Richard T. Garner and "Beyond Morality"

[Wowbagger]

I already sense an apparent contradiction in Garner's introduction. If my feeling is true, it would be significantly detrimental to his argument. So, I am asking if anyone else has something to say on the manner, before I officially bring it before my opponent.

The intro can be found here: http://beyondmorality.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Introduction_May_2012.pdf

Garner states, on page 3, that he wants to:

...make a case against the idea of inescapable and binding demands from supernatural demanders, or more strangely, from no demanders at all.​

But, ironically, on page 5, he states:

...I will show that if we leave morality out of the discussion, and make a few other changes about how we think about and relate to one another, we may find ourselves making decisions many moralists will not only admire, but also insist on calling “moral.”​

Proving that EVEN HE is bound to inescapable demands (presumably from no demanders at all)!

It sounds to me like this: Instead of proving morality doesn't exist, he is coming to moral conclusions using language designed not to admit that.

Can anyone explain why I am wrong about this?

 

[Soapy Sam]

*sigh*

Why is it that when we are talking about subject matter that is obviously scientific, then the tendency is to use phrases such as:


It appears as though...
The weight of evidence suggests...
There is support for the view that...

Yet, when the same people turn their attention to something far more complicated and contentious like morality then suddenly pronouncements are made with strident and dogmatic certainty.

I think you skipped the first line.

 

[Soapy Sam]

I think this is largely right. But, I would alter that last part: "Not doing so might be considered immoral, at first. But, if the consequences ended up being good, it will change the group's mind."

I wholeheartedly agree with that!!

There might be absolute core sources of morality (from our evolutionary inheritance). But, they are not necessarily "absolute" once they bubble up to the societal level. Societies do have the opportunity to warp and change their behaviors, even away from previously natural absolutes, if doing so ends up helping everyone even more.

Herd behaviour changes faster among humans than other animals, as all behaviour does, because of communication and copying. I don't see moral behaviour as particularly different from any behaviour. I doubt anyone would describe planting your seeds at the right season as "moral", but it certainly makes sense to do it then. The outcome is apt to be a crop being available for harvest at the right time. You could choose to plant it three months late and if it works, others will copy you- but chances are it will not work and you will be hungry come winter. Similar, real world constraints must apply to any behaviour. (Now that is a dogmatic assertion. )

 

[Correa Neto]

Sometimes it seems like a dog chasing its own tail...

In broad, general and rather fuzzy terms, evolution selected specimens whose characteristics made them less aggressive towards other individuals of their groups. Cooperative behaviors were and are passed through generations if they benefit the individual and the group. Even aggressive individuals can learn to play by the rules (probably to a certain point and in generalist terms - there are always exceptions). Evolution selected the individuals less prone to aggressive behavior within the group and more prone to learn the laws of the group.

One can think of a landscape, a topology of behaviors; the hills would be the most likely behaviors- those which would give specimens an advantage while working within their groups. The more a given behavior benefits the individual and the group he/she belongs to, the higher its hill. Sure, there's some space in this topography for non-cooperative and even disruptive behavior. The group can withstand them to a certain point.

I guess few would disagree. The disagreement comes when we start considering which behaviors are more important and why. How relevant, how important are these highs? I think it depends on the perspective, on environment, on politics, on economics, on group size. Societies are actually composed by groups of different sizes and groups within groups. An example of perspective- I'll take care of my own folks first. Another example: behaviors we consider abhorrent may be considered as normal by another group. Actually the may even be considered OK for us if we are applying them to people outside our group and/or under extreme circumstances (exs: "bomb them all", cannibalism). It is harsh, it is cruel, it is unfair, and it is uncomfortably close to extreme moral relativism. It sucks – from my perspective.

Now, the highest hills, the principles we consider dearest to our closer, tighter, smallest, dearest groups, quite possibly values common to all human cultures and groups - Are they the "oughts"? Are they actually universal imperatives? How hardwired are we to them? Now, before asking these questions, another one must be answered: "What are these values?"

I can think of a very few. I bet we all can. I be we'll come to similar answers. We'll then will be left with another question- "Along history, have they been breached?" The answer, which I doubt will generate too much disagreement, is "Yes and quite often and in many scales."

Some values may be dear to us all (Uh... Let me think about the news... OK, to most of us). We may even be hardwired to behave in such ways, or to tend to follow this or that behavior, but when circumstances allow or force us, we have the option to not follow this or that code. The behavior topology will change; maybe a new hill will grow, perhaps out of a valley.

In other words- the "oughts" are relative, determined by situation, by context. If needed (or if the opportunity appears) humans can (maybe will) override them.

 

[phiwum]

It is not merely that society accepts it, that makes it binding. It is that natural forces make certain things good to do or bad. And, society eventually figures those out, and adopts them.

Though, it is more complicated than that, because a lot of those natural forces are emergent properties of the collective society. But, even as such, it is (perhaps eerily) not something the society really has any control over.

It is possible to convince everyone in a society to do the wrong thing: Perhaps something that hurts a lot of people for arbitrary reasons. Those things would be accepted by society, for a while, but they would still objectively be wrong. Eventually, they will figure that out, and reverse the bad ideas. (Assuming at least some of them survive.)

That moment when society corrects itself is one of the eerie ways in which natural forces "conspire" to bend society towards what is objectively right.

You have not really said anything about what the good is, so there is no basis for the claim that society tends to adopt those values which are good. It is not at all apparent to me what you mean by "objectively wrong" values here. How do you determine (independently of the social norms) which values are objectively wrong?

(Of course, we could point out that different societies have different values in many areas, and hence cast doubt on your claim that it all works out in the end, but that is the less interesting criticism.)

The moral obligation becomes apparent when we recognize that questions such as "Should I do X?" often turn into questions of:

"Should I be part of what everyone is eventually going to value, anyway, because it happens to be in the best interests of society? Or, should I be one of those historic footnotes that gets swept to the side, while everyone else does what is in the best interests of society?"

There could be detractors from naturally occurring morality. Someone does have the freedom to say: "I wish to be a footnote of evil, in history, by doing what is against the best interests of the society's very survival!"
(Though, I don't think they would actually say it quite like that.)

But, this is not a problem unique to natural morality.

Honestly, it does not seem apparent that the question "Should I do X?" is very often replaced by "Should I abide by values that will eventually be adopted?" But no matter, because we still need an argument to the effect that there are objectively good values and that society tends towards these due to natural, emergent properties of societies.

To be honest, I am a moral realist, though I can't defend the stance. So, it's not that I'm reluctant to agree that there are objective values. But you've gone rather further here. You evidently know more than that there are objective values -- you know what they are! You must, since you confidently claim that society tends to adopt the right values over time.

So, let's see how you determine which norms are the right norms, independently of social consensus.

Even if morality came to us from a divine entity, it could still have detractors. Someone would have the freedom to say: "I will NOT do what God said I should. And, I WILL do what God said I must never do!"

Not even God would be 100% perfectly binding, if He existed.

When we say a norm is "binding", we do not mean that everyone, or most people or, indeed, anyone actually does what the norm requires. What we mean is that it is indeed the case that everyone ought to do so.

I tend to think that, barring certain circumstances, it is wrong to lie. I also think that damn near everyone has told a lie that it was wrong to tell.

So, I'm not sure what point you're trying to make here. It certainly isn't relevant to the quoted snippet of my post, which was, "But your account does not say that such a person has a moral obligation to do so."

 

[Sophronius]

As with any philosophical question, it is essential that you start by disentangling the issue. When it comes to the whole "is morality objective" debate, there really are several questions being asked that must be answered seperately:

1) Do moral questions mean anything?
2) Is there a mind-independent source of universal morality that cannot be argued with?
3) Can you objectively determine and evaluate moral questions?
4) In practice, how similar is human morality?

The answer to 1 is yes. People can disagree on moral issues, people base policies on moral issues, etc. Moral statements do mean something most of the time. At other points it is just a way to say "I like X" or "I dislike Y". I don't think it's fruitful to spend too much time on this part since it's really just common sense.

The answer to 2 is a resounding no. Yes, you can have "objective morality" in the sense that its validity is not subject to human opinion simply by defining your morality as "What my dog feels is moral is moral". The problem with this however is that there is no compelling reason why anyone should care about this kind of "objective morality". Similarly, I don't think there is any way you can convince aliens from planet X to follow your morality, no matter how much you like it personally, unless they have a similar sense of morality to begin with.

Question 3 is where it gets interesting. I say that the answer is yes: As long as you grant that everything in the universe is subject to the same laws of physics, there is absolutely no reason to believe that human morality should be subject to different rules. Human morality must be based on human moral preferences as a matter of simple logic. Furthermore, naturalism dictates that such moral preferences can be measured objectively at least in principle. It follows then that in a deterministic universe, one can scientifically determine as well as answer moral questions without room for further argument. As such morality can be said to be objective in this specific sense. However, this kind of "objective morality" is still subject to moral preferences, and moral preferences may differ between intelligent beings, and there is no way to logically dictate what preferences a being ought to have in the first place. As such morality can be evaluated objectively but is still subject to individual moral preferences.

4) Question four is where it gets hard. In practice, how universal are human moral preferences really? Are moral disagreements the result of inescapable genetic/cultural differences, or mostly just the result of a lack of understanding of the subject? This question is important because if human morality is more or less universal, then for all intents and purposes we could have universal human morality, which would make things a lot easier for society as a whole. I believe the current consensus is that humam moral instincts for things such as "murder is bad" is pretty much universal, but for subtler issues this may be less so.

Of course clearing all that up and making the debate about more than just "Objective morality: yes/no"? might prove hard to do in only a couple of minutes... I'll be impressed if you manage it.

 

[phiwum]

Question 3 is where it gets interesting. I say that the answer is yes: As long as you grant that everything in the universe is subject to the same laws of physics, there is absolutely no reason to believe that human morality should be subject to different rules. Human morality must be based on human moral preferences as a matter of simple logic. Furthermore, naturalism dictates that such moral preferences can be measured objectively at least in principle. It follows then that in a deterministic universe, one can scientifically determine as well as answer moral questions without room for further argument. As such morality can be said to be objective in this specific sense. However, this kind of "objective morality" is still subject to moral preferences, and moral preferences may differ between intelligent beings, and there is no way to logically dictate what preferences a being ought to have in the first place. As such morality can be evaluated objectively but is still subject to individual moral preferences.

Unless you mean something like taking readings of every human brain and determining which moral opinions are most popular, I don't see how the highlighted bit is so obvious. I don't know what else you might mean by "human moral preferences", generally speaking, since it is obvious that there is no broad, universal human moral preferences.

Nor do I think that taking a vote leads to something I would want to call objective morality. (I tend to think, for instance, that a truly objective morality would not change over time, but human moral preferences definitely do change over time.)

Finally, I also dispute the claim that, "Human morality must be based on human moral preferences as a matter of simple logic." This is not at all obvious to me, much less a matter of simple logic.

 

[Soapy Sam]

*sigh*

Why is it that when we are talking about subject matter that is obviously scientific, then the tendency is to use phrases such as:


It appears as though...
The weight of evidence suggests...
There is support for the view that...

Yet, when the same people turn their attention to something far more complicated and contentious like morality then suddenly pronouncements are made with strident and dogmatic certainty.

In red are all the particular dogmatic assertions I am talking about.

This post appears to be confusing a number of problems here, namely the distinction between descriptive ethics, normative ethics and meta-ethics.

The poster takes the view that behaviour is how creatures behave. The reasons for that behaviour are extremely complex and involve complexity at every level from the molecular, through education, individual character, politics, social dynamics, geography , history, memory (somatic and extra somatic) and a whole bunch of other stuff.

This is a text based internet forum. You want a thesis, I don't think this is the appropriate format.
What you got was a 2 cent summary of my thinking on the matter. I don't expect you to agree with it, because I don't expect any two people to agree on these issues.

I would probably agree that a descriptive ethics needs to take into account evolutionary theory, and broad similarities in what constitutes right or wrong may point to an evolutionary origin.

If 2 creatures share the same behaviour after being out of any social contact for 50,000 years, I think we have to conclude that the reason is innate to both.

But evolution also appears to have placed in us certain behavioural dispositions such as infidelity in men, caring for kin above strangers and various other things that we may want to apply our reasoning to to determine whether or not it is right to do those things.

Can you demonstrate why you think the word "right" in that sentence means anything at all?

You then give a moral relativist idea that suggests that going along with the herd is the right thing to do and not doing so is immoral. It is unclear whether or not you mean this descriptively or in a normative sense. But how about the idea that by running away with Jim to free him, Huckleberry Finn was being immoral by stealing property - i.e a slave?

That's not my idea, it's a working definition which you are free to criticise or improve.
Moral behaviour is, first and foremost, behaviour. Whether it is moral is a matter of opinion - and opinions vary in space and time. The problem with the concept of morality as often used in threads here is that it is largely undefined. If it is immoral to steal, then yes, Huck's behaviour was immoral. If it is immoral to enslave, is stealing a slave a moral act? No, because it's theft. Yes, because it's immoral to enslave. A question that has both a yes and a no answer is not well formed. Until you define morality, moral questions are largely meaningless.

You sneer at the idea that moral philosophers love their "meaningless" question about if everyone believed X then would it make it right, but indeed why not tell us the answer anyway. If everyone in society thought owning slaves was right then would it make it right?

I don't actually see a "sneer" button here. Perhaps you have a later version of the software? I think asking questions is a waste of time unless you define your terms.
My answer to the question is yes. If everyone in society thought owning slaves was right, then it would be right. That's what democracy is.

Or how about, if everyone in society (except the slaves themselves who are not really considered social beings anyway) thought that slavery was right, but only one person objected, then is that person immoral in your view?

Yes. And he's likely to find himself in deep doo-doo as a result. Of course, if he can convince enough people that he is right, then the situation can change.

Also, while you may disagree that there is an enormous variation in moral views, I take it that you would at least agree that there is a very meaningful variation in human views and that the follow up is also true, that where there are moral disagreements these moral disagreements are indeed intractable:

This is a matter of education. If you are raised believing that homosexuality is a sin and a crime, then you move somewhere that it is considered perfectly OK, then you will be shocked. You will defend your beliefs because not doing so will itself seem to be letting your moral standards slip.

If people were trained to understand that such variations in behaviour as exist between cultures are merely matters of local custom, rather than "moral absolutes", we would all be a great deal better off.

For an example of intractability, very few people say "I'm okay with you having abortions if you want one, but I am against."

Similarly people don't say that about slavery either, or the right of women to vote, and many other things.

Similarly, people find it hard to take the moral relativist view of honour killing, burka-wearing, FGM, circumcision in boys, polygyny and various other things.

If you do not believe me then take a look at the threads in politics and social affairs, current events etc...

You make my point well. These are not questions of right and wrong and nobody should think they are. They are matters of local custom- and may work perfectly well for centuries, so long as the locality remains reasonably culturally isolated.
I don't care about women wearing burkas in Saudi Arabia. I do care about a woman wearing one in Scotland. Why does it upset me? Because I have a suite of biases and bigotries, painfully acquired over 6 decades and I don't like people going around with their faces hidden. Am I right? Yes and no. It goes against normal behaviour in Scotland and so my herd attitude is violated, so yes. It's none of my business what a woman chooses to wear, so no. If you see this as an issue of morality, it's an impossible question to answer. Seen purely as a matter of local custom, it's a far simpler question, just as it's a simpler question if she chooses to walk around naked.

The problems start in a world where people can move to another cultural area in a matter of hours and yet expect to find the behavioural rules to be exactly the same as those they left behind.
This is where the whole idea of multi-culturalism falls flat . What is right and wrong, beyond issues of survival, is a temporary, local majority opinion and no more than that. What is possible,or practicable, or necessary may be very different. Dis te minorem quod geris imperas. When in Rome...

 

[Arcade22]

Only that it WOULD, IF I can substantiate that.

I will patiently for you to logically "substantiate" how you get normative claims from descriptive claims, preferably without begging the question, resorting to special pleading and other assorted fallacies.

Considering that you are already resorting to an appeal to popularity ("Should I be part of what everyone is eventually going to value, anyway") and Appeal to consequences ("because it happens to be in the best interests of society?") i think I'm going to have to wait a long time.

 

[phiwum]

If 2 creatures share the same behaviour after being out of any social contact for 50,000 years, I think we have to conclude that the reason is innate to both.

Surely not.

There may be many other reasons that similar behavior occurs. Similar situations, for instance, may often generate similar (but independently derived) behavior.

 

[Sophronius]

Unless you mean something like taking readings of every human brain and determining which moral opinions are most popular, I don't see how the highlighted bit is so obvious. I don't know what else you might mean by "human moral preferences", generally speaking, since it is obvious that there is no broad, universal human moral preferences.

Nor do I think that taking a vote leads to something I would want to call objective morality. (I tend to think, for instance, that a truly objective morality would not change over time, but human moral preferences definitely do change over time.)

Ah, I was worried I was assuming too much clarity there. I'll try to expand upon my points, hopefully without making this post too long:

I am making a distinction between universal morality (same moral rules for everyone) and "objective" morality (the process of answering moral questions can be done objectively). I am saying the first is impossible, so I'm definitely not arguing in favour of anything like a moral vote.

I am saying that the second bit is possible: That is to say, moral arguments are susceptible to the same rules of a) logic and b) science as any other topic. So first of all, I am taking the fact that neuroscience can be used to objectively measure preferences in principle to mean that moral preferences themselves are in the realm of objective fact: If I say that I think rape is cool, that is a factually incorrect statement since I don't actually believe that. Though it's not feasible to scan my mind, you will probably accept that this is the case. As such, this shows that statements regarding what people's moral preferences are is a matter of objective fact.

The obvious counterpoint to this is that just because a preference that can be established objectively, that doesn't mean that the preference itself is "right". There is no universal objective morality, after all. However, things can still work out in practice if human moral preferences just happen to be sort of similar. In the hypothetical where all humans have exactly the same moral preferences (everyone is a clone of me), then I can say with certainty that a person who claims that "rape is cool" is factually incorrect/lying given that I know that I would be lying if I said the same. Of course the world isn't populated by clones of me, but if people are 90% or 80% or 70% similar in terms of moral preferences, then the exact argument can still be made with 90% or 80% or 70% certainty respectively.

So let's illustrate this by expanding on this example. A perfectly ordinary person is caught up in a crazy rapist cult. This person goes around saying that "Rape is good!", but their heart isn't really into it: They are just saying it because they are expected to say it. Is this person wrong? Different moral philosophers would treat this example differently:

Moral noncognivist: It's a meaningless statement, there is no such thing as morality. He is just expressing emotion and nothing else.
Moral realist: He is wrong! It is written in the fabric of reality that torture is wrong!
Error theorist: It's wrong because all moral statements are wrong.
Relativist: Well, it's his opinion. It's all relative anyway, so what's to say he is more or less right than you?
Me: What he is stating does not fit his own moral preferences: He is simply confused as a matter of fact. Even if he really did believe that, he would still be factually wrong if he claimed that "rape is good" is a universal truth rather than just a statement of his own preferences.

I hope that this makes my position and why I hold it a little clearer.

Finally, I also dispute the claim that, "Human morality must be based on human moral preferences as a matter of simple logic." This is not at all obvious to me, much less a matter of simple logic.

It's just a definitional thing. Morality must be based on moral preferences because when people make a statement regarding morality they are stating a moral preference. Of course you could define morality as "The rate at which my dog wags his tail" but that definition would not capture what people actually mean by morality. Of course you could define morality as "whatever my god says is good" but that is just a trick: When asked why you should care about what god says is good, people will say that it's because he is loving and values human life etc. which people actually value for their own sake, so it all comes down to moral preferences again. As such I don't think there is any sensible definition of morality that does not involve preferences.

I will patiently for you to logically "substantiate" how you get normative claims from descriptive claims

Where else would you get your normative claims from? Do you just pluck them out of thin air?

 

[phiwum]

Ah, I was worried I was assuming too much clarity there. I'll try to expand upon my points, hopefully without making this post too long:

I am making a distinction between universal morality (same moral rules for everyone) and "objective" morality (the process of answering moral questions can be done objectively). I am saying the first is impossible, so I'm definitely not arguing in favour of anything like a moral vote.

I am saying that the second bit is possible: That is to say, moral arguments are susceptible to the same rules of a) logic and b) science as any other topic. So first of all, I am taking the fact that neuroscience can be used to objectively measure preferences in principle to mean that moral preferences themselves are in the realm of objective fact: If I say that I think rape is cool, that is a factually incorrect statement since I don't actually believe that. Though it's not feasible to scan my mind, you will probably accept that this is the case. As such, this shows that statements regarding what people's moral preferences are is a matter of objective fact.

The obvious counterpoint to this is that just because a preference that can be established objectively, that doesn't mean that the preference itself is "right". There is no universal objective morality, after all. However, things can still work out in practice if human moral preferences just happen to be sort of similar. In the hypothetical where all humans have exactly the same moral preferences (everyone is a clone of me), then I can say with certainty that a person who claims that "rape is cool" is factually incorrect/lying given that I know that I would be lying if I said the same. Of course the world isn't populated by clones of me, but if people are 90% or 80% or 70% similar in terms of moral preferences, then the exact argument can still be made with 90% or 80% or 70% certainty respectively.

So let's illustrate this by expanding on this example. A perfectly ordinary person is caught up in a crazy rapist cult. This person goes around saying that "Rape is good!", but their heart isn't really into it: They are just saying it because they are expected to say it. Is this person wrong? Different moral philosophers would treat this example differently:

Moral noncognivist: It's a meaningless statement, there is no such thing as morality. He is just expressing emotion and nothing else.
Moral realist: He is wrong! It is written in the fabric of reality that torture is wrong!
Error theorist: It's wrong because all moral statements are wrong.
Relativist: Well, it's his opinion. It's all relative anyway, so what's to say he is more or less right than you?
Me: What he is stating does not fit his own moral preferences: He is simply confused as a matter of fact. Even if he really did believe that, he would still be factually wrong if he claimed that "rape is good" is a universal truth rather than just a statement of his own preferences.

I hope that this makes my position and why I hold it a little clearer.

So, if I understand correctly, you are saying the following:

(1) It is reasonable to assume that science can eventually determine the beliefs, preferences, values, etc., of an individual by examining the brain structure.

(2) Given (1), science can eventually (and objectively) determine the moral beliefs of an individual.

(3) Insofar as some moral claims are very widely held, these claims are approximately universal (and objective, in the sense of (2)) -- and the more widely held, the closer to universal.

Okay, I don't know whether (1) is true or not, because I'm not sure how beliefs, values, etc. are represented in brain structure and whether the representation is so regular from person to person that, in principle, it can be "read" from the structure. But, let's take (1) as given, because it's not a particularly interesting point in this context.

(2) is trivial, given (1), but (2) is clearly not what one usually means when he refers to "objective morality". All that's going on here is that there is objective evidence that Fred believes X. That is not the same as saying that X is objective, so I think that your terminology has been very misleading.

(3) is not very interesting, to my mind.

It's just a definitional thing. Morality must be based on moral preferences because when people make a statement regarding morality they are stating a moral preference. Of course you could define morality as "The rate at which my dog wags his tail" but that definition would not capture what people actually mean by morality. Of course you could define morality as "whatever my god says is good" but that is just a trick: When asked why you should care about what god says is good, people will say that it's because he is loving and values human life etc. which people actually value for their own sake, so it all comes down to moral preferences again. As such I don't think there is any sensible definition of morality that does not involve preferences.

It's a definition only if you take for granted that (a) there is nothing more to morality than individual moral opinions and (b) that such opinions are properly termed "moral preferences". Frankly, I think both points are dubious, though (a) is the more interesting one, of course.

Insofar as (a) is a very contentious point, it is simply not the case that "simple logic" entails that human morality must be based on human moral preferences. The fact is that many of us think that there is something more than mere individual (or even majority) opinion that genocide, for instance, is a bad thing.

As I said previously, I'm not prepared to defend realism, but unless you can give a clear argument to the effect that morality really is nothing but mere opinion, that is, a purely emotional reaction to various situations and actions, you really should not claim that this is simple logic.


Where else would you get your normative claims from? Do you just pluck them out of thin air?[/QUOTE]

 

[Soapy Sam]

Surely not.

There may be many other reasons that similar behavior occurs. Similar situations, for instance, may often generate similar (but independently derived) behavior.

...in creatures that are similar.

 

[phiwum]

...in creatures that are similar.

I'm not sure that's a necessary condition.

 

[Sophronius]

So, if I understand correctly, you are saying the following:

Hm, close, but I would change it slightly:

(1) Naturalism dictates that it's possible to scientifically determine a person's beliefs, preferences, values, and everything else that leads to moral statements, by examining the brain structure.

(2) Given (1), statements of moral preference are statements of objective fact. Moral preferences can therefore be determined objectively.

(3) The consequences of actions, and whether or not they satisfy moral preferences, can be determined objectively.

(4) Given (2) and (3), both moral preferences and how best to satisfy them can be established objectively. The entire process of answering a moral question, namely asking what is desired and how to achieve it, is therefore objective. Moral questions can thus be answered entirely objectively, to the extent that they can be answered at all.

(5) Morality is not strictly universal. However, as long as moral preferences are sufficiently similar, one can derive a moral system from moral preferences that approaches universality; the more similar human preferences are, the closer to universal morality you come.

Your reaction to the above is basically "So what?". However, I think that the implications are very important indeed. If we are able to derive a human morality that is approximately universal for all intents and purposes... Well that's really almost as good as actually having universal morality. Unfortunately I don't think human moral preferences are that similar, but it's certainly still a far cry from the all-too-common "Well morality is all relative!" claim that gets tossed around so much.

It's a definition only if you take for granted that (a) there is nothing more to morality than individual moral opinions and (b) that such opinions are properly termed "moral preferences". Frankly, I think both points are dubious, though (a) is the more interesting one, of course.

Insofar as (a) is a very contentious point, it is simply not the case that "simple logic" entails that human morality must be based on human moral preferences. The fact is that many of us think that there is something more than mere individual (or even majority) opinion that genocide, for instance, is a bad thing.

Honestly, I think that this is simply a point where you are confused. I have never heard any sensible proposal for where morality would come from other than moral preferences. However, that does not mean that it's "all just opinion". The word "opinion" is generally taken to mean that you can hold whatever belief you want and it's all equally valid, and if what I wrote above is correct then that is most certainly not the case. It's not an opinion that humans are conscious, it's a fact, even if we don't fully understand consciousness. It's not an opinion that certain things are human!morally wrong, it's a fact. The fact that human morality comes from humans does not detract from it any way.

Your reaction strikes me as similar to the notion that "we can't all just be atoms". Saying that humans are made of atoms does not make us any less conscious, saying that we evolved does not make our existence less worthwhile, and saying that human morality comes from human preferences does not make morality meaningless. The origin does not matter. What matters is that we have morality, and even though it's not 100% universal, 90% would still be pretty damn good.

 

[Wowbagger]

Wow, I could go on forever, at this point, responding to all the posts in this thread!

I decided to cut to the chase, and focus on this one first:

2) Is there a mind-independent source of universal morality that cannot be argued with?

(snip)

The answer to 2 is a resounding no. Yes, you can have "objective morality" in the sense that its validity is not subject to human opinion simply by defining your morality as "What my dog feels is moral is moral". The problem with this however is that there is no compelling reason why anyone should care about this kind of "objective morality". Similarly, I don't think there is any way you can convince aliens from planet X to follow your morality, no matter how much you like it personally, unless they have a similar sense of morality to begin with.

One of the fantastic predictions I would make is that if we ever did meet aliens from another planet (we'll call it Planet X), you would be wrong. And, one of the following probably WILL happen:

1. We will convince the Planet Xers that our morality is superior, and they will eventually adopt it.

OR

2. The Planet Xers would demonstrate that their morality is superior to ours, and we will eventually adopt theirs.

OR

3. A mixture of both 1 and 2, depending on how much research each planet did on a particular issue.


For example:

They might be more advanced than us in determining the morality of abortions (even if our physiology is different) - so we would alter our abortion laws according to their insights.

Meanwhile, we might be more advanced than them on the topic of government-provided health care laws, so their laws would adapt according to insights they gain from us.

After a while, both of our moralities will probably converge on the exact same values and enforcement systems, etc. Sorta like a "thermodynamics of morality" if you will.


I think that, yes, there IS a mind-independent source of morality that cannot be argued with: It stems out of natural forces that we can not argue with.

Natural processes have more control over what our moral values should be, than we actually do. This is (probably) true, despite the fact that much of those forces take the form of emergent properties of a society.

The reason we should care is because society will end up bending its will towards the directions of what facts dictate, anyway. You either reap the rewards of being part of that, or you become a casualty of history.

 

[phiwum]

Hm, close, but I would change it slightly:

(1) Naturalism dictates that it's possible to scientifically determine a person's beliefs, preferences, values, and everything else that leads to moral statements, by examining the brain structure.

I'm not sure that naturalism dictates that. It rather depends on how complicated the relationship between structure and belief, etc., is. But, as I said, this is not the central topic of interest.

(2) Given (1), statements of moral preference are statements of objective fact. Moral preferences can therefore be determined objectively.

Well, only if, by "statements of moral preference", you mean, "Person X believes moral claim P" are statements of objective fact. But, frankly, even without statement (1), I'd be willing to grant that such statements are objective fact.

(3) The consequences of actions, and whether or not they satisfy moral preferences, can be determined objectively.

Well, this contains rather more implicit claims than it appears. First, it contains the presumption that moral "preferences" are fundamentally about consequences of actions. I'm not willing to grant that, given that there are many persons who've thought deeply about such matters and concluded that morality is about something other than outcomes. Such persons have, in your terminology (which I do not like), "preferences" that have nothing directly to do with consequences of actions.

But, insofar as a person's moral intuitions are consequentialist in nature, I still dispute (3). This morning, for instance, NPR had an interview with a writer who suffered a tragic loss as a child. He convinced his brother to play backfield, despite his weak knees, which led to a knee injury, a botched surgery and a sad death due to infection. You tell me: supposing science could predict this outcome from his action, would science say that he was responsible for his brother's death? But for the fact that he convinced his brother to play that position, his brother would not have ended up in the hospital (at least not that day). And he knew of the weak knees. Nonetheless, the chain of events leading to the death of his brother was complicated. Was it his fault?

From my perspective, this is not a scientific question.

(4) Given (2) and (3), both moral preferences and how best to satisfy them can be established objectively. Moral questions can therefore be answered entirely objectively, to the extent that they can be answered at all. Therefore the entire process of moral reasoning should be handled objectively.

Does not follow. All that follows is that we can objectively determine the truth value of the sentence, "Person X believes that doing A in situation S is wrong." That is not the same as determining the answers to moral questions objectively.

(5) Morality is not strictly universal. However, as long as moral preferences are sufficiently similar, one can derive a moral system from moral preferences that approaches universality; the more similar human preferences are, the closer to universal morality you come.

Your reaction to the above is basically "So what?". However, I think that the implications are very important indeed. If we are able to derive a human morality that is approximately universal for all intents and purposes... Well that's really almost as good as actually having universal morality. Unfortunately I don't think human moral preferences are that similar, but it's certainly still a far cry from the all-too-common "Well morality is all relative!" claim that gets tossed around so much.

Certainly, I'm not tossing that claim around.

But I don't see that you've done anything better. It has been well-known for quite some time that we can talk about moral relativism on either the individual or the cultural level. When we regard the entire planet as the relevant culture, then we get the project that you're discussing. We simply poll the planet and take the most popular views (or at least those that are nigh-universal) as the standard. How is this not just a particular form of subjectivism?

Honestly, I think that this is simply a point where you are confused. I have never heard any sensible proposal for where morality would come from other than moral preferences. However, that does not mean that it's "all just opinion". The word "opinion" is generally taken to mean that you can hold whatever belief you want, and if what I wrote above that is most certainly not the case. It's not an opinion that humans are conscious, it's a fact, even if we don't fully understand consciousness. It's not an opinion that certain things are human!morally wrong, it's a fact. The fact that human morality comes from humans does not detract from it any way.

Your reaction strikes me as similar to the notion that "we can't all just be atoms". Saying that humans are made of atoms does not make us any less conscious, saying that we evolved does not make existence less worthwhile, and saying that human morality comes from human preferences does not make morality meaningless. The origin does not matter. What matters is that we have morality, and even though it's not 100% universal, 90% would still be pretty damn good.

The highlighted bit strikes me as astonishing. Just what moral philosophy have you read?

As far as my use of "opinion" rather than "preference", well, I rather think that's closer to a respectful term. I take for granted that everyone has some moral opinions that they would, in a sense, prefer not to have. We all feel that we've fallen short of our own moral compasses. I personally don't prefer to feel shame. I feel it because it is, sometimes and in my opinion, appropriate.

It is not my preference. My moral preference would be: whatever I do is right whenever I do it.

 

[phiwum]

I think that, yes, there IS a mind-independent source of morality that cannot be argued with: It stems out of natural forces that we can not argue with.

Natural processes have more control over what our moral values should be, than we actually do. This is (probably) true, despite the fact that much of those forces take the form of emergent properties of a society.

The reason we should care is because society will end up bending its will towards the directions of what facts dictate, anyway. You either reap the rewards of being part of that, or you become a casualty of history.

Do you think that you have an argument that actually supports these opinions?

I don't mean that as an insult. I have freely admitted that I have opinions about morality for which I cannot provide an argument that I deem sufficient. I don't ask anyone to take my opinions too seriously for this reason.

So, I'm asking whether you think you're in the same boat as me.

 

[Arcade22]

Where else would you get your normative claims from? Do you just pluck them out of thin air?

No i don't make normative ethical statements at all. Ethics and morality is of no use to me.

I think that, yes, there IS a mind-independent source of morality that cannot be argued with: It stems out of natural forces that we can not argue with.

Yet you seem to have big problems supporting your beliefs with anything besides your faith.

 

[phiwum]

No i don't make normative ethical statements at all. Ethics and morality is of no use to me.

With due respect, I find this kind of hard to believe.

You have no opinion about whether, say, Ariel Castro did something wrong?

Or whether, by and large, killing a random stranger is a bad thing to do (bad in the moral sense, of course)?

On the odd chance that someone steals from you, your reaction is purely in terms of enlightened self-interest and understanding of different perspectives and needs, and you do not feel any sense of being literally wronged?

Honestly, even if I were not a moral realist and I believed that ethics is simply a purely emotional reaction to events, I would doubt that you are accurately stating what you feel.