Answer to the objective morality argument.

[westprog]

Whether it is practical to believe is completely irrelevant to the issue of whether it is true or not.

Honestly, just because something is unpleasant doesn't make it false.



So you are saying that the element of 'inflicting of pain' inherent to torture is inherently wrong, even though it in its entirely (the greater good) could still be acceptable.

That's nice and all, but you still haven't shown that inflicting pain is inherently wrong.



And nobody is denying this. The more we discuss this the more I get the feeling we have a problem with communication here.

Do you see the difference between these two statements?

A) It is a fact that I don't like action X
B) It is a fact that action X is inherently wrong irregardless of how anyone thinks or feels about it.

I agree with statement A. I disagree with you on statement B. So far you have yet to give me any arguments to support statement B.



Again, not what I am saying. The experience is not illusory. However the notion that your opinion on the matter is unfalsifiably true is what I disagree on.

If we agree that the experience is not illusory, then we can go to the next stage. Does it matter? In the case of my own pain, I know that it does matter. It matters to me. From this I can deduce that the universe, of which I am a part, is not value free. I can directly investigate this. I do it all the time.

Creating a moral code from one's own experiences is bound to be an error-prone process, but the fact that we don't know what is right in a given circumstance doesn't mean that there is no right.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

However, if an individual instance of torture is wrong, it's wrong because of the pain, and because of the unwillingness to experience the pain.

Correct. Because of the pain and the unwillingness to experience the pain -- not just the pain itself. There are issues of fairness and treatment of others involved as well.

I think there's a consensus (either practical or relative) that while it is wrong to do something to someone without their permission, the degree of wrong is greater if the pain caused is greater. If someone says "Don't touch me" it's not as bad to slap their face as it is to break their arm, all else being equal.

Morality mostly reduces to pain avoidance and pleasure seeking, for oneself and for others. Pain being defined in the broadest sense.

Personally, I think you should replace the word "mostly" above with "largely", a difference in emphasis. Of course pain avoidance and pleasure seeking are two of the bases of morality. But many debates here seem to center around the evolutionary contributions to morality with contributors often mistaking our evolutionary heritage of pain avoidance, pleasure seeking, and empathy as morality. While that is a huge contributor to what we call morality, those moral sentiments are not all there is to morality, nor would I call them "most of morality". If we did, we would be stuck with "morality is what we feel", some sort of emotivism.

Emotion is a integral part of morality. But so is the interplay of empathy and negotiated settlement amongst all the players. Reason and generalization play big roles in the process.

To return to the OP, we can certainly argue that torture is "objectively wrong" because of the pain and fairness issues, but that sense of "objective" is not one based in human mind independence. We arrive at that sense of "objective" as a universalizable inter-subjective feeling. We can consider it universal (as it relates to humans), but the universe doesn't care.

 

[Sophronius]

If we agree that the experience is not illusory, then we can go to the next stage. Does it matter? In the case of my own pain, I know that it does matter. It matters to me.

Right, it matters to you. As in, different people experience it differently. As in, it is subjective.

From this I can deduce that the universe, of which I am a part, is not value free. I can directly investigate this. I do it all the time.

Your original position on this matter was that objective morality exists irregardless of what anyone thinks or feels. Have you changed this position, or did I misunderstand you somehow?

 

[bluskool]

Not to derail, but it seems to me that one is not prior to the other, they are interdependent. It's only once we know what are the proper and improper methods for determining whether something is X can we then utilize the proper ones to see if something is X or not, but the only way we can know what are the proper methods is by doing a real-life test against something that we already know is X. But how did we know it was X? By using the proper methods. But how did we know what were the proper methods? By checking it against something that we know is X. Rinse, lather, repeat.

You are confused. I am not talking about whether or not something is x, I am talking about whether or not x exists. We very much need to know if x exists or not before we can discover the methods for determining x from non-x.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You are confused. I am not talking about whether or not something is x, I am talking about whether or not x exists. We very much need to know if x exists or not before we can discover the methods for determining x from non-x.

Can you name one thing, other than "thinking" (which implies time and energy in some form) that we know exists^*? We don't have a means of knowing if human-mind-independent morality exists. That people like to think of it as existing is clear, and that we mean different things when we use the word "objective" is also clear.










^* leaving aside death and taxes

 

[bluskool]

I'm not sure that helps in any way, but it is the contour of the minfield that I have often encountered in these debates.

Thanks, it is helpful. Very good post and very clear. I can tell you have thought about this issue a lot as well. The idea of inter-subjectivity is new to me, but I like the concept. It certainly seems to provide an answer to the central problem I am getting at. I will definitely be exploring this idea further.

 

[Cavemonster]

Can you name one thing, other than "thinking" (which implies time and energy in some form) that we know exists^*?

When we talk about what exists, we're talking about what is a model, based on observation that makes useful predictions, as evidenced by accurate descriptions and proven predictions.

Gravity is real, I can continue to make observations of it. The model of gravity allows me to build things that work, ignoring it in many cases would lead to flawed engineering.

That doesn't mean that it's a logical impossibility that all measurments are mistaken and that gravity isn't real, or that it couldn't cease being real tomorrow, but there's a standard of testing and induction that has been very useful, in fact it has been more practically applicable and logically consistent than any other form of aquiring knowldege.

By that standard, neither gods, nor morals exist. Both are not only unevidenced, but as commonly presented, unfalsifiable.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Thanks, it is helpful. Very good post and very clear. I can tell you have thought about this issue a lot as well. The idea of inter-subjectivity is new to me, but I like the concept. It certainly seems to provide an answer to the central problem I am getting at. I will definitely be exploring this idea further.

Thanks, I'm glad I could help.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

When we talk about what exists, we're talking about what is a model, based on observation that makes useful predictions, as evidenced by accurate descriptions and proven predictions.

Gravity is real, I can continue to make observations of it. The model of gravity allows me to build things that work, ignoring it in many cases would lead to flawed engineering.

That doesn't mean that it's a logical impossibility that all measurments are mistaken and that gravity isn't real, or that it couldn't cease being real tomorrow, but there's a standard of testing and induction that has been very useful, in fact it has been more practically applicable and logically consistent than any other form of aquiring knowldege.

By that standard, neither gods, nor morals exist. Both are not only unevidenced, but as commonly presented, unfalsifiable.

Yes. The argument that there are "objective morals" (meaning human mind-independent morals) is entirely unfalsifiable. That people want them to exist is clear. That they exist is entirely unclear, and as far as I can tell never demonstrated. That we have "objective morals" using other meanings of the word "objective" I think is fairly clear.

The things that we absolutely know exist we can count on one, possibly illusory, hand.

But, as you point out, that is not what we generally mean by "exist".

 

[bluskool]

Can you name one thing, other than "thinking" (which implies time and energy in some form) that we know exists^*?

Sure, the universe.

We don't have a means of knowing if human-mind-independent morality exists. That people like to think of it as existing is clear, and that we mean different things when we use the word "objective" is also clear.

Then that's the answer. It doesn't exist, so any epistemological questions about it are worthless.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sure, the universe.

And how are you certain that Descartes' evil genie hasn't fooled you into thinking that it exists?

 

[bluskool]

And how are you certain that Descartes' evil genie hasn't fooled you into thinking that it exists?

I can't be certain.
But I am getting confused because I didn't realize at first that you are not the original person that I was responding to. Are you, like him, disagreeing with the idea that ontological and epistemological questions are not the same thing and should be answered separately or are you just making a radically skeptical statement about ontology in general? Or maybe something else that I am missing?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I can't be certain.
But I am getting confused because I didn't realize at first that you are not the original person that I was responding to. Are you, like him, disagreeing with the idea that ontological and epistemological questions are not the same thing and should be answered separately or are you just making a radically skeptical statement about ontology in general? Or maybe something else that I am missing?

No, I don't think ontological and epistemic questions are the same thing. I am simply pointing out that when it comes to epistemic certainty regarding ontological reality, we can count the number of things we know on one hand.

There's thinking, and to my mind this implies time and energy in some sense. I have never been able to convince myself that this must also include space since idealists tend to think of "thinking" as occurring without reference to space.

I'm afraid we're a bit stuck when it comes to knowing ultimate reality. For the most part the best we can do is guess (build models and test them).

ETA:
So, I guess that one answer to your original issue is that, no we do not know that there are objective moral truths (in the sense that 'objective' means human mind independent). Some people only think that they know this, but no one knows it for certain.

It might be true, it might not be true. Seems like the answer depends on the existence of God. But since the argument is being used to prove the existence of God, the whole thing seems a bit circular.

 

[Cavemonster]

I'm afraid we're a bit stuck when it comes to knowing ultimate reality. For the most part the best we can do is guess (build models and test them).

I think for the purpose of this argument, we can assume we're using my definition of "exist", otherwise you could break off on the same tangent in pretty much any thread from global warming to vaccines "But is global warming really real? What if it's a figment of our imagination?"

For the purpose of this argument, I think we can agree to embrace empiricism and induction. If we don't it's not going to be a discussion of this particular topic but one of the wider philosophical issue of how we know anything.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I guess I should be a little more explicit.

Proposition one is fine. The only way to have objective moral truths is if there is a mind outside of us that can serve as a universal judge. That is God. That uses the definition for "objective" to mean human mind-indpendent.

Proposition two, however, switches the definition of "objective" to universal inter-subjective. The only "objective moral truths" to which anyone can point are those sorts of moral truths -- such as, killing an innocent is wrong. Most all of us feel that killing an innocent is wrong because that is the way we are built and we have agreed in our moral codes that killing innocents is wrong.

Like virtually all syllogisms that seek to prove the existence of God, this one depends on equivocation error.

Since we can know virtually no ontological truth with certainty, there is no way that we can know that objective moral truth exists by the first meaning of "objective". We only know that "objective moral truth" exists in the weaker way -- the same way that we know the universe exists, so to speak. We know the universe exists because we sense it. We build a model and every experience we have backs up the idea. It is not certain knowledge since our senses might be fooled, but it's the best we can arrive at for what really *is*. We know about "objective moral truth" because we (mostly) all feel that certain things are wrong. Neither of these truths -- the existence of the universe, or the "objective moral truth" that killing an innocent is wrong -- necessarily mesh with what actually *is*.

So, I agree with you that it is important to distinguish between the epistemic and the ontological.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think for the purpose of this argument, we can assume we're using my definition of "exist", otherwise you could break off on the same tangent in pretty much any thread from global warming to vaccines "But is global warming really real? What if it's a figment of our imagination?"

For the purpose of this argument, I think we can agree to embrace empiricism and induction. If we don't it's not going to be a discussion of this particular topic but one of the wider philosophical issue of how we know anything.

That's all fine, but the word "objective" I believe is being used in two different ways in the original syllogism. One of them refers to something that we cannot, by definition, know (that objective moral truth exists and is mind-indpendent).

 

[Cavemonster]

That's all fine, but the word "objective" I believe is being used in two different ways in the original syllogism. One of them refers to something that we cannot, by definition, know (that objective moral truth exists and is mind-indpendent).

Well, yes, but we cannot know it in the same way that we cannot know of the existence of a god or an invisible dragon in my garage. It is unknowable in that manner which for all practicalities must default to non-existent for any serious purpose.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, yes, but we cannot know it in the same way that we cannot know of the existence of a god or an invisible dragon in my garage. It is unknowable in that manner which for all practicalities must default to non-existent for any serious purpose.

Correct. And that is why the syllogism fails in my opinion. It switches from the first definition of "objective" to another definition; it depends on an equivocation error.

 

[elipse]

I agree that the words "objective" and "subjective" serve more to confuse this issue than to clear it up. I thought at first "oh, clearly subjective" until I read some more posts and thought about it a little more...what do I mean when I say subjective? So here's my reasoning, trying not to use the terms "objective" and "subjective." (Bear in mind that I'm reasoning as I go, and that I have not read the other threads on the same subject, so I might not be on the same track y'all are on.)

It is clear that what is considered ethical/moral behavior has changed over the course of human history.

Does that mean that our morality as a species has changed?

I see a few different possibilities.

1. Our morality comes from an outside sourse, a "god" of some stripe, that has itself changed its ideas about what constitutes moral behavior. (This might be considered "objective" if by objective you mean "outside the human mind," although you're still left with the question as to whether morality is subjective to the "god" that imposed it upon us.) I find this idea neither plausible nor useful, but I'm including it because it is a possibility.

2. Our basic code of morality, something along the lines of "it is unacceptable to take certain actions against certain individuals," has been hardwired into us over the course of our evolution as a species, and any changes we see in what is considered "moral behavior" are not changes to that basic code of morality, but instead reflect changing attitudes as to the scope of the code. In other words, the code stays the same, but we change our definition of "certain actions" and "certain individuals." For instance, the parameters could once have been: "It is unacceptable to kill a male member of one's own tribe. (Obviously, this is an oversimplification that ignores things like deviance from the accepted social order. I think the basic premise still holds even if you make the "code" in question more complex.) Over time, the parameters have changed to something more like "It is unacceptable to knowingly cause pain without consent to any member of the human species, and maybe some animals, if they're cute and not tasty." (If the basic code remains the same, and we just change parameters as society changes, then one could argue that "morality", but not "moral behavior" is objective, if by objective we mean "hardwired by evolution.")

3. The "moral code" I just posited is too vague to be workable as an actual moral code, and our "morality" is in fact nothing more or less than the general consensus of a particular society regarding "moral behavior." Thus it changes from place to place and over time, and is in fact subjective, but seems objective if only one society's norms are considered, since the vast majority members of that society subscribe to the same norms.

In scenarios 2 and 3, there will always be people who do not believe in their own society's current standards for the parameters of moral behavior, but most of these will fall into line because of societal pressure/punishment. In scenario one I suppose such people would be...aberrations? broken? evidence against scenario one?

anyhow, there's my reasoning. I think I'm leaning towards scenario 2, but I'm still not sure if that would be considered "objective" or not.

 

[westprog]

Since we can know virtually no ontological truth with certainty, there is no way that we can know that objective moral truth exists by the first meaning of "objective". We only know that "objective moral truth" exists in the weaker way -- the same way that we know the universe exists, so to speak. We know the universe exists because we sense it. We build a model and every experience we have backs up the idea. It is not certain knowledge since our senses might be fooled, but it's the best we can arrive at for what really *is*. We know about "objective moral truth" because we (mostly) all feel that certain things are wrong. Neither of these truths -- the existence of the universe, or the "objective moral truth" that killing an innocent is wrong -- necessarily mesh with what actually *is*.

So, I agree with you that it is important to distinguish between the epistemic and the ontological.

There's a difference between the way that we surmise the existence of the universe, and the way we access the moral world. "The universe" is a model we construct to predict what happens to us when we do things. However, pain is something we directly experience. We can doubt that the fire that burns our hand exists. It's more difficult to doubt the pain. From suffering comes value, from value comes morality.