The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

So everything. Concentrating your hearing is a physical act....

Eh.....?

Actually, "concentrating" is a word which can be understood in two ways. It is a mental behaviour. It is a good example of something which can be given both a physical and mental description - very different descriptions, but descriptions that are related in exactly the same way as "brain process" and "subjective experience" are related. So I will use the terms "concentrate-P" to describe the physical processes and "concentrate-M" to describe the subjective experience. Simply mixing them up would be a linguistic mistake.

, things have to happen in your physical brain to change the focus of your attention (as you acknowledged in the materialistic explanation that you gave me for what was going on in my stopping clock example).

Things happen in your brain when change the focus of your attention. And I repeat that there was nothing materialistic about my explanation. You have got science and materialism confused as per the title of this thread. I gave you a scientifically-informed answer, not a materialistic one. Why have repeated the claim it was materialistic but not justified it?

If we can say that I was conscious of the ticking clock but chose not to focus my awareness on it than we can equally well say I was conscious of the picture on the wall behind me but chose not to bring it into awareness by turning my head to look at it.

No, that would be a mistake - a mistake that any person who had studied phenomenology would not make. We have two different senses of "available to consciousness". I might equally say that I could bring the dark side of the moon into my consciousness if I was orbiting the moon. That's not the same as ticking clock you are not paying attention to.

Light reflected from the picture is hitting the back of my head, but the chain of causation stops there. No consciousness experience takes place as a result of this. The sounds from the ticking clock make my eardrum reverberate and are transduced into electrical signals in my brain, and are stored temporarily in my short term memory. Then they are erased. No consciousness experience takes place.

Except it does......you it's just in the background. I just explained my position. I seem to be explaining it again.

The only difference between the two situations is that in the second case we need to imagine internal brain functions to see that the situation are in fact comparable.

Erm, no, the situations are as different as the clock and the dark side of the moon.

Some philosophers don't like doing this because then they have to deal with icky science stuff which is beneath them.

Does this sentence mean something?

And consciousness is those things that I am actually focussed on. Consciousness is awareness, at least it is if it is to have the properties that supposedly make it impossible to reduce to a physical description.

Cart before horse. Consciousness has many levels.

There are no background qualia.

Except there are. What's your justification for claiming there aren't, apart from that you think it helps your argument?

Well Sartre agreed with me here and disagreed with Husserl. Consciousness must be translucent, there can be no things "in" consciousness that we are not actually aware of.

Consciousness is full of things one is only marginally aware of. Otherwise we would be overloaded. That is a perfectly reasonable, scientifically informed explanation.

I was being slightly tongue-in-cheek calling it an argument for eliminativism. The purpose of my argument was to show that you don't have an understanding of consciousness that makes any sense. And clearly you don't.

You argument doesn't show this. It's got nothing to do with MY argument. It's not even an effective argument against Descartes.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Your definitions are:

Physical : Objective, 3rd-person.
Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.

If your definition of physical does now allow me to say "objectively observable by a third person," then I don't know what your definition means. In particular, if you want physical to mean "not mental," then I disagree with the definition.

Yes, I know you want another definition to mine, but your problem is that you are unable to coherently define it any other way! You are desperately trying to put the cart before the horse, but it isn't working.

Why do you keep using the term "objectively observable"? Answer: because you want to be able to conflate subjective and objective. "Observable", in the truest sense of the word, refers entirely to the contents of your mind. What "physical objects" really are are objects of your perception which are spatially extended. But you also want "physical" to mean something else - something entirely different and not part of your mind. Hence you can't provide a coherent set of definitions.

You have just admitted that you are unwilling to allow any set of definition which make mental and physical exclusive. But you can't even provide any set of definitions of your own which allow you to define mental and physical as non-exclusive! That is the whole point of this thread. That is why the book the opening post links to is called "the taboo of subjectivity". You do not want to allow anybody to define anything as being inherently subjective where "inherently subjective" implies non-physical. Why not? It's got nothing whatsoever to do with whether mental and physical are actually different categories and everything to do with you wanting to make sure your definitions are rigged so the proof doesn't go through.

I think you do understand the proof, Paul. I think you understand it well enough to know that if one has a set of definitions where subjective and objective (or mental and physical, or 1st-person and 3rd-person) are opposites that the proof goes through. Why else would you be refusing to accept any definitions which define them as opposites?

So how about, instead of trying to rig your definitions in order to be able to claim you "don't see the proof", why don't you concentrate on making your definitions accurate and clear? If you cannot supply a coherent set of definitions then it is powerful evidence that there is something wrong with the way you are trying to define them.

I'll make it even clearer. What you want to do is to avoid defining anything at all to be "inherently subjective". Yet minds, as you well know, are inherently subjective. Your inability to decide which way to jump on this issue is what prevents me from being able to move to the next part of the argument.

I think you know that (1) and (2) are true:

1) If you define minds as being inherently subjective then I can easily demonstrate that physicalism must be false. But the definitions are coherent.

2) If you define minds as not existing then I will accuse of defending a position which is prima facie absurd. But the definitions are coherent.

leaving you trying to...

3) Define minds as being something subjective, which exists, but which is some way can also be described as objective i.e. something which is both subjective and objective at the same time.

The reason the proof works is that it is impossible to provide any coherent set of definitions which satisifies (3). That is why I am giving you a free hand to define your terms however you like, and stop accusing me of rigging the definitions. I want you to come to your own realisation that what you are trying to do is impossible. Any definitions that try to satisfy (3) will lead to a contradiction. That is why you can't do it. That is why the proof works.

Ah, so you are defining mental to mean "the experience of private behavior," as opposed to simply "private behavior."

You have once again introduced a term that

a) I never used and never defined
b) Attempts to conflate subjective and objective.

I haven't defined "mental" to mean "behaviour" at all. Why do you keep inventing new terms and claiming I defined them?

Private behavior can be explained to a third person, whereas its experience cannot be had by a third person.

Why use the term "behaviour" at all? What is it needed for? Why have you introduced it? Why have you claimed I defined it when I didnt'?

So, you need to expand your definition of physical so that we know what it means for something to be objective. And you need to change your definition of mental to "subjective experiences."

I don't need to change my definition of "mental" to "subjective experiences" because I already defined these things as being the same.

But it certainly is important to clarify "what it means for something to be objective/physical/3rd-person." The trouble is, as soon as try to give you a coherent definition of this, you will reject it on the grounds that it doesn't allow you to conflate subjective and objective. You will accuse me of question begging, even though all I will be doing is providing a set of definitions which is coherent.

It cannot be done, Paul. There is no coherent set of definitions which allows you to conflate mental and physical in the way you want to. The only coherent sets of definitions are the definitions which lead to materialism being shown to be false, or lead to eliminativism and achieve coherency at the cost of refusing to define "mental" at all and attempting to eliminate subjectivity. You are free to continue trying, but it cannot be done.

There is your proof.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Seems dangerous to allow one's metaphysic to rule out that which is clearly an empirical question.

~~ Paul

It's not clearly an empirical question.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Since Paul has been unable to supply a coherent set of definitions for me to demonstrate that all versions of materialism except eliminativism are incoherent, would anyone else like to try?

I need definitions of:

Mental, Physical, subjective and objective.

Geoff

 

[Darat]

Since Paul has been unable to supply a coherent set of definitions for me to demonstrate that all versions of materialism except eliminativism are incoherent, would anyone else like to try?

I need definitions of:

Mental, Physical, subjective and objective.

Geoff

I would suggest then that you don't start with words that reflect the "dualism" that is deeply embedded in the English language.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes, I know you want another definition to mine, but your problem is that you are unable to coherently define it any other way! You are desperately trying to put the cart before the horse, but it isn't working.

Geoff, if this is going to be the game, then tell me now so I can do something else with my time.

Why do you keep using the term "objectively observable"? Answer: because you want to be able to conflate subjective and objective. "Observable", in the truest sense of the word, refers entirely to the contents of your mind. What "physical objects" really are are objects of your perception which are spatially extended. But you also want "physical" to mean something else - something entirely different and not part of your mind. Hence you can't provide a coherent set of definitions.

But subjective and objective are clearly conflated. When thousands of people are sitting in a ball park watching baseball, there are thousand of subjective experiences happening. But there is also the objective fact that everyone is watching this baseball game, the objective sequence of events in the game, the objective group cheering at a home run, etc.

So, the trick is to define subjective as the one thing that is not shareable: My inner experiences as I watch the game. Not the fact that I have inner experiences, not the shareable content of the experiences, but the experiences themselves.

You have just admitted that you are unwilling to allow any set of definition which make mental and physical exclusive. But you can't even provide any set of definitions of your own which allow you to define mental and physical as non-exclusive! That is the whole point of this thread. That is why the book the opening post links to is called "the taboo of subjectivity". You do not want to allow anybody to define anything as being inherently subjective where "inherently subjective" implies non-physical. Why not? It's got nothing whatsoever to do with whether mental and physical are actually different categories and everything to do with you wanting to make sure your definitions are rigged so the proof doesn't go through.

What I objected to was the clearly question-begging statement "inherently subjective (i.e. NOT BRAIN PROCESSES)." I'm not trying to rig the proof, because I don't know what the proof is.

I'm not sure what "inherently subjective" has to do with nonphysical. I could see how you might try to define some noun as nonphysical, but what does it mean to define an adjective as nonphysical? Why don't you try defining physical first, to see if I agree? I was defining it in an epistemological way, whereas you probably want to define it ontologically.

I think you do understand the proof, Paul. I think you understand it well enough to know that if one has a set of definitions where subjective and objective (or mental and physical, or 1st-person and 3rd-person) are opposites that the proof goes through. Why else would you be refusing to accept any definitions which define them as opposites?

Because they aren't opposite. For example, my subjective experiences clearly objectively happen. There you go; they are already intertwined.

So how about, instead of trying to rig your definitions in order to be able to claim you "don't see the proof", why don't you concentrate on making your definitions accurate and clear? If you cannot supply a coherent set of definitions then it is powerful evidence that there is something wrong with the way you are trying to define them.

I'm sure there is something wrong. The world has no obligation to make our definition game easy. Apparently, however, you think that you have overcome the philosophical problem of the ages. So why don't you present your definitions for critique?

I'll make it even clearer. What you want to do is to avoid defining anything at all to be "inherently subjective". Yet minds, as you well know, are inherently subjective. Your inability to decide which way to jump on this issue is what prevents me from being able to move to the next part of the argument.

I'm happy to define subjective experiences as inherently subjective, as long as I understand what you mean by "inherently subjective."

You have once again introduced a term that

a) I never used and never defined
b) Attempts to conflate subjective and objective.

I haven't defined "mental" to mean "behaviour" at all. Why do you keep inventing new terms and claiming I defined them?

You may substitute another word for behavior, as long as the definition is not circular. So the term mental would mean "the experience of private X." Perhaps we can avoid the problem by defining it as "private experience"? No, that won't work.

I don't need to change my definition of "mental" to "subjective experiences" because I already defined these things as being the same.

No, you didn't. You defined mental as:

Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.

What is it that's subjective and private? The experience, right?

It cannot be done, Paul. There is no coherent set of definitions which allows you to conflate mental and physical in the way you want to. The only coherent sets of definitions are the definitions which lead to materialism being shown to be false, or lead to eliminativism and achieve coherency at the cost of refusing to define "mental" at all and attempting to eliminate subjectivity. You are free to continue trying, but it cannot be done.

Are we done yet?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not clearly an empirical question.

It's not an empirical question whether technology could allow me to experience someone else's mental experiences? Do you have a proof of this?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Without a doubt. There is nothing about either calculation or word processing which cannot be fully describe in terms of the entities of physics.

So we agree that if I calculate something in my brain but do not share it with anyone, then we have a physical mental private experience, right?

~~ Paul

 

[cyborg]

So we agree that if I calculate something in my brain but do not share it with anyone, then we have a physical mental private experience, right?

I don't think it matters; his arguement above is that we know about the entire calculation process of a computer engaged in a task therefore that's fine. We don't know the entire calculation process of a brain therefore that's not fine. The machine doesn't have a private mental process because we readily identify it as a machine, whereas if we don't view ourselves as machines then we get to do some special pleading that we infact have special mental processes other machines don't.

I don't see how it doesn't just boil down to an argument from ignorance - we don't know everything about our brains therefore neutral monism.

 

[chriswl]

Things happen in your brain when change the focus of your attention. And I repeat that there was nothing materialistic about my explanation. You have got science and materialism confused as per the title of this thread. I gave you a scientifically-informed answer, not a materialistic one. Why have repeated the claim it was materialistic but not justified it?

Materialistic in the sense of "compatible with materialism". That part of your description was in terms of purely physical things.

No, that would be a mistake - a mistake that any person who had studied phenomenology would not make. We have two different senses of "available to consciousness". .

What is the essential difference between turning my head to look at something and turning my attention to something? Well, if you have no interest in the physical structure of the brain (icky science stuff, remember?) then you can say that one is a physical act and the other is mental. But actually, to turn our attention to something requires us to do something physical in our physical brains. Only then can we perceive the thing that we want to switch our attention to. Until we have done this we are no more conscious of the "background" thing than we are of the dark side of the moon.

Except it does......you it's just in the background. I just explained my position. I seem to be explaining it again.

You explained that conscious, for you, includes things that we are not actually aware of. Not for me and not for many other people, many philosophers included. But let's go with your definition. You have now lost the right to claim that consciousness is the kind of thing that cannot possibly be reduced to a merely physical description. The sort of thing that cannot be reduced in this way is awareness. Background stuff of which we are unaware, we can quite happily reduce to non-conscious brain states.

This is why I focussed on actual conscious awareness in the example I gave and showed that we don't seem to know what it actually is. Because conscious awareness is the thing that causes all the problems. If we don't understand that then it matters, given that it's supposed existence is the reason why materialism is untennable, why it must supposedly, inevitably leave out something important.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

But subjective and objective are clearly conflated.

Only by materialists. I haven't conflated them.

When thousands of people are sitting in a ball park watching baseball, there are thousand of subjective experiences happening. But there is also the objective fact that everyone is watching this baseball game, the objective sequence of events in the game, the objective group cheering at a home run, etc.

Good. But there is no conflation here, if you look carefully enough. I am going to take this in steps so you can explain exactly where I lose you.

1) From your 1st-person, subjective, point of view there is only subjective experiences, and only one set of subjective experiences - yours. That includes all the things we normally call "mental" (your excitement or boredom, for example) and all the we normally call "physical" (the experience of perceiving the game). In this sense, everything is subjective. Hammegk is quite correct to point out that the only "objective" thing he is aware of is that he is conscious at all.

2) Because you are a human, and not an animal, you have a complicated set of abstract ideas about these subjective experiences. Part of what you subjectively observe are other human beings, and, via a process of empathising with them, you conclude, via a line of reasoning which is so automatic you aren't aware of it, that they have their own set of subjective experiences. You also conclude, via the same line of reasoning, that there must be an external world - the one which is (in some sense) the cause of both your subjective experiences and those of other people.

3) So we have arrived at the subjective and objective things via different routes. This is why you cannot coherently define the same thing to be subjective and objective at the same time. All of the subjective things are identified by the fact they are given to you directly (regardless of whether they are in the foreground or the background of what is given to you directly). But none of the objective things are given to you directly. The only reason you believe that there is an external world AND the only reason you believe that other people have subjective experiences is via a line of reasoning. So subjective things are NOT abstractions and objective things ARE. This makes them mutually exclusive, whether you like it or not.

**************************VERY IMPORTANT NOTE*************************
If you are going to challenge this then please do not do so solely on the grounds of "But this can't be right, because if it is then materialism is false". That would be no better than challenging something solely on the grounds it would falsify the Bible, which is exactly what the materialists are being accused of. If you give me a response of this form, I will call it for what it is. This is not "question-begging". It is the proof you claim you can't see. You cannot defend materialism by declaring that all definitions which lead to it's demise are "question-begging". You cannot defend the Bible by declaring that all definitions which lead to it's demise are "question-begging".
**************************VERY IMPORTANT NOTE**************************

I need you to think very carefully about what you mean by "Physical".

Do you mean

P1) The parts of your subjective experiences which have extension

or

P2) The actual external world which causes those experiences

or

P3) Both of them.

This is what hammegk means when he says that physicalists don't understand what "physical" means. hammegk would simply define physical as P1. Physicalists sometimes want to define it as P1, sometimes want to define it as P2, and sometimes want to define it as P3.

So, the trick is to define subjective as the one thing that is not shareable: My inner experiences as I watch the game.

All of your experiences are "inner experiences". You do not have any other kind.

Not the fact that I have inner experiences, not the shareable content of the experiences, but the experiences themselves.

There is no "shareable content". You cannot share your experiences. You can only share descriptions of them.

I'm not sure what "inherently subjective" has to do with nonphysical.

But since you aren't sure what "physical" is either, this isn't enormously surprising.

I could see how you might try to define some noun as nonphysical, but what does it mean to define an adjective as nonphysical?

It means the adjective describes something nonphysical?

Why don't you try defining physical first, to see if I agree? I was defining it in an epistemological way, whereas you probably want to define it ontologically.

My own position is defined in the thread on neutral monism. However, given that I am trying to show that physicalism is false, I have to use arguments which look like they lead to idealism (or dualism). As already stated, I believe that idealism and dualism are also mistakes, but in order to reach the point where you are willing to abandon all three of them in favour of neutral monism, I have to use arguments that sound like they are going to lead to idealism/dualism.

"Physical" is used by physicalists in two ways which they then conflate - defined as P1, P2 and P3 above. My neutral monist position allows a set of definitions which avoids all this confusion, but you don't understand it so I can't use it here. Specifically, my own position (which isn't really encompassed by the definitions I gave earlier in this thread) denies the P2 usage of "physical". It defines "physical" as P1 only, which is why the position sounds like idealism to a materialist. Instead of P2 I define a neutral entity, and I never make a P3 conflation.

Because they aren't opposite. For example, my subjective experiences clearly objectively happen. There you go; they are already intertwined.

See description of what is happeninf at the baseball game.

I'm sure there is something wrong. The world has no obligation to make our definition game easy. Apparently, however, you think that you have overcome the philosophical problem of the ages. So why don't you present your definitions for critique? Worried about them?

No. I am completely confident that my definitions (the ones in my thread, not the ones in this thread) work.

I'm happy to define subjective experiences as inherently subjective, as long as I understand what you mean by "inherently subjective."

See description of baseball games. They are inherently subjective because they are private and given to you directly. The bits you want to claim are "shareable" are only shareable via empathy and abstract reasoning. You don't actually share any of your subjective experiences. Other people, just like you, must construct the objective things via a line of reasoning and empathy. So do you see why the direct experiences are neither shareable nor objective?

You may substitute another word for behavior, as long as the definition is not circular. So the term mental would mean "the experience of private X." Perhaps we can avoid the problem by defining it as "private experience"?

Private experience, qualia, mind, mental, inherently subjective....all the same to me. But NOT the same as "behaviour". Behaviour is something which can equally be used describe minds or brains. So if you want to use it, you need to specify whether you mean physical activity or mental activity.

Are we done yet?

Not yet, no.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Materialistic in the sense of "compatible with materialism". That part of your description was in terms of purely physical things.

Then it was "idealistic" in the sense it was "compatible with idealism" and "neutreal monistic" in the sense it was "comaptible with neutral monism".

But you seem to think this has demonstrated something. All it has demonstrated is that you don't understand the relationship between science and materialism, as per the title of the thread. You are calling things "materialistic" when what you should be saying is "scientific".

You explained that conscious, for you, includes things that we are not actually aware of.

Not quite. You've put words into my mouth. What I actually said was that it includes things we are minimally aware of.

Not for me and not for many other people, many philosophers included. But let's go with your definition. You have now lost the right to claim that consciousness is the kind of thing that cannot possibly be reduced to a merely physical description.

Chris, this is a straw man. You are debunking a definition I DID NOT GIVE.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So we agree that if I calculate something in my brain but do not share it with anyone, then we have a physical mental private experience, right?

~~ Paul

I wasn't asked about human beings performing calculations. We were talking about word-processors. I never agreed that brains were computers. In the case of the computer, we do not empathise, see that they are like us, and assume they have private experiences (minds). We tend to assume the opposite. The human calculation is different. In this case we can describe it as either a physical process or as a subjective experience. But that does not mean that the physical process and the subjective experience are the same thing.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

TO ALL:

Perhaps I can make a constructive suggestion.

Since physicalism continually confuses:

physical: P1) The parts of your subjective experiences which have extension
physical: P2) The hypothesised external world which causes those experiences
physical: P3) Both of the above conflated together

Can we try to have this discussion with these three things seperated?

Is that acceptable?

How about:

P1) Physical (as experienced subjectively)
P2) EXTERNAL
P3) Banned on the grounds that it is incoherent.

?

This is the nitty-gritty......

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I wasn't asked about human beings performing calculations. We were talking about word-processors. I never agreed that brains were computers. In the case of the computer, we do not empathise, see that they are like us, and assume they have private experiences (minds). We tend to assume the opposite. The human calculation is different. In this case we can describe it as either a physical process or as a subjective experience. But that does not mean that the physical process and the subjective experience are the same thing.

Agreed, nor does it mean they aren't.

The problem now is that the delineation between physical/mental/subjective/objective relative to what goes on in my head has become a daunting task.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How about:

P1) Physical (as experienced subjectively)
P2) EXTERNAL
P3) Banned on the grounds that it is incoherent.

I don't think you're going to get us to agree on a definition of physical that clearly excludes internal experience, especially given the problem in my previous post. Exactly which part of adding two numbers in my head is physical and which is not?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Agreed, nor does it mean they aren't.

The problem now is that the delineation between physical/mental/subjective/objective relative to what goes on in my head has become a daunting task.

~~ Paul

It was always a daunting task. The materialists only think it is easy because they have made the fundamental mistake of mixing up P1 and P2. However, it's not impossible. At least you now see that the task is daunting, you might be more willing to take my system seriously.

 

[cyborg]

At least you now see that the task is daunting, you might be more willing to take my system seriously.

You'd have to drop the flawed mathematics to start with.

Your problem is still that the mind disappears once everything that is currently unknowable about how the brain does things is known.

You have a magic box philosophy. Remove the magic, remove the philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff suggests the way out....

How about:

P1) Physical (as experienced subjectively)
P2) EXTERNAL
P3) Banned on the grounds that it is incoherent.

...and it is rejected on the grounds it contradicts the materialists Bible:

I don't think you're going to get us to agree on a definition of physical that clearly excludes internal experience, especially given the problem in my previous post.

The baseball game? WHAT problem? I explained the answer.

Exactly which part of adding two numbers in my head is physical and which is not?

WHICH definition of physical? I have no idea what you are trying to say until you can tell me WHICH definition of physical you are talking about.

Let's go back to my definitions. I want you to tell me exactly WHY you reject them. Is it because there is actually something about them that makes them unusable? Or is it for the sole reason that you think such a definition will lead to a falsification of physicalism?

P1) Physical (as experienced subjectively)
P2) EXTERNAL
P3) Conflation of P1 and P2

Do you understand the difference between these things? Do you understand that P1 is part of your subjective experiences and P2 is something we only know exists via a process of empathy and reasoning?

Do you therefore understand that P3 is incoherent?

If you are honestly NOT trying to defend physicalism, I cannot for the life of me figure out why you won't accept the above explanation.

Please tell me what is actually wrong with this explanation. Don't just tell me "We won't accept it because it contradicts our Bible!"

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let's go back to my definitions. I want you to tell me exactly WHY you reject them. Is it because there is actually something about them that makes them unusable? Or is it for the sole reason that you think such a definition will lead to a falsification of physicalism?

I'm done with this until you drop the disingenuous crap about my metaphysical fears. You're spewing this continuously in an effort to obfuscate the issue. I hold no ontological beliefs one way or the other, and until you stop assuming I do, leave me alone.

The idea is for you to prove that materialism, whatever the hell that is, is false. It is not for you to rant at me because you think I'm a materialist. Go find an actual materialist to rant at.

~~ Paul