Teleportation

[Darat]

I think you are getting confused with your "I"s by assuming that the "I" can't be duplicated.

In the hypothetical at the moment of creation of the copy there would be no way of distinguishing the two apart using their "consciousness". Where there was one "cos" there are now two individuals that both feel and think they are "cos". Both have the same memories of being conscious, both would be able to relate what happened to them when they had their first kiss and so on. So just like the number of eyes, legs, arms and so on have been duplicated so has the number of "I"s.

Everything has been duplicated. However once they start experiencing different stimulus the "I"s will start to diverge and therefore killing either the copy or the original would be killing a fully conscious being. If you killed the original the copy would still think of himself as "cos" and vice-a-versa since we only experience out own consciousness.

 

[hodgy]

If the actual physical atoms are transported and reassembled then the transportee at destination is still 'you'. If the transportee at destination is simply copied using local substances, then it is not you but someone who believes himself to be you (or recognises that whilst he feels like he is you, technically he isn't).

In the event of copying there are not 2 yous but one 'you' and one 'copy of you'.

 

[Phaedrus74]

If the actual physical atoms are transported and reassembled then the transportee at destination is still 'you'. If the transportee at destination is simply copied using local substances, then it is not you but someone who believes himself to be you (or recognises that whilst he feels like he is you, technically he isn't).

In the event of copying there are not 2 yous but one 'you' and one 'copy of you'.

By that same reasoning you are copy of the original you since none of the cells you were born with survive to this day.

 

[hodgy]

By that same reasoning you are copy of the original you since none of the cells you were born with survive to this day.

Absolutely not. For starters, how can I be a copy of the original when I am demonstrably taller, fatter, uglier and more opinionated?

 

[Phaedrus74]

Absolutely not. For starters, how can I be a copy of the original when I am demonstrably taller, fatter, uglier and more opinionated?

So you admit you are not you!

 

[hodgy]

So you admit you are not you!

You are confusing the physical composition of a specific brush with the existence of Trigger's brush.

Whilst Trigger has changed both the head and handle several times in 20 years, it is still Trigger's brush.

In this case there is a constant identifying tag (Tigger's brush) that can be used to distinguish it from all other brushes, in the case of me that tag is 'I'.

 

[Phaedrus74]

You are confusing the physical composition of a specific brush with the existence of Trigger's brush.

Whilst Trigger has changed both the head and handle several times in 20 years, it is still Trigger's brush.

In this case there is a constant identifying tag (Tigger's brush) that can be used to distinguish it from all other brushes, in the case of me that tag is 'I'.

In that case, why is it that in the case of a 'reconsituting' transporter this identity ceases to hold?

 

[hodgy]

In that case, why is it that in the case of a 'reconsituting' transporter this identity ceases to hold?

Assuming you mean the transporter that makes a copy: It because the new 'I' tag is also a copy of the original one but physically not the original one.

This is entirely different from a gradually developing / evolving person who refers to themselves as 'I'. 'I' is a single instance in the sense that the experiences that contribute to the development of the relevant person are discrete and unique for that 'I'. Once you have a copy you have 2 unique and discrete sets of experience so you have 2 'I's.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Assuming you mean the transporter that makes a copy: It because the new 'I' tag is also a copy of the original one but physically not the original one.

This is entirely different from a gradually developing / evolving person who refers to themselves as 'I'. 'I' is a single instance in the sense that the experiences that contribute to the development of the relevant person are discrete and unique for that 'I'. Once you have a copy you have 2 unique and discrete sets of experience so you have 2 'I's.

What is this 'Tag' you are referring to? If you are referring to the name of the subject, there is no copying being done. If you were to insist that the reference of the tag ceases to exist (think dangling pointer) you are postulating a necessary connection between the name and the named.

In what way would the rebuilding transporter constitute such an ontological discontinuity that would warrant the judgement that the original 'I' ceases to exist. I will grant you that the physical original is destroyed but if that is the only grounds on which you would deny the copy his/her right to be called the 'I', I would argue that this destruction is of no ontological significance.

[Sorry for the phrasing, my language gets a bit threadbare under these circumstances]

 

[cos]

In the hypothetical at the moment of creation of the copy there would be no way of distinguishing the two apart using their "consciousness".

From the instant that the copy became aware of its environment, the two people could be sorted by their consciousness easily enough. One of them would have experienced the disorientation of suddenly (if not unexpectedly) perceiving that he is in a different location. The other would perceive no change.

Where there was one "cos" there are now two individuals that both feel and think they are "cos". Both have the same memories of being conscious, both would be able to relate what happened to them when they had their first kiss and so on. So just like the number of eyes, legs, arms and so on have been duplicated so has the number of "I"s.

Agreed. But the individual "I"s would be distinct. The original consciousness would continue experiencing itself at its original location. I'm saying that since I am currently that original consciousness, I would remain so once the copy came into being.

Everything has been duplicated. However once they start experiencing different stimulus the "I"s will start to diverge and therefore killing either the copy or the original would be killing a fully conscious being.

At no point would either individual be "fake" in any way, but I could only be the consciousness of one or the other.

If you killed the original the copy would still think of himself as "cos" and vice-a-versa since we only experience our own consciousness.

Indeed. And since, as you say, we only experience our own consciousness, to disintegrate it at any point would be the end of this particular instanced person, me, no matter how many copies might exist.

 

[Michael C]

From the instant that the copy became aware of its environment, the two people could be sorted by their consciousness easily enough. One of them would have experienced the disorientation of suddenly (if not unexpectedly) perceiving that he is in a different location. The other would perceive no change.

Imagine this: we could arrange to put you under a general anaesthetic before the "teleportation" takes place. The newly-constructed copy would also start its existence under anaesthetic. It would be programmed with your memories, up to and including the moment when the anaesthetic took effect.

While you're both under anaesthetic, we'd physically transport you to where the copy had been made. We'd then place both you and the copy in the same room and wake them out of the anaesthetic state at the same time. Now both people have the disorientation of perceiving that they are in a new location. From this point on we have two separate individuals who will now have separate experiences, but they share an identical past. They will both be equally convinced, by their own memories, that they are cos. Is there any fundamental difference between them? Can they work out who is who? Does it matter?

I used to think that if this happened to me, there would still be one person who was the real "me" and the other would be something else, a copy. Now I'm coming round to the view that although we would now be two people, neither one of us would have a stronger tie to out shared past than the other one. So we might say the old "me" has split into two "me"s.

I don't know what would really happen. It would certainly pose a problem for my wife.

 

[hodgy]

What is this 'Tag' you are referring to? If you are referring to the name of the subject, there is no copying being done. If you were to insist that the reference of the tag ceases to exist (think dangling pointer) you are postulating a necessary connection between the name and the named.

I'll try to explain it a different way:

At some point in my life my consciousness became sufficiently sophisticated to name (or tag) itself as 'I'. Since I believe that there are other conscious entities that also label themselves as 'I', I generally use the tag 'I' as a reference to my consciousness and use other identifiers when referring to other people's 'I's (e.g. their names). Whilst I refer to my 'I' as simply 'I', I nevertheless understand that in reality it is I(x) where x is a universally unique identifier.

If I(x) is copied in, the manner of the duplicating transporter, the remote result is I, occupying a different time and space than I(x) and subject to a discrete set of experiences.

the only way that there can be a single I (shorthand for single I(x) remember) is if the duplication somehow provides 2 bodies with a common consciousness (for 'I' is the label that the consciousness applies to itself, not to other consciousness that might happen to be copies or templates of itself).

 

[cos]

Imagine this: we could arrange to put you under a general anaesthetic before the "teleportation" takes place. <snip>

Hmm.

From this point on we have two separate individuals who will now have separate experiences, but they share an identical past. They will both be equally convinced, by their own memories, that they are cos. Is there any fundamental difference between them? Can they work out who is who? Does it matter?

I see your point. In this situation, I don't see a way to objectively work out the truth of the matter.

I'm coming round to the view that although we would now be two people, neither one of us would have a stronger tie to out shared past than the other one. So we might say the old "me" has split into two "me"s.

I can't shake the conviction that just by regaining consciousness in that room, I would be confirming that I'm the original.

But of course, the other "me" would have the exact same unshakeable conviction.

My brain might be broken now.

It would certainly pose a problem for my wife.

I think my girlfriend would adapt to that situation.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I'll try to explain it a different way:

At some point in my life my consciousness became sufficiently sophisticated to name (or tag) itself as 'I'. Since I believe that there are other conscious entities that also label themselves as 'I', I generally use the tag 'I' as a reference to my consciousness and use other identifiers when referring to other people's 'I's (e.g. their names). Whilst I refer to my 'I' as simply 'I', I nevertheless understand that in reality it is I(x) where x is a universally unique identifier.

If I(x) is copied in, the manner of the duplicating transporter, the remote result is I, occupying a different time and space than I(x) and subject to a discrete set of experiences.

the only way that there can be a single I (shorthand for single I(x) remember) is if the duplication somehow provides 2 bodies with a common consciousness (for 'I' is the label that the consciousness applies to itself, not to other consciousness that might happen to be copies or templates of itself).

So, clarifying, I(0) refers to you and I(1) refers to me, correct?

What reason does your 'copy' have to suppose that after transportation it is no longer I(0) but I'(0) (apart from the knowlegde that the original body no longer exists). What would make the distinction between I(0) and I'(0) meaningful? It doesn't matter to the entity referred to as I(0) since it has ceased to exist, and the entity I'(0) believes itself to be I(0) and is identical in every respect apart from spatial position. To me, but I will grant you that this is an opinion, there is no meaningful discontinuity in the consciousness of I(0).

 

[cos]

Don't apologize, it's a tricky business (trust me, philosophical articles treating this subject aren't significantly more coherent).

I feel for the philosophers, then.

It boils down to the question of what you consider to be you. Your position is that the entire causal history of your being is a necessary precondition for identity.

Well, I'm saying that my consciousness arises from (is?) the particular arrangement and activity of the matter in my brain at this moment. The specific matter may change over time, but the "pattern" is the thing perceived as continuous.

Since there is no meaningful way of distinguising between you and your copy (apart from the fact which one was 're-created') the question whether or not your copy is "really you" becomes somewhat empty: [...] it's not like something essential has been lost.

Assuming the original is destroyed, it's true that the copy cannot distinguish himself from the original, nor can anyone else. Yes, the copy will definitely be "a" me, he's just not the one I rode in on, so to speak. The consciousness that I refer to as "I" will cease to exist the moment that the components which create it are no longer functioning properly, which includes being disassembled. That's death, whether by instant vaporization or lack of oxygen.

If I were to remain alive after being copied, I don't think it makes sense to say that I would ever become conscious of the duplicate's perceptions. If I went on to die a natural death years later, I assume it would be the same sort of death I would experience had I not been copied. So what makes my sudden and violent death, at any other point in the timeline, a special case?

How would my experience of consciousness "jump" from one specific instance of a pattern to an entirely different instance generated from the same pattern?

I'll do my best to clarify if this is gibberish. I really am trying to point to something...

 

[hodgy]

So, clarifying, I(0) refers to you and I(1) refers to me, correct?

Or I(12345) is me, I(123456) is my copy and I(321234) is you, or whatever, as long as whatever is in parenthesis is unique.

What reason does your 'copy' have to suppose that after transportation it is no longer I(0) but I'(0) (apart from the knowlegde that the original body no longer exists).

No reason except for the knowledge that that is what physically happened. If the process somehow removes that knowledge then no reason at all. it does not change the reality of the situation though.

What would make the distinction between I(0) and I'(0) meaningful?

Meaningful in what way? Why does it need to be meaningful? It just is.

It doesn't matter to the entity referred to as I(0) since it has ceased to exist, and the entity I'(0) believes itself to be I(0) and is identical in every respect apart from spatial position.

This is one of the points explored by the previously mentioned (and quite entertaining) film ('Prestige'). The film is set in Victorian times and the transporter does not destroy the original but only produces the remote copy. Consequently, I(0) has to be prepared to be drowned upon each performance of his celebrated trick.

This is the crux of the matter - would you really drown yourself (suicidal tendencies aside) believing that I(1) will faithfullly carry on your legacy? You still have to plunge into the water, your still have to feel the fear and panic, you still have to die....

Now, if the acceptance of death is made easier by virtue of the technology then it becomes an easier decision to make - probably the majority of us could convince ourselves that its a perfectly reasonable choice. BUT - the obscuration of the reality from individual perception does not negate that reality. In both cases I(0) dies.

 

[Phaedrus74]

So, clarifying, I(0) refers to you and I(1) refers to me, correct?

Or I(12345) is me, I(123456) is my copy and I(321234) is you, or whatever, as long as whatever is in parenthesis is unique.

Got it.

What reason does your 'copy' have to suppose that after transportation it is no longer I(0) but I'(0) (apart from the knowlegde that the original body no longer exists).

No reason except for the knowledge that that is what physically happened. If the process somehow removes that knowledge then no reason at all. it does not change the reality of the situation though.

I would say underlying physical reality, but that's nitpicking to an extent.

What would make the distinction between I(0) and I'(0) meaningful?

Meaningful in what way? Why does it need to be meaningful? It just is.

Meaningful meaning that it makes sense and/or makes a difference to make the distinction.

It doesn't matter to the entity referred to as I(0) since it has ceased to exist, and the entity I'(0) believes itself to be I(0) and is identical in every respect apart from spatial position.

This is one of the points explored by the previously mentioned (and quite entertaining) film ('Prestige'). The film is set in Victorian times and the transporter does not destroy the original but only produces the remote copy. Consequently, I(0) has to be prepared to be drowned upon each performance of his celebrated trick.

This is the crux of the matter - would you really drown yourself (suicidal tendencies aside) believing that I(1) will faithfullly carry on your legacy? You still have to plunge into the water, your still have to feel the fear and panic, you still have to die....

Now, if the acceptance of death is made easier by virtue of the technology then it becomes an easier decision to make - probably the majority of us could convince ourselves that its a perfectly reasonable choice. BUT - the obscuration of the reality from individual perception does not negate that reality. In both cases I(0) dies.

Which is the reason that McCoy is notoriously reluctant to use transporters, and I will grant you that you are justified in this case in making the claim that I(0) has died.

Imagine however a society that uses transporters as we use cars. Would you still want to maintain that millions of people die everyday because of the fact that they use transporters? I can imagine lawyers would, since they would be making tons of money of the continuous drafting of wills and related 'products'. This is the point where my previous 'nitpick' becomes slightly more that just a nitpick:

I am not arguing the physical facts, but the circumstances under which you would be justified in applying the concept of dying. The movie the Prestige works precisely because this concept is applicable, in Star Trek the application of the concept would (I believe) be considered nonsensical (or quaint in the case of Dr. McCoy).

Reality is not solely determined by brute facts. Our environment is, but reality is also determined to an extent by our expectations and beliefs. So a statement to the effect that "the original (body) was destroyed" is unproblematic. When applying concepts like "I" (in the regular sense, I like your notion of I(x) though) "to die" or "Self", things get increasingly muddled since they do not just depend on physical circumstances, but also our relationship to and evaluation of these circumstances.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Don't apologize, it's a tricky business (trust me, philosophical articles treating this subject aren't significantly more coherent).

I feel for the philosophers, then.

Well, philosophers know what they are getting into, it's the freshmen you should feel sorry for.

It boils down to the question of what you consider to be you. Your position is that the entire causal history of your being is a necessary precondition for identity.

Well, I'm saying that my consciousness arises from (is?) the particular arrangement and activity of the matter in my brain at this moment. The specific matter may change over time, but the "pattern" is the thing perceived as continuous.

Since there is no meaningful way of distinguising between you and your copy (apart from the fact which one was 're-created') the question whether or not your copy is "really you" becomes somewhat empty: [...] it's not like something essential has been lost.

Assuming the original is destroyed, it's true that the copy cannot distinguish himself from the original, nor can anyone else. Yes, the copy will definitely be "a" me, he's just not the one I rode in on, so to speak. The consciousness that I refer to as "I" will cease to exist the moment that the components which create it are no longer functioning properly, which includes being disassembled. That's death, whether by instant vaporization or lack of oxygen.

I'm engaged in a similar discussion with hodgy and I just argued that applying the concept "death" might not be justified under all circumstances: In the case of the movie "the Prestige" it is definately justified, in the case of Star Trek it is definately not justified.

If I were to remain alive after being copied, I don't think it makes sense to say that I would ever become conscious of the duplicate's perceptions. If I went on to die a natural death years later, I assume it would be the same sort of death I would experience had I not been copied. So what makes my sudden and violent death, at any other point in the timeline, a special case?

It's not so much a special case, inasmuch that it might not be a case of "death" at all depending on the context. (Note: I'm not denying that your original (body) ceases to exist. I'm merely questioning whether this warrants the qualification of this occurrence as a "death" under all circumstances.)

How would my experience of consciousness "jump" from one specific instance of a pattern to an entirely different instance generated from the same pattern?

The point of the discussion is that the pattern is your consciousness, there is no jumping involved. Replicate the pattern -> replicate the consciousness (That these consciounesses immediately start to diverge because of differences in environment is not relevant, at the moment of replication they are identical (apart from spatial location)).

I'll do my best to clarify if this is gibberish. I really am trying to point to something...

Keep at it, these are interesting questions that can show something important about the relationship between language, mind and world.

 

[hodgy]

Imagine however a society that uses transporters as we use cars. Would you still want to maintain that millions of people die everyday because of the fact that they use transporters?

Yes (assuming the transporters worked in the previously agreed way).

I am not arguing the physical facts, but the circumstances under which you would be justified in applying the concept of dying.

I think you would always be justified in applying the concept of dying, since that is what it is. The proposition that is being made to you is - are you prepared to die so that another person can live?

That that person would happen to be a copy of me doesn't seem to make much difference to me in evaluating the proposition.

Imagine you knew that the remote 'you' would be less than a 100% true copy of you - what differences would you be prepared to allow in order to undergo transportation?

Reality is not solely determined by brute facts. Our environment is, but reality is also determined to an extent by our expectations and beliefs. So a statement to the effect that "the original (body) was destroyed" is unproblematic. When applying concepts like "I" (in the regular sense, I like your notion of I(x) though) "to die" or "Self", things get increasingly muddled since they do not just depend on physical circumstances, but also our relationship to and evaluation of these circumstances.

Despite what I said above, I do take your point and I accept that you could be right in that there could be people / a society where dying to be transported was generally accepted. The degree of discomfort, pain and risk involved would also be a major determining factor I assume. I guess we will not really know until someone invents a working transporter

Its an interesting thought / discussion though.

 

[Furious Coder]

By that same reasoning you are copy of the original you since none of the cells you were born with survive to this day.

Is this true? I thought we were born with all our brain cells, and that they persist for our entire lives. The molecules may be replaced over time, but the cells remain intact.

I have to agree with cos and his "shaking hands then being killed" scenerio. There's an end to my consiousness at whatever point I am killed or disassembled, and it's of no comfort to me that an indentical duplicate of myself is leading my life for me. I want to lead my life, I want to experience it, I want to be alive. The notion of my consiousness coming to an abrupt halt but the outside world not noticing my passing because to all observers I am still alive (in the form of my teleported duplicate) is highly disturbing to me.