Answer to the objective morality argument.

[Soapy Sam]

I see your point, but I don't agree. HOWEVER .... the consequences of believing they exist, exist.

Well- That's because you're immoral, innit?

But this doesn't mean what the consequences are based off of are "real".

Everything is real. Even imaginary things.

 

[Soapy Sam]

I see your point, but I don't agree.

Well- That's because you're immoral, innit?

But this doesn't mean what the consequences are based off of are "real".

Everything is real. Even imaginary things.

 

[bluskool]

Perhaps. And I've had others disagree with me using this analogy before .... but in the same vein I could argue then that the Na'vi and their home-world exist and are not fiction, rather they are in abstraction. Not only can I view them in movie format, but I can go out and buy an action figure representative of them.

At the very minimum, their history exists and is not fiction, but is closer to abstraction.

What do you think? Is this a good analogy, or does it breakdown at some point?

I think it breaks down. When you describe the Na'vi, you are describing what would be physical objects if they actually existed in space and time. Since they are fiction, they do not really exist. However, abstract objects are not physical objects (real or imagined) in any way. For example, numbers are abstract objects. They certainly do not exist physically and are not imagined objects that could exist physically. But numbers do seem to really exist, just in the abstract.

 

[bluskool]

I agree with you, being a materialist myself, but I think there are other ways to go.

I think my stance is along the lines of, "You want the truth?! You can't handle the truth!" (Not you specific, you general.) I mean this in the sense of not all truths are worth knowing and some are actually worth avoiding. I don't advocate intellectual dishonesty but come at if from a pragmatic point of view.

I'll give you an example.

I remember explaining what obstetrical fistula was and how it might be on the uptick in those African communities that proposed sex with a virgin as a cure for AIDS. Perhaps this came from A Walk to Beautiful on Nova, I don't remember.

In any case, the person I was talking to thought it polluted their mind, perhaps ruining some idea that the world was a nice place. I felt I had done some harm by exposing them to this truth, and little, if any good.

From my own experience, there are things I wish I hadn't experienced, that I wish were not in my head. Mostly stuff about man's inhumanity to man and so forth. So, yes. I am advocating that a bit of 'not knowing' or even a nice fiction is better sometimes than raw truth.

I'd even go so far as to say it is healthier for some people to think themselves more handsome, or more intelligent or whatever. I like truth, don't get me wrong. But there is a lot of useless truth on offer. Perhaps the middle ground would be to put it in "warning, some viewers might find this offensive" or "spoiler alert" fashion.

I understand your sentiment. I think my approach is more along the lines of the "no pain, no gain" idea. For example, if everyone turned a blind eye to the worlds problems because of how depressing they are, nothing would ever improve. If we never experienced sorrow, joy and happiness would be meaningless. Perhaps your approach is more along the lines of the Modest Mouse philosophy. "If life's more beautiful without the pain, well I'd rather never even see beauty again."

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

God gives morals that are no more objective than any other source: the law, human thought, science fiction, etc. If God gave a new message to "torture and kill all atheists" would any Christian actually suddenly believe that that was the moral thing to do?

If an intelligent being has the intellectual capacity and freedom to analyze the moral quality of actions it will consistently reach the conclusion that it is generally wrong to cause harm to other intelligent beings.
That would constitute an objective morality.

 

[blutoski]

My guess is that the question was posted in response to Sam Harris' TED talk: [Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions]. Also see the related huffpo article: [Toward a Science of Morality]

As it happens, the most recent [SGU episode 252] with Massimo Pigliucci^WP discusses the weaknesses in Harris' claims/ideas.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The objective morality argument for God really gets to me sometimes. It's not that it is a good argument and it is fairly easily answered, but the answers always seem dissatisfying to me.
I am sure everyone knows the argument, but I will state it briefly.
(1) Objective morality can only exist if God exists.
(2) Objective morals do exist.
(3) therefore God exists.

Premise (1) is easily defeated with the Euthyphro Dilemma, but this defeater does not entail that objective morals exist. It only entails that if they do, they can't be grounded in God.
The easiest defeater is to deny (2), but this is where I get tripped up. If moral values are subjective, then I have to admit that I can't really condemn another persons actions. But this seems wrong. From a purely emotional standpoint, I, of course, want to be able to say that torturing an innocent child is wrong, not just that I think it is wrong, but that it really is wrong. If morals are subjective and someone could say that it is morally right to torture an innocent child, it just seems like the words "right" and "wrong" have no meaning in a moral context.

Does anyone else feel this way?
Does anyone have a better response to the argument or a different understanding of the consequences of the responses I already gave?
Am I obsessing over something that really doesn't matter and should just get over it (since the moral structure of our societies will remain the same regardless of the objective/subjective question)?
Something else?

Some of this has already been covered, but here is my perspective on this (for what it's worth and that isn't much).

When using the word "objective", especially in discussions on morality, I've found that we tend to mean one of three things: (1) mind-independent, (2) inter-subjective, or (3) universal.

The problem in these sorts of discussions is that the differing senses of "objective" are often mixed and matched to end with an equivocation error. Add to this the fact that "objective" is contrasted with "subjective" and we also use the word "subjective" to mean more than one thing so that we end up with a bloody mess.

Morality being objective in the OP sense, meaning human mind-independent, depends on another mind, hence the appeal to God. That does not make morality actually mind-independent because it is dependent on God's mind (the rules have to come from somewhere and rules depend on minds), but it meets the criteria for objective for the sake of argument. There is no other way to arrive at objective morality using the connotation of morality as mind-independent unless you want to posit a thinking universe that contains moral principles. Some people choose to do so, but most think them completely daft.

Morality as inter-subjective is what most people mean when discussing "objective" morality. This connotation of the word provides a means for us to arrive at near (or possibly even complete) universality. We are built with moral sentiments, provided us by evolution. Those moral sentiments -- for instance the internal sense that it is wrong to kill an innocent -- are not morality itself but one of its origins. Morality, as we commonly speak of it, also depends on interaction with others. It is a negotiated settlement between individuals based in moral sentiments. Appeal to moral sentiments themselves ends in the naturalistic fallacy.

One of the issues that is often clouded over, unfortunately, in discussions of the evolutionary basis of morality is that moral sentiments are often equated with morality itself. While these (ultimately subjective) feelings serve as important moral guides, without human interaction we would never arrive at the types of morality that we seem to have. And if we appealed only to moral sentiments, then there would be no answer to the Charlie Mansons of the world. But since morality is a combination of moral sentiment and inter-subjective agreement, we are able to universalize the overwhelming majority of opinion on any particular subject. The fact that 99% of humans feel that killing humans is wrong and that virtually everyone agrees that killing innocent humans is wrong makes killing innocent humans wrong. There are a few who do not feel that killing an innocent is wrong, but they are still taught that it is and are expected to act on that teaching.

This is obviously not "objective" according to the first meaning of the word, but it is the best we seem capable of; and it does not lead to "without God everything is permissable".

Another way of stating this is to say that it makes as much sense to speak of a personal language as it does of a personal morality. Language only exists for interaction between people. The same is true of morality.

As to the final way that we use the word, some state that either deontology (duty-based morality, think Kant) or utilitarianism provides an objective morality. But, from what I can tell, this seems to mean that morality is universal not objective in the first sense, since these philosophies are supposed to be universalizable. Neither is human mind-independent; both are inter-subjective. The former relies primarily on reason, the latter on a combination of reason and emotion. And from what we now know of neuroscience, reason as we think of it is not possible without emotion, so both are emotion/feeling based.

I'm not sure that helps in any way, but it is the contour of the minfield that I have often encountered in these debates.

 

[marplots]

I understand your sentiment. I think my approach is more along the lines of the "no pain, no gain" idea. For example, if everyone turned a blind eye to the worlds problems because of how depressing they are, nothing would ever improve. If we never experienced sorrow, joy and happiness would be meaningless. Perhaps your approach is more along the lines of the Modest Mouse philosophy. "If life's more beautiful without the pain, well I'd rather never even see beauty again."

That is excellent. And I'm glad you didn't ask me to support my sentiment. I thought about it and I couldn't do it. But even though I can't support willful ignorance logically, I still think it's a good idea in some cases.

I should credit a Baptist preacher for the notion. He made the point (perhaps talking about pornography or something) that we have a choice about what to put into our heads and what to avoid. His claim was that we are shaped by these things (a very materialist notion I think!) and that we should take care to protect those beliefs we currently value. (This parallels an idea about memes protecting themselves by inoculating against countervailing memes.)

Anyhow, I tried it with billboards, always trying to not see them as I drove. I don't know what didn't get into my head, I didn't look at them... But somewhere in there is both an evil and a good idea. I just don't have the wit to communicate it well. The evil part is how are we to know what we should avoid? Are we to rely (as in the Baptist minister's case) on others to decide for us? I do not want to be treated as a child, but neither do I wish to have toxic images or ideas in my skull.

I do not believe that I am immune to manipulation and arbitrary influence. My ego isn't strong enough to say, "Bring it all on. Play your best game. For I will ferret out the wheat from the chaff and resist all attempts to alter my worldview." Surely this is false, or I wouldn't know that Coke is the real thing, or that the US is the most honorable nation on earth.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

It may be true that morals are subjective, but it is far from clear. The existence of different sets of morality among different cultures or species does not, in any way, mean that objective morality does not exist. Some cultures or species might just be wrong about their morality.

How do you determine, objectively, which ones are wrong?

 

[kestertaylor]

The only moral I believe in is a type of mushroom.

This reminds me of an Eddie Izzard quote I rather love:

"There was supposed to be a moral, but because I'm dyslexic, it is, in fact, a marble."

 

[bluskool]

How do you determine, objectively, which ones are wrong?

That is an epistemological question, while the question I am asking in this thread is an ontological one. There's no use in asking how we know what is objectively right and wrong unless we can first figure out if objective right and wrong actually exists. The point I was making is that just pointing out that different cultures have different morals does not prove that morality is subjective. To pick an obvious example, it would be like saying that there exists a culture that believes that 2 + 2 = 5, therefore arithmetic is subjective.

 

[Paul2]

There's no use in asking how we know what is objectively right and wrong unless we can first figure out if objective right and wrong actually exists.

Not to derail, but it seems to me that one is not prior to the other, they are interdependent. It's only once we know what are the proper and improper methods for determining whether something is X can we then utilize the proper ones to see if something is X or not, but the only way we can know what are the proper methods is by doing a real-life test against something that we already know is X. But how did we know it was X? By using the proper methods. But how did we know what were the proper methods? By checking it against something that we know is X. Rinse, lather, repeat.

 

[westprog]

The first sentence says it all really. Yes, the truth hurts sometimes.

However, just because you can't hold objective truth doesn't mean you can't condemn actions of others. No, you don't get to argue based on having a superior moral viewpoint (and frankly, it pisses people off when you do anyway) but you can still argue. For example, you could point out that allowing the torture of people isn't a good idea if you want a stable society, so it is in everybody's best interest to condemn it.

Or if you find that argument too cold, here's the one I prefer. The absence of absolute morality in no way implies absence of empathy. Nowhere does it say that rationality forces you to only care about yourself. You can still say that, as a human being, you care about other human beings and don't want to see them hurt. Perfectly valid.

So yes, it's true that the other guy isn't 'wrong' to torture a child, but that doesn't mean you have to like it and it doesn't mean you have to tolerate it either.

Hope you found that helpful.

However, if you don't believe that torture is actually wrong, that means that it's quite legitimate to use it in order to achieve a more stable society - one of the more common uses of torture.

The reason why torture is objectively wrong is simple - it hurts. Pain is unpleasant. Simples.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The reason why torture is objectively wrong is simple - it hurts. Pain is unpleasant. Simples.

Replace the word "torture" with the word "surgery" in the above to see why that is not an adequate answer, I'm afraid.

A Kantian approach for the question of torture works much better in my opinion.

 

[Sophronius]

However, if you don't believe that torture is actually wrong, that means that it's quite legitimate to use it in order to achieve a more stable society - one of the more common uses of torture.

It is perfectly legitimate, objectively speaking. You may consider it undesirable however, on grounds of empathy or even more practical considerations.

The reason why torture is objectively wrong is simple - it hurts. Pain is unpleasant. Simples.

So anything that is unpleasant is objectively wrong now?


Honestly, I don't see the point in these discussions unless you first accept that just because you feel a certain way doesn't make it true.

 

[westprog]

Replace the word "torture" with the word "surgery" in the above to see why that is not an adequate answer, I'm afraid.

A Kantian approach for the question of torture works much better in my opinion.

There are plenty of moral conundrums which present difficulties. Is it all right to carry out surgery if somebody wants you to do it? What if they don't want you to? What if you need to torture somebody to find where in the school the bomb is?

This is to avoid the point that the reason why we consider torture bad is simple. It hurts. We know what it feels like to be in pain. We know that it is a wrong thing for us. Hence we assume that to do it to a child, or a man, or maybe even a dog, is also wrong. Issues about the greater good can be left aside. We're considering the issue of whether different things are of equal value. The way we know that they aren't is by experiencing them.

 

[westprog]

It is perfectly legitimate, objectively speaking. You may consider it undesirable however, on grounds of empathy or even more practical considerations.

Which is a practical problem with the relative view of ethics. Ultimately, anything goes, given whatever stated aims one professes.

So anything that is unpleasant is objectively wrong now?

Anything unpleasant carries wrong with it. Whether or not it sums up to being wrong can be a complex issue, and even if there is agreement that objective morality exists, there is certainly no agreement as to which specific actions are or are not moral.

Honestly, I don't see the point in these discussions unless you first accept that just because you feel a certain way doesn't make it true.

If I feel a certain way it is true that I feel that way. If I experience pain, then it is true that I experience it. I've no sympathy with views of the world that discount the experience of pain or pleasure as being illusory. That's simply ruling out the data that don't fit the model, which is not even good science.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

There are plenty of moral conundrums which present difficulties. Is it all right to carry out surgery if somebody wants you to do it? What if they don't want you to? What if you need to torture somebody to find where in the school the bomb is?

This is to avoid the point that the reason why we consider torture bad is simple. It hurts. We know what it feels like to be in pain. We know that it is a wrong thing for us. Hence we assume that to do it to a child, or a man, or maybe even a dog, is also wrong. Issues about the greater good can be left aside. We're considering the issue of whether different things are of equal value. The way we know that they aren't is by experiencing them.

Pain does not, in an of itself, make torture objectively wrong. Some things that are painful are done for good reasons.

Pain is one of the issues that we use to guide moral sentiments; we like to avoid pain and maximize pleasure, of course.

We cannot say that torture is 'objectively wrong' simply because of the pain involved (in the sense that this objectivity is human mind independent) because there are many situations in which pain is part of something greater. There must be other issues at play because pain is not always a bad thing, it is not always wrong. A human inflicting pain is not always in the wrong. If inflicting pain were 'objectively wrong' there would be no debate.

In other words, relying simply on the pain issue is another instance of the naturalistic fallacy. While morality has its origin in our feelings (moral sentiments), it does not stop there. Morality is more than one thing; it is not simply feeling, nor is it simply reason applied to feeling, nor is it simply rule-following, nor is it simply empathy. It is a complex mixture based in all of the above.

With torture one of the other issues at play is that it is not fair to the person being made to feel pain. The torturer uses the torturee as a means to an end and not as an end itself.

 

[Sophronius]

Which is a practical problem with the relative view of ethics. Ultimately, anything goes, given whatever stated aims one professes.

Whether it is practical to believe is completely irrelevant to the issue of whether it is true or not.

Honestly, just because something is unpleasant doesn't make it false.

Anything unpleasant carries wrong with it. Whether or not it sums up to being wrong can be a complex issue, and even if there is agreement that objective morality exists, there is certainly no agreement as to which specific actions are or are not moral.

So you are saying that the element of 'inflicting of pain' inherent to torture is inherently wrong, even though it in its entirely (the greater good) could still be acceptable.

That's nice and all, but you still haven't shown that inflicting pain is inherently wrong.

If I feel a certain way it is true that I feel that way. If I experience pain, then it is true that I experience it.

And nobody is denying this. The more we discuss this the more I get the feeling we have a problem with communication here.

Do you see the difference between these two statements?

A) It is a fact that I don't like action X
B) It is a fact that action X is inherently wrong irregardless of how anyone thinks or feels about it.

I agree with statement A. I disagree with you on statement B. So far you have yet to give me any arguments to support statement B.

I've no sympathy with views of the world that discount the experience of pain or pleasure as being illusory. That's simply ruling out the data that don't fit the model, which is not even good science.

Again, not what I am saying. The experience is not illusory. However the notion that your opinion on the matter is unfalsifiably true is what I disagree on.

 

[westprog]

Pain does not, in an of itself, make torture objectively wrong. Some things that are painful are done for good reasons.

However, if an individual instance of torture is wrong, it's wrong because of the pain, and because of the unwillingness to experience the pain.

Pain is one of the issues that we use to guide moral sentiments; we like to avoid pain and maximize pleasure, of course.

We cannot say that torture is 'objectively wrong' simply because of the pain involved (in the sense that this objectivity is human mind independent) because there are many situations in which pain is part of something greater. There must be other issues at play because pain is not always a bad thing, it is not always wrong. A human inflicting pain is not always in the wrong. If inflicting pain were 'objectively wrong' there would be no debate.

The complication is the degree to which pain, pleasure, life, death, are to be balanced out. It's not whether pain is to be avoided or not. We know what pain is like. It's a matter of how the pain is to be shared around.

In other words, relying simply on the pain issue is another instance of the naturalistic fallacy. While morality has its origin in our feelings (moral sentiments), it does not stop there. Morality is more than one thing; it is not simply feeling, nor is it simply reason applied to feeling, nor is it simply rule-following, nor is it simply empathy. It is a complex mixture based in all of the above.

With torture one of the other issues at play is that it is not fair to the person being made to feel pain. The torturer uses the torturee as a means to an end and not as an end itself.

I think there's a consensus (either practical or relative) that while it is wrong to do something to someone without their permission, the degree of wrong is greater if the pain caused is greater. If someone says "Don't touch me" it's not as bad to slap their face as it is to break their arm, all else being equal.

Morality mostly reduces to pain avoidance and pleasure seeking, for oneself and for others. Pain being defined in the broadest sense.