Teleportation

[DrBaltar]

I was thinking about something along these lines before I came to this forum. I don't know if it belongs in a different thread or if it's similar enough to the transporter problem.

Let's say that Brains R' Us is a new company and is able to recreate a fully functioning brain stem that functions identically to a given person's brain stem, except that it is physically tougher and more resistant to damage or degradation. For some reason John is paranoid about getting in an accident and winding up paralyzed, so he signs up to have his brain stem replaced by an artificial brain stem. The procedure is a complete success, and John leads a normal life and is completely satisfied with the replacement.

Then Brain's R' Us comes up with the technology to replace the cerebellum, and sends out their yearly catalog to John. John is intrigued again about this new technology and has his cerebellum replaced. Brain's R' Us scans his cerebellum and makes a functionally identical artificial cerebellum. All inputs to the cerebellum are handled just like the real one, and it outputs signals to the cerebral motor cortex just as the real cerebellum would. Again it's a complete success and there are no changes to John's personality or in how he perceives his mental state.

This goes on and on until eventually every part of John's brain is replaced by artificial replacements. After all is done, John still seems like John. His brain never stopped functioning through any of the procedures. Memories which were stored in John's brain were also scanned and replicated in the artificial replacements. After all this is he really still the same person? If not, at what point did he become someone or something else?

 

[Dilb]

Well, I'm saying that my consciousness arises from (is?) the particular arrangement and activity of the matter in my brain at this moment. The specific matter may change over time, but the "pattern" is the thing perceived as continuous.

The very idea of a reassembly-transporter is that matter is the same, regardless of where and when it came from: atoms have identical properties, so they can't be labelled as different in a way that produces physical effects. Transporting an apple produces, for all uses and effects, another apple.

Saying your consciousness is the pattern is saying that your consciousness is a physical thing: it's matter, with details about where the matter is. So for all physical uses and effects, a copy of your consciousness is your consciousness.
This is assuming that you would still be you, even if you were actually five feet to the right; i.e. that the physical location of your body doesn't define your consciousness.

Assuming the original is destroyed, it's true that the copy cannot distinguish himself from the original, nor can anyone else. Yes, the copy will definitely be "a" me, he's just not the one I rode in on, so to speak. The consciousness that I refer to as "I" will cease to exist the moment that the components which create it are no longer functioning properly, which includes being disassembled. That's death, whether by instant vaporization or lack of oxygen.

It doesn't make sense to say one is "more really me", because even between you and a teleporter copy, you couldn't decide which is which based on just talking it out. You need to go and talk to the teleporter operator. If your sense of self relies on talking to someone, your saying your identity depends on the entire external universe. That doesn't strike me as a good way of defining yourself.

If I were to remain alive after being copied, I don't think it makes sense to say that I would ever become conscious of the duplicate's perceptions. If I went on to die a natural death years later, I assume it would be the same sort of death I would experience had I not been copied. So what makes my sudden and violent death, at any other point in the timeline, a special case?

How would my experience of consciousness "jump" from one specific instance of a pattern to an entirely different instance generated from the same pattern?

I'll do my best to clarify if this is gibberish. I really am trying to point to something...

Your making a subtle assumption: that there is only one "you" possible. You have it correct that, if you have a duplicate, you don't experience two bodies, you don't die and then wind up in a new one. It's two different people at that point. In a teleporter, however, it's not two different people: it's two of the same person.

For example, consider numbers. Let's say I write down 15 on a piece of paper. Despite the fact that the 15 is really a combination of ink, cellulose, and whatever else, the "self of the number" that I'm interested in is just the integer between 14 and 16. I use the teleporter to duplicate the number: now I have two identical numbers (I could even just use the telephone). It doesn't make sense to say that I have the "original 15" and a "new, but practically identical 15". It is, as a number, the exact same thing. If I then burn my unteleported number, I've lost that version of the number. However, I still have 15. I've "transferred" the number, because "transferred" just means my number is in a different physical location.

Your consciousness doesn't "jump" to a new body: it splits into two, and each part smoothly continues, one in the first place, one in the second. If the one in the first place ends immediately after the split, we can say; for all purposes concerning consciousness, that it smoothly continues as one consciousness.

 

[jmercer]

I was thinking about something along these lines before I came to this forum. I don't know if it belongs in a different thread or if it's similar enough to the transporter problem.

Let's say that Brains R' Us is a new company and is able to recreate a fully functioning brain stem that functions identically to a given person's brain stem, except that it is physically tougher and more resistant to damage or degradation. For some reason John is paranoid about getting in an accident and winding up paralyzed, so he signs up to have his brain stem replaced by an artificial brain stem. The procedure is a complete success, and John leads a normal life and is completely satisfied with the replacement.

Then Brain's R' Us comes up with the technology to replace the cerebellum, and sends out their yearly catalog to John. John is intrigued again about this new technology and has his cerebellum replaced. Brain's R' Us scans his cerebellum and makes a functionally identical artificial cerebellum. All inputs to the cerebellum are handled just like the real one, and it outputs signals to the cerebral motor cortex just as the real cerebellum would. Again it's a complete success and there are no changes to John's personality or in how he perceives his mental state.

This goes on and on until eventually every part of John's brain is replaced by artificial replacements. After all is done, John still seems like John. His brain never stopped functioning through any of the procedures. Memories which were stored in John's brain were also scanned and replicated in the artificial replacements. After all this is he really still the same person? If not, at what point did he become someone or something else?

Ah, I've been down this path before.

The question is one of replication and originality. Look at it this way - if you were to create a matter duplicator and create an exact duplicate of the Mona Lisa... what would the difference be between the original and the duplicate?

If we could invent a "history viewing time machine" and look back through time, we could see the original being painted by Da Vinci... and if we were patient enough, we could trace the steps of the original every single instant to the current moment. It would be clear which had been touched by the hand of the master, and which was merely a copy.

At the moment someone is transported, the original is destroyed and the copy is created - if you were to follow the time-line for the original with our hypothetical history viewer, you'd see him or her born, and would lose them at the instant of destruction in the transporter. If you applied the same machine to the duplicate, you would only be able to trace them back to the instant of assembly in the other transporter.

The original would have been killed and a duplicate created. The duplicate would have the perfect illusion of having been everywhere the original had been - done all that the original had done - but in reality, they would never have done any of those things.

Now, let's consider the idea of NOT destroying the original.

Which version is the "real" Mr. (or Ms.) Smith? The answer lies in another question - what if the copy went and murdered someone while the original was at work? Are both equally guilty?

Of course not - only the version committing the crime is guilty because they are not the same person.

In the same sense, the replacement of someone's brain ultimately results in the destruction of the original at some point - probably the point where the part of the brain containing the processes we call "consciousness" were transformed into a computer... because in spite of the continuity of thought and experience, the physical wetware enabling the original personality stops working when it's destroyed.

If we apply the same logic, lets not destroy the original brain - but transplant it into a clone of the same persons body while placing the robotic brain into the original body. Who, then, is the original?

I submit that it's the wetware version, because of the physical continuity of the brain involved.

The point may be a fine one - a narrow distinction - but I believe that it's a critical distinction regardless.

 

[DrBaltar]

I thought most parts of the brain contribute more or less to consciousness. Which part are you saying is where consciousness happens?

 

[Just thinking]

Ah, I've been down this path before.

You're not alone.

The question is one of replication and originality. Look at it this way - if you were to create a matter duplicator and create an exact duplicate of the Mona Lisa... what would the difference be between the original and the duplicate?

If we could invent a "history viewing time machine" and look back through time, we could see the original being painted by Da Vinci... and if we were patient enough, we could trace the steps of the original every single instant to the current moment. It would be clear which had been touched by the hand of the master, and which was merely a copy.

My arguments go along similar lines, only I call attention to them having different world-lines ... sounds more physicsy.

At the moment someone is transported, the original is destroyed and the copy is created - if you were to follow the time-line for the original with our hypothetical history viewer, you'd see him or her born, and would lose them at the instant of destruction in the transporter. If you applied the same machine to the duplicate, you would only be able to trace them back to the instant of assembly in the other transporter.

The original would have been killed and a duplicate created. The duplicate would have the perfect illusion of having been everywhere the original had been - done all that the original had done - but in reality, they would never have done any of those things.

The point being that a duplicate is still a duplicate, no matter how exact to the original. Duplicate atoms are just that --- different atoms.

Now, let's consider the idea of NOT destroying the original.

Ahhh, just like my first scenario with the blue/orange rooms in which our individual goes to sleep.

Which version is the "real" Mr. (or Ms.) Smith? The answer lies in another question - what if the copy went and murdered someone while the original was at work? Are both equally guilty?

Of course not - only the version committing the crime is guilty because they are not the same person.

In the same sense, the replacement of someone's brain ultimately results in the destruction of the original at some point - probably the point where the part of the brain containing the processes we call "consciousness" were transformed into a computer... because in spite of the continuity of thought and experience, the physical wetware enabling the original personality stops working when it's destroyed.

If we apply the same logic, lets not destroy the original brain - but transplant it into a clone of the same persons body while placing the robotic brain into the original body. Who, then, is the original?

I submit that it's the wetware version, because of the physical continuity of the brain involved.

Agreed ... only the continued physical matter that ultimately processes that which we call the self is valid in claims of being the original in every respect.

 

[jmercer]

Some parts of the brain are involved in autonomous functions and so forth - the medulla, for example. However, there are parts of the brain - if destroyed - result in a coma with no higher brain activity showing, while the body chugs onward.

As to which particular parts of the brain support the higher functions - I'm not specifically certain, but I know there are regions associated with functions such as speech, coherent thought, emotion and so forth.

 

[DrBaltar]

Right, all these parts are part of the consciousness. If you shut each part off, I think you might be like HAL from 2001 as Dave Bowman turned off a function of HAL's brain one by one. "Dave, my mind is going. I can feel it. I can feel it. I'm a... fraid." If someone could do that to you, you would probably also feel your mind going. Are all these parts like support functions to the real consciousness? Can you turn them all off except for one part of the brain, and you would have severely limited consciousness, but still have the sense of 'I'? If so, what part of the brain is that?

Or are there multiple parts, aside from some of the periphery functions of the brain that work together and are required for consciousness and turning off or removing any of them shuts consciousness down?

 

[This is The End]

Sorry to respond a couple pages late on this one.

After all, once asleep and immune to any external experiences, both should continue to process brain activity in identical manners as long as they are asleep.

I'm having a spot of trouble resolving this part with chaos theory.

It seems after the switch, something like a difference in the pillow form could lead to the body moving, which would lead to changes in the brain state. As time went on their dreams would probably start to vary widely (or would it be wildly).

This relates to the topic at hand, again already approached on page one. Even if you produced an infinite number of clones, it's only a matter of time before chaos theory makes them unique, no matter how exactly you try and simulate same environments.

 

[This is The End]

Me wanting to bring up my simulation (video game) save state (memory dump) analogy leads me to believe we’re having the same problems with this debate as those in the (Universe – Real Universe, or Simulation in a Real Universe, or any number of levels up or down) thread(s).

People have qualms about death and qualms about being unique.

If an exact copy of you (transport) is sat next to you in a chair, there are two of you (though not for very long thanks to chaos). From that point on, all qualms are of equal significance, it doesn’t matter which one is to die or not. Either one that dies is just as much of a thing happening as the other, likewise the thoughts of either one being left alive are equally as valid.

Some of you are proposing we look at two apples and ask which one of them is an apple?

This I typed by hitting 5 keys:

3 + 3

This I didn’t type, I copy and pasted it from the above (which I typed):

3 + 3

Guess what? They both equal 6.

 

[DrBaltar]

I understand that an exact copy of me is just as valid as me. But me being me, I am more concerned about my own consciousness than my copy. If someone wanted to live forever, something he might want to do is like the example I wrote above: replace each part of his brain with artificial functional duplicates. Now, obviously it wouldn't do him much good if a neurosurgeon opened up his skull and took out his brain and replaced it with an artificial brain that was capable of duplicating his personality and thought processes exactly.

So that is why I'm saying this happens piece by piece, one section of the brain at a time. If done this way, is it then worth it to someone to have his brain replaced in this manner to achieve immortality?

 

[hodgy]

I understand that an exact copy of me is just as valid as me. But me being me, I am more concerned about my own consciousness than my copy. If someone wanted to live forever, something he might want to do is like the example I wrote above: replace each part of his brain with artificial functional duplicates. Now, obviously it wouldn't do him much good if a neurosurgeon opened up his skull and took out his brain and replaced it with an artificial brain that was capable of duplicating his personality and thought processes exactly.

So that is why I'm saying this happens piece by piece, one section of the brain at a time. If done this way, is it then worth it to someone to have his brain replaced in this manner to achieve immortality?

Of course - Trigger's brush - see earlier in the thread.
Ultimately its a matter of perception and personal choice. I suspect that for most people a contiguous consciousness (sleep etc... aside) is what matters - the parts can be replaced but at any given time the parts identify as I(x) where x remains constant.

 

[hodgy]

Me wanting to bring up my simulation (video game) save state (memory dump) analogy leads me to believe we’re having the same problems with this debate as those in the (Universe – Real Universe, or Simulation in a Real Universe, or any number of levels up or down) thread(s).

People have qualms about death and qualms about being unique.

If an exact copy of you (transport) is sat next to you in a chair, there are two of you (though not for very long thanks to chaos). From that point on, all qualms are of equal significance, it doesn’t matter which one is to die or not. Either one that dies is just as much of a thing happening as the other, likewise the thoughts of either one being left alive are equally as valid.

Some of you are proposing we look at two apples and ask which one of them is an apple?

This I typed by hitting 5 keys:

3 + 3

This I didn’t type, I copy and pasted it from the above (which I typed):

3 + 3

Guess what? They both equal 6.

We are not asking questions of validity or equality. The question is would you, as the original, be happy to die and a copy of you to live (remotely). I have no religious, moral, spiritual or logical issue with this - I am just concerned that the question is posed correctly.

It is clear that the remote 'you' is an independant individual with a separate consciousness. The fact that he / she happens to be like you is somewhat irrelevant IMO - imagine the remote you was only 99% like you, or 90% or 50%...

 

[Just thinking]

Sorry to respond a couple pages late on this one.



I'm having a spot of trouble resolving this part with chaos theory.

It seems after the switch, something like a difference in the pillow form could lead to the body moving, which would lead to changes in the brain state. As time went on their dreams would probably start to vary widely (or would it be wildly).

This relates to the topic at hand, again already approached on page one. Even if you produced an infinite number of clones, it's only a matter of time before chaos theory makes them unique, no matter how exactly you try and simulate same environments.

Well, that's all part of my hypothetical --- and after all, if we can either teleport to an identical copy or duplicate same, we can have identical rooms with identical beds (and pillows). So let's try and work it out assuming a truly identical room, except for wall color; something that would not matter until being awake.

Plus, it's not that they become unique at some point --- it's whether or not he (in the blue room) will continue to exist (and where) should the original be destroyed.

 

[Just thinking]

We are not asking questions of validity or equality. The question is would you, as the original, be happy to die and a copy of you to live (remotely). I have no religious, moral, spiritual or logical issue with this - I am just concerned that the question is posed correctly.

I doubt either the original or the duplicate would be happy to die --- even if he knew the other was to go on living. I believe they are as independently different (to themselves) as are twins --- or any two people for that matter.

It is clear that the remote 'you' is an independant individual with a separate consciousness. The fact that he / she happens to be like you is somewhat irrelevant IMO - imagine the remote you was only 99% like you, or 90% or 50%...

If you take that percentage down low enough, your DNA and mine would make us identical to that point.

 

[This is The End]

Well, that's all part of my hypothetical --- and after all, if we can either teleport to an identical copy or duplicate same, we can have identical rooms with identical beds (and pillows).

An identical bed? Perhaps, if I believe how stiff some people like them.... but a pillow, by definition, is soft..... so two identical pillows should be impossible because of chaos theory....


To perfectly simulate one pillow, you would have to observe it, which necessarily changes it's state. Perhaps also a serious flaw with the topic at hand.

 

[Dilb]

We are not asking questions of validity or equality. The question is would you, as the original, be happy to die and a copy of you to live (remotely). I have no religious, moral, spiritual or logical issue with this - I am just concerned that the question is posed correctly.

It is clear that the remote 'you' is an independant individual with a separate consciousness. The fact that he / she happens to be like you is somewhat irrelevant IMO - imagine the remote you was only 99% like you, or 90% or 50%...

I don't think you're quite grasping what it means to be a copy.

Pretend we can trace our consciousness through time, like so

start------------------------------------end
+time->

Creating a duplicate means we have a split

start-------------------------------------end
                \----------------------end2

To anyone other than you, there isn't a reason to think that you are locked on the first path. The second path is a perfectly fine, continuous existence, which before the split, is exactly the same as the original (where original refers to the original body, not the 'original consciousness'). By all your mannerisms, memories, thoughts, the copy is the same consciousness. To people who can't really be sure what the original body is, it looks like

                  /----------------------end1
start-------------
                  \----------------------endA

Afterwards there are two (different) people with the same past. Not similar, the same, like if a time-traveller met himself. Or like in biology, when a mother cell splits into two daughter cells: neither is the original*. Nothing important about being you, the you they know and love, the you they met in the past before duplication, is uniquely on either path.

If someone uses the duplicator to transport themselves, it looks like this

start-----------B-end1
                  \----------------------endA

The person right before teleportation (B) expects that, yes, the consciousness in this body will end, but it will also sidestep into path A. Consciousness can do that, because it's just information that can be duplicated. If everything goes as planed, there will never be a unique continuity coming to an end.

If something goes wrong, and the original isn't ended like it should have been, we get this

start----------------1
                  \--A

We have two very similar, but distinct people. The person on path 1 is not the same as the person on path A, and will not be thrilled about being killed now**. They won't jump onto path A, they won't experience both path 1 and path A, they're just a single person on path 1. Similarly, there's a single person on path A. The only kink is that when we trace their history, for anything person 1 did before the duplication, in all meaningful sense person A also did it.

*In cells the original DNA is divided evenly between the cells, unlike our assembled duplicate, but it's an immaterial point as consciousness isn't based on the continuity of the matter, it's the continuity of the mind/arrangement of matter.
**If this is a very short time, a few hours at most, I could see one of the people talking the other into death, because the person really did intend to have a copy of them die. It would probably require a lot of belief in the process, or an unusual belief in rational arguments, but I wouldn't say it's impossible.

 

[hodgy]

I doubt either the original or the duplicate would be happy to die --- even if he knew the other was to go on living. I believe they are as independently different (to themselves) as are twins --- or any two people for that matter.

I agree, this is more or less the position I have been advocating.

 

[hodgy]

I don't think you're quite grasping what it means to be a copy.

Pretend we can trace our consciousness through time, like so

start------------------------------------end
+time->

Creating a duplicate means we have a split

start-------------------------------------end
                \----------------------end2

To anyone other than you, there isn't a reason to think that you are locked on the first path. The second path is a perfectly fine, continuous existence, which before the split, is exactly the same as the original (where original refers to the original body, not the 'original consciousness'). By all your mannerisms, memories, thoughts, the copy is the same consciousness. To people who can't really be sure what the original body is, it looks like

                  /----------------------end1
start-------------
                  \----------------------endA

Afterwards there are two (different) people with the same past. Not similar, the same, like if a time-traveller met himself. Or like in biology, when a mother cell splits into two daughter cells: neither is the original*. Nothing important about being you, the you they know and love, the you they met in the past before duplication, is uniquely on either path.

If someone uses the duplicator to transport themselves, it looks like this

start-----------B-end1
                  \----------------------endA

The person right before teleportation (B) expects that, yes, the consciousness in this body will end, but it will also sidestep into path A. Consciousness can do that, because it's just information that can be duplicated. If everything goes as planed, there will never be a unique continuity coming to an end.

If something goes wrong, and the original isn't ended like it should have been, we get this

start----------------1
                  \--A

We have two very similar, but distinct people. The person on path 1 is not the same as the person on path A, and will not be thrilled about being killed now**. They won't jump onto path A, they won't experience both path 1 and path A, they're just a single person on path 1. Similarly, there's a single person on path A. The only kink is that when we trace their history, for anything person 1 did before the duplication, in all meaningful sense person A also did it.

*In cells the original DNA is divided evenly between the cells, unlike our assembled duplicate, but it's an immaterial point as consciousness isn't based on the continuity of the matter, it's the continuity of the mind/arrangement of matter.
**If this is a very short time, a few hours at most, I could see one of the people talking the other into death, because the person really did intend to have a copy of them die. It would probably require a lot of belief in the process, or an unusual belief in rational arguments, but I wouldn't say it's impossible.

The exact copy and same past arguments are red herrings, the new person is still a new person.

Suppose that the copy could be exact (i.e. the duplication process is perfect) - on this basis you provided the argument above. Now suppose that it is not perfect - maybe something trivial like transportees get blue hair. For your argument - does this matter and if so, how / why? If the blue hair is an acceptable compromise,what further compromises are allowable? At what point does the copy stop being 'you'?

For my position, the faithfulness of replication is an arbitrary and somewhat irrelevant side-issue, the copy is any case, a new, separate individual. This fact is not changed by how close the copy is to the original.

Before my conception I share the same past as my Father. In your example, the copy does not share the same physical past as the original. It's physical past is the engineering of the duplication machine and the use of it to manufacture the copy. True, the copy is made with a memory that is a copy of the original's memory but it is not the same memory.

If the original is destroyed then what is achieved is not really transportation but an illusion of transportation that an outside observer (but not the 'transportee', for he is dead) can experience. If the original is not destroyed then the illusion fails and you have simply created a remote copy of yourself. In the Prestige the duplication machine is used precisely for this purpose - to create an illusion of transportation.

 

[jmercer]

Of course - Trigger's brush - see earlier in the thread.
Ultimately its a matter of perception and personal choice. I suspect that for most people a contiguous consciousness (sleep etc... aside) is what matters - the parts can be replaced but at any given time the parts identify as I(x) where x remains constant.

An interesting point; in sleep, we apparently are still self-aware and aware of the passage of time on some level, according to psychologists. Anesthesia may be different, but there are documented cases of people under anesthesia who were fully aware of events - but were paralyzed and unable to indicate this. (God, I shudder whenever I think of that!)

However, people in comas are a different situation, because their brainwave patterns show little or no activity associated with consciousness.

On an aside to DrBaltar - I don't really think it matters if you replace the brain one neuron at a time with a microcircuit or whatever; it's merely the difference between a quick death (such as a massive stroke would be) and a slow death (such as Alzheimers).

 

[jmercer]

The exact copy and same past arguments are red herrings, the new person is still a new person.

Suppose that the copy could be exact (i.e. the duplication process is perfect) - on this basis you provided the argument above. Now suppose that it is not perfect - maybe something trivial like transportees get blue hair. For your argument - does this matter and if so, how / why? If the blue hair is an acceptable compromise,what further compromises are allowable? At what point does the copy stop being 'you'?

For my position, the faithfulness of replication is an arbitrary and somewhat irrelevant side-issue, the copy is any case, a new, separate individual. This fact is not changed by how close the copy is to the original.

Before my conception I share the same past as my Father. In your example, the copy does not share the same physical past as the original. It's physical past is the engineering of the duplication machine and the use of it to manufacture the copy. True, the copy is made with a memory that is a copy of the original's memory but it is not the same memory.

If the original is destroyed then what is achieved is not really transportation but an illusion of transportation that an outside observer (but not the 'transportee', for he is dead) can experience. If the original is not destroyed then the illusion fails and you have simply created a remote copy of yourself. In the Prestige the duplication machine is used precisely for this purpose - to create an illusion of transportation.

A very nice summary and conclusion. (Not to mention illustration). I agree fully.

So... would using a transporter be suicide and/or assisted suicide?