Richard T. Garner and "Beyond Morality"

[angrysoba]

I am working on that. But, do you agree that in principle, if I were to substantiate the ideas, it would qualify as answering normative questions? I am not asking you to agree that it does, right now. Only that it WOULD, IF I can substantiate that.

I only ask because it seems I already have doubters:

No. I don't agree that as it was stated it would constitute normative ethics.

Rather it seems to confirm that you are confused about what is at issue.

It seems to me that you are beginning with a rather Whiggish assumption that society is inexorably becoming better and "more moral" and that people who don't share your liberal Western moral ideals will end up in the dustbin of history. But even if that was true (and that is what needs to be substantiated) it would not follow that the liberal Western moral ideals are right and that they constitute correct moral norms.

 

[angrysoba]

The poster takes the view that behaviour is how creatures behave. The reasons for that behaviour are extremely complex and involve complexity at every level from the molecular, through education, individual character, politics, social dynamics, geography , history, memory (somatic and extra somatic) and a whole bunch of other stuff.

This is a text based internet forum. You want a thesis, I don't think this is the appropriate format.
What you got was a 2 cent summary of my thinking on the matter. I don't expect you to agree with it, because I don't expect any two people to agree on these issues.
If 2 creatures share the same behaviour after being out of any social contact for 50,000 years, I think we have to conclude that the reason is innate to both.
Can you demonstrate why you think the word "right" in that sentence means anything at all? That's not my idea, it's a working definition which you are free to criticise or improve.
Moral behaviour is, first and foremost, behaviour. Whether it is moral is a matter of opinion - and opinions vary in space and time. The problem with the concept of morality as often used in threads here is that it is largely undefined. If it is immoral to steal, then yes, Huck's behaviour was immoral. If it is immoral to enslave, is stealing a slave a moral act? No, because it's theft. Yes, because it's immoral to enslave. A question that has both a yes and a no answer is not well formed. Until you define morality, moral questions are largely meaningless.
I don't actually see a "sneer" button here. Perhaps you have a later version of the software? I think asking questions is a waste of time unless you define your terms.
My answer to the question is yes. If everyone in society thought owning slaves was right, then it would be right. That's what democracy is.
Yes. And he's likely to find himself in deep doo-doo as a result. Of course, if he can convince enough people that he is right, then the situation can change.

This is a matter of education. If you are raised believing that homosexuality is a sin and a crime, then you move somewhere that it is considered perfectly OK, then you will be shocked. You will defend your beliefs because not doing so will itself seem to be letting your moral standards slip.

If people were trained to understand that such variations in behaviour as exist between cultures are merely matters of local custom, rather than "moral absolutes", we would all be a great deal better off.
You make my point well. These are not questions of right and wrong and nobody should think they are. They are matters of local custom- and may work perfectly well for centuries, so long as the locality remains reasonably culturally isolated.
I don't care about women wearing burkas in Saudi Arabia. I do care about a woman wearing one in Scotland. Why does it upset me? Because I have a suite of biases and bigotries, painfully acquired over 6 decades and I don't like people going around with their faces hidden. Am I right? Yes and no. It goes against normal behaviour in Scotland and so my herd attitude is violated, so yes. It's none of my business what a woman chooses to wear, so no. If you see this as an issue of morality, it's an impossible question to answer. Seen purely as a matter of local custom, it's a far simpler question, just as it's a simpler question if she chooses to walk around naked.

The problems start in a world where people can move to another cultural area in a matter of hours and yet expect to find the behavioural rules to be exactly the same as those they left behind.
This is where the whole idea of multi-culturalism falls flat . What is right and wrong, beyond issues of survival, is a temporary, local majority opinion and no more than that. What is possible,or practicable, or necessary may be very different. Dis te minorem quod geris imperas. When in Rome...

The highlighted part is a question that Wowbagger needs to answer given that he is the one arguing the proposition that there are objective moral norms. It is not necessary for me to demonstrate that "right" means anything, but rather is part of the definition of normative ethics:

Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because it examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative_ethics

Wowbagger is going to engage in a debate with someone who is a moral skeptic, that is Wowbagger's opponent will be asking Wowbagger to demonstrate the meaning of right in the context of ethics.

What's strange to me is that your own moral relativism is so clearly at odds with Wowbagger's claims to objective moral norms and yet you two are high-fiving each other and engaged in furious agreement.

It suggests to me that neither of you properly understand what is being debated.

 

[angrysoba]

Where else would you get your normative claims from? Do you just pluck them out of thin air?

Unfortunately this is a problem for Wowbagger. Because his opponent will see the question you posed as analogous to "Where else do fairies come from if not from the flowers at the bottom of the garden?"

His opponent would argue that while he can accept the existence of the flowers at the bottom of the garden, not only do fairies not spring from there but they don't spring from anywhere because they don't exist.

This is not to say that it is necessarily my position, but Wowbagger should understand that in this debate he is at a serious disadvantage because all his opponent needs to do is to fold his arms and watch Wowbagger flail.

If we are talking about establishing the truth, then the burden is indeed hard.

I recommend another tactic: fight dirty!

In order to do this what you will have to do is:

a) ad hominem attack
b) appeal to emotion

This can be done in the following ways. You can ask your opponent if throwing acid in the faces of young girls who only want to be educated is objectively wrong or not. When your opponent is forced to say no, you can stand up and decry his heartlessness and immorality and in Hitchens-like histrionics you can seek the judgment of the audience,

"Has it really come to this that the herbivourous liberal lefties can no longer even bring themselves to denounce the subjugation and ruination and acidinthefacination of young girls and have to stroke their strokey beards and adjust their pince-nez and shrug their shoulders and mutter 'who are we to say?' " and then start jabbing your finger accusingly and theatrically and Shakespeareanly declaring "For shame! This capitulation to evil! For shame!"

It will not actually be a sound argument but you may be able to trick the audience.

 

[angrysoba]

By the way, Wowbagger. When I said that your theory appears Whiggish, what I was referring to was this theory, nicely summarized on Wiki:

Whig history (or Whig Historiography) is the approach to historiography which presents the past as an inevitable progression towards ever greater liberty and enlightenment, culminating in modern forms of liberal democracy and constitutional monarchy. In general, Whig historians emphasize the rise of constitutional government, personal freedoms and scientific progress. The term is often applied generally (and pejoratively) to histories that present the past as the inexorable march of progress toward enlightenment.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig_history

The idea is quite an old one, and you can generally find these ideas in old fashioned Liberal English philosophers.

The main points of attack are on the idea that a) moral progress has been made and b) that moral progress is inevitable.

It seems to me that you are arguing in favour of both, and I would expect your opponent to raise both issues and attack them. Probably the first one is more easily defensible. Certainly pointing to scientific progress should be easy. Pointing to moral progress is a little more difficult to definitively prove, yet most people are satisfied with things such as the abolition of slavery, the rights of women to vote etc... that the audience can be fairly easily persuaded. The idea that it is inexorable, however, is really very difficult. Almost nobody attempts to do this now as it is a very fishy assumption. For example, Steven Pinker emphatically denies he was putting forward a Whiggish interpretation of history in his Better Angels book (or at least on the talk circuit about the book).

If you are going to put forward the argument you have so far made then be prepared to argue those points.

 

[Wowbagger]

The main aim of my side of the argument would be to demonstrate that taking an objective approach to morality will more likely tell you a lot more about values, compassion, etc. than Error Theory. Even if my own ideas do not turn out to be correct.

To do that, learning more about Error Theory is paramount. So, if anyone has anything to offer about that, rather than my own side, I would appreciate it.

My own side might need work, too. But, I am working on that.

Also, if anyone can answer to this contradiction I think I spotted, in Garner's work, please do so: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=9648154#post9648154


The evidence for objective moral truths I will present will hopefully come in several forms:

* There is the historic evidence, as angrysoba points out: It should be easy to demonstrate how suffering and violence have been reduced, and altruism has increased, over time. Etc.

* There might even be scientific studies to demonstrate various aspects of this. Though, to that regard, I would rather wait until the end of the week to discuss that further. I just scheduled a meeting with a friend of mine, with expertise in experimental design and such, to go over this, for Wednesday evening. I will try to offer a summary Thursday morning. But, since that is Thanksgivukkah, I might not be able to debate about it much until Friday (11/29/2013). I have been warned to maintain a pessimistic attitude about that angle, though. So, we'll just have to see.

* And, there is theoretical support, if we accept that almost all of the effects emerge out of Natural Selection. Now, of course, Natural Selection is NOT a form of morality. But, it could be said to function as a proto-morality: An early, key ingredient to something that will eventually turn into a morality. There are several predictions that come out of that: For example, that we will adopt those values that are best for the well-being of our genes, etc.



Now to dive into some responses:

So, let's see how you determine which norms are the right norms, independently of social consensus.

Those norms that are better for our overall well-being are good. Those that detract from our well-being are bad. There are several different ways one can objectively measure such things, based on health, wealth, amount of suffering, etc. These measures could be made independently of whatever society claims as a consensus.

Though I posit that, once discovered, improvements to norms will eventually, almost inevitably permeate society.

I do not think there is any other stable form of moral values that can exist, in the real world, other than those that improve our well-being. All values that, accidentally or intentionally, detract from well-being will eventually be found and removed. That is, in effect, what human societies are formed for, in the first place.

1) Do moral questions mean anything?
2) Is there a mind-independent source of universal morality that cannot be argued with?
3) Can you objectively determine and evaluate moral questions?
4) In practice, how similar is human morality?

1. Yes. I think Sophronius sums it up well enough. I would add that the term "moral" is going to be part of our lexicon for a long time, so we might as well give the term a useful purpose.

2. I already explained why I say Yes, in a previous post.

3. Yes. I take issue with Sophronius' statement "there is no way to logically dictate what preferences a being ought to have in the first place". I posit that humans will, almost inevitably, go for the scientific approach, because it gets the best, most reliable results. I do not think any other preference would be sustainable forever.

4. This IS a tough question, which is why you have to separate as much of the proximate details from the ultimate factors as possible. There will likely be a wide variety of different proximate details, in different societies, throughout all of time. But, they will all find themselves funneling into the same ultimate root causes. Causes which could be said to emerge out of Natural Selection, if you go down far enough.

Of course clearing all that up and making the debate about more than just "Objective morality: yes/no"? might prove hard to do in only a couple of minutes... I'll be impressed if you manage it.

I am trying to be innovative without sounding too kooky. It is an interesting challenge. Even here, where I have more time.

I will patiently for you to logically "substantiate" how you get normative claims from descriptive claims, preferably without begging the question, resorting to special pleading and other assorted fallacies.

We can see that, throughout history, descriptive claims have a habit of transforming into our normative ones. There is no reason to assume this will stop or reverse itself. And, I do not think there is any other stable manner in which norms can be formed. It appears to me as though all other alternatives exist primarily as a form of fiction.

Considering that you are already resorting to an appeal to popularity

NO!! That is NOT, at all, what I am doing!!! You misunderstand:

Something is NOT morally good merely because it is popular. But, rather good things are the ones that usually tend to become popular, though there are temporary exceptions from time to time.

(And, historically, we can find plenty of examples of popular things being bad.)

and Appeal to consequences

This is closer to the mark of what I am doing. But, like the "appeal to popularity", it requires modification:

Something is not necessarily recognized as good, simply because it seems to have desirable consequences. But, rather: Those things that seem to have desirable consequences are those that almost inevitably become known as good things.

I do not think there can be very many historic examples of where this was not the case. In the real world, morality seems to stabilize around what offers the better levels of well-being, to everyone in a society. Any other alternative would largely exist in the realm of fiction.

No i don't make normative ethical statements at all. Ethics and morality is of no use to me.

I am trying to learn more about this point of view, so if you have any particular insights into it, to offer, let me know.

Do you think that you have an argument that actually supports these opinions?

I am trying. Read this post.

It seems to me that you are beginning with a rather Whiggish assumption that society is inexorably becoming better and "more moral"

I think, in general, Whiggish thinking is about right. Though, there is an important point to make in this regard:

We can NOT expect society to become better and better, straight up, in a solid line. But, we CAN expect it to happen in fits and starts, so that progress resembles something closer to an inclined saw-tooth graph.

An inclined saw-tooth graph has a lot of jagged ups and downs within it. But, there is a general trend of going up or down over time.

Historically, most forms of violence have gone down, in a saw-tooth-like manner. And most measures of healthiness have gone up, in a saw-tooth like manner.

Is there any reason those trends should not continue?

it would not follow that the liberal Western moral ideals are right and that they constitute correct moral norms.

Where did THAT come from?!!!! You must have me confused with Sam Harris.

I do not presume "liberal Western moral ideals" are the right ones, at all! A true objective moralist would not place bets on any particular school of thinking, like that, but would rather examine these questions as objectively and independently as possible!

a) ad hominem attack

I can't do this. I respect the formidableness of my foe too much.

b) appeal to emotion

That is how Micheal Shermer ended his side of the debate, on this topic, at NECSS. It was an unmitigated disaster!

That very disaster is one of my motivations for throwing my hat into these debates. I certainly have no intention to duplicate it!

 

[angrysoba]

I think, in general, Whiggish thinking is about right. Though, there is an important point to make in this regard:

We can NOT expect society to become better and better, straight up, in a solid line. But, we CAN expect it to happen in fits and starts, so that progress resembles something closer to an inclined saw-tooth graph.

An inclined saw-tooth graph has a lot of jagged ups and downs within it. But, there is a general trend of going up or down over time.

Historically, most forms of violence have gone down, in a saw-tooth-like manner. And most measures of healthiness have gone up, in a saw-tooth like manner.

Is there any reason those trends should not continue?


Where did THAT come from?!!!! You must have me confused with Sam Harris.

I do not presume "liberal Western moral ideals" are the right ones, at all! A true objective moralist would not place bets on any particular school of thinking, like that, but would rather examine these questions as objectively and independently as possible!

I can't do this. I respect the formidableness of my foe too much.

That is how Micheal Shermer ended his side of the debate, on this topic, at NECSS. It was an unmitigated disaster!

That very disaster is one of my motivations for throwing my hat into these debates. I certainly have no intention to duplicate it!

Are you talking about the one between Shermer and Pigliucci?

If so, then yes, Shermer was completely shot down in flames.

And yes, maybe I do have you confused with Sam Harris.

I think as you said, the important thing will be to read up on your opponent's position. I have provided you with a suggestion for a core text, and you have another one to hand. Maybe it would be best to start by summarizing your opponent's argument as clearly and honestly and as well as you can and then inspecting it for flaws.

 

[Wowbagger]

Are you talking about the one between Shermer and Pigliucci?

If so, then yes, Shermer was completely shot down in flames.

That'd be the one!

And yes, maybe I do have you confused with Sam Harris.

I guess it's too easy to do that. But, we do have our differences.

I think as you said, the important thing will be to read up on your opponent's position. I have provided you with a suggestion for a core text, and you have another one to hand. Maybe it would be best to start by summarizing your opponent's argument as clearly and honestly and as well as you can and then inspecting it for flaws.

I think I found one such flaw, already. And, I am still hoping for feedback on it: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=9648154#post9648154

 

[Sophronius]

Wow, I could go on forever, at this point, responding to all the posts in this thread!

I decided to cut to the chase, and focus on this one first:

One of the fantastic predictions I would make is that if we ever did meet aliens from another planet (we'll call it Planet X), you would be wrong. And, one of the following probably WILL happen:

Excellent! You're turning our difference in beliefs into a difference of expectations. I actually think that's a very good way to have a meaningful discussion (better than arguing definitions at least ) about ethics.

I have to disagree, however. I feel that you underestimate just how alien aliens are likely to be. Having evolved on a seperate planet, they are liable to have none of the concepts that we do. They might not even have a concept of love if they reproduce asexually, for example. I suspect that a complete difference in emotions and sensations would make moral agreement impossible.

However! It would still be entirely possible for them to tell us how to act more morally, in accordance with our own moral preferences. For example, they might be more capable of predicting the consequences of our actions better than we can, or they might even use superior neuroscience to better determine what our preferences are than we can ourselves.

What I can not see happening is us having a discussion and convincing them that they should care about we care about. I think this can be very clearly illustrated if you replace the aliens with intelligent, sapient robots who care about nothing other than constructing paper clips. Good luck convincing them to follow your morality.

I think that, yes, there IS a mind-independent source of morality that cannot be argued with: It stems out of natural forces that we can not argue with.

I'm confused here. What natural forces do you mean? Are you talking about actual laws of nature? Or do you just mean things like society?

The main aim of my side of the argument would be to demonstrate that taking an objective approach to morality will more likely tell you a lot more about values, compassion, etc. than Error Theory. Even if my own ideas do not turn out to be correct.

To do that, learning more about Error Theory is paramount. So, if anyone has anything to offer about that, rather than my own side, I would appreciate it.

Ok. I'm no expert (well, I did help teach a course on ethics for a bit I guess), but I'll put in my 2 cents:

Error theorists differ from moral noncognivists in that they recognize that moral claims are meaningful claims, they just believe that they are wrong. When someone says that 'murder is wrong', the error theorists holds that a factual claim is being made about reality, and concludes that this claim is wrong. Error theory is to moral realism like atheism is to theism: Error theorists basically tend to say that the burden of proof lies on the moral realist to show there is any meaningful morality, and if the moral realist cannot do this the error theorist assumes they are correct. I think this kind of reasoning is stupid, since it's not an either/or issue. Moral realists often claim that there is some kind of morality "out there", which is incorrect as far as I know, but the error lies in going from "no magical morality" to "Morality is entirely subjective". That simply does not follow and it's throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

If I were to debate this person, I would start by freely yielding that there is no "magic" morality which is mind-independent. I would argue that this is no more meaningful an objection than it is to say that consciousness does not exist because we are made of atoms. The fact that human morality has to be based on human morals which evolved over time does not detract from it in the slightest. I would further argue that the entire process of moral argument can be handled objectively, since both moral preferences and predicted outcomes of actions can be measured objectively: As such no step in the process is open to opinion. A person who says that "murder is wrong" is saying that they believe that murder is harmful to society's moral preferences as a general rule, and that not only do they feel this but the rest of humanity would agree on this as well as long as they are sufficiently informed: It is a factual statement about human moral preferences as well as the predicted outcomes of actions. The statement is entirely factual and entirely correct. As such error theory is wrong.

I would then proceed to argue that the existence of psycopaths does not in any way detract from this argument (your opponent will invariably bring this up). Psycopaths are not some kind of ubermesch that have removed their moral shackles, they are in essence morally handicapped. This can be seen by the fact that psycopaths are much more likely to be imprisoned, for example. This is the result of the fact that they are unable to recognize the consequences of their actions, and of recognizing that other people are similar to them. This should be unsurprising given the fact that our moral sense evolved for a reason (counter-counter argument: religion )

Either way, your struggle is going to be that this person (if he is like other error theorists) will simply take your arguments and say "Well your moral truth is nice and all, but it isn't moral Truth with a capital T, so it doesn't count. It's not REALLY moral truth unless it is 100% objective and universal and mind-independent and you could convince a psycopath of it. And if you can't do that, well then I'm right by default and everything is subjective and it's all a wash."

3. Yes. I take issue with Sophronius' statement "there is no way to logically dictate what preferences a being ought to have in the first place". I posit that humans will, almost inevitably, go for the scientific approach, because it gets the best, most reliable results. I do not think any other preference would be sustainable forever.

I think you're answering a different question. There are 2 questions here:

A) Can you convince a person to assume moral preferences without appealing to moral preferences that they already have?
B) What is the best way to analyze what preferences people have and how best to satisfy them?

The answer to A has to be no, I think, unless selfish desires would somehow necessitate moral rules. In the case of sentient paper-clip maximising robots however, I fail to see how this would happen.

The answer to B may very well be "the scientific method".

I do not presume "liberal Western moral ideals" are the right ones, at all! A true objective moralist would not place bets on any particular school of thinking, like that, but would rather examine these questions as objectively and independently as possible!

I would actually agree with Harris that western ethics are objectively superior to those preached by strict adherents of the Koran. All bias aside, it should not be surprising that a culture that at least tries to be right does better in science and ethics than a culture that thinks religion is the answer.

Garner states, on page 3, that he wants to:

...make a case against the idea of inescapable and binding demands from supernatural demanders, or more strangely, from no demanders at all.

But, ironically, on page 5, he states:

...I will show that if we leave morality out of the discussion, and make a few other changes about how we think about and relate to one another, we may find ourselves making decisions many moralists will not only admire, but also insist on calling “moral.”

Proving that EVEN HE is bound to inescapable demands (presumably from no demanders at all)!

It sounds to me like this: Instead of proving morality doesn't exist, he is coming to moral conclusions using language designed not to admit that.

Hmm, I've read the pages you mention and honestly, I don't see the issue. He's not saying that he abides by moral demands, he is saying that he is in favour of doing things that we may intuitively feel are moral, but which aren't actually moral. I see no contradiction there.

This guy actually strikes me as quite mild and reasonable, which might make things difficult for you. Yes, he says that we should do away with morality, but then he argues that we should still be compassionate to each other (because that's what we want). It would be much easier to attack him if he made the all too common claim that all cultures are equally valid. Does he say anywhere that you can't say that the taliban is wrong, or anything like that? That would be much easier to attack. Even if he doesn't say that, you could still ask him during the debate whether or not he would deem the taliban morally wrong, just to make him sweat a little.

If not, you might argue that he says we should do away with morality, but then proceeds to argue in favour of things that we consider to be moral (compassion and such), so you could argue that he is really just doing away with the language of morality. You could then say that he is right in criticizing the current discourse regarding morality, but that that is only reason to improve it, not to throw it away entirely.

 

[Correa Neto]

The post was not directed towards me, but...

Those norms that are better for our overall well-being are good. Those that detract from our well-being are bad. There are several different ways one can objectively measure such things, based on health, wealth, amount of suffering, etc. These measures could be made independently of whatever society claims as a consensus.

OK, our well being and society. But these norms, do they actually apply to a given society as awhole or just to parts of it?

Another problem is that since measurements -which I agree could be (and are) made- can be carried out independently of consensus within a society, then could be based in arbitrary and/or relative criteria. What I consider as important may be irrelevant for somenone else.

It seems to me we are stuck to using our own values to evaluate other cultures, other groups. We can look around and we can look back, but our view is biased. I also have an uncomfortable hindsight feeling when I look to our past cultures...

Though I posit that, once discovered, improvements to norms will eventually, almost inevitably permeate society.

I do not think there is any other stable form of moral values that can exist, in the real world, other than those that improve our well-being. All values that, accidentally or intentionally, detract from well-being will eventually be found and removed. That is, in effect, what human societies are formed for, in the first place.

The problem is that the norms seem to be mutable through history. Societies and cultures are always changing. So the norms can't be established in an objective and clear way. Maybe some very loose definitions would do the trick, but I bet we will find several cases of these rules being thrown in to the garbage bin.

We can NOT expect society to become better and better, straight up, in a solid line. But, we CAN expect it to happen in fits and starts, so that progress resembles something closer to an inclined saw-tooth graph.

An inclined saw-tooth graph has a lot of jagged ups and downs within it. But, there is a general trend of going up or down over time.

Historically, most forms of violence have gone down, in a saw-tooth-like manner. And most measures of healthiness have gone up, in a saw-tooth like manner.

Is there any reason those trends should not continue?

I would like to agree with you, my gut feeling says you may be correct but I fear my bias -an optimistic view of mankind and its future ^(*)- may be playing a role.

I am not sure, for example, that violence has atually decreased along history. It may be my bias (since I live in a country where its climbing), but I propose the notion it is decreasing may also be a bias, a function of where in the world you live.

To solve this, I think we would need a number of statistic data on violence (ex.: homicides, rape, aggression) normalized say, to the world's population at each given time frame.

And even if the trend is real... Well, maybe there' s no reason to think it will not change sometime in the future. Or to think the criteria for well-being and morality in the future would be considered by us as being good. The future may quite as well be a dystopia. My utopia, remember, can be someone else's dystopia. Conservatives and religious fundamentalists of all types would hate to live in my utopia, for example.

(*) I fear my views may actually be slowly changing to a more cynical and pessimistic perspective.

 

[Sophronius]

Well, only if, by "statements of moral preference", you mean, "Person X believes moral claim P" are statements of objective fact. But, frankly, even without statement (1), I'd be willing to grant that such statements are objective fact.

No, no, no. Preferences and beliefs are not the same thing at all. I think this is an important point:

"I like ice cream" is a factual claim about a part of reality, namely the physical workings of my body.

"I hold the belief that ice cream tastes like beef" is a factual claim about what I believe. The fact that I hold that belief can be correct while the thing that is belief is still wrong. Whether or not I hold this belief is not nearly as relevant as whether or not the thing that I belief is correct.

When I say that you can objectively analyze what moral preferences a person holds, this is equivalent to saying that ice cream objectively does not taste like beef. It is entirely different from your interpretation, which is that a person believes a moral claim (equivalent to believing that ice cream tastes like beef), which is not nearly as relevant.

I am saying that the building blocks of morality can be objectively ascertained. That is a much more significant claim than saying that you can objectively determine what a person believes about morality.

Well, this contains rather more implicit claims than it appears. First, it contains the presumption that moral "preferences" are fundamentally about consequences of actions. I'm not willing to grant that, given that there are many persons who've thought deeply about such matters and concluded that morality is about something other than outcomes. Such persons have, in your terminology (which I do not like), "preferences" that have nothing directly to do with consequences of actions.

Ok, yes, fine. To a large extent, moral debates are determined by how a person feels about a certain proposition. i.e. you can shift a moral debate on abortion with phrases like "pro-choice" or "pro-life". I do not believe this is a meaningful way to hold a moral discussion, however. I believe that how a person feels about an issue is only a shortcut to what actually matters, which is the expected outcome of a proposition and the moral desirability of that outcome. The reason that examples like the trolley problem don't work is because people intuitively grasp that allowing people to push other people onto train tracks wouldn't result in a society they want to live in.

But, insofar as a person's moral intuitions are consequentialist in nature, I still dispute (3). This morning, for instance, NPR had an interview with a writer who suffered a tragic loss as a child. He convinced his brother to play backfield, despite his weak knees, which led to a knee injury, a botched surgery and a sad death due to infection. You tell me: supposing science could predict this outcome from his action, would science say that he was responsible for his brother's death? But for the fact that he convinced his brother to play that position, his brother would not have ended up in the hospital (at least not that day). And he knew of the weak knees. Nonetheless, the chain of events leading to the death of his brother was complicated. Was it his fault?

The answer to whether that person is "responsible" in the loosest sense of the word is "yes, to the extent that any other factor that could have prevented that outcome from happening is responsible". A butterfly flapping his wings might be "responsible". The issue is that when you use a word like "fault", you are slipping in connotations such as "blame". The issue then becomes whether or not we should hold it against that person and be angry at them, which is an entirely different question. (one which can still be answered, but it's obviously much harder to do so.)

Does not follow. All that follows is that we can objectively determine the truth value of the sentence, "Person X believes that doing A in situation S is wrong." That is not the same as determining the answers to moral questions objectively.

I believe your disagreement here is the result of your misinterpreting what I mean by "preference", which is not the same as "belief", as explained in the first part of this post. What we can do is objectively determine what a person (morally) desires AND how best to obtain it, which means that it can be objectively determined what a person should do GIVEN their desires/preferences.

Certainly, I'm not tossing that claim around.

But I don't see that you've done anything better. It has been well-known for quite some time that we can talk about moral relativism on either the individual or the cultural level. When we regard the entire planet as the relevant culture, then we get the project that you're discussing. We simply poll the planet and take the most popular views (or at least those that are nigh-universal) as the standard. How is this not just a particular form of subjectivism?

If you agree that we can have a moral system that is the same as a universal and objective morality for all intents and purposes then I think I have proved a whole lot. I think it is worth recognizing the importance of this. Surely you would agree that the average person who hears that "morality is subjective" does not conclude what I just described? If so, surely you must also agree that "subjectivism" is not an adequate description for "Near universal and objective morality".

The highlighted bit strikes me as astonishing. Just what moral philosophy have you read?

Oh, I know that there are a ton of other suggestions, I just don't think they are sensible.

1) "Morality is what god says is good". Well there is no god, so no.
2) "Morality is what maximising evolutionary fitness". Naturalistic fallacy, so no.
3) "Morality is out there, somewhere". Too vague, so no.

Do you know of any sensible alternative to "human morality comes from human moral preferences/desires"?

As far as my use of "opinion" rather than "preference", well, I rather think that's closer to a respectful term. I take for granted that everyone has some moral opinions that they would, in a sense, prefer not to have. We all feel that we've fallen short of our own moral compasses. I personally don't prefer to feel shame. I feel it because it is, sometimes and in my opinion, appropriate.

The way I use it, opinions and preferences are entirely different things. "Evolution is a lie!" is an opinion, not a preference. "I like vanilla ice cream better than chocolate ice cream" is a preference. What opinions someone has has no bearing on what is morally right, but preferences are important.

 

[angrysoba]

I already sense an apparent contradiction in Garner's introduction. If my feeling is true, it would be significantly detrimental to his argument. So, I am asking if anyone else has something to say on the manner, before I officially bring it before my opponent.

The intro can be found here: http://beyondmorality.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Introduction_May_2012.pdf

Garner states, on page 3, that he wants to:

...make a case against the idea of inescapable and binding demands from supernatural demanders, or more strangely, from no demanders at all.​

But, ironically, on page 5, he states:

...I will show that if we leave morality out of the discussion, and make a few other changes about how we think about and relate to one another, we may find ourselves making decisions many moralists will not only admire, but also insist on calling “moral.”​

Proving that EVEN HE is bound to inescapable demands (presumably from no demanders at all)!

It sounds to me like this: Instead of proving morality doesn't exist, he is coming to moral conclusions using language designed not to admit that.

Can anyone explain why I am wrong about this?

To be honest, I do not know.

I would suggest that you read the first four chapters which he says,in his introduction, the argument is laid out.

But as far as I know you are not debating this particular guy, are you? Rather you are debating someone who subscribes to the argument in the book. If that is the case then it would be better to get the big picture instead of trying to find apparent, but perhaps not actual, contradictions in the introduction.

 

[Arcade22]

With due respect, I find this kind of hard to believe.

You have no opinion about whether, say, Ariel Castro did something wrong?

Or whether, by and large, killing a random stranger is a bad thing to do (bad in the moral sense, of course)?

None of those things are anymore "immoral" than a rock rolling down a hill.

On the odd chance that someone steals from you, your reaction is purely in terms of enlightened self-interest and understanding of different perspectives and needs, and you do not feel any sense of being literally wronged?

I don't know about "enlightened" self-interest, but I care about the things i care about. If someone steals something from me that i care about i will of course be angry but morality doesn't come into it. Just because i don't want my property stolen does not mean anyone else "shouldn't steal my property" nor that stealing my property is "immoral".

Honestly, even if I were not a moral realist and I believed that ethics is simply a purely emotional reaction to events, I would doubt that you are accurately stating what you feel.

Then please explain what i really feel since you are apparently an expert in deducing what people really feel.

 

[Meed]

Wowbagger, I don't agree with either you or Garner, but I think Garner' position will be easier to defend with argumentation (I don't know much about error theory so I could be wrong).

 

[phiwum]

None of those things are anymore "immoral" than a rock rolling down a hill.



I don't know about "enlightened" self-interest, but I care about the things i care about. If someone steals something from me that i care about i will of course be angry but morality doesn't come into it. Just because i don't want my property stolen does not mean anyone else "shouldn't steal my property" nor that stealing my property is "immoral".



Then please explain what i really feel since you are apparently an expert in deducing what people really feel.

No, if you insist that genocide is no more intrinsically wrong, from your point of view, than a tumbling pebble, then of course I have to accept your self-reported opinions.

But I have trouble imagining what it is like to believe thus. I cannot fathom the belief that intentionally causing serious harm to others is not wrong (because nothing is either right or wrong in this sense).

Nonetheless, I'll accept that you have the courage of your claimed convictions.

 

[Arcade22]

We can see that, throughout history, descriptive claims have a habit of transforming into our normative ones. There is no reason to assume this will stop or reverse itself. And, I do not think there is any other stable manner in which norms can be formed. It appears to me as though all other alternatives exist primarily as a form of fiction.

Since it is apparently a habit of descriptive claims I'm sure you will have no problem in giving countless examples and showing how this is of any relevance towards morality, especially in supporting your conjecture that science can say what people "ought" to do.

Something is NOT morally good merely because it is popular. But, rather good things are the ones that usually tend to become popular, though there are temporary exceptions from time to time.

So good things are things that usually (with some exceptions) become popular? I can't really see how a definition like that would ever be useful for anything since it's so broad as to be useless.

This is closer to the mark of what I am doing. But, like the "appeal to popularity", it requires modification:

Something is not necessarily recognized as good, simply because it seems to have desirable consequences. But, rather: Those things that seem to have desirable consequences are those that almost inevitably become known as good things.

Again i can't see how your definition is useful in the slightest. What i get from this is that: Good things are things that (usually) became known as such because they seem to have desirable consequences.

Since you didn't define "desirable consequences" good things might apply to just about anything from disease to ice cream.

I am trying to learn more about this point of view, so if you have any particular insights into it, to offer, let me know.

Here's how i see it, all of morality stem from the basic idea that people ought to do something or inversely that people ought not to do something. How this very basic and core thought is justified is incredibly varied: ranging from the laws and orders ordained by deities, "reason", purpose, ones "self-interest", the wellbeing of ones country/king/people/human race and so on. No matter how someone justifies it in the end the justification is, in all the cases i can think of, reduced into some article of faith.

As i remain thoroughly unconvinced i can't believe that something "ought to do" anything. The simplest way i can put it is that things do as they are willing and able to do. There is no justification in saying that someone/something "ought not" rape, murder, torture, steal or jaywalk anymore than anyone is justified in saying that the sun "ought to shine forever" or that a rock on top of a hill "ought to roll down from its hill".

Although plenty of people have no problem with finding normative statements regarding rocks and stars as unjustified people have no issues with resorting to special pleading when it comes to humans because it apparently leads to "awful" conclusions. "Why, if murder and jaywalking is no more immoral than rocks rolling down hills that's awful and we can't have that! We got to come up with something different!" And thus the charade keeps on going.

 

[Wowbagger]

Since it is apparently a habit of descriptive claims I'm sure you will have no problem in giving countless examples and showing how this is of any relevance towards morality, especially in supporting your conjecture that science can say what people "ought" to do.

From the perspective of someone who is deciding what they ought to do: This becomes subconsciously relevant - That person would have to decide: "Should I go with what seems to be true (Thus turning a descriptive claim into a normative one)? Or, should I go with something that is not as reliable?"

I know people DO NOT LITERALLY ask themselves that, in that way. But, as a historic trend, that is what societies, collectively, end up doing. At least in the long run. Some facts take longer than others to soak in.

For example: Corporal punishment used to be a lot more prevalent in schools, often under the "spare the rod and spoil the child" Biblical claim. Once the word from science got out, that such punishment is actually antithetical to student productivity, the practice almost entirely stopped (except for a few small schools, but they are considered disgusting to most other people). In that way, a descriptive claim: "corporal punishment has a negative impact on student productivity", transformed into a normative one: "corporal punishment is bad."

So good things are things that usually (with some exceptions) become popular? I can't really see how a definition like that would ever be useful for anything since it's so broad as to be useless.

I know that one is a trivial claim. I only brought it up to explain why I was not making an appeal to popularity.

Good things are things that (usually) became known as such because they seem to have desirable consequences.

Sounds about right, if a little bit too wordy.

Since you didn't define "desirable consequences" good things might apply to just about anything from disease to ice cream.

"desirable consequences" could be taken as a synonym for "good for our well-being". I get tired of using the same words all the time.

How this very basic and core thought is justified is incredibly varied:

The funny thing is that most of those justifications have a lot in common:
They are different attempts to reach what is in the best interest of everyone's well being. And, they tend to converge on the same sets of ideas, in a predictable manner that has more to do with the size of the population and various environmental factors, rather than the stated justification.

ranging from the laws and orders

Which are essentially codified moralities. (I am pretending there was a comma between ' laws and orders' and 'ordained by deities')

ordained by deities

It is interesting how those who claim to get their morals from gods tend to converge on ideas you don't really need to get from gods.

"reason"

Reason is not bullet-proof, and can be misguided. But, it is more likely to lead to the right answers faster than almost anything else. The only type of justification that does it better is Science, but even that one is not always perfect.

As a side note: I think that those who (claim to) get their morals from gods will probably end up matching closely to those who get them from reason, after a while. But, it will take them longer.

the wellbeing of ones country/king/people/human race

Which is what all the others you listed will end up boiling down to!

in all the cases i can think of, reduced into some article of faith.

That might be true for most people, now. But, does not necessarily need to stay the case. I suspect morality will, eventually, be accepted as a realm of science, and not something based on faith.

Oh, and before you ask: No, science is NOT, itself, a form of faith. It is grounded in objective reality, that can be independently and reliably verified by disinterested parties.

There is no justification in saying that someone/something "ought not" rape, murder, torture, steal or jaywalk anymore than anyone is justified in saying that the sun "ought to shine forever" or that a rock on top of a hill "ought to roll down from its hill".

Interesting you should say that!

The example I was going to use in my opening remarks was to ask "SHOULD the earth revolve around the Sun?" It does seem like an absurd question. But, I would go on to demonstrate that moral questions, such as "Should I value well-being?" would eventually reach that level of absurdity, because the answer is going to be more obvious: "Duh, of course!! What else are ya gonna do?!"

Well, at least that is something one would EXPECT to happen, if morals really are based on objective truths. This is a theoretical prediction. Only the future can really tell us, for sure.

 

[angrysoba]

For example: Corporal punishment used to be a lot more prevalent in schools, often under the "spare the rod and spoil the child" Biblical claim. Once the word from science got out, that such punishment is actually antithetical to student productivity, the practice almost entirely stopped (except for a few small schools, but they are considered disgusting to most other people). In that way, a descriptive claim: "corporal punishment has a negative impact on student productivity", transformed into a normative one: "corporal punishment is bad."

There are two or three things here that you are mixing up but the most important confusion is between two different reactions to corporal punishment:

a) corporal punishment disgusts people.

b) corporal punisment does not increase student productivity.

You seem to be arguing that one of these is dependent on the other. However, the latter claim might have no relevance to the former claim. Could I not be disgusted by corporal punishment even if it did help a student study better?

The third confusion is, I think, your historical analysis. I do not know if you are correct about that. You may be, but it seems to me that ending corporal punishment was not a scientific cause but an ethical cause. Similarly, I think that goes for ending slavery and women's rights to vote were not grounded on beliefs that scientists had discovered no differences in people. In fact, we know that many abolitionists themselves thought it laughable that black and white people were equal. And racial sciences and eugenics were all the rage at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century after the formal abolition of the slave trade and also US slavery.

My point is that if you are going to make claims about how science has created normative rules then you have to be able to actually demonstrate that, and to me it is not at all clear that corporal punishment as an example is even factually accurate and that's before you tackle the task of showing there is some valid logical inference between finding corporal punishment to be "unproductive" to saying that we ought not to do it.

 

[angrysoba]

The example I was going to use in my opening remarks was to ask "SHOULD the earth revolve around the Sun?" It does seem like an absurd question. But, I would go on to demonstrate that moral questions, such as "Should I value well-being?" would eventually reach that level of absurdity, because the answer is going to be more obvious: "Duh, of course!! What else are ya gonna do?!"

Well, at least that is something one would EXPECT to happen, if morals really are based on objective truths. This is a theoretical prediction. Only the future can really tell us, for sure.

Errrm... that looks like a problem to me in the sense that you are explicitly drawing attention to the difference in is and ought statements.

Indeed, the Earth going around the Sun does not imply that it ought to, and the fact that almost everyone values "well-being" does not imply that everyone ought to.

There are surely problems that you can see with that. Aside from the very vague notion of well-being, clearly most people do not value the well-being of everyone equally. Biologically we are more prone to value the well-being of our children more than those of strangers, and many people value their own well-being higher than their children's. And some don't value their well-being in the sense that they may seek pleasure which damages themselves rather than maintains their lives. And of course some people commit suicide. And some people may even put notions of justice or liberty, or truth above individual or collective well-being for example those who say, "let justice be done and the heavens fall" or the Churchillian quote that it would be better to fight once there was no hope because to fight and die is better to live and be enslaved.

Now, perhaps you can analyze each case as ultimately falling under the concept of well-being, but it would seem a pretty useless term if well-being refers to all or any of the above.

ETA: In fact it would risk becoming a circular argument: People value that which people value and having what you value is well-being therefore well-being is what we value.

 

[dafydd]

Anyway, while I disagree with the apparent premise that science can tell us what we ought to do

It can tell us what we ought to do. Science tells you not to step into an empty lift shaft, for example.

 

[angrysoba]

It can tell us what we ought to do. Science tells you not to step into an empty lift shaft, for example.

Really? You didn't know that before you studied science? I learnt that when I was a child.

Besides, you are still wrong because if your intention is to commit suicide then maybe stepping into an empty lift shaft would be an effective way of accomplishing your goal.