipsism. If you deny the existence of any "mind-independent reality", then you also deny the existence of other minds. Unless, of course, you believe in Berkeley's contention which uses God in its explanation.

Subjective idealism is denying any reality independent of any minds. It's giving an analysis of what it means to talk about the "physical". Remember that, for the non-materialist, minds are not part of physical reality. So Berkeley has no more reason to be a solipsist then interactive dualists.

Basically he said this about physical reality. What we understand as "physical reality" cannot be abstracted from a perceiving subject. If you maintain there exists an unexperienced reality, then, by definition, we cannot know about it through experience i.e we cannot experience the unexperienced. Nor can we know about it through reason which I explained at the beginning of this post. Saying you can have a reality in abstraction from any mind is like saying you can have a grin without a cat.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Aargh! They're the same flavor! Everything implied by one is implied by the other! It doesn't matter what word you use to describe the universe!

 

[hammegk]

There you go, a third fundamental existent.

Well, let's see. Do those critters effect or affect "matter"? If so, are they not "matter"?

Ergo, I disagree.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wrath said:
Aargh! They're the same flavor! Everything implied by one is implied by the other! It doesn't matter what word you use to describe the universe!

Whew! For awhile there, I thought I was the only one being driven crazy by this meaningless distinction.

Hammegk said:
Well, let's see. Do those critters effect or affect "matter"? If so, are they not "matter"?

They also effect mind, so they are mind. Mind and matter are just different vibrations of the one existon.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Why is there a need for a material chair which is exactly like the perceived chair? And it's opposed to what science says anyway. This brings us to the consideration that the material chair is quite unlike our perceptual experiences of it. But if the material chair is quite unlike the perceived chair, then what it is exactly like must forevermore remain unaccessible to us (like Kant's nounema). Again, why suppose the existence of a wholly, in principle, unknowable reality?

First you say we can't know "what it is exactly like." Then you say it is "wholly ... unknowable."

Subjective idealism is denying any reality independent of any minds. It's giving an analysis of what it means to talk about the "physical". Remember that, for the non-materialist, minds are not part of physical reality. So Berkeley has no more reason to be a solipsist then interactive dualists.

What you seem to describe is like an ocean of Mind, out of which pops little waves of independent minds (small "m"). Then, each mind constructs a virtual physical reality around itself and between itself and the other minds. In order for all the minds to construct an inter-consistent reality, there must be rules and laws that dictate how the reality is formed. These rules and laws are inditinguishable from what we ordinarily think of as physical laws. Again, this ontology is indistinguishable from materialism/physicalism/whatever.

You appear to like your ontology better because working from inside out to create reality seems more logical than working from outside in. But why? Just because our senses cannot detect the totality of the external world is no reason to force the external world to be exactly equal to what our senses detect.

~~ Paul

 

[EternalUniverse]

Ian,

Let me first start off by saying that I deem idealism to be a respectable position enjoying some strong arguments in support. I do see some weaknesses with the position that hinders it from being judged more worthy than other positions (especially scientific realism). More below.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I'm really not happy with this "external world" business. So instead I'm going to refer to it as MIR (mind-independent reality).[/i]

I think I could have stated more clearly what I meant by "external world" (EW).
Philosophers generally define this term as "everything that exists outside my own mind". So if an EW exists, then I am in your EW, and you are in mine. The EW is only "mind-independent" such that things existing outside of each individual's mind (including objects and other people's minds) continue to exist when not perceived.

If we accept this definition, the term "MIR" seems like one that ignores the "problem of other minds", while providing no justification for this omission. Why start off with the position that there are other minds, and objects are simply things that exist in people's minds? It seems like a weak way to dodge solipsism.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Now, if we have no justification for the existence of a MIR, then why believe in it? But Berkeley went beyond this. He maintained the notion of an MIR is unintelligible. If there is a MIR chair for example, then what is it like? I mean is the real material chair similar to the experienced chair? Is the real material chair (external to all minds) brown in color? Note that we're talking about brownness as perceptually experienced. So can this non-experienced reality be exactly like our experiences? I don't know what Berkeley's arguments exactly were (I can't remember) but it is a completely unnecessary duplication. Why is there a need for a material chair which is exactly like the perceived chair? And it's opposed to what science says anyway. This brings us to the consideration that the material chair is quite unlike our perceptual experiences of it. But if the material chair is quite unlike the perceived chair, then what it is exactly like must forevermore remain unaccessible to us (like Kant's nounema). Again, why suppose the existence of a wholly, in principle, unknowable reality?[/i]

You deal with several things here. I will deal with them one by one.

a) Concerning knowing reality "exactly", both idealism and scientific realism agree that reality is not necessarily what is perceived, so there is no problem there. Only common sense realism posits, for example, that oranges are really "orange" (in color); and, common sense realism isn't a very strong position to begin with.

b) The knowledge argument can be turned against idealism. If idealism is built on the foundation of things that we know exist (i.e. experiences), and discards things that may or may not exist (i.e. physical objects), then entities like God should not be used. As well, since we can not experience other minds, then they should not be assumed either. This leads to solipsism.

c) If idealism appeals to simplicity (for example, by discarding the "unnecessary" belief in a MIR), it doesn't explain the seeming correspondence between interpersonal experiences. Invoking God, a contentious concept, doesn't solve this problem.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
He infers the existence of God. Our sensory perceptions are ordered into certain familes we call physical objects. But we could have existed in a Universe where our sensory perceptions were completely random, and chaotic, and unpredictable. So there must be intelligence behind the order we see. Basically he is inferring the mind of God in much a similar way to which we infer the minds of other people. Just as other peoples bodies act in a way suggestive of purpose, so does the Universe as a whole act in such a way to suggest purpose (and therefore a mind responsible).[/i]

Ok. See above.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

The name is unimportant. Call it qualia, perceptual experiences or whatever. Actually he uses the term "idea", but the meaning of this term has slightly changed since Berkeley's time.[/i]

From my understanding, the term "idea" can refer to beliefs, concepts and sensations. Would an idealist define each as one and the same?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Subjective idealism is denying any reality independent of any minds. It's giving an analysis of what it means to talk about the "physical". Remember that, for the non-materialist, minds are not part of physical reality. So Berkeley has no more reason to be a solipsist then interactive dualists.

Basically he said this about physical reality. What we understand as "physical reality" cannot be abstracted from a perceiving subject. If you maintain there exists an unexperienced reality, then, by definition, we cannot know about it through experience i.e we cannot experience the unexperienced. Nor can we know about it through reason which I explained at the beginning of this post.
Saying you can have a reality in abstraction from any mind is like saying you can have a grin without a cat.

What exactly did you say about the inability to know reality through reason? Scientific realists would state that their position is more plausible through abductive reasoning. Specifically, saying that physical objects exist makes the reality of our experiences less suprising compared to using an explanation that invokes a supernatural being.

 

[Interesting Ian]

EternalUniverse,

Before I respond to your post in detail, I wonder if you could clarify one or two things for me by answering the following questions.

1. What do you understand by "scientific realism"?
2. Why do you believe scientific realism is incompatible with subjective idealism? (although perhaps your answer to the first question will make the answer here obvious)
3. Berkeley's philosophy holds that both experiences (ideas) and experiencers (selves) exist. Do you hold that he should only have believed that experiences/ideas exist?
4. What do you understand by the term supernatural? If materialism were true and a "God" existed, would such a "God" be supernatural? If materialism is not true are our minds supernatural?
   [/list=1]
   
   Answering these questions will help me prepare a more comprehensive response to address all your concerns

 

[hammegk]

I don't have to contend that they are hallucinatory.

You can call them Fred. The word hallucinatory is what most of us would term an experience at odds with what other human observers present at the time perceived.

Whew! For awhile there, I thought I was the only one being driven crazy by this meaningless distinction.

Yeah, damn philosophy.

They also effect mind, so they are mind. Mind and matter are just different vibrations of the one existon.

Sounds to me like A and ~A simultaneously. Bell IIRC has also suggested Aristotelian logic may be wrong as a description of "what-is", or I guess we could say "what-is" is not a local phenomenum. Actually I suggest this monad meets all requirements of objective and physical.

Is atheism rational under this monad, if it is a "new monad"? Does it provide added insight or verifiability as a predictor of quantum nuttiness? I didn't realize psi was a problem we were trying to solve.

 

[EternalUniverse]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

EternalUniverse,

Before I respond to your post in detail, I wonder if you could clarify one or two things for me by answering the following questions.[/i]

Certainly.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
1) What do you understand by "scientific realism"?[/i]

Maybe I can give a quick summary of what I understand to be the major competing theories.

If we look at the possible characteristics that an object can have, there are at least four possibilities:

a) objects have what Locke would call secondary qualities (e.g. color, smell, taste, etc.).

b) objects have what Locke would label as primary qualities (e.g. size, shape, etc.).

c) objects are composed of what scientific theories (especially physics) tell us, like atoms.

d) objects are extended in space-time (i.e. lie in the external world).

Common sense realism would agree with (a)-(d). Representative realism would probably only agree with (b)-(d), stating that secondary qualities arise out of mental representations, and are not intrinsic to the objects themselves. Scientific realism would focus mainly on (c) and (d). Characteristics in (b) are said to be better explained by (c). Idealism denies (a)-(d); that is, there are no mind-independent (to use your term) objects in the first place.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

[*]Why do you believe scientific realism is incompatible with subjective idealism? (although perhaps your answer to the first question will make the answer here obvious)[/i]

Both of these theories disagree how our experiences are caused. As stated, scientific realism assumes that an objective, mind-independent reality exists, which causes our perceptions of this reality. Idealism denies this. Both theories disagree, also, about how our perceptions are ordered. Any realist theory would cite the laws of nature (i.e. physical laws). Idealism might invoke God as an explanation, or perhaps "perceptual laws"?

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


[*]Berkeley's philosophy holds that both experiences (ideas) and experiencers (selves) exist. Do you hold that he should only have believed that experiences/ideas exist?[/i]

I'm not sure what you are trying to get at here. Are you asking if I think that he should have invoked God as an explanation about the order of our perceptions? If so, then no.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

[*]What do you understand by the term supernatural? If materialism were true and a "God" existed, would such a "God" be supernatural? If materialism is not true are our minds supernatural?

Interesting. I've not really thought about an actual definition of supernatural - perhaps something that goes against our current understanding of the laws of the universe (usually expressed in physics)? To answer your second question, if we are talking about a God who can do things that goes against physics (like create out of nothing, an entire planet teeming with life), then yes. To answer your third, it would depend on the "correct" view of the universe. If it was monistic, favoring the existence of only minds, then minds would not be supernatural.

 

[hammegk]

As stated, scientific realism assumes that an objective, mind-independent reality exists, which causes our perceptions of this reality. Idealism denies this.

May I say "no it doesn't", depending on the flavor of idealism. You might search Objective Idealism for an overview.


On a general comment that could be made in many threads -- and will be since I like to repeat myself -- "How can the word "paranormal" have any meaning to anyone?- It's just become a standard materialist worldview red-herring imo.