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Why do you not believe/discuss the Pearl Harbor Cts?

No, because if he did, why should he have let the Japanese fleet get away? Fine! lure the enemy into shooting first. That is smart politics. But, you don't let him run away afterwards! You lie waiting with everything you have and give him a good beating in return.

The facts that Pearls was NOT alerted, that fighter-planes did NOT take off (except for a few brave entrepreneurs), that the carriers were NOT in a position to hit back, that the AAA guns were NOT manned and poised, those facts are the best proof that the attack was not part of a US plan.

You could almost see the planning meeting

President: Okay gentlemen here is the idea. We send our ships to Pearl Harbor, let the Japanese launch a brilliant tactical strike against us, then spend four years 5 trillion dollars and countless American and allies lives pushing them back across the Pacific

Admiral: If I may Mr President we have an alternate plan. Lay in wait for the Japanese. When they launch their planes, we launch ours and send their entire fleet to the bottom of the ocean, and the war is over by lunchtime

President: Seriously, whats the fun in that?
 
You could almost see the planning meeting

[...]
President: Seriously, whats the fun in that?

If you want to seriously engage the issue, and I wouldn't blame you for not wnting to, you need to realize this would not be a military decision. As I said earlier, militarily, it was disaster, politically it was a triumph. An honest appraisal of the different options must not exclude political considerations - like the emotional potency of the event.

Was 1941 America easily riled up by dashing naval battles? Mmmaybe, a little.

We do know what the surge on the street after what happened was like. The character of it was very important - the clarity of it ... unprovoked ... total surprise ... defenseless ... aggression ... massacre ... thousands dead. These are all important factors in the real equation, and it all was based on the decisions, on both sides of the Pacific, that brought things to head there.
 
If you want to seriously engage the issue, and I wouldn't blame you for not wnting to, you need to realize this would not be a military decision. As I said earlier, militarily, it was disaster, politically it was a triumph. An honest appraisal of the different options must not exclude political considerations - like the emotional potency of the event.

Was 1941 America easily riled up by dashing naval battles? Mmmaybe, a little.

You are welcome to your opinion, and after all thats all it is. Americans have long been enchanted by the victories their navy has produced. All the way back to 1813 and the battle of Lake Erie. The population has been enthralled with the cavalier like behaviour of is navy

Naval warfare is as much about attitude as it is about equipment or training. The ultimate expression of this attitude can be found in studying the battle of Midway. There is no way in the world the avaliable US forces should have troubled the Japanese fleet, but through sheer guile they turned the direction of the war.
 
CL,
I'm going to pretend I'm sober - not an easy task, I assure you, but I've been steeping myself in WWII and particularly the Pacific for quite a number of years, so I'm pretty sure of my footing, here.

This whole presumption is based on post-facto deliberations by people who should've known better and who ignored the facts of what was going on in Asia before the US involvement. For FDR or for anyone to have laid out this grand plan - as much as a decade in advance, presumes facts that are just not in play.

In August of '39, there was a little heralded but decisive battle on the borders of Mongolia. This event not only brought forward perhaps the greatest general of WWII (Zhukov) but also changed the entire war in Asia. What had been a land war, with designs on Russia, became a push southwards and eastwards. If you're not familiar with the battle or with the Japanese designs on Vladivastok and eastern Russia, you should read up on it. It's rather enlightening.

In short, Japan was planning to take vast expanses of the eastern part of the Soviet Union. Had they succeeded against Zhukov and secured Mongolia, they would have been in an ideal position when Hitler started Barbarosa to cut off all of Russian Asia. The spoils would have covered almost all of their raw material requirements, and they would've had no need to urgently head towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. They would've gotten all sorts of resources.

Japan had this "thing" for Russia. (And Russia wasn't all that fond of Japan, either.) Their navy was an afterthought (much as MacArthur didn't give much credence to either naval or air power). Their invincible army was going to march through all of China and Russia, and with Germany attacking from the west, as the plan went, Russia would crumble.
Well, except for Zhukov .....

I'll leave you with that. I see a couple of folks who actually know WWII are in the thread. I'm quite sure MRC Hans, who has much more detailed knowledge of the times, can give even better definition of what I think is the seminal event in the war in Asia.

(Germany got the pay-back from this scenario, Big Time! Check out the number of times they tried to get Japan - after Mongolia - to open an Eastern front. Japan wrote of their ally as treacherous and decided to go their own way, thereby freeing up Russia to throw everything at their Western front, and notably Zhukov led the way.)
 
In August of '39, there was a little heralded but decisive battle on the borders of Mongolia. This event not only brought forward perhaps the greatest general of WWII (Zhukov) but also changed the entire war in Asia. What had been a land war, with designs on Russia, became a push southwards and eastwards. If you're not familiar with the battle or with the Japanese designs on Vladivastok and eastern Russia, you should read up on it.

It would help, of course, if somebody mentioned that it was the Battle of Khalkhin Gol you should read up on, but that might make it too easy...

Dave
 
...it makes sense from a logic standpoint...

Sorry, but it makes no sense from a logical standpoint. The history of the United States up to that time proved that no huge body count was needed for a declaration of war.

The U.S. entered World War I over something as dumb the Zimmerman Note. What would have made logical sense to fabricate a similiar telegram involving Japan. It makes no sense whatsoever to allow many of your warships to be intentional destroyed at the start of a war.
 
It would help, of course, if somebody mentioned that it was the Battle of Khalkhin Gol you should read up on, but that might make it too easy...

Dave

Oh, another knowledgeable smartazz, I see.:spjimlad::spjimlad:

How am I supposed to remember that? I'm seriously not sober. But I reckoned "Google + Zhukov + Mongolia + 1939" would probably get to it. Probably the first real modern battle of the 20th century. A little bit of everything from tanks to artillery to air support to traditional infantry (and some horse and pony battalions for the nostalgia buffs).

But .... Yeah, one of my favorite "unknown" battles. Probably changed the course of WWII in more ways than could've been imagined at the time. (And the introduction of Zhukov as a major player is just a bonus. Reporting to Crazy Joe had a lot to do with it, of course, but here was a guy who defined the obscenity of war! Straight into the mouth of the beast!)

ETA: Sorry - forgot the spiders... didn't mean to be snarky.
 
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Khalkin Gol is also known as Nomonhon. In fact ,the standard detailed English Language book on the topic by Alvin Coox is called that.
But nearly 600 pages it is not for the casual reader.
BTW, I and a couple of people are now playtesting some scenarios on the tactical level about Nomonhon/Khalkin Gol for the Matrix Games version of "Rising Sun", part of their revision of the John Tiller/Talonsoft Campaign system.
 
Man, aplogies for that last post of mine. I was trying to make a big point and getting pretty tired already. Shoulda left it.

This whole presumption is based on post-facto deliberations by people who should've known better and who ignored the facts of what was going on in Asia before the US involvement. For FDR or for anyone to have laid out this grand plan - as much as a decade in advance, presumes facts that are just not in play.

Which presumption? The whole provoke Japan notion may well have been floating around for a while before the final crystalization, but it doesn't yield much evidence until the time it becam more conscious (if it did) - probably in late 1940, definitely my mid-1941, just getting more dedicated as time went by. It was a year span also marked by worsening situation vis a vis Axis power.

As for your Mongolian aspect, I am aware that there was a moment of tension there between USSR and Japan's army, tho I'm less familiar with the details. How does this relate?
 
Sorry, but it makes no sense from a logical standpoint. The history of the United States up to that time proved that no huge body count was needed for a declaration of war.

True, major death was not always needed. Would it be for this scale of mobilization? Can you name the last time the US mobilized like it did for WWII? Odd then how the catastrophe triggering it just happened to be of a relevant scale. Are you aware the scale of outrage affects its potency?

The U.S. entered World War I over something as dumb the Zimmerman Note.

You forgot the Lusitania. That was far enough from home, just ambiguous enough, perhaps, that it was far from effective. But it did introduce the notion that German people were ready to kill us if we were close enough. The fact that they were also meddling with the Americas was the last straw, but it's hard to say if that alone would have done it. There was political maneuvering too by Wilson et al. I think there was a relative shortage of popular conviction, compared to WWII. We only had to be engaged briefly towards the end.

What would have made logical sense to fabricate a similiar telegram involving Japan. It makes no sense whatsoever to allow many of your warships to be intentional destroyed at the start of a war.

That they intended to attack Panama or something? An enemy violating the Monroe Doctrine always pushes buttons. That would be a good move. Good enough? I don't know. Lots of people would be working on exposing a hoax. That's risky. I can't sit here and quantify US opinion, and draw up a precise mathematical formula. Again, you're framing the loss of ships from simple +/- military perspective. + is good - is bad.

Politically tho, this way we know it was a real design of theirs, because it happened. We know they started it because we were at home port, at rest. Can't get any clearer. We lost a substantial loss. How do Americans cope with that? Demand payment in full usually, plus some, don't they?

"Remember the Alamo!"
"Remember the Maine!"
"Remember the Zimmerman Telegram?"
"Remember Pearl Harbor!"

What do all these but one have in common?
 
As for foreknowledge of the PH attacks goes... What would have been better, *IF* there was foreknowledge of when and where the attack was going to be made, would be to warn PH at 7:25 a.m of an impending attack and greet the Japanese with 14" guns a blazing and fighters scrambled. Think of the propaganda victory: "Japanese attempt a sneak attack on a sleepy Sunday morning, and they're repelled! Now, onwards to Midway!" Meanwhile minimizing US casualties and maximizing Japanese casualties, possibly even making the fight easier in the Pacific, especially with the Battleships intact. Maybe even recall the carrier group that was lucky enough to not be there, to turn towards the attacking fleet and attack the lightly defended Japanese carriers.

That would be the best way *IF* the attack was known ahead of time to get the most out of the propaganda.

Of course, just like 9/11, it's possible for a great nation to be caught with it's collective pants down.
 
I remember reading a book some years ago, don't remember what it was called or who the author was. The book made reference to Ian Fleming who was with British Naval Intelligence.

The story goes somewhat like this.

The British had installed the communications systems in Burma and surrounding areas (I think, my memory of this is quite bad). The British were eavesdropping on the Japanese for some time and were the first to break the Japanese naval codes. America's involvement in the war was limited to lend lease and were reluctant to get more involved in the war.

The British, having broken the Japanese Naval Codes, knew that the Japanese fleet were on the way to attack Pearl Harbour.

They did not pass this information on to America as they knew that once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, America would enter the war boots and all.

They felt that 7000 lives was a small price to pay.

Just another CT, methinks.
 
Hindsight Historians ROCK!

Sorry, my time machine is broken.

As for foreknowledge of the PH attacks goes... What would have been better, *IF* there was foreknowledge of when and where the attack was going to be made, would be to warn PH at 7:25 a.m of an impending attack and greet the Japanese with 14" guns a blazing and fighters scrambled.

Military thinking again. I do realize this is a valid approach - I would think it was likely considered and advocated among the few who had to be involved in any conspiracy. I think my link earlier got buried, but here is where I explain how a - can become a +.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/battle-of-pearl-harbor-alternate.html
An excerpt:
The first and foremost consideration is establishing the clarity of the aggressor/victim situation; the public would not tolerate our entry as an aggressor, but might be forced to concede to a ‘defensive’ war if the other side fired the first shot. Consider this line from the vague and misleading warning to Army commanders in the Pacific, sent Nov 27: “If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.” This is not quite the order to ‘let yourself get shot’ that some present it as, but it does illustrate, at the least, that Washington explicitly desired a well-defined they-started-it beginning (to the extent they wanted a beginning at all, of course).

As it wound up, hostilities could not be avoided, and the Japanese fired hundreds of first shots. Our side managed but a few in return, quite obviously in defense, and the administration got their desired clarity in spades.
 
I remember reading a book some years ago, don't remember what it was called or who the author was. The book made reference to Ian Fleming who was with British Naval Intelligence.

The story goes somewhat like this.

The British had installed the communications systems in Burma and surrounding areas (I think, my memory of this is quite bad). The British were eavesdropping on the Japanese for some time and were the first to break the Japanese naval codes. America's involvement in the war was limited to lend lease and were reluctant to get more involved in the war.

The British, having broken the Japanese Naval Codes, knew that the Japanese fleet were on the way to attack Pearl Harbour.

They did not pass this information on to America as they knew that once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, America would enter the war boots and all.

They felt that 7000 lives was a small price to pay.

Just another CT, methinks.

7,000 lives? This might be interesting, if not bunk. I'll look into it, it may be a book I'm planning to buy next round. There is a thread where we talk about the British-naval code angle (still near the top - Pearl Harbor and JN-25B) if you want to check that out. I'm considering it as a possibility for the moment.

Wow, good thread so far, as good as I can hope for. I can see I'm not getting far convincing anyone of this case on its own merits. Roadblocks all over. How about we take a look at the coincidence theory then? See what's so attractive on the other side?

The bomb plot messagaes. What does everyone think about this intelligence not being passed to Pearl? It was received in Washington, was not seen in Hawaii. As to why, here are some views from Washington:
One Army officer testified that these were just another series of messages among thousands, but did confess it was the only such conversation among those so specific “in the sense of dividing any particular waters.”
Theodore Wilkinson, a brief interim director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did recall what seems to be the bomb plot “information system.” Wilkinson told the Joint Congressional Committee he felt this material didn’t warrant being sent to Pearl Harbor as it showed nothing more that “the nicety of detail of intelligence” they were gathering – about how to attack Pearl Harbor, as it turns out.
Chief of Naval Operations Stark, and his self-appointed intel distributor Turner both professed to not recalling the messages at all, and dismissing the significance if they had seen or heard of them as showing the Japanese "attention to detail".

The coincidence theorist view is, what? that everyone just failed to realize that, in a period later said to be only marked by clues pointing elsewhere than Pearl Harbor, that Pearl Harbor being sectioned into a grid, with ships at rest locaions noted and regularly updated, sent back to Japan, was them just being randomly detailed and not a clue. No one in Washington had it occur to them what this might indicate, or mentioned by someone else in the two months-plus the info was being transmitted, entirly invisible to the on-site defenders.

Alright, you know, that is comforting. People are just so dumb sometimes, especially in mass, bureaucratic and such, just like 9/11. That's okay, we try, we learn, we fail again, but that's okay. People weren't sacrificed, that's all that matters, mother fate/ God/whatever was just helping us out, like always. What else can you expect? :D
 
They did not pass this information on to America as they knew that once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, America would enter the war boots and all.

They felt that 7000 lives was a small price to pay.

Just another CT, methinks.

Well mayb not. Churchill did have a habit of forgetting to tell allies important stuff occasionallly
 
Alright, you know, that is comforting. People are just so dumb sometimes, especially in mass, bureaucratic and such, just like 9/11. That's okay, we try, we learn, we fail again, but that's okay. People weren't sacrificed, that's all that matters, mother fate/ God/whatever was just helping us out, like always. What else can you expect?

You really do not want to get involved with 9/11 Truthers. You don't ,really.
 
You really do not want to get involved with 9/11 Truthers. You don't ,really.

No, not where I was going. Thx fr advc.

Is there any other type of historian? :)

Exactly. Hindsight is the only way to see the past - the question is the filters you have (and the filters the raw data goes through before getting to you). A good historian will try to correct for his biases to glimpse the truth he might have a hard time with. I'm not, in that sense, trying to be a good historian here, but playing hard to my own bias to pierce through the prevailing bias for a more balanced overall understanding.
 
Is there any other type of historian? :)

Well, sometimes pseudo-historians DO tend to second guess decisions made in the past based on knowing how things ultimately turned out. Just sayin' ;)
 

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