The relationship between science and materialism

Paul,
just give him the definitions and show him that your arguments still stand.
Go Paul, go!!!
:dc_tongue:
 
Geoff said:
Hold on a moment....why are you going back to the previous argument when we already know that you can't define physical and have four definitions of mental? What's the point? Please forget the previous discussion. You have since stated that there is referent for the world "qualia" so that discussion is void.
What does qualia have to do with it? You stated that "subjective" implied "not a brain process."

Geoff said:
Certainly.

Physical : Objective, 3rd-person.
Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.

Two terms. No confusion.
Nope, sorry. Some of your mental activity is most certainly objectively observable, and therefore physical according to your definition.

Geoff, come on. Present your proof in a concise manner. If I don't like a definition, I'll critique it just like the rest of the proof. This attempt to paint me in a corner does nothing other than annoy me and make me think you're an ass.

Why have such a restrictive definition of consciousness? Isn't it obvious that there are various levels of awareness and that you can focus on different elements of your experiences?
Yes, and the ones you aren't focused on are nonconscious!

This is the whole point in phenomenology! You are supposed to pay very close attention to what is happening in your mind. Not just the stopping of clock-ticks, but the whole shebang - most of which is ignored by the so-called "practical approach" of materialistic cognitive science! Why on earth anybody thinks this is the basis of a defence of eliminativism is beyond me.
Who's ignoring anything? Tell me how introspection is going to answer the question of what a deja vu is.

~~ Paul
 
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Mary said:
Paul,
just give him the definitions and show him that your arguments still stand.
Go Paul, go!!!
Would you like to take a turn being treated as a child? :D

You know, if this all ends up with me being a Geoff-proclaimed eliminativist, fine. I don't give a **** what metaphysical tag he puts on me.

~~ Paul
 
Would you like to take a turn being treated as a child? :D

You know, if this all ends up with me being a Geoff-proclaimed eliminativist, fine. I don't give a **** what metaphysical tag he puts on me.

~~ Paul

I can't put a tag on you, because you can't define your terms.

And I am sorry if I come across as patronising. This is very frustrating for me too. All sorts of accusations are been levelled at me, continually, which I have learned to just ignore. And I am repeatedly told that there has been no "proof", when the proof has been demonstrated on this board at least twenty times by myself alone. I don't know what it will take to get you to admit that it is impossible to defend materialism and that therefore materialism is false.

I do not want to patronise people. I want them to admit it when they have lost the argument (cannot defend their position or define their terms coherently). Then I wouldn't end up patronising them. :(
 
Nowhere have I seen you define your terms coherently, either. That would be the big problem in philosophy, wouldn't it?

Look, take my definitions, add one for whichever word you think I haven't defined, leave out qualia, and show your proof. Then we'll have something to discuss, instead of this annoying fuzzy crap.

I'll admit I've lost the argument when I understand your proof.

~~ Paul
 
Nowhere have I seen you define your terms coherently, either. That would be the big problem in philosophy, wouldn't it?

I defined them at the start of the thread about neutral monism, in terms of neutral monism. I defined them five minutes ago in this thread, in ways that have nothing to do with neutral monism. What else am I expected to do?

Look, take my definitions, add one for whichever word you think I haven't defined, leave out qualia, and show your proof. Then we'll have something to discuss, instead of this annoying fuzzy crap.

Until you can supply me with a useable set of definitions which you are happy with, then all I can do is ask you for your definitions, or to accept mine (the ones in this thread, not the other one).

I can't prove anything unless you give me the vocabulary with which to specify it, because until you do that, I can't tell whether the definitions lead to a reductio ad absurdum (elminativism, coherent materialism) or a contradiction (all the pseudo-materialist positions).
 
In the general case just use the tag Secular Humanist, unshakeably secure in his philosophy -- some form of materialism, possibly with a hint of dualism on the edges.
 
Then just call me an eliminative materialist and be done with it. I can't find a consistent definition of that term, either, so why not?

~~ Paul
 
Hammegk said:
In the general case just use the tag Secular Humanist, unshakeably secure in his philosophy -- some form of materialism, possibly with a hint of dualism on the edges.
I'm not unshakeably secure in my philosophy, because I don't have one. The point of this tedious thread was not to explain my philosophy, but Geoff's.

~~ Paul
 
Here, I'll tell you what. I'll play the fool. Here are my definitions. Don't ask me to clarify them. Show me the proof. If a clarification is required, mention that in the proof. Then we can refine the proof as we go.

subjective: viewed from the first person
objective: perceptible by all observers
qualia: (undefined, has no referent)
physical: observable, in principle, by at least one person
mental: A term used to circumscribe certain subjective experiences. If you need an example experience, pick one and I'll tell you whether I think it's mental.

~~ Paul
 
Paul

What does qualia have to do with it? You stated that "subjective" implied "not a brain process."

That part of the debate is void, since I don't know what your terms meant.

Originally Posted by Geoff :
Certainly.

Physical : Objective, 3rd-person.
Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.

Two terms. No confusion.

Nope, sorry. Some of your mental activity is most certainly objectively observable, and therefore physical according to your definition.

I haven't defined the term "observable" at all. I think it is a problematic term that would have to be split into sub-terms. So "objectively observable" is something you are introducing using your terms, which are incoherent. Please stick to my definitions if you are going to challenge my definitions.

Likewise, I have defined "mental" to mean "subjective, 1st-person, private". Therefore my definition of "mental activity" means "activity in my mind, view from a subjective, 1st-person perspective". So, according to my definitions, the phrase "objectively observable mental activity" is totally devoid of meaning.

Please respecify your objection without introducing terms I haven't defined or using terms I have to defined to mean something I haven't defined it to mean.

Geoff, come on. Present your proof in a concise manner.

Using what words? :D

If I don't like a definition, I'll critique it just like the rest of the proof.

You just rejected my definitions by using terms I hadn't defined at all and by using terms I had defined to mean something I didn't define them to mean!
 
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Suppose that someone make a machine that can interpret and present the conscious (first person) experiences of a brain to another individual, as if those experiences were happening to him.

Is this possible, even in principle? If yes why? if no why?
 
That part of the debate is void, since I don't know what your terms meant.

Goeff has me on ignore. But for everyone else, this is one of Geoff's sticking points. He cannot state that qualia are not a brain process (because that would out him as a woo, and everyone would ask for evidence), nor can he state that qualia are a brain process (because that would negate his whole house of cards).

So he has to duck and weave like this when pressed on that particular point. "Void" indeed.

Likewise, I have defined "mental" to mean "subjective, 1st-person, private". Therefore my definition of "mental activity" means "activity in my mind, view from a subjective, 1st-person perspective". So, according to my definitions, the phrase "objectively observable mental activity" is totally devoid of meaning.

Similarly, Geoff knows that this debate hinges on whether qualia are a theoretically observable process in the brain, as rational people believe is overwhelmingly likely, or something spooky. So he defines "mental" to mean spooky as we see here, and then when anyone points out he is presenting convenient definitions in place of evidence he hides under a huge pile of obfuscation.
 
I didn't know if it was available to consciousness? No, maybe not. I would have had to concentrate on my hearing to have known that. So what?
So everything. Concentrating your hearing is a physical act, things have to happen in your physical brain to change the focus of your attention (as you acknowledged in the materialistic explanation that you gave me for what was going on in my stopping clock example). If we can say that I was conscious of the ticking clock but chose not to focus my awareness on it than we can equally well say I was conscious of the picture on the wall behind me but chose not to bring it into awareness by turning my head to look at it.

Light reflected from the picture is hitting the back of my head, but the chain of causation stops there. No consciousness experience takes place as a result of this. The sounds from the ticking clock make my eardrum reverberate and are transduced into electrical signals in my brain, and are stored temporarily in my short term memory. Then they are erased. No consciousness experience takes place. The only difference between the two situations is that in the second case we need to imagine internal brain functions to see that the situation are in fact comparable. Some philosophers don't like doing this because then they have to deal with icky science stuff which is beneath them.

Why have such a restrictive definition of consciousness? Isn't it obvious that there are various levels of awareness and that you can focus on different elements of your experiences?
And consciousness is those things that I am actually focussed on. Consciousness is awareness, at least it is if it is to have the properties that supposedly make it impossible to reduce to a physical description. There are no background qualia.

This is the whole point in phenomenology! You are supposed to pay very close attention to what is happening in your mind.
Well Sartre agreed with me here and disagreed with Husserl. Consciousness must be translucent, there can be no things "in" consciousness that we are not actually aware of.

Why on earth anybody thinks this is the basis of a defence of eliminativism is beyond me.
I was being slightly tongue-in-cheek calling it an argument for eliminativism. The purpose of my argument was to show that you don't have an understanding of consciousness that makes any sense. And clearly you don't.
 
Suppose that someone make a machine that can interpret and present the conscious (first person) experiences of a brain to another individual, as if those experiences were happening to him.

Is this possible, even in principle? If yes why? if no why?

BDZ,

Depends on your metaphysics. Mine rule it out.

Geoff
 
Geoff said:
I haven't defined the term "observable" at all. I think it is a problematic term that would have to be split into sub-terms. So "objectively observable" is something you are introducing using your terms, which are incoherent. Please stick to my definitions if you are going to challenge my definitions.
Your definitions are:

Physical : Objective, 3rd-person.
Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.

If your definition of physical does now allow me to say "objectively observable by a third person," then I don't know what your definition means. In particular, if you want physical to mean "not mental," then I disagree with the definition.

Likewise, I have defined "mental" to mean "subjective, 1st-person, private". Therefore my definition of "mental activity" means "activity in my mind, view from a subjective, 1st-person perspective". So, according to my definitions, the phrase "objectively observable mental activity" is totally devoid of meaning.
Ah, so you are defining mental to mean "the experience of private behavior," as opposed to simply "private behavior." Private behavior can be explained to a third person, whereas its experience cannot be had by a third person.

So, you need to expand your definition of physical so that we know what it means for something to be objective. And you need to change your definition of mental to "subjective experiences."

~~ Paul
 

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