Why do you not believe/discuss the Pearl Harbor Cts?

[fuelair]

I know of no inarguable verified, not debunkable evidence of such. Any such evidence would remove it from a need to discuss. Without such, it is just mental masturbation. Either way, discussion is kind of pointless.

 

[Caustic Logic]

It had nothing to do with a restraining effect on Indo China. It was to discourage them from attacking Pearl Harbor by ceating a situation of unacceptable losses for the IJN.

The Japanese understood the value of Peal as a base, and always intended to attack it. The US in their Rainbow studies arrived at the same conclussion

Intelligent argument appreciated - I've got to go to work now. Will get back to this later.

 

[Caustic Logic]

It had nothing to do with a restraining effect on Indo China. It was to discourage them from attacking Pearl Harbor by ceating a situation of unacceptable losses for the IJN.

The Japanese understood the value of Peal as a base, and always intended to attack it. The US in their Rainbow studies arrived at the same conclussion

1) my bad. The deterrence was re: Dutch East Indies in particular, not Indochina.

2) I'm not aware of any designs against Pearl Harbor aside from the fleet there. As the joint investigation of 45 said "the opinion has been expressed by several naval witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet *wherever it might be* at the very outset of hostilities." ??? They would sail to California? Well of course, but Hawaii, whod'a thunk it? That's only half the distance!

Did these studies specify an attack against the Fleet at the Harbor, or just the Harbor? (presumably infrastructure, the few ships there, etc.)

3) You may appreciate some of the Commissions other findings:

"the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore no conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to attack our Pacific Fleet."

“It was his understanding that the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was with a view to its providing a restraining influence on Japan."

"The Secretary of State, as well as our Ambassador to Japan were satisfied that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations."

"It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet was
exposed to any greater danger by reason of the fact that it was based at
Hawaii. The 360 perimeter of the islands afforded unlimited avenues for
operations and the maximum channels for escape in the event of attack by
a hostile superior force. The west coast, on the other hand, afforded
only a 180 scope of operation with no avenues for escape from a
superior attacking force and left only the alternative of proceeding
into the teeth of such a force."

How can you argue with that logic? Hawaii was safer than California!

4) Deterrent mission: Okay, I got the country wrong, but here is Adm. Richardson citing CNO Stark in a letter of May 27 1940 he called “one of the most direct replies to any of my letters to him, although it was far from being as definitive as I would have liked:"

“Why are you in the Hawaiian area? Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presnence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action.”

See next post for some more details on the policy and why it may have - oops - backfired.

 

[Caustic Logic]

First, on pst #19 I misread "counterattack" somehow as Japanese attack on PH. apologies theprestige, but your post still makes it sound like battleships were crawling through broken glass rather than gliding through water, in an attempt to magnify the *mind-boggling* distances involved.
---
The closest we have to a plausible reason for the Fleet's permanent basing in Hawaii is it was "thought" it would have a "restraining effect" on Japanese moves into the Dutch East Indies and in general. It had the general proximity but not the strength or readiness for this end, and so served more as a provocation that invited response (calling the bluff). This is actually an inversion of that other Roosevelt’s famous maxin – speak softly and carry a big stick - and can be glimpsed in these quotes:

“In my discussions in Washington, both within the Navy department and within the White House, it was constantly asserted that the presence of the fleet in Hawaiian waters was exerting a restaining influence on the Japanese. […] the statement might have had a factual basis […] but, it has always seemed odd to me that such an affirmative statement had not been made in the intervening years by some Japanese military officer occupying an important position in the Japanese governmental structure during this period.” [Adm. Richardson, Treadmill to Pearl Harbor, p330]

"I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might
influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military
government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for
war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not
undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in
Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action." [Richardson, to Congressional investigation in 1945]

“The US Fleet […] received orders to remain at Pearl Harbor […] with the purpose of dissuading the Japanese Government from moving southward […] The War Department staff believed that a show of strength in the Pacific might be taken by the Japanese Government as an occasion open hostilities. On this ground the Army planners strongly objected to leaving the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. […] The retention of the fleet in the Pacific might cause Japanese leaders to review and revise their plans, but it would act as a deterrent “only as long as other manifestations of government policy do not let it appear that the location of the fleet is only a bluff.” [Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, pp 15-16 - cited in Richardson, 330]

[On Navy decision to publicly recall all possible aviators from Pearl to training in Florida, publicly leaving the fleet with even weaker aviation abilities]: “Since this information […] was bound to become known to Japaneseintelligence activities, it was a sure giveaway to the Japanese that the U.S. governmental positioning oof the fleet in Hawaii was one of bluff, and not of early combative action.”[Richardson, 313 - emph. mine]

“It seemed to me that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull evaluated the Japanese leaders in terms of themselves. Military moves, which were valueless from the hard realities of war and just window dressing, were assigned great weight. The President and Mr. Hull never seemed to take into consideration that Japan was being led by military men, who would evaluate military moves largely on a military basis.” [Richardson, 333]

“The seed of the disaster that was about to occur had been sown as Admiral Richardson had predicted the year before, when our foreign policy was allowed to dictate military strategy. This situation had resulted in a disastrous deterrent posture. Our bluff was called when the failure of Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts to restore its flow of oil made a preemptive strike an attractive option as a way to save Japan’s face.” [Layton et al. And I Was There, p 235]

Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese Foreign Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that "the continued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas * * *." [19] As Secretary Hull stated, [20] "The worst bandit * * * doesn't like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him at * *. They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not." [Joint Committee, final report 1946 - weird asterisks in original, as found here.]

That last is interesting. We just had an "unloaded gun" pointed halfway to their heads? Deterrent?

 

[MG1962]

That last is interesting. We just had an "unloaded gun" pointed halfway to their heads? Deterrent?

The problem the American planners had was not being aware of the Zengen Sakuson Doctrine that dated all the way back to 1923. Japanese naval planners became obsesed in creating circumstances for a "Grand battle" specifically with the US navy. In its orginal form, the American fleet would be lured into Japanese waters, after an initial attack by auxillery units. The Japanese Capital ships would send the American fleet to the bottom

Minozu Genda, who was the Billy Mitchell of the Japanese navy wrote extensively about the intitial planning in a series of memos in the late 1940's. He talks of a switch in the Zengen doctrine to being a carrier based offensive operation, and students at the Naval War College in Tokyo being asked to put together a wish list and tactical doctrine for a major encounter with US forces.

So it can be argued that the Japanese were expecting significant conflict with the US as early as 1936, and depending how serious you take the Zengen Sakuson doctrine an expectation of conflict going back 20 years before the actual war

 

[dudalb]

Of course talking about "Provoking" the Japanese raises suspiscions someone is either Whitewashing Japanese aggression in the Pacific, or playing the "Moral Equivilency" card.

 

[MG1962]

Of course talking about "Provoking" the Japanese raises suspiscions someone is either Whitewashing Japanese aggression in the Pacific, or playing the "Moral Equivilency" card.

Thats a very interesting point. I dont claim to be an authority, but I am completely unaware of any planning on the US part for pre-emptive offensive action. The US only ever decided on a reactive posture. This places your armed forces at a disadvantage, but given the state of US military spending between the wars. One has to consider it was the only option.

As a side light, one has to wonder why serious consideration to invasion of the Hawaiin Islands was not considered. It would have triggered the obvious reaction from the US and brough about the Zengen Sakuson they so wished for

 

[Caustic Logic]

So it can be argued that the Japanese were expecting significant conflict with the US as early as 1936, and depending how serious you take the Zengen Sakuson doctrine an expectation of conflict going back 20 years before the actual war

I'm not sure how this is supposed to fit in, but that's an interesting point. The US Navy had been hatching Orange war plans for conflict with Japan since, like 1910, spurred by the IJN victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Fleet Problem XIX was carriedout 1938, and included a simulated Jap attack on Oahu from the north, on a Sunday morning, and took the port by surprise. 3 1/2 years later, it seems any lessons were forgotten.

They may have used PH in those drills partly because they were there, rather than its likeliness to be hit. But still, I find it odd they consider it in peacetime, but all of a sudden as hostilities are imminent, Hawaii is upgraded in estimates to an 'impregnable' fortress, and the Japanese are clearly preparing for multiple major operations, Hawaii is basically the one place EVERYONE was surprised by?

---
So what I was wondering, after I found all those quotes, and typed some out, what's your take on the reason for basing the Fleet at Pearl? Is there some other explanation offered that you can share? Or is 'restraining Japan' the best we have?

 

[Caustic Logic]

Of course talking about "Provoking" the Japanese raises suspiscions someone is either Whitewashing Japanese aggression in the Pacific, or playing the "Moral Equivilency" card.

That's fine, suspicion is good. I encourage it I may well be biased towards 'leveling the field,' but only within the context of the facts. Japan was still responsible for the burning and bayoneting and mass rapes, disembowelments, beheadings, tortures, and other abuses in China, if that helps. The enslavement of 'comfort women' from China and Korea, the engineered crises used to conquer manchuria, etc...

The facts on the American side are what they are. I'm trying to discuss those.

I am completely unaware of any planning on the US part for pre-emptive offensive action. The US only ever decided on a reactive posture. This places your armed forces at a disadvantage, but given the state of US military spending between the wars. One has to consider it was the only option.

Actually... I did read in Layton's book about MacArthur's plan to bomb [ETA: be prepared to, or to threaten to, to make it possible] Japan itself from the Philippines. Rather 'bold,' it was considered, but ultimately unrealistic, given the limits of, as you say, peacetime production on bombers, and also the shortage of carriers in the Pacific. This was thought to be a stronger deterrent than the fleet at Hawaii - bombs on Toky was the goal - it was being built up throughout '41, up to 12/7, and was the reason for the 48 B-17s scheduled in from the States.

We were trying to put two guns to their head, one being loaded, the other harmless. Both were smacked from our hands.

Apologies for a top-o-my-head rendition of this episode - anyone else hear of this?

As a side light, one has to wonder why serious consideration to invasion of the Hawaiin Islands was not considered. It would have triggered the obvious reaction from the US and brough about the Zengen Sakuson they so wished for

Since I'm new to the Zengen Sakuson, could you explain how that would work? Sounds interesting.

 

[MG1962]

So what I was wondering, after I found all those quotes, and typed some out, what's your take on the reason for basing the Fleet at Pearl? Is there some other explanation offered that you can share? Or is 'restraining Japan' the best we have?

There is a very old military doctrine caled "Force in Keeping" I just tried to google it and got nothing relevant. My guess is modern military parlance has changed and it has another name

The basic idea is that you assemble a force, but have no intention of actually committing it to battle. The fact the force exists influences enemy battle plans, usually discouraging them to attack. Two examples of this doctrine in effect was the British Home Fleet and the German Grand fleet in WW1. Neither could be dispersed, nor really committed to battle for fear that losses would be so great the other side would get an advantage.

Yes the Germans did sorte in strength once, but had no real intention of engaging the British. In 5 years of war elements of both fleets saw each other once

In the same war, the Italian navy, an inferior force, kept the Austro Hungarian navy bottled up for the entire conflict. Simply by swinging at anchor in the right harbour.

 

[MG1962]

Since I'm new to the Zengen Sakuson, could you explain how that would work? Sounds interesting.

The basic concept was to lure the US fleet into Japanese waters. As they approach they are attacked and whittled down by submarine, destroyer and air attack. Even the concept of Kamakazi attacks was considered

At some point the Japanese fleet would sail in force and clean up the remainder of the Americans, hence delivering a great fleet victory. When looked at closely the similarities between this and the battle of Tsushima in 1905 in which a Japanese fleet ambushed and destroyed an inferior Russian fleet.

Many Japanese naval units were built and designed for this battle. The Japanese sacrificin armour for speed.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Cool, so we have a historical precedent for the bluff military force, and for whatever it means to the current case, the Japanese lure-and-ambush tactic.

Still no refutation of the stated purpose of the fleet move to Hawaii, still no grappling with the notion that 'deterrence' failed, and that both hawaii and the Philppines were taken as weak provocations tempting pre-emption. No arguments that being halfway to Japan increased the odds of a Japanese attack.

Where's the JREF's big guns?

Anyone wanting more info on the Philippines bombing plan, see Layton et al, chapter 15, Imperfect Threats - readable here until you hit your viewing limit like I did:
http://books.google.com/books?id=bZkmLX8i6UgC&printsec=frontcover

I'll be back with more later.

 

[Caustic Logic]

December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor. By William H. Bartsch. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003.
http://www.armyhistory.org/ahf2.aspx?pgID=877&id=256&exCompID=56
Acc. to this review, this book talks about "the shift in the American outlook that would elevate the Philippines from a strategic liability to an asset primarily based on using B-17s to deter Japanese ambitions."

This book discusses it on page 7
http://books.google.com/books?id=ajQgDfPxKYYC

The idea was long-range bombers from Luzon, bomb Japan, land in Vlaidivostok, if Stalin would say cool (he never did).

Military history buffs - what's the significance of a possible offensive force being established just south of Japan in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor?

Layton et al. say military planners wanted Hull to maintain negotiations longer, until this threat was ready. But Hull was upset to find Japanese bad faith, feigning diplomacy to cover for war prep. This caused him to "kick the whole thing over" on Nov. 27, issue the Hulltimatum, and the automatic recoil hit before the threat was ready, and while Pearl was still neglected as a "way station" for that effort.

It was a military disaster, but a political triumph.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Uh, the US Fleet was NEVER based at San Francisco 1in the 1930's. It was based at San Diego.
You are shooting yourself in the foot with howlers like that one.
So you admit have no evidence that the fleet was based in Hawaii as a staked out lamb for the Japanese Fleet?

Actually looks like it was more like LA.

On 7 May 1940, the U.S. fleet moved its headquarters from San Pedro, California, to Pearl Harbor. The move was undertaken with great reluctance by Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Richardson and most Navy officials who opposed the move thought a fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor would be unnecessarily exposed to Japanese naval strength.

http://www.history.navy.mil/books/comint/comint-4.html

San Pedro wiki - a neighborhood of Los Angeles, United States Navy Battle Fleet Home Port 1919-1940

Speaking of howlers, dude, whadya think of the commission saying Hawaii was safer than California, as if they have no clue of physical space?

eh...

 

[Foolmewunz]

December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor. By William H. Bartsch. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003.
http://www.armyhistory.org/ahf2.aspx?pgID=877&id=256&exCompID=56
Acc. to this review, this book talks about "the shift in the American outlook that would elevate the Philippines from a strategic liability to an asset primarily based on using B-17s to deter Japanese ambitions."

This book discusses it on page 7
http://books.google.com/books?id=ajQgDfPxKYYC

The idea was long-range bombers from Luzon, bomb Japan, land in Vlaidivostok, if Stalin would say cool (he never did).

Military history buffs - what's the significance of a possible offensive force being established just south of Japan in the lead-up to Pearl Harbor?

Layton et al. say military planners wanted Hull to maintain negotiations longer, until this threat was ready. But Hull was upset to find Japanese bad faith, feigning diplomacy to cover for war prep. This caused him to "kick the whole thing over" on Nov. 27, issue the Hulltimatum, and the automatic recoil hit before the threat was ready, and while Pearl was still neglected as a "way station" for that effort.

It was a military disaster, but a political triumph.

CL,
You're just all over the map of the Pacific, aren't you? Settle into a coherent theme, please, because you just seem to be clutching at any old straw the wind blows your way.

Just to cover these few:

Clark AFB "just south of Japan in the lead up to Pearl...."
1. "Just south of"? The range of the B17 wouldn't have gotten it to Tokyo and then to Vladivastok, so this is nonsense. By the end of the war, they might've made it, but not in '41, and certainly not with the earlier B17s. So "just south of" is a bit misleading. That's sort of like asking if Greece is threatened because there's a submarine off Yemen! Japan had no possessions other than Formosa (Taiwan) within bombing range at the time, so the bombers were meant as deterrent to expansion into Southeast Asia.
2. "lead-up to Pearl Harbor"? Slightly tainting things with your choice of words, are you? There was a Japanese lead-up/build-up to Pearl. The American forces were being positioned to try to deter Japan's intentions.

As to the review that you linked to, they seem to more clearly state that they actually scrambled the B17s and fighters, but they couldn't keep them airborne forever. When they landed again and Big Mac proceeded to have one of his Big Mac attacks (of indecisiveness when it comes to the use of air as an attack technique), the Japanese hit the Philippines. (This is also rather well-known history of the area.)


As to the "military planners" wanting Hull to stall....
1. Layton seems rather self-serving in his post-war comments. He wasn't in the thick of things in every theater as he makes it sound.
2. What good would Hull's negotations have done, in hindsight, as the multi-carrier fleet had left the Kuriles three days earlier.

The Japanese had the whole thing mapped out, including the move from the Kuriles, which was a stroke of genius, in retrospect. All activities in the Pacific after August of '39 pointed southwards, so everyone was anticipating that any attack would be in that area. (And it actually was - the attack on Pearl was a pre-emptive strike to try to take the US Navy out of play for long enough that the Japanese could secure hegemony amongst all the former European colonies, particularly Malaya and the East Indies and Philippines, and Central and Southern China and Indochina (rubber, oil, iron ore and coal).


Your comment as to wanting to generalize the discussions leads me to believe that you're not faring well in the specific discussions. I have a feeling you're not going to fare all that better in this area, either. You have yet to provide anything other than conjecture. Conjecture, I might add, that's been pretty well gone over extensively in the past few decades.

 

[Foolmewunz]

<snip>

Speaking of howlers, dude, whadya think of the commission saying Hawaii was safer than California, as if they have no clue of physical space?

eh...

Context is everything, sometimes.

The discussion of "safer" was in lieu of being able to escape in all directions, thus requiring any opposing naval force to encircle the islands 360 degrees - a task that has never been accomplished, to my knowledge in modern naval warfare. Whereas a single port/bay can be quite easily bottled up, as is witnessed by the numerous times it's been done.

Where would ships escape moving eastwards in the event of an eventual attack on the US mainland? Alameda county? Could they take the freeway?

Equally, in the North Atlantic, many were concerned in having the fleet in Norfolk or Brooklyn. It'd be real easy for a German wolfpack to bottle them up.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Thanks for a response. It was feeling lonely there. This one first, since it's easier.

Context is everything, sometimes.

The discussion of "safer" was in lieu of being able to escape in all directions, thus requiring any opposing naval force to encircle the islands 360 degrees - a task that has never been accomplished, to my knowledge in modern naval warfare. Whereas a single port/bay can be quite easily bottled up, as is witnessed by the numerous times it's been done.

Where would ships escape moving eastwards in the event of an eventual attack on the US mainland? Alameda county? Could they take the freeway?

Equally, in the North Atlantic, many were concerned in having the fleet in Norfolk or Brooklyn. It'd be real easy for a German wolfpack to bottle them up.

I get what they mean - coasts are like walls to ships, they work best in the open... yeah, me naval expert... but that's a non-sequitur. The main thing is the coast was also another 2000 mi plus further away from Japan. I know they aren't really that dumb, but it sounds so dumb to me to just compare them on some kind of par. Hey, maybe there's some inlet on a spit off Honshu with superb 360 view and defensibility, maybe that's a good spot?

I'm sure you get what I mean. I'm sure there's some context there I'm missing, I just caught that as illustrating my point w/irony.

 

[Caustic Logic]

CL,
You're just all over the map of the Pacific, aren't you? Settle into a coherent theme, please, because you just seem to be clutching at any old straw the wind blows your way.

In general, I don't think so, but I am rushing ahead a bit on this point, and it shows. Thanks for taking the time to offer thoughts.

Clark AFB "just south of Japan in the lead up to Pearl...."

I was thinking relatively, in terms of Pacific distances - fleet at CA, fleet at HI, bomber force at Philippines. Way way east, way east, just south

1. "Just south of"? The range of the B17 wouldn't have gotten it to Tokyo and then to Vladivastok, so this is nonsense. By the end of the war, they might've made it, but not in '41, and certainly not with the earlier B17s. So "just south of" is a bit misleading. That's sort of like asking if Greece is threatened because there's a submarine off Yemen! Japan had no possessions other than Formosa (Taiwan) within bombing range at the time, so the bombers were meant as deterrent to expansion into Southeast Asia.

You're probably right where we disagree(d) here. I'm not a big WWII buff, and lack some of the reference points a lot of others have. Looking closer at my source, it seems the Tokyo-Russia attack line was more of a proposal, and only introduced in October '41. So the B-17 force was, I presume, for more local deterrence, and this offensive plan was not a factor "in the lead up."

Because I used this as evidence of a planned offensive capability above, I'd like to scratch that point.

2. "lead-up to Pearl Harbor"? Slightly tainting things with your choice of words, are you?

Juxtaposing, to make my point.

As to the "military planners" wanting Hull to stall....
1. Layton seems rather self-serving in his post-war comments. He wasn't in the thick of things in every theater as he makes it sound.

I'm sure that kind of bias plays some role in the book, and most of the contents are clearly from after-the-fact research. Sure. Grain of salt...

2. What good would Hull's negotations have done, in hindsight, as the multi-carrier fleet had left the Kuriles three days earlier.

The Japanese had the whole thing mapped out, including the move from the Kuriles, which was a stroke of genius, in retrospect. All activities in the Pacific after August of '39 pointed southwards, so everyone was anticipating that any attack would be in that area. (And it actually was - the attack on Pearl was a pre-emptive strike to try to take the US Navy out of play for long enough that the Japanese could secure hegemony amongst all the former European colonies, particularly Malaya and the East Indies and Philippines, and Central and Southern China and Indochina (rubber, oil, iron ore and coal).

Good summary, brief and potent. To answer the question in there, as you perhaps forgot, the PH striking force's order-to-sail included this proviso:

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will
reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile
action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to
reassemble and return to their bases.

As for the Philippines, I doubt that would be spared. Would sparing Pearl avoid war with US? Would sparing the Philippines even? Opinion polls and White House meetings give very different indications.

Your comment as to wanting to generalize the discussions leads me to believe that you're not faring well in the specific discussions.

I think they went fairly well. Just ran their course, until someone adds something new. This one can keep going, since it's more general.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Still no refutation of the stated purpose of the fleet move to Hawaii, still no grappling with the notion that 'deterrence' failed, and that both hawaii and the Philppines were taken as weak provocations tempting pre-emption. No arguments that being halfway to Japan increased the odds of a Japanese attack.

Where's the JREF's big guns?

Son, you need more than a pea-shooter to lure out the big guns.

What IS your case? So some of the decisions were, when seen in retrospect, not optimal? Some were even stupid?? Those things happen.

It was a military disaster, but a political triumph.

Pearl? It was a military disaster .... for Japan:

1) They did not manage to put the US navy out of action for nearly long enough.

2) They grabbed the tiger by the tail, and bore the consequences.

3) Getting the US into the war was the worst thing that could happen to the Axis.

So wasn't it a boon to TDR? It sure was.

So didn't TDR MIHOP it?

No, because if he did, why should he have let the Japanese fleet get away? Fine! lure the enemy into shooting first. That is smart politics. But, you don't let him run away afterwards! You lie waiting with everything you have and give him a good beating in return.

The facts that Pearls was NOT alerted, that fighter-planes did NOT take off (except for a few brave entrepreneurs), that the carriers were NOT in a position to hit back, that the AAA guns were NOT manned and poised, those facts are the best proof that the attack was not part of a US plan.

As for long-range bombing ideas:
Do you have any idea at all about the conditions for long-range air navigation at the time? Do you realize that they had hardly more navigation aids than a 19th century ship?

Hans

 

[Caustic Logic]

Son, you need more than a pea-shooter to lure out the big guns.

Haha! I need the right shout-out - the Big guns know when someone's talkin' to them!

What IS your case? So some of the decisions were, when seen in retrospect, not optimal? Some were even stupid?? Those things happen.

Good, thanks. So far we're on the reasoning behind putting the fleet in Hawaii and the effect this had on making it a more likely target of japanese hostilities. That's a small part of the whole case, and this part is fairly circumstantial, largely conjecture. In short, what we [you and I] seem to agree on is that "some decisions" were "not optimal" or "even stupid." All I'd like to add is that the relative stupidity or brilliance of a move is of necessity based on the intent of the move. What may seem stupid...

Pearl? It was a military disaster .... for Japan:

Well, from a military PoV, the battle- it was brilliantly done and unnaturally successful. In the long term, of course...

1) They did not manage to put the US navy out of action for nearly long enough.

Dit'n even scratch the carriers.

2) They grabbed the tiger by the tail, and bore the consequences.

3) Getting the US into the war was the worst thing that could happen to the Axis.

Yamamoto insisted, if they absolutely MUST do that, attacking the fleet at Pearl on the side was the best way to start it.

So wasn't it a boon to TDR? It sure was.

So didn't TDR MIHOP it?

I'm sure I should know what TDR is. I'm guessing FDR.

No, because if he did, why should he have let the Japanese fleet get away? Fine! lure the enemy into shooting first. That is smart politics. But, you don't let him run away afterwards! You lie waiting with everything you have and give him a good beating in return.

Good point, and a point for more conjecture. Admittedly, that's one way of doing things, and it has its merits, like whooping the enemy early on, defending your own ships better, less casualties... but there are other levels that would be considered - I did a blog post about the different ways a provocation could be managed.
http://12-7-9-11.blogspot.com/2009/02/battle-of-pearl-harbor-alternate.html
It's pretty cynical read, but I challenge anyone to deny the basic logic of it.

The facts that Pearls was NOT alerted, that fighter-planes did NOT take off (except for a few brave entrepreneurs), that the carriers were NOT in a position to hit back, that the AAA guns were NOT manned and poised, those facts are the best proof that the attack was not part of a US plan.

Alright, those are certainly... words... you typed.

As for long-range bombing ideas:
Do you have any idea at all about the conditions for long-range air navigation at the time? Do you realize that they had hardly more navigation aids than a 19th century ship?

Again, I don't know as much about that as I thought, and it's a side-point. Apparently in '41 there was such a proposal being looked at, by Marshall and Stimson, et al. I don't know the details, but you can check the sources above and take it up with Gen. MacArthur.

Hans[/QUOTE]