brain/mind

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Modern skepticism is but an obscure mid-twentieth century aberration of positivist philosophy and in the broader context of science and ontology is trully old-hat and something of an embarrassment to the broader understanding and knowledge held outside the narrow tunnel-visioned confines of what the movement and its founders would have the world believe.

Coloful metaphores add nothing to a discussion, except for the emotional prone. That said, skepticism is just that, dont confuse the people with the idea.

Space and time, defining everything that we cognise by sensuous means, are in themselves just forms of our receptivity, categories of our intellect, the prism through which we regard the world -- or in other words, space and time do not represent the properties of the world, but just properties of our knowledge of the world gained through our sensuous organism.

"forms of receptivity"... of what? You imply that Space/Time are not "part" of the noumena?

"properties of our knowledge" of.... what? you are being circular here.

The clear knowledge of phenomena does not make us more acquainted with things in themselves. The investigation of phenomena does not give us the comprehension of the true substance of things.

"true substance" what would that mean, exactly? We know and talk about phenomena, thats correct. There is also a noumena, independent of our talking. Thats it. If you begin to give adjectives to noumena you are merely deceiving yourself.

Mind is not brain, and the JREF MDC cannot work.

Care to explain (to me, I just arrived to the thread) what is "MDC"??

Oh, yes, and by "mind" you mean exactly what?

 

[Dancing David]

Any and all. We can pick an example of a word that refers to qualitative experience if you like. How about "beep"?

I am asking what experience would lead to a belief in the non-physical.

The process of discrimination. Discrimination makes it possible to say "I am having this experience instead of that one".

What allows for a discrimination between physical and non-physical?

How do these words define non-physical experience? They don't. They only act as arbitrary labels.

i believe they can be used as discriptors of qualitativge experience?

Sorry, I should not have used the map and territory analogy because that implies that there is a relational definition going on. Its purpose was to distinguish language and qualitative experience.

And I am asking for a difference between quantitative and qualitative experience?

I see none, but then i am a materialist who feels that thoughts, emotions, perceptions are a dependant property of a body.

If you can't describe a qualitative experience how do you know you are having one? This leads to a behavioral discussion of language, sensation and perseption.

Qualitative experience is direct knowledge of its existence.

Through what means , what is percieved outside of the sense organs or the brain. i understand that such might exist, but i ask what evidence wouyld there be of one?

There is no reason to ask how I know if it exists. But saying it is non-physical comes through comparing what we conceive of as physical with qualitative existence.

What are you comparing then? What potentail qualities of experience would discriminate between a physical and non-physical experience.

I disagree. It is not based soley on language usage. It is based primarliy on qualitative existence and our comparison of relational things (such as language) with it. If there wasn't an existence that could not be defined relatonally though language, then I would have no reason to say such things would I?

Which posits the question, if something can't be defined or described then how is one to know that one is having an experience that is different from a physical experience.

It just begs the question of how another potential individual would know that they had had the non-physical experience.

It seems to be a magical defintion because of the dependance upon saying that it is a private experience that you can't describe.

Which from the behavioral POV is related to asking, how do you know that you have the experience?

Ah, but these things are relationally defined and refer to physical things.

No I would say they are solely semantic concepts that reffer to concepts of thought constructs with only vauge relation to physical objects.

Well, I understand your frustration, but this is pretty much how it is. The reality is that it can't be defined so I know that no amount of trying will ever accomplish that. You can call it magic if you want!



Yes it is not the same. But if you are trying to describe, then you clearly do not think that there is an existence that is un-describable! Which is why I do not try to describe.

So how do you know you had the experience?

That's just a re-label. "like what you feel" and "quality" and "non-physical", all do not define what is being refered to.

What is being reffered to?

I don't think you're being rude at all. Please don't hold back for my sake! You are right that a have an inability to express what I am refering to. That is the central point I am making! But I don't feel I am hiding anything.

I think that private information that can not be described is suspect of not existing at all.

Just my POV.

many do describe things they think are non-physical.

You seem to be hiding behind a semsnatic argument of just saying it is indescribable.

Most people when they refer to an experience can recall is as a memory which is often self labeled in words and images. If one was to posit an immaterial being or a brain capable of experience then I would suggest it would have a way of self reference to be aware of an experience.

Otherwise it seems as though you are saying the following

"I know that an invisible pink unicorn exists, but you can't describe it because it is invisible"

I know that is not what you are sayingL:

Which is why i ask , what knowledge leads you to believe in the non-physical?

This may be circular in that you will say "it is unable to be phrased in language", then how would it be phrased?

 

[Dancing David]

Space and time, defining everything that we cognise by sensuous means, are in themselves just forms of our receptivity, categories of our intellect, the prism through which we regard the world -- or in other words, space and time do not represent the properties of the world, but just properties of our knowledge of the world gained through our sensuous organism.
The clear knowledge of phenomena does not make us more acquainted with things in themselves. The investigation of phenomena does not give us the comprehension of the true substance of things.
Mind is not brain, and the JREF MDC cannot work.

Well this begs the question, what means are available to us to gather knowledge concerning the things in and of themselves?

It would seem to me that the only means for that is through the sensations, which participate in the things in and of themselves, the perception which are generated by the brain to be a model of the sensations. Yet perceptions also partake of things in and of themselves.

I totaly agree that thoughts, words and perceptions are part of a transitory world. But all of them are generated by the nuemena.

How else would you come to understand the nature of things in and of themsleves. we can not esacpe the contsraints of biology.

Photons are things in and of themselves, although they do not label themselves as such. the chemical interaction between a photon and a photo chemical in the eye are things in and of themselves, although they do not label themselves as such. Nerve transmission is a series of things in and of themselves. Etc.

So it would appear that we sense, percieve and think based upon the action of things in and of themselves.

So while there is no direct perception of things in and of themselves, there are the things in and of themselves and we partcipate in them.

So when does a nuemena become a phenomena? Is an atom in my eye less of a neumena than an atom alone in space?

 

[Invidious]

The process of discrimination. Discrimination makes it possible to say "I am having this experience instead of that one".

Okay davidsmith73, I think this is where Dancing D is getting hung up. What are you using to discriminate between describable and indescribable experiences?

If you say, "My Mind," than we have what appears to be a circular argument.

1. I have a mind independent of my brain
2. I know so because I have experiences which transend my fleshy brain and cannot be described using fleshy words
3. I can tell these experiences apart from fleshy experiences by using my mind
4. Therefore I have a mind independent of my brain

Where does the discrimination come from if not from your brain (or mind, if you insist)?

 

[Dancing David]

Double post.

 

[Dancing David]

Okay davidsmith73, I think this is where Dancing D is getting hung up. What are you using to discriminate between describable and indescribable experiences?

If you say, "My Mind," than we have what appears to be a circular argument.

1. I have a mind independent of my brain
2. I know so because I have experiences which transend my fleshy brain and cannot be described using fleshy words
3. I can tell these experiences apart from fleshy experiences by using my mind
4. Therefore I have a mind independent of my brain

Where does the discrimination come from if not from your brain (or mind, if you insist)?

Or another phrasing would be "How does your mind know the difference between the physical and non-physical experience".

Actualy I am more looking for the point of contact where communication will occur. But an indescribable experience is not something can communicate with.

And I would argue that indescribable experience is what all experience is any how because we have to learn the language to describe it. Although the two are very intertwined. A person never exposed to language may lack more than the ability to talk. They may not be able to organsie thier thoughts the way most people do.

 

[davidsmith73]

Okay davidsmith73, I think this is where Dancing D is getting hung up. What are you using to discriminate between describable and indescribable experiences?

If you say, "My Mind," than we have what appears to be a circular argument.

1. I have a mind independent of my brain
2. I know so because I have experiences which transend my fleshy brain and cannot be described using fleshy words
3. I can tell these experiences apart from fleshy experiences by using my mind
4. Therefore I have a mind independent of my brain

Where does the discrimination come from if not from your brain (or mind, if you insist)?

DD and I disagree on a few fundamental issues. I recognise that "the mind" is usually defined as a physical process, and I also use the term in that way. You may have to adjust your perception of the debate between DD and me on that basis because it looks like you are ascribing, to me, a different usage of "mind", more along the lines that Maatorc is using the term.

I don't think the mind is independent of the brain because I define the "mind" to be defined relationally, for example, the discrimination between 'red' and 'pink' is a process of the mind (having said that, "independent" can be used in a variety of ways too!).

What I am saying is that there exists a reality that is not relational, cannot be defined, is not a physical process. Call that reality what you want. I call it qualitative experience.

The part I am finding hardest to answer is "how do you know non-physical reality exists?"

I think it is paradoxical to ask such a question. You cannot infer quality so there is no doubt as to its nature. What you may question is discrimination, ie, whether there is a "particular" quality that is "red". The boundaries of "red" can be moved arbitrarily can they not?

Also, it may help you to know that I am thinking along the lines of a monism in which all physical "things" or processes are relationships between qualities.

Still thinking on this so I apologise if questions remain.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

What I am saying is that there exists a reality that is not relational, cannot be defined, is not a physical process. Call that reality what you want. I call it qualitative experience....

... Also, it may help you to know that I am thinking along the lines of a monism in which all physical "things" or processes are relationships between qualities.

I know what you mean and I have some questions:

1 Would it there be "qualitative experiences" without you?

2 Do you assume that "qualitative experiences" are as primordial to nature as atoms and quarks?

3 If "things" are qualities would you say that there should be experiences before "things"?

 

[maatorc]

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Originally Posted by Maatorc
Modern skepticism is but an obscure mid-twentieth century aberration of positivist philosophy and in the broader context of science and ontology is trully old-hat and something of an embarrassment to the broader understanding and knowledge held outside the narrow tunnel-visioned confines of what the movement and its founders would have the world believe.
In due time, and probably quite soon, the movement will pass into the bottomless well of extremist cults, and the true tradition of question and challenge will continue as if nothing had interrupted its service to true science and humanity.

1... This does not convince me that mind is not brain.

Quote:
The clear knowledge of phenomena does not make us more acquainted with things in themselves. The investigation of phenomena does not give us the comprehension of the true substance of things.

2... Perhaps not, but then there is no way to gain the comprehension.

1... Prove that mind is brain.
2... Certainly not through physical comsciousness, but prove there is no way.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

1... Prove that mind is brain.

Disprove the correlations.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Mind doesn't matter

A quote from Jay Moore's "Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism" referring to "...what occasions mental talk". Among other reasons, " Complex social-cultural cultural epistomological preconceptions or inappropriate linguistic metaphors, in which case the term is a fanciful explanatory fiction (e.g., from "folk psychology"), and is of interest only in regard to the social and cultural conditions which promote its use, rather than a genuinely explanatory term."
I think this whole discussion exemplifies that.
The term "mind" is undefinable and easily discarded from serious discourse.

 

[Dancing David]

DD and I disagree on a few fundamental issues. I recognise that "the mind" is usually defined as a physical process, and I also use the term in that way. You may have to adjust your perception of the debate between DD and me on that basis because it looks like you are ascribing, to me, a different usage of "mind", more along the lines that Maatorc is using the term.

I don't think the mind is independent of the brain because I define the "mind" to be defined relationally, for example, the discrimination between 'red' and 'pink' is a process of the mind (having said that, "independent" can be used in a variety of ways too!).

What I am saying is that there exists a reality that is not relational, cannot be defined, is not a physical process. Call that reality what you want. I call it qualitative experience.

The part I am finding hardest to answer is "how do you know non-physical reality exists?"

I think it is paradoxical to ask such a question. You cannot infer quality so there is no doubt as to its nature. What you may question is discrimination, ie, whether there is a "particular" quality that is "red". The boundaries of "red" can be moved arbitrarily can they not?

Also, it may help you to know that I am thinking along the lines of a monism in which all physical "things" or processes are relationships between qualities.

Still thinking on this so I apologise if questions remain.

I appreciate your patience, and I expect that my boundaries will move as well. I do accept that monism is the better solution that dualism, i just happen to choose materialism as it fits my nature.

While you say it is paradoxical to ask the question, I would say that it is paradoxical to make the statement that something non-physical exists but can't be described in relational terms.

That is because i believe (as a behaviorist and a materialist) that all reality exterior and interior is relational.

It gets down to the things in and of themselves. They do interact and therefore they are seemingly automaticaly relational (until string theory or GUT says otherwise). If I examine the apparent nature of the things in and of themselves, which i can only do through things in and of themselevs, i am made of things in and of themselves, then it does appear that there is always a relationship between things in and of themselves and other things in and of themselves. As I discussed with hammegk the TIAOT are all that it appears that there are, the disagreement is over what is the base ontology of TIAOT. But hammegk agreed and I agreed that currently there was no evidence that would suggest the dualism option, it was either material monism or mental monism and there was no data to suggest anything that was non-physical in any way.

I will ponder upon your statement and try to understand it. Thank you for your patience. I will try to be patient mysel about the qualities making the relations that are physical processes and try to understand that POV before I comment upon it. It could be similar to the nature of physics in some ways that are a little metaphorical. The properties of matter are generated by the fields and forces that act at a distance.

Which gets into the 'wave-particle duality' which is a conceptual problem only. matter is waves and particles at the same time.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

1... Prove that mind is brain.

There are no proofs in science. All evidence points toward the brain being the source of internal experience. No evidence points toward a separate mind.

2... Certainly not through physical comsciousness, but prove there is no way.

There are no proofs in science. However, a counterexample would go a long way toward demonstrating mind separate from brain.

~~ Paul

 

[Invidious]

...it looks like you are ascribing, to me, a different usage of "mind", more along the lines that Maatorc is using the term.

You are correct, and I appologize. It appears I left my brain back in the other conversation when I jumped to this one.

 

[maatorc]

A quote from Jay Moore's "Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism" referring to "...what occasions mental talk". Among other reasons, " Complex social-cultural cultural epistomological preconceptions or inappropriate linguistic metaphors, in which case the term is a fanciful explanatory fiction (e.g., from "folk psychology"), and is of interest only in regard to the social and cultural conditions which promote its use, rather than a genuinely explanatory term." I think this whole discussion exemplifies that.
The term "mind" is undefinable and easily discarded from serious discourse.

We should try not to think about it.

 

[Jeff Corey]

About what?

 

[Mercutio]

This does not convince me that mind is not brain.

~~ Paul

I bet I could convince you.

Paul....grasshopper... mind is most definitely not brain. Put as simply as possible, mind is behavior.

Sure, a more thorough explanation is consistent with Corey's "the brain exists; the mind does not". That which we call "mind" is mostly explanatory fiction and ignorance; we do not infer "mind" for behaviors which we can easily see causes for, but when we are ignorant of the reasons for our behavior, we say that it is the product of our minds. "I changed my mind" is shorthand for "my behavior changed, but I am ignorant of the real reasons." We infer "mind" from what we see in behavior that we cannot see direct causes for in the environment. (Of course, in some cases, we can determine through experimental analysis what the actual causes of behavior are, and thus know that it was a function of environmental causes; it is clear that determined behavior is seen as freely chosen if one is ignorant of the determinants.)

I could go on at length, but I will heed Dancing David's words...

 

[Jeff Corey]

...That is because i believe (as a behaviorist and a materialist) that all reality exterior and interior is relational..

Brief derail, David, if I may.
What sort of behaviorism do you feel most comfortable with? Early methodological behaviorism, which ignores any role of private events , later methodological behaviorism, which implies the causal potency of internal events (intervening variables) in a S->O->R model, or radical behaviorism (ala Skinner) which doesn't.
How about you, Merc.
P.S. Cop the book from Sloan Publishing. Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Jay Moore. Every mind-body, mental yentle is covered.

 

[maatorc]

I bet I could convince you. Paul....grasshopper... mind is most definitely not brain. Put as simply as possible, mind is behavior.
Sure, a more thorough explanation is consistent with Corey's "the brain exists; the mind does not". That which we call "mind" is mostly explanatory fiction and ignorance; we do not infer "mind" for behaviors which we can easily see causes for, but when we are ignorant of the reasons for our behavior, we say that it is the product of our minds. "I changed my mind" is shorthand for "my behavior changed, but I am ignorant of the real reasons." We infer "mind" from what we see in behavior that we cannot see direct causes for in the environment. (Of course, in some cases, we can determine through experimental analysis what the actual causes of behavior are, and thus know that it was a function of environmental causes; it is clear that determined behavior is seen as freely chosen if one is ignorant of the determinants.) I could go on at length, but I will heed Dancing David's words...

What is it of you that is performing these endlessly complex ratiocinations to the effect that these same processes are a fiction?
Does this also mean that "you' are a fiction?
Does this also mean that your ideas to the effect that 'mind' and hence your thoughts are a a fiction, are also a fiction?

 

[maatorc]

About what?

You know, about thinking.