On Materialism

[Suggestologist]

So now, rather than trying to claim a concrete existence of qualia, you try to define concrete as a process. Forgive me if I think this has the feel of a philosophical grasping at straws. Perhaps I don't quite see it--certainly, actions are extended in time, and objects exist for extended periods of time, but to equate actions and objects in the manner you do strains credulity.

What I'm suggesting is that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes; just as non-concrete objects can; so you need to be more specific than just "can be reduced to process or action".

I have said it was a useful category. I have also said it does not exist without the members of the category. I challenge you to pick out a sexy walk in a group of seated individuals. I challenge you to say which walk gets you across the room quicker, given that you don't engage in the actual action of that walk. The usefulness of a category does not mean that it has any existence whatsoever independent of its parts. [quoteWell, when a piece of concrete is demolished and turned to sand, where does the concrete go?

Oh, come on. Are you saying you can point to the component parts of an action like walking in a seated person? Please demonstrate.

Yes. The way you walk, turns into the way you sit. Just like the concrete turns into the gravel. The component parts (in walking and sitting) seem to be the legs, arms, and general body posture.

Again I was merely trying to explain the specific usage of sight in one example. Any usage of any word may be unique, and so ambiguous if you try to apply another definition to it. That is why words are best defined by their usage, rather than by relationship to some ideal.

and their existence is the action/process. Just as with any other qualia. This was my point.

But see above; the same is true of any "concrete" object. "Existence" of a concrete object can always be reduced to action/process. To define the difference, you need to be more specific.

And each separate usage is a separate instance, which is why we have categories...and the redundancy is my point. seeing a sight is redundant. Remembering a memory is redundant. Experiencing a qualia is redundant.

Well, I need to disagree with myself slightly. Experiencing an experience may mean that the person has dissociated the experience; or in other words: in their minds eye -- sees themselves -- and sees how that other self experiences it. And, that agrees with your argument that usage is unique.

 

[Mercutio]

Yes. The way you walk, turns into the way you sit. Just like the concrete turns into the gravel. The component parts (in walking and sitting) seem to be the legs, arms, and general body posture.

The way you walk turns into the way you sit? I doubt you even buy this yourself! The whole point of "a walk" is that it is the action. Someone with the exact same bodily dimensions as me (legs, arms, and general body posture) will almost assuredly have a different walk from me (my walk may well be unique, due to my personal history). A walk is not, cannot be "stored" in my sitting (I would argue the same distinction for any private behavior as well--it makes sense to talk about remembering, but "memories" as objects do not exist. Even cognitive psychologists have ceased looking at it that way, turning to a re-constructive action of remembering.) I may very well enjoy looking at the way somebody is sitting, but in no way does that identify a sexy walk! Nor does flying turn into perching, writing into typing, singing into snoring, or any action into another action. That's why we call it "another" action.

On the plus side, you have demonstrated exactly the same type of misuse of object and action that takes place at the private level with our conceptions about thinking, feeling, and remembering. At least this way, the example we are using is something that others can see.

 

[csense]

If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical?

What of time

What about it?

Well, do you think the statement, time is non-physical, is meaningfull.
I would make an educated guess and say that the majority of the population thinks so.


If when motion increases, time decreases, then clearly time and space interact with each other, and yet, are two seperate things, and if motion, or physical processes, can affect time, then it also can not be an abstract or a priori principle, therfore, it must be something that exists within what we call objective reality, or outside the observer, even though both may be correlated.

Do you think that this is possibly an example of the non-physical interacting with the physical, and if not, why.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

csense,

Well, do you think the statement, time is non-physical, is meaningfull.

No, I do not.

I would make an educated guess and say that the majority of the population thinks so.

I would guess that you are probably right. Those people are wrong.

If when motion increases, time decreases, then clearly time and space interact with each other, and yet, are two separate things, and if motion, or physical processes, can affect time, then it also can not be an abstract or a priori principle, therefore, it must be something that exists within what we call objective reality, or outside the observer, even though both may be correlated.

Do you think that this is possibly an example of the non-physical interacting with the physical, and if not, why.

No, I do not. Time is an abstract concept, not something which exists and interacts with other things.

Consider your above example of time dilation and length contraction. What does it actually mean to say that when an object is moving, time slows down, and length contracts?

What it means is that the duration between two events is shorter in that reference frame, and the displacement between two events is shorter in that reference frame.

Duration and displacement are not things, physical or otherwise. They are properties of things. The duration between two events is a property of those events. The displacement between two events is a property of those events. Space and time are mathematical concepts we use to quantify these properties.

Space and time do not interact with anything. Neither do velocity, and acceleration (which are simply derivatives of the above). They are abstract concepts we use to quantify the properties of things, events, and processes.


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

....
Space and time do not interact with anything. Neither do velocity, and acceleration (which are simply derivatives of the above).

Interesting comment.

They are abstract concepts we use to quantify the properties of things, events, and processes.
Dr. Stupid

What isn't?

 

[Suggestologist]

The way you walk turns into the way you sit? I doubt you even buy this yourself! The whole point of "a walk" is that it is the action.

The physical parameters of a person's body, directly impact both the possible ways they can walk, and the possible ways they can sit.

Just like the properties of the rocks in the concrete, determine the possible ways that the concrete will look, or how the gravel will look, or how the magma will look (if the rocks are melted).

Someone with the exact same bodily dimensions as me (legs, arms, and general body posture) will almost assuredly have a different walk from me (my walk may well be unique, due to my personal history).

Right. You can never say that two things are exactly identical. But we can determine degrees of similarity.

A walk is not, cannot be "stored" in my sitting

There is obvious information in the way you sit, which tells us the way you will walk. Without getting into psychological aspects, the size and proportions of your body parts is an obvious source of information.

(I would argue the same distinction for any private behavior as well--it makes sense to talk about remembering, but "memories" as objects do not exist. Even cognitive psychologists have ceased looking at it that way, turning to a re-constructive action of remembering.) I may very well enjoy looking at the way somebody is sitting, but in no way does that identify a sexy walk!

How is asking yourself "Is that a sexy walk?" any different than asking yourself "Is that a stone block?" ?

And how is asking yourself "How will that gravel look when incorporated into concrete?" any different than asking yourself "What does the way she sits tell me about the way she will walk?"

Nor does flying turn into perching, writing into typing, singing into snoring, or any action into another action. That's why we call it "another" action.

But those are conceptual distinctions that tell me how you categorize and punctuate events; it does not mean that someone else may not punctuate things differently.

On the plus side, you have demonstrated exactly the same type of misuse of object and action that takes place at the private level with our conceptions about thinking, feeling, and remembering. At least this way, the example we are using is something that others can see.

I agree that thinking, feeling, remembering, and so on are nominalizations. However, everything can be reduced to actions and processes.

Reductionism (oops, a nominalization) to the process level does not partition concepts the way you think it does. I could offer the needed partition, but I'm interested to see if you understand that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes and actions.

 

[hammegk]

....I'm interested to see if you understand that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes and actions.

LOL. Welcome to the fray.

 

[Mercutio]

[The physical parameters of a person's body, directly impact both the possible ways they can walk, and the possible ways they can sit.

Just like the properties of the rocks in the concrete, determine the possible ways that the concrete will look, or how the gravel will look, or how the magma will look (if the rocks are melted).
...
Right. You can never say that two things are exactly identical. But we can determine degrees of similarity.
...
There is obvious information in the way you sit, which tells us the way you will walk. Without getting into psychological aspects, the size and proportions of your body parts is an obvious source of information.
...
How is asking yourself "Is that a sexy walk?" any different than asking yourself "Is that a stone block?" ?

And how is asking yourself "How will that gravel look when incorporated into concrete?" any different than asking yourself "What does the way she sits tell me about the way she will walk?"
...
But those are conceptual distinctions that tell me how you categorize and punctuate events; it does not mean that someone else may not punctuate things differently.

I agree that thinking, feeling, remembering, and so on are nominalizations. However, everything can be reduced to actions and processes.

Reductionism (oops, a nominalization) to the process level does not partition concepts the way you think it does. I could offer the needed partition, but I'm interested to see if you understand that all "concrete" objects can be reduced to processes and actions.

Are you suggesting that all is action? That nothing acts? I'm terribly sorry, but I'm having a really tough time believing that you are really making this argument. I think I want to know that you are serious before I make an attempt at answering you. Please tell me why a concrete block is an action in the same way that walking is. Tell me about the walking separate from the (well, I'd call it a person, but perhaps a person is an action--oh, dash it, I'll be reckless and call it a person) person who is walking, and tell me about the concrete block separate from the...the...see, here I don't get what object is concrete blocking right now.

If this is just a philosophical exercise, and you actually see a difference between walking and concrete blocks, please let me know--I won't hold it against your argument, and will continue to pursue same. I just honestly don't (can't?) believe that for a moment you see an equivalence here.

As for the earlier bits, you are describing the parameters of the walker, not the walk. They are, of course, related in that the former does (must? I don't know) put constraints on the range of the latter. But any more than that and you are on thin ice, which also puts constraints on your walking. Knowing the gravity of the planet you happen to be on also "is an obvious source of information" which "tells us the way you will walk"(to use your phrases), but I hope you do not equate the gravity with the walking.

 

[Suggestologist]

Are you suggesting that all is action? That nothing acts? I'm terribly sorry, but I'm having a really tough time believing that you are really making this argument. I think I want to know that you are serious before I make an attempt at answering you. Please tell me why a concrete block is an action in the same way that walking is. Tell me about the walking separate from the (well, I'd call it a person, but perhaps a person is an action--oh, dash it, I'll be reckless and call it a person) person who is walking, and tell me about the concrete block separate from the...the...see, here I don't get what object is concrete blocking right now.

Concrete must go through a process of curing in order to strengthen. Let's pretend that such a process can stop at some time and that you're not asking me to defend this aspect as a process.

Matter is not at rest, internally. The concrete block stays a concrete block because of molecular/atomic bonding (though that isn't the only reason it stays together). Such bonding constitutes an ongoing process that never finds a resting point -- the matter is always in motion -- electrons whirring around keeping the matter from disintegrating into smaller pieces, and once in a while a bond here and a bond there fails, and oxidation happens to that part of the block, and a bird craps on another part that causes chemical reactions, and a worm crawls underneath it, and it gets rained on, etc. All of which cause small amounts of disintegration from the "block". Matter is always undergoing processes, and processes are inherent to any concept of "concrete" objects.

A person consists of many, many processes; respiration, circulation, digestion, cognition, etc. I would think that while a concrete block might seem hard to imagine as a process, that a person could easily be seen as a set of processes.

If this is just a philosophical exercise, and you actually see a difference between walking and concrete blocks, please let me know--I won't hold it against your argument, and will continue to pursue same. I just honestly don't (can't?) believe that for a moment you see an equivalence here.

There is an equivalence in the way that you have attempted to construct the partition. You won't like the way I construct mine, because it has nothing to do with process vs. object, per se. You just really won't like it. But here it is: The test for nominalization is: Of a noun or noun phrase -- Ask yourself the question: "Can you put it in a wheelbarrow?" If you can't, then it's a nominalized verb (e.g. "a walk" is a nominalization of walking or walking-in-a-particular-fashion [but then, "milk" was a taken from the verb: milking..]). If you can put it (or a representative piece of it) in a wheelbarrow, then it's an actual physical object, just like the wheelbarrow. Just don't confuse the wheelbarrow with an imaginary wheelbarrow that can hold non-physical objects ... (So, you sort of have to presuppose that the material world exists in order to conduct the test properly.)

As for the earlier bits, you are describing the parameters of the walker, not the walk. They are, of course, related in that the former does (must? I don't know) put constraints on the range of the latter.

Well, a walk is a sequence of visual inputs over time; much like a concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs over a space.

But any more than that and you are on thin ice, which also puts constraints on your walking. Knowing the gravity of the planet you happen to be on also "is an obvious source of information" which "tells us the way you will walk"(to use your phrases), but I hope you do not equate the gravity with the walking.

Gravity and friction coefficients definately impact the way someone walks, just as do the parameters of their body, and their mood, and the way they learned to walk in the first place. These are analogous with the properties of the gravel before it gets concretized.

 

[Mercutio]

Concrete must go through a process of curing in order to strengthen. Let's pretend that such a process can stop at some time and that you're not asking me to defend this aspect as a process.

Matter is not at rest, internally. The concrete block stays a concrete block because of molecular/atomic bonding (though that isn't the only reason it stays together). Such bonding constitutes an ongoing process that never finds a resting point -- the matter is always in motion -- electrons whirring around keeping the matter from disintegrating into smaller pieces, and once in a while a bond here and a bond there fails, and oxidation happens to that part of the block, and a bird craps on another part that causes chemical reactions, and a worm crawls underneath it, and it gets rained on, etc. All of which cause small amounts of disintegration from the "block". Matter is always undergoing processes, and processes are inherent to any concept of "concrete" objects.

Look at your last sentence here. Note the difference between it and "objects are actions", which was the gist of your argument before.

A person consists of many, many processes; respiration, circulation, digestion, cognition, etc. I would think that while a concrete block might seem hard to imagine as a process, that a person could easily be seen as a set of processes.

A set of processes undergone by...more processes? Are you proposing an infinite regression of actions with never anything actually acting? BTW, a person does not "consist of...processes". Those processes are not the person, the are the actions of the person. As the actions of the concrete block are curing, waiting a loooong time, and eventually crumbling.

There is an equivalence in the way that you have attempted to construct the partition. You won't like the way I construct mine, because it has nothing to do with process vs. object, per se. You just really won't like it. But here it is: The test for nominalization is: Of a noun or noun phrase -- Ask yourself the question: "Can you put it in a wheelbarrow?" If you can't, then it's a nominalized verb (e.g. "a walk" is a nominalization of walking or walking-in-a-particular-fashion [but then, "milk" was a taken from the verb: milking..]). If you can put it (or a representative piece of it) in a wheelbarrow, then it's an actual physical object, just like the wheelbarrow. Just don't confuse the wheelbarrow with an imaginary wheelbarrow that can hold non-physical objects ... (So, you sort of have to presuppose that the material world exists in order to conduct the test properly.)

Either I'm not understanding you, or you have flipped your argument 180 degrees. If a concrete block is really an action, which you have claimed previously, does that mean we cannot put it in the wheelbarrow? If a thought or a memory are as real as a concrete block, can we have a wheelbarrow full of thoughts? I think your wheelbarrow is on my side. I must have misunderstood you before--I thought you were trying to either show that qualia were some form of object, or failing that, show that what we normally think of as objects are in fact processes. Your wheelbarrow disagrees with you...

Well, a walk is a sequence of visual inputs over time; much like a concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs over a space.

A concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs? You can put visual inputs in a wheelbarrow? You are claiming a walk exists only in the eye of the beholder? I thought you said it was composed of leg lengths and angles and the like...

Gravity and friction coefficients definitely impact the way someone walks, just as do the parameters of their body, and their mood, and the way they learned to walk in the first place. These are analogous with the properties of the gravel before it gets concretized.

You are going to have to develop this analogy. I think you will find that it breaks down. Besides which, you were not claiming an analogy between object and action, but an identity.

 

[Dancing David]

very nice discussion here,

to summarise my impression, although I am not sure where this is headed with the qualia thing.

objects: things that interact with other things. ie material objects that can interact with the wheelbarrow

confusion over the word action:
a. the physics sense where any change in parameters is aclled action
b. human motivation sense where action implies deliberate will

Suggestologis: seems to be haeded in the direction that all objects are involved in acton at some level of perception

Therefore objects partake of both object and actiopn.


I would just like to state at this point though that when it comes to qualia I agree with Dr. Stupid, abstraction exist as mental contructs not as 'real' things, and therefore while we can create mental contructs like 'time' (which can only be defined by reference to physical processes) that all mental constructs loose meaning when set apart from there physical definition, they loose thier meaning.

Further examples:
beauty: this is a cultural norm, it is defined culturaly by a set of symetry and proportions that are culturaly determined. To remove the human percieving the object as beautiful and say that an object has a trancendant quality called beauty is lacking in meaning.

qualia: as been discussed repeatedly, there are no qualia without the organic entity to percieve them, in the scientific sense there are defined wavelegths of light. But it is the perciever that makes them qualia. Without the perception there are no qualia.

my two cents.

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.
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Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?
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You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...

Please point out where I have ever stated this. And last time I heard, Q-Source was a materialist. She might have changed her mind since, I don't know. But simply because she has the integrity to recognise the major problems of materialism doesn't necessitate she's not a materialist.

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What on earth could "scientific materialism" mean? That science is compatible with materialism? Or that science implies materialism??
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This is a very dishonest post. We both know perfectly well that I have explained to you what I mean by "scientific materialism" many times before. You told me that it is essentially what you call naturalism, remember?

Ah naturalism! So why are you calling it scientific materialism? What on earth has naturalism got to do with materialism?? The only metaphysical positions that naturalism has are the denial of libertarian free will, and that the totality of reality can be described by physical laws. Quite unlike materialism.

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Anyway I would venture to suggest that the assumptions it might make that science doesn't is that there is a material reality, that consciousness is derived from this material reality, and that the physical world is closed.
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1) It does not make the assumption that there is a "material reality".

That's true enough if you're referring to naturalism. I was confused by you calling it scientific materialism.

That would be meaningless without first defining what the word "material" means. It assumes that reality is objective,

Does it? Where did you get this from?

and that its components can be either directly observed, or indirectly observed through interactions, and that a set of logical consistent rules exist which can be inferred by observing its components. It then defines the word "material" to refer to the components of that reality.

You are mistaken.This is not what the word material means. It is a mind independent reality from which minds are logically derived. It is also typically thought as as ontologically self-subsistent. In brief the material is the prime reality with consciousness being either concomitant or derived from this prime reality.

2) It does not assume that consciousness is derived from this material reality.

Naturalism doesn't, materialism does.

It need make no specific assumptions about consciousness at all. We observe that consciousness exists, and is therefore part of reality. Our assumption that it can be explained scientifically, in terms of matter and physical processes, is not specific to consciousness. It is an assumption we make about anything which can be observed to exist. And once again, that is an assumption that science must make in order to be coherent.

This is naturalism, not materialism.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?
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You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...
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Please point out where I have ever stated this.

You have, on many occasions, expressed the belief that reality is composed of a single type of ontological existent, and that this existent is consciousness. Do you deny this?

And last time I heard, Q-Source was a materialist. She might have changed her mind since, I don't know. But simply because she has the integrity to recognise the major problems of materialism doesn't necessitate she's not a materialist.

Q-Source flat-out stated that she believes materialism is false, and that she thinks consciousness is non-physical. The first means that she is either not a materialist, insane, or a liar. The second indicates that she is a dualist.

This is a very dishonest post. We both know perfectly well that I have explained to you what I mean by "scientific materialism" many times before. You told me that it is essentially what you call naturalism, remember?
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Ah naturalism! So why are you calling it scientific materialism? What on earth has naturalism got to do with materialism?? The only metaphysical positions that naturalism has are the denial of libertarian free will, and that the totality of reality can be described by physical laws. Quite unlike materialism.

Same old Bullsh*t. I am not even going to respond to this crap. What's the point? You obviously weren't listening any of the other times I explained this to you.


Dr. Stupid

 

[metacristi]

While I agree that the actual computational-emergentist hypothesis regarding the nature of consciousness [which reject even the 'interactionist dualism' of Eccles'] is the most supported by the empirical data gathered so far I don't think science need the 'epistemical' assumption that it is actually 'true' [albeit still fallible].As I've argued before,for the moment at least,it is only a mere conjecture.We need much more evidence to go beyond the simple conjecture status:an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being or at least a successful 'holistic' theory of mind.

Moreover I don't think that science should presuppose [as an 'epistemological' assumption based on the actual objective data] the materialistic approach of consciousness in general [where as materialistic count also Chalmers' panpsychism,Eccles' interactionist dualism or Penrose-Hameroff's 'quantum consciousness'] as being 'true'.For the same reasons as above.

After all the assumption made by science that consciousness can be understood does not entail us to assume the computational-emergentist hypothesis or materialism in general as being enough to explain consciousness.Not even as an 'epistemological assumption':the 'for the moment we don't know' is a better alternative...Indeed there is still possible that we will never understand consciousness in its entirety not because of some evident experimental limitations but simply because a form of idealism is true [which we will never know from 'inside'].

All we can derive from the actual findings in the neurology field is a rational basis for a personal belief that consciousness is entirely material [or in a stronger form an emergent,computational,phenomenon of matter].Of course this does not mean that all would be rational people should also believe the same...

 

[Suggestologist]

Look at your last sentence here. Note the difference between it and "objects are actions", which was the gist of your argument before.
[/b] A set of processes undergone by...more processes? Are you proposing an infinite regression of actions with never anything actually acting?

[/B]

Well there are materialists who think that at the bottom of everything, there is some piece of matter. Then there are energeticists who think that at the bottom of everything there is energy. The distinction between matter and energy may be an irrelevant dichotomy, but there is no reason to believe that there is any-THING at the bottom of everything -- there is no evidence that tells us if the energeticists are right or the materialists are right -- it may be that both and neither are right.

BTW, a person does not "consist of...processes". Those processes are not the person, the are the actions of the person. As the actions of the concrete block are curing, waiting a loooong time, and eventually crumbling.
Either I'm not understanding you, or you have flipped your argument 180 degrees. If a concrete block is really an action, which you have claimed previously, does that mean we cannot put it in the wheelbarrow?

[/B]

Very good question. You know that you put something in the wheelbarrow -- but what is it, really? The answer is that it is only a "concrete block" as part of your "user illusion" of the matter. A good illustration of "User Illusion" is seeing a bathtub as a bathtub, rather than just a piece of matter in a shape -- because you see a use for the matter and it's shape and set-up.

If a thought or a memory are as real as a concrete block, can we have a wheelbarrow full of thoughts? I think your wheelbarrow is on my side. I must have misunderstood you before--I thought you were trying to either show that qualia were some form of object, or failing that, show that what we normally think of as objects are in fact processes. Your wheelbarrow disagrees with you...

My wheelbarrow disagrees with what you thought I meant, because you could not see that all concrete objects can be reduced down to process level definitions.

A concrete block is a sequence of visual inputs? You can put visual inputs in a wheelbarrow?

[/B]

Ah, but putting visual inputs into a wheelbarrow correlates them with the visual inputs OF the wheelbarrow. That is what putting something into a wheelbarrow is -- especially since we usually only use an imaginary wheelbarrow, placing things into it in view of our mind's eye(s).

You are claiming a walk exists only in the eye of the beholder? I thought you said it was composed of leg lengths and angles and the like...

You can look at things from different perspectives, can't we?

You are going to have to develop this analogy. I think you will find that it breaks down. Besides which, you were not claiming an analogy between object and action, but an identity.

Yes, tacit definitions, identities.

 

[Mercutio]

I'm not entirely certain I understood any of that. I actually had to go back and read through your posts again to see whether you had shifted views or what, and I am sorry to say I have no clue. Is it that qualia are real, that nothing is real, that matter is actually action, that actions have actions, and it's turtles all the way down?...I give up.

My wheelbarrow disagrees with what you thought I meant, because you could not see that all concrete objects can be reduced down to process level definitions.

Thus, you are saying that thinking and concrete blocks and bathtubs are in fact all the same. When you throw in the "looking at things from different perspectives", it is not unreasonable to actually mistake the process that is a bathtub from that which is a concrete block, or "red". Ordinarily, I would say "I know you don't mean this, but where have I gone wrong?", but I honestly think that this sort of mistake is[/] implied by your line of reasoning...or perhaps I just thought that is what I read, and actually I was bathtub at the time.

But anyway...so qualia are every bit as real as bathtub-processes, and not merely metaphorically so, but literally so. Fine. So why stop with qualia? Surely the experience of red needs to be experienced. And the experience of experiencing the experience needs also to be experienced. We need qualia2, and qualia3, and qualiaprimeturtle, don't we? Or is there a logical reason for stopping with the first turtle?

Oh, and did you actually answer the one about the walk being in the eye of the beholder? I only saw another question, and I cannot for the life of me tell what is serious and what is not, here.

 

[Suggestologist]

I'm not entirely certain I understood any of that. I actually had to go back and read through your posts again to see whether you had shifted views or what, and I am sorry to say I have no clue. Is it that qualia are real, that nothing is real, that matter is actually action, that actions have actions, and it's turtles all the way down?...I give up.

Thus, you are saying that thinking and concrete blocks and bathtubs are in fact all the same.

In some respects, they are, in others they aren't. Don't engage in all-or-none thinking.

You can put a "walker" (defined as a person who walks) into a wheelbarrow; but you cannot put the walk into the wheelbarrow separate from the walker. The idea that the person is a walker depends on a "user illusion"; with respect to a base of the person as (just) a person. And, of course, personhood is a lower-level "user illusion" than walkerhood.

The relationship is attribute to attibutee. To call a person a walker is an example of metonymy -- compressing the attibute and attributee into one entity. To call a set of "matter" a person is also an example of metonymy (and I don't mean that in a materialist vs. non-materialist sense) -- a "user illusion".

But anyway...so qualia are every bit as real as bathtub-processes, and not merely metaphorically so, but literally so. Fine.

Qualia result from cognitive processes. Consciousness "feels like" something becuase most people use a kinesthetic strategy to determine reality -- a reality test based on a feeling (usually in the "gut").

So why stop with qualia? Surely the experience of red needs to be experienced. And the experience of experiencing the experience needs also to be experienced. We need qualia2, and qualia3, and qualiaprimeturtle, don't we? Or is there a logical reason for stopping with the first turtle?

Sounds like the same problem as quantum measurement requiring an observer to collapse the quantum state. As far as I can tell, they haven't figured out why things should collapse (for an observer of the first observer) with the first observer, either.

I don't see anything wrong with second-order experience, though. What exactly a person means by "experiencing an experience" may differ from person to person; but it may mean just dissociating from the experience and experiencing things from a dissociated (intramental) point of view. Second-order (and higher) dissociation is also possible.

Oh, and did you actually answer the one about the walk being in the eye of the beholder? I only saw another question, and I cannot for the life of me tell what is serious and what is not, here.

Yes. The walk is in the eye of the "user illusioner". Someone else may call it a crawl.

 

[Mercutio]

I think that actually cleared up quite a bit. I will remain comfortable with thinking at the level of an actual "person". That this person can be seen as a walker, runner, thinker or anything-elser is essentially dissection, albeit functional rather than structural dissection. That the person can be seen as an arbitrary collection of matter in a space-time continuum is an abstraction in the other direction. The apparant autonomy of behavior (in that the only strings attached are metaphorical--certainly we obey TLOP and behave in accordance with other laws--say, of learning) of this particular collection of matter over the course of what we'll label a "lifetime" is, to my thinking, a more natural line of demarcation. I'll be willing to consider other lines of demarcation as soon as any practical reason to arises. From my perspective, then, arbitrary as it may be from your philosphical view, concrete blocks, bathtubs, and people can be put into wheelbarrows, "walkers" cannot because as soon as they are put in they become "sitters", walks and qualia cannot be put in. In terms of actions, they are accomplished by things (even though they may be technically accomplished by actions composed of actions composed of actions, ad infinitum), such that concrete blocks and bathtubs tend to just sit around, people walk and talk and see and feel and hear. They don't hear qualia, they simply hear. They don't see qualia, they simply see. Given my arbitrary level of abstraction, does this make sense?

 

[Q-Source]

I am a materialists who recognises the limitations of Science to explain what consciousness is. I do not know what consciousness is but I know it exists. Does that make me a dualist? No, it doesn't because I am not giving a definition of consciousness.

I accept what Science offers but I do not accept what Scientific materialism offers.

Q-S

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Q-Source,

I am a materialists who recognises the limitations of Science to explain what consciousness is. I do not know what consciousness is but I know it exists. Does that make me a dualist? No, it doesn't because I am not giving a definition of consciousness.

You know x exist, but can't define what x refers to? What does that mean?

How can you make any claims about consciousness without first defining what you mean by the term? Your above statement is utterly devoid of any meaning.

I accept what Science offers but I do not accept what Scientific materialism offers.

Can you be specific? What does science offer? What does scientific materialism offer that science does not?

[edited to add]

In your first sentence above, you claim that you accept materialism, but recognize the limitations of science. In your las sentence you claim that you accept science, but not materialism. Could you explain how this is not contradictory?


Dr. Stupid