What does qualia have to do with it? You stated that "subjective" implied "not a brain process."Geoff said:Hold on a moment....why are you going back to the previous argument when we already know that you can't define physical and have four definitions of mental? What's the point? Please forget the previous discussion. You have since stated that there is referent for the world "qualia" so that discussion is void.
Nope, sorry. Some of your mental activity is most certainly objectively observable, and therefore physical according to your definition.Geoff said:Certainly.
Physical : Objective, 3rd-person.
Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.
Two terms. No confusion.
Yes, and the ones you aren't focused on are nonconscious!Why have such a restrictive definition of consciousness? Isn't it obvious that there are various levels of awareness and that you can focus on different elements of your experiences?
Who's ignoring anything? Tell me how introspection is going to answer the question of what a deja vu is.This is the whole point in phenomenology! You are supposed to pay very close attention to what is happening in your mind. Not just the stopping of clock-ticks, but the whole shebang - most of which is ignored by the so-called "practical approach" of materialistic cognitive science! Why on earth anybody thinks this is the basis of a defence of eliminativism is beyond me.
Would you like to take a turn being treated as a child?Mary said:Paul,
just give him the definitions and show him that your arguments still stand.
Go Paul, go!!!
Would you like to take a turn being treated as a child?
You know, if this all ends up with me being a Geoff-proclaimed eliminativist, fine. I don't give a **** what metaphysical tag he puts on me.
~~ Paul
Nowhere have I seen you define your terms coherently, either. That would be the big problem in philosophy, wouldn't it?
Look, take my definitions, add one for whichever word you think I haven't defined, leave out qualia, and show your proof. Then we'll have something to discuss, instead of this annoying fuzzy crap.
I'm not unshakeably secure in my philosophy, because I don't have one. The point of this tedious thread was not to explain my philosophy, but Geoff's.Hammegk said:In the general case just use the tag Secular Humanist, unshakeably secure in his philosophy -- some form of materialism, possibly with a hint of dualism on the edges.
What does qualia have to do with it? You stated that "subjective" implied "not a brain process."
Originally Posted by Geoff :
Certainly.
Physical : Objective, 3rd-person.
Mental : Subjective, 1st-person, private.
Two terms. No confusion.
Nope, sorry. Some of your mental activity is most certainly objectively observable, and therefore physical according to your definition.
Geoff, come on. Present your proof in a concise manner.
If I don't like a definition, I'll critique it just like the rest of the proof.
That part of the debate is void, since I don't know what your terms meant.
Likewise, I have defined "mental" to mean "subjective, 1st-person, private". Therefore my definition of "mental activity" means "activity in my mind, view from a subjective, 1st-person perspective". So, according to my definitions, the phrase "objectively observable mental activity" is totally devoid of meaning.
So everything. Concentrating your hearing is a physical act, things have to happen in your physical brain to change the focus of your attention (as you acknowledged in the materialistic explanation that you gave me for what was going on in my stopping clock example). If we can say that I was conscious of the ticking clock but chose not to focus my awareness on it than we can equally well say I was conscious of the picture on the wall behind me but chose not to bring it into awareness by turning my head to look at it.I didn't know if it was available to consciousness? No, maybe not. I would have had to concentrate on my hearing to have known that. So what?
And consciousness is those things that I am actually focussed on. Consciousness is awareness, at least it is if it is to have the properties that supposedly make it impossible to reduce to a physical description. There are no background qualia.Why have such a restrictive definition of consciousness? Isn't it obvious that there are various levels of awareness and that you can focus on different elements of your experiences?
Well Sartre agreed with me here and disagreed with Husserl. Consciousness must be translucent, there can be no things "in" consciousness that we are not actually aware of.This is the whole point in phenomenology! You are supposed to pay very close attention to what is happening in your mind.
I was being slightly tongue-in-cheek calling it an argument for eliminativism. The purpose of my argument was to show that you don't have an understanding of consciousness that makes any sense. And clearly you don't.Why on earth anybody thinks this is the basis of a defence of eliminativism is beyond me.
Suppose that someone make a machine that can interpret and present the conscious (first person) experiences of a brain to another individual, as if those experiences were happening to him.
Is this possible, even in principle? If yes why? if no why?
Your definitions are:Geoff said:I haven't defined the term "observable" at all. I think it is a problematic term that would have to be split into sub-terms. So "objectively observable" is something you are introducing using your terms, which are incoherent. Please stick to my definitions if you are going to challenge my definitions.
Ah, so you are defining mental to mean "the experience of private behavior," as opposed to simply "private behavior." Private behavior can be explained to a third person, whereas its experience cannot be had by a third person.Likewise, I have defined "mental" to mean "subjective, 1st-person, private". Therefore my definition of "mental activity" means "activity in my mind, view from a subjective, 1st-person perspective". So, according to my definitions, the phrase "objectively observable mental activity" is totally devoid of meaning.
Seems dangerous to allow one's metaphysic to rule out that which is clearly an empirical question.Geoff said:Depends on your metaphysics. Mine rule it out.
Seems dangerous to allow one's metaphysic to rule out that which is clearly an empirical question.
~~ Paul