brain/mind

[Jeff Corey]

Thinking is a folk psychology term for a lot of things I do. Behavioral scientists call them "private events" or "private behaviors". I am the only person that can observe them, but I talk to myself and plan future actions, see what I want to draw or write or carve. Picture things that aren't there.
All it is, is behavior.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Does this also mean that "you' are a fiction?

Exactly. Finally. You are getting it.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Oops, a case of putting Descartes before the horse.

 

[Topspy]

Let me see if I can say this so other people can understand what I mean. I am sort of a master of tortured writing and sometimes have great trouble expressing simple ideas. I do a lot of technicalish writing for work and I basically suck at it. Nothing seems simple to me. Be that as it may.....

I get Discover magazine, but honestly, I almost never read it. I happened to glance at the letters to the editor in this last issue and some people wrote in about a previous article involving the mind/brain issue. I'm guessing the article essentially confirmed that the mind is an emergent property of the brain and its chemical activity. At least one letter - obviously not from a stupid person - expressed the typical discomfort at the idea that "we" and the self are just the result physiological functions and not some independent entity merely occupying our bodies.

I have never understood this position in two respects. First, I have never grasped the idea that because something is attributable to physical/chemical causes and effects is somehow diminishes its authenticity and remarkableness - that the self somehow has less integrity and significance because it isn't supernatural. But the main thing that bothers me with this whole idea that the self should or could be independent of the body and worldly processes is that it implies either that it is dependent on other processes not of this world (and what would incline anyone to suppose there are such processes?) or that it is not a function of processes at all.

Now this latter, to me, is impossible even to imagine and completely nonsensical. It seems to me absolutely implicit in existence that there must be process. A mind is not a mind if it is not thinking and thinking itself is a process. Awareness is a process and any process has to happen via mechanisms of some sort. This same sort of issue arises when considering the notion of the supernatural altogether. If things are to be supernatural it implies that they are happening via some alternate set of processes that are not of this world or they are somehow happening by no processes at all. In as much as "happening" is a process itself, it seems to me that this idea just makes no sense whatsoever. If you accept the idea that "supernatural" things happen via some set of other worldly processes, what is it thats give these processes, in some peoples minds, more significance and meaning than worldly processes?

I apologize if this all sounds stupid to you and I've wasted your time. I'm sure there is nothing original in this, but does anyone understand what I am trying to express? my best, bdk

Sorry I am late in this thread, but to respond to the OP on this item: "If things are to be supernatural it implies that they are happening via some alternate set of processes that are not of this world or they are somehow happening by no processes at all." I would have to ask, if in the 12th century someone had demostrated a modern electronic device - an IPOD say - would that device HAVE to be a 'natural device' or a 'supernatural device' given the knowledge at the time? Would this not be considered as "happening via some alternate set of processes that are not of this world?" If so it follows that any unexplained phenom can POSSIBLY be explained in the future with newly-found principles.......

 

[maatorc]

Exactly. Finally. You are getting it.

As stated in your post 417, you still do not know what this thread is about.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

As stated in your post 417, you still do not know what this thread is about.

So.. you are reading. Good to know. Now, can you tackle my questions?

 

[maatorc]

So.. you are reading. Good to know. Now, can you tackle my questions?

You came in very late, and kick off not with questions but with smart-alec personality focussed remarks. If you have already made up your mind, I will not waste my time.

 

[Slimething]

If you have already made up your mind, I will not waste my time.

The inner one in his skull or the other one in your imagination? Be specific.

 

[davidsmith73]

I know what you mean and I have some questions:

1 Would it there be "qualitative experiences" without you?

Complex question! Bottom line answer - yes!

Because if I am to take mental monism seriously then I see the self as particular physical relationships (between qualities) that are constructed in such a way as to give the illusion of separateness from the rest of experiential reality. In other words, I would treat the matter in a similar way as a materialist. But since I am thinking along the lines of physical processes being relationships between qualities, then there can be qualitative experience without the illusion of "self". And thinking about it, isn't that an experience that many people have actually reported? (including Susan Blackmore)

2 Do you assume that "qualitative experiences" are as primordial to nature as atoms and quarks?

Another very complex question! I would first have to delve into the justification of reductionism in the light of mental monism. I mean, if physical things are relationships between qualities then any theoretical model is no longer describing a reality "external" to experience. Instead, models would be describing the way in which relationships, between qualities, are connected within experience.

So I might be justified in questioning whether atoms or quarks exist in the sense of fundamental "entities". I would certainly not deny that reductionism works in the way that it does in that a cause-effect hierarchy is produced, I would just recognise that this hierarchy only forms within experience. But I really need the think long and hard about this one because I may be confusing experienced relationships and the models that describe them. And you may well ask next - why does this reductionist hierarchy form within experience? And before you do ask it, I'll tell you I haven't a clue Although I might start reading some David Bohm. I have a feeling some clues lie there...

3 If "things" are qualities would you say that there should be experiences before "things"?

I don't really understand this question. Do you mean "things" in a physical sense?

 

[aggle-rithm]

Oops, a case of putting Descartes before the horse.

Ow.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

You came in very late, and kick off not with questions but with smart-alec personality focussed remarks. If you have already made up your mind, I will not waste my time.

Sorry for being late, I have other occupations. That said, my questions are relevant and can help us clear the path for understanding. If you consider that a waste of time is your choice, but then how can you expect us to take you seriously?

Im not making jokes about you, just asking very punctual questions.

 

[billydkid]

Sorry I am late in this thread, but to respond to the OP on this item: "If things are to be supernatural it implies that they are happening via some alternate set of processes that are not of this world or they are somehow happening by no processes at all." I would have to ask, if in the 12th century someone had demostrated a modern electronic device - an IPOD say - would that device HAVE to be a 'natural device' or a 'supernatural device' given the knowledge at the time? Would this not be considered as "happening via some alternate set of processes that are not of this world?" If so it follows that any unexplained phenom can POSSIBLY be explained in the future with newly-found principles.......

Well, your point is well taken, however there are some important distinctions to be made. Before people understood electricity, they were still exposed to all sorts of phenomena which they couldn't explain. To put it more clearly - the phenomena existed before any explanation for the phenomena did. With things typically referred to as supernatural there is very little if any authentic phenomena in need of explanation. There are tales - just as there are tales of big foot and the Loch Ness monster - but I have never run into any phenomena in my experience of the world (and I would venture to guess that no one else in here has either) that defied conventional explanation.

If, on the other hand, any significant number of us were running into phenomena for which the conventional, scientific world view could not account, then there might be some basis for suspecting there are things going on which require some alternate explanation than those currently available. I realize this doesn't really address what you are saying and you are correct. It is possible there are physical laws and principles which are as of yet undiscovered which factor into the behavior of the universe, but there is nothing that indicates the need for these additional physical laws.

My view of unexplainable phenomena is that it does not exist. We may not understand all aspects of the governing laws of the universe, but nothing in our experience indicates that there are is any need for fundamental reinterpretation of the way the world works. Bear in mind that claimed "supernatural" (for lack of a better word) phenomena contradicts the things we do know about how the universe functions.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Complex question! Bottom line answer - yes!...

... I am thinking along the lines of physical processes being relationships between qualities, then there can be qualitative experience without the illusion of "self". And thinking about it, isn't that an experience that many people have actually reported? (including Susan Blackmore)

Oh yes of course, in fact, "I" have been there. I used to consider that those "QE" where in fact a primary component of what we call reality (well, in a way there are, but only in a subjective way), the reason I changed my mind is because last year I was sick, and my QE was different to whatever I have experienced before. In fact, my QE were "diminishing", so to speak, and then it hit me that if I die the QE will die too. Forget about "me" (what I call me) because that is obvious, Im talkin that the very same components of what I call "the world" and "the self" will be gone.

Now, most skeptics will say that this is not a surprise, but the point here is that I no longer consider that QEs are an "essential" component of the universe, maybe a byproduct, but thats it.

BTW, I do believe that "the universe" is a very different thing to what most skeptics or not skeptics believe.

Another very complex question! I would first have to delve into the justification of reductionism in the light of mental monism. I mean, if physical things are relationships between qualities then any theoretical model is no longer describing a reality "external" to experience. Instead, models would be describing the way in which relationships, between qualities, are connected within experience...

I agree with this. There is no "external" reality and by consequence there is no "internal" reality. All we have is noumenal and phenomenal "things".

I don't really understand this question. Do you mean "things" in a physical sense?

Nope. "physical" is a conceptual construction, I would mean something like your QEs (if I understood what you mean by them). What do you think?

 

[davidsmith73]

Oh yes of course, in fact, "I" have been there. I used to consider that those "QE" where in fact a primary component of what we call reality (well, in a way there are, but only in a subjective way), the reason I changed my mind is because last year I was sick, and my QE was different to whatever I have experienced before. In fact, my QE were "diminishing", so to speak, and then it hit me that if I die the QE will die too. Forget about "me" (what I call me) because that is obvious, Im talkin that the very same components of what I call "the world" and "the self" will be gone.

Yes, this point has to be addressed by any mental monism. Someone can report memories of "diminishing" QE while undergoing general anaesthesia , followed by an inference of "missing time", and reason (albeit with a necessary apriori that a QE-independent reality exists) that there was a period in time whereby "I" became completely devoid of QE.

But is that inference justified? Reports only speak of "diminishing" QE and the inference of QE-independent existence is an experienced memory or report. In other words, "unconsciousness" is only ever reported from consciousness! That may seem patently obvious to say but I see it as a starting point from which any inference about QE-independent reality must argue from. And I believe that any such argument is circular in that QE-independent reality must be assumed first in order for the argument to even get off the ground.

I may have misinterpreted your position, but are you proposing an QE-independent reality?

What I think is that "unconsciousness" is a nonsense. There is no QE-independent reality. Under mental monism, what needs to be explained here are the relationships that equate to change in QE without discourse to an QE-independent reality. If such a change in QE as that which occurs between "unconsciousness" can be explained within that overall framework, then there is no need to infer a QE-independent realm.

Similarly, death can't be the end of QE per se. It can be the end of "me" or "you" in that both are terms refering to specific relationships between QE, which can change.

I agree with this. There is no "external" reality and by consequence there is no "internal" reality. All we have is noumenal and phenomenal "things".

I don't really understand what noumenal means. Is it another way of refering to "objective" or experience-independent reality? If not, then what is the difference between noumenal and phenomenal? If so, then I don't understand how you can on the one hand say there is no reality external to experience, but on the other say there is noumenal reality?

Nope. "physical" is a conceptual construction, I would mean something like your QEs (if I understood what you mean by them). What do you think?

I see. Ok, I'll return to your original question:

If "things" are qualities would you say that there should be experiences before "things"?

No, because I don't see any reason to think they exist

 

[Dancing David]

Brief derail, David, if I may.
What sort of behaviorism do you feel most comfortable with? Early methodological behaviorism, which ignores any role of private events , later methodological behaviorism, which implies the causal potency of internal events (intervening variables) in a S->O->R model, or radical behaviorism (ala Skinner) which doesn't.
How about you, Merc.
P.S. Cop the book from Sloan Publishing. Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Jay Moore. Every mind-body, mental yentle is covered.

I do not know , probably whatever is most recent, I believe that internal behaviors exist and are part of reinforcement.

So not a strict Skinnerist. Probably a methodist but i do not know. I will look and see.

 

[Dancing David]

What is it of you that is performing these endlessly complex ratiocinations to the effect that these same processes are a fiction?
Does this also mean that "you' are a fiction?
Does this also mean that your ideas to the effect that 'mind' and hence your thoughts are a a fiction, are also a fiction?

Some things appear to exist the body, the thoughts, the emotions, the perception and habits. Other things like mind, consciousness and politics don't appear to exist.

 

[maatorc]

Sorry for being late, I have other occupations. That said, my questions are relevant and can help us clear the path for understanding. If you consider that a waste of time is your choice, but then how can you expect us to take you seriously? Im not making jokes about you, just asking very punctual questions.

Having come in very late it would greatly help you to read all the posts in the thread as to points and questions and comments and replies.

 

[Topspy]

Bah. You totally misinterpreted my stand. I was making fun of the OP......

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Yes, this point has to be addressed by any mental monism. Someone can report memories of "diminishing" QE while undergoing general anaesthesia , followed by an inference of "missing time", and reason (albeit with a necessary apriori that a QE-independent reality exists) that there was a period in time whereby "I" became completely devoid of QE.

I believe the question goes deeper. As I understand, QEs have always "content". Everything points, so far, that this "content" is provided by the senses, and controlled by the brain. Without them, it is very difficult to say that there could be any QEs at all.

But is that inference justified? Reports only speak of "diminishing" QE and the inference of QE-independent existence is an experienced memory or report. In other words, "unconsciousness" is only ever reported from consciousness! That may seem patently obvious to say but I see it as a starting point from which any inference about QE-independent reality must argue from. And I believe that any such argument is circular in that QE-independent reality must be assumed first in order for the argument to even get off the ground.

You are correct. In fact, let me tell you that a "state of consciousness" can be achieved in which the memory loss does not happen. Its called Advaita, or "non duality consciousness". In order to TRY to put this in words I can say that the body have experiences, then the body goes to sleep, sometimes it dreams, sometimes not... but QEs are always present. Note that Im not talking about an "I" who is always there, there is nobody left, no duality, no separation, just what could be called "noumenal QEs" (believe me, words cant reach that far, this is a primitive attempt, from language, to express "THAT").

I may have misinterpreted your position, but are you proposing an QE-independent reality?

Yes. Despite what I just said, it is clear to me that the "regularities of experience" are independent from observers. QEs are related to those regularities, but do not shape them, so to speak.

What I think is that "unconsciousness" is a nonsense. There is no QE-independent reality. Under mental monism, what needs to be explained here are the relationships that equate to change in QE without discourse to an QE-independent reality. If such a change in QE as that which occurs between "unconsciousness" can be explained within that overall framework, then there is no need to infer a QE-independent realm.

It is a strong point. This would imply that QEs are an essential component of what is called reality. I used to think exactly like that, but I have failed to find proofs of this. The only "evidence" is the "Advaita Awareness" I talked about before. Out of this, nothing points to this as being real.

I agree with you, how to explain changuing QEs without an "external" cause? A possible "argument" against this is that, while you are in a non duality consciousness, nothing "needs" to be "explained". But then again, that doesnt explain anything!

Similarly, death can't be the end of QE per se. It can be the end of "me" or "you" in that both are terms refering to specific relationships between QE, which can change.

Except that we would still need to find QEs that are not related to a brain-senses system.

I don't really understand what noumenal means. Is it another way of refering to "objective" or experience-independent reality? If not, then what is the difference between noumenal and phenomenal? If so, then I don't understand how you can on the one hand say there is no reality external to experience, but on the other say there is noumenal reality?

Noumenal would mean "the real objectivity". The so called "objective reality" is a fantasy. Most believe that this reality is composed by matter, space, planets, rocks, forces... without noticing that those are concepts that depend on meanings that depend on senses that depend on noumena. You can call this noumenal reality as what is there when no one sees.

But still, what I dont like about the terminology, is that it IMPLIES a duality between "the world" and "the perceiver", which I believe its just an interpretation, so, feel free to tell me more about the subject. How would you explain perceptual regularities?

I see. Ok, I'll return to your original question:

" If "things" are qualities would you say that there should be experiences before "things"?"

No, because I don't see any reason to think they exist

Let me rephrase, I believe my question is confusing. QEs stand for Qualitative Experiences. What Im asking is if you believe that this QEs are the basic components of reality, instead of "classic" components like atoms, quarks, forces and etc.