On Materialism

[Suggestologist]

Feeling is an action. Tasting is an action. Experiencing is an action. (I ordinarily say "a behavior", which is technically better, but after so many times through this I felt like a change.) Walking is an action. It, like feeling, tasting, and experiencing, is something I do (or my body does--works the same, take your pick).

And "do" is a stand in for verbs, like "it" is a stand-in for nouns.

Your body does the tasting automatically, after you consciously (or not) cause the taste to obtain (by putting your tongue on something), the initial linkage to qualia also usually happens automatically -- the images and feelings your brain associates with the taste get revivified to some extent and you become aware of them either in direct or peripheral awareness (consciousness or preconsciousness).

I have a particular walk (some would say "gait" or "manner of walking", but "walk" will also suffice). You, if you knew me, would recognise me by my walk long before you saw my features, if I walked toward you from some distance away. My walk (noun) has the same type of existence as do my feelings(noun), tastes, or experiences, which is to say a linguistic existence.

Hmmm... linguistic existence? You mean that someone creates the concepts within their brain? Which helps categorize (thus reducing complexity) and predict the state of the world in the future?

These are nouns we use as stand-ins for actions. Sometimes it is a useful abstraction; a physical therapist might refer to my walk when talking to another pt, perhaps even as a particular type of walk. But my walk does not exist in any real form apart from my walking (verb--ok, gerund in this case). The noun usage is an artifice. You see a face; you do not see a sight of a face. (Yes, I know that our language allows us to say we catch sight of something--my point is exactly that it *is* our language rather than our experiencing that opens this can of worms.)

I disagree. To say that you "catch sight" puts into metaphorical context the way you experienced the event -- it relates directly to how the experience itself evolved; and/or the usual contextual frames the person applies to their experience.

You taste sugar; you do not taste the taste of sugar. You experience love; you do not experience the experience of love.

If someone said that they "taste the taste of sugar" we would understand the statement to be redundant and the same as "taste the sugar". But to experience the taste of sugar means something different; it implies a revivification of other events and feelings and images associated with the taste.

In your "love" example, you deleted the object of the act of loving. A comprable statement could be: "experience the love of my pet" or "experience loving my pet".

Qualia are a wonderful thing to study. For linguists, perhaps. For me, I'll study seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling...fearing, loving, and all the other actions we do ("things" we do is just another example of our language making nouns out of actions).

But then, we can reduce all nouns to actions/processes -- the easier ones to reduce, we call nominalizations; the harder ones to reduce, we just call nouns.

 

[scribble]

Feeling is an action. ...

I just wanted to say that you've made a great post, Mercutio, I probably couldn't have said it so well myself, though I was tempted to try while reading through this thread. Glad you beat me to it.

-Chris

 

[Mercutio]

Hmmm... linguistic existence? You mean that someone creates the concepts within their brain? Which helps categorize (thus reducing complexity) and predict the state of the world in the future?

I'm having a tough time with "creates the concepts within their brain". Some people mean this literally, others not so literally. I mean that our language treats these actions, these behaviors that we do, as nouns, but does not differentiate between types of nouns. A noun that is an abstract category of behaviors looks just as concrete as, well, concrete, when a sentence makes the claim that we "see" it. I see a concrete block; I see qualia; I see dead people (oops, got carried away there). I have a computer; I have a walk.

So if I understand your comment (and I certainly may not), no I do not mean that we create the concepts within our brains. These concepts have their only claim to actual existence in the fact that they are nouns. They are nouns only having snuck in the back door. Of course, we are completely comfortable with treating them as nouns. In fact, the only time treating them as nouns gets us into trouble is when we then decide we need to look for them, examine them, describe them, and see what they can do. Only then do we find out that there appears to be something special about "qualia" since they cannot be described, only experienced. Well, my "walk" can only be experienced, too. When I sit down, where did my walk go?

I disagree. To say that you "catch sight" puts into metaphorical context the way you experienced the event -- it relates directly to how the experience itself evolved; and/or the usual contextual frames the person applies to their experience.

The "way" we experience the event is, of course, terribly important; it is the context of our action. Our actions can only be best understood when we do examine them in context; any dissection of "running", say, is incomplete until we see the context of running for a bus, running from an attacker, or running for exercise. The context of seeing is likewise important, and sheds light on the qualia issue as well. The context of seeing must include what it is we are looking at (or imagining, which can be seen as seeing without the thing present), our history with that thing, and our current reasons for looking at that thing.

In that sense, "catching sight" of someone can add to the contextual description, I agree. But I meant to emphasise "sight" in that phrase--we see the person, we do not see the sight of that person. So perhaps you are quibbling over a point I did not intend.

If someone said that they "taste the taste of sugar" we would understand the statement to be redundant and the same as "taste the sugar". But to experience the taste of sugar means something different; it implies a revivification of other events and feelings and images associated with the taste.

More of the above--the full context of tasting sugar will of course depend on context--whether you are stirring it into coffee or licking it off a supermodel's abs....(just give me a moment here...) but my intent was to simplify the example to just the taste part. Of course, the same argument applies to all the rest of the context. If part of this experience is remembering the last time you licked sugar off Laetitia Casta, you are remembering doing that, you are not remembering the memory of doing that.

In your "love" example, you deleted the object of the act of loving. A comprable statement could be: "experience the love of my pet" or "experience loving my pet".

By now, it should be plain that the two sentences here are completely different contexts. Either way, we are not "experiencing the experience", but merely (if "merely" can ever apply to love) loving or being loved.


Oh, and thanks, scribble!

 

[Q-Source]

Why not answer the question instead of declaring victory by strongarm-not-answering.

I don't like to have impolite discussions with people I like and respect. And I like Stimpy and this exchange was deteriorating into name calling.

By the way, would you mind being honest about the context of the quote you keep using in your signature line? It would be good of you to point out to you that proximate to that comment was the obvious statement something like "QM is simply a description of how matter works".

It seems to be out of context, but you were insisting many posts with the same.

Anyway, I am going to do you a favour and delete it. I am bored with it.

Q-S

 

[Interesting Ian]

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.

Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Eric:

No, I'm not trolling. As I hinted, I have already had qualia explained, but I fail to understand. What I fail to understand is that qualia are anything but some abstraction level of observations.

What on earth could an "abstraction level of observations" conceivably mean?

I fail to see how they are distinct from objective information, except for degree of measurability.

Because of what the words "objective" and "information" actually mean. They are not objective because only the subject experiences them, and they are not information because they are not physical.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Which assumptions do you think scientific materialism makes, that science does not?

What on earth could "scientific materialism" mean? That science is compatible with materialism? Or that science implies materialism??

Anyway I would venture to suggest that the assumptions it might make that science doesn't is that there is a material reality, that consciousness is derived from this material reality, and that the physical world is closed.

 

[scribble]

What on earth could an "abstraction level of observations" conceivably mean?

I think you should read the whole thread before you go looking for a fight. Mercutio explained this idea well, I think, and especially gave a good example of it (search for 'walk').

Because of what the words "objective" and "information" actually mean. They are not objective because only the subject experiences them, and they are not information because they are not physical.

Is this a deliberate attempt to sidetrack the thread, or do you just not care? If you're trying to make a real point, back it up - if you're just throwing out meaningless assertations, then maybe putting it below your tagline bar would make it clear it's unimportant to read.

-Chris

 

[Interesting Ian]

I think you should read the whole thread before you go looking for a fight. Mercutio explained this idea well, I think, and especially gave a good example of it (search for 'walk').

I have read the entire thread scumbag. No previous reference were made to this phrase.

Because of what the words "objective" and "information" actually mean. They are not objective because only the subject experiences them, and they are not information because they are not physical.
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Is this a deliberate attempt to sidetrack the thread, or do you just not care? If you're trying to make a real point, back it up - if you're just throwing out meaningless assertations, then maybe putting it below your tagline bar would make it clear it's unimportant to read.

What the f*ck is your problem?? What the f*ck do I have to back up?? I am simply stating what is the case. If can't understand what I'm saying then please don't bother responding to my posts.

Is this a deliberate attempt to sidetrack the thread, or do you just not care? If you're trying to make a real point, back it up - if you're just throwing out meaningless assertations, then maybe putting it below your tagline bar would make it clear it's unimportant to read.

-Chris [/B]

I answered his question. How on earth someone can remotely imagine that this somehow is derailing the thread is quite beyond me. You've got a screw loose mate.

 

[scribble]

I have read the entire thread scumbag. No previous reference were made to this phrase.

Much anger I sense in you, young Jedi. Go to the Dark Side you will, hrmmm?

I answered his question. How on earth someone can remotely imagine that this somehow is derailing the thread is quite beyond me. You've got a screw loose mate.

I thought 'mate' was a term of affection to you brits.

I was refering to the fact that you made some assertions there without any sort of reasoning, evidence, or proof given behind them.

-Chris

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

That is exactly what it means in modern materialism. The archaic metaphysical notion of some sort of "material substance" of which everything is composed, was discarded as meaningless a long time ago. Unfortunately, the Idealists and Dualists still base their philosophies on such incoherent concepts as "ontological substances", and many of them insist on claiming that modern materialists do as well.
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Which idealists and dualists are doing this? Could you provide a list of them?

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...

What on earth could "scientific materialism" mean? That science is compatible with materialism? Or that science implies materialism??

This is a very dishonest post. We both know perfectly well that I have explained to you what I mean by "scientific materialism" many times before. You told me that it is essentially what you call naturalism, remember?

Anyway I would venture to suggest that the assumptions it might make that science doesn't is that there is a material reality, that consciousness is derived from this material reality, and that the physical world is closed.

1) It does not make the assumption that there is a "material reality". That would be meaningless without first defining what the word "material" means. It assumes that reality is objective, and that its components can be either directly observed, or indirectly observed through interactions, and that a set of logical consistent rules exist which can be inferred by observing its components. It then defines the word "material" to refer to the components of that reality. That is exactly what science does, and must do, in order to be coherent.

2) It does not assume that consciousness is derived from this material reality. It need make no specific assumptions about consciousness at all. We observe that consciousness exists, and is therefore part of reality. Our assumption that it can be explained scientifically, in terms of matter and physical processes, is not specific to consciousness. It is an assumption we make about anything which can be observed to exist. And once again, that is an assumption that science must make in order to be coherent.

3) It does assume that the physical world is causally closed. Science must also make that assumption in order to be coherent.

I know you disagree with all three of the above statements. I could not care less. Your own dismissal of the idea that science is something worth taking the time to understand, renders any opinions you may have about it completely worthless.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

I thought 'mate' was a term of affection to you brits.

Not always.

I was refering to the fact that you made some assertions there without any sort of reasoning, evidence, or proof given behind them.

-Chris

Because it is so mindnumbingly simple. A qualia, such as for example the actual raw experience of redness, is something which only the subject experiences. You might also experience redness when you look at the same object. But in each case we each have our own qualitative experience of redness. Moreover it is likely that the shade of redness I experience will not be absolutely identical to yours, despite viewing the same object. Indeed you could be seeing blue whenever I see red, but we would never know it because you have always systematically labelled your experience of blue as being red. Conversely I might see blue whenever you see red. Since we are systematic in labelling our experienced colors, we could never know that what I experience as being red you see as blue, and vice versa. This perhaps more than anything else demonstrates the subjectivity of qualia.

Now to be objective it has to be publically accessible. So although you can never check that I am seeing exactly the same color (qualia) as you, you can in principle check the neural correlates of someone experiencing a color. Likewise for the object we are both visually experiencing as being red, anyone can in principle check that the object concerned is reflecting a certain wavelength of light which our minds will interpret as being what we will respectively label as redness (even though our experiences might well be different).

A similar consideration applies to information. The term has a particular meaning. It applies only to the physical world. By physical world I mean that which in principle anyone could observe, either directly or indirectly, using the appropriate instruments. So information is applicable to the wavelength of light reflected and the neural correlates of seeing a color, but not the raw experience (qualia) of the color itself.

 

[scribble]

Because it is so mindnumbingly simple. A qualia, such as for example the actual raw experience of redness, is something which only the subject experiences. You might also experience redness when you look at the same object. But in each case we each have our own qualitative experience of redness. Moreover it is likely that the shade of redness I experience will not be absolutely identical to yours, despite viewing the same object.

Why do you consider that likely? I've never had a disagreement with anyone I've met over what is red and what is blue - though in defense of your argument, I do not have any color blind friends.

This perhaps more than anything else demonstrates the subjectivity of qualia.

My experiences are subjective by your definition, I agree. Yet somehow, I can accurately relate my experiences to another person and they can demonstrate that that understanding came through just fine. If I have done this, is my experience not indirectly observed by the person I am describing it to, and therefore 'publically accessable'? How is it, if all of our internal experiences are so totally different and unrelateable, we are able to relate them so well? I think you will need to provide some hefty proof of this claim - it's way out there as far as I'm concerned.

Now to be objective it has to be publically accessible. So although you can never check that I am seeing exactly the same color (qualia) as you, you can in principle check the neural correlates of someone experiencing a color. Likewise for the object we are both visually experiencing as being red, anyone can in principle check that the object concerned is reflecting a certain wavelength of light which our minds will interpret as being what we will respectively label as redness (even though our experiences might well be different).

Sounds good to me.

A similar consideration applies to information. The term has a particular meaning. It applies only to the physical world. By physical world I mean that which in principle anyone could observe, either directly or indirectly, using the appropriate instruments. So information is applicable to the wavelength of light reflected and the neural correlates of seeing a color, but not the raw experience (qualia) of the color itself. [/B]

So you're saying a qualia is not information, or contains no information, or what exactly? If it has absolutely 0 processing value, then why do we experience things at all? If we didn't have qualia (the raw experience, you say) of things, then how would we know anything at all of the world around us?

-Chris

 

[Mercutio]

OOooooh, scribble, you are not going to like this--for the last two posts, I agree more with Ian than with you! Of course, I need to translate his, but once you figure in the perspective change, he is more conservative in his explanation than are you. You have the right general idea, but several details are awry. Ian's general idea is off, but the details are, on first reading, are spot on.

Ok, on second reading, I disagree with both of you! But it will have to wait, cuz it will take some serious time.

or maybe...

Ian is right about us not being certain we see the same colors. There is a LOT we can do with color-matching, extrapolations from people who are colorblind in only one eye, and so on, to suggest tremendous agreement among individuals, but we absolutely (thus far) cannot guarantee that your red is his red (I was going to say I know mine is different, because I have different concentrations of photopigments from the average person, but truth to tell, we cannot say that my red differs from yours. We can demonstrate identical proportions of photopigments in the retina, but all that does is put more burden on the challenge--it does not prove we see the same red). Of course, the colors will be (to the extent that we can agree on publicly verified "red" or "blue") functionally identical, so their structural identity is, for scientific purposes, irrelevant. As Scribble says, you don't argue over what color "red" is; this does nothing to refute Ian's point. Pragmatically, however, Ian's point is irrelevant. Interesting, but not subject to scientific investigation.

Ian's differentiation of objective and subjective may well be correct, but it is not the current differentiation between public and private (or overt and covert), and there are important differences. Rather than speaking of "seeing red" as a private behavior, an action accomplished by an organism, Ian speaks of it as the subjective observation of a qualia. That is, in fact, the way we generally (colloquially) speak of it. It is the language that gets us into trouble. (which I wrote of at length earlier, and have no wish to repeat here.)

Scribble's claim that the indirect description of a private event can render it publicly observable is another no-no. What is publicly observable in that case is verbal behavior. Since you cannot tell whether I am descibing accurately or lying, we had best not consider it an indirect observation of private experience. Certainly we can (and must) rely on verbal reports to study our private behaviors (and we have much success with this), but that is not the same as rendering the private public.

As for your discussion on information--both of you--at this point I'm going to have to give the victory to the pinot grigio, and call it quits.

 

[csense]

If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical?

What of time

 

[Suggestologist]

I'm having a tough time with "creates the concepts within their brain". Some people mean this literally, others not so literally. I mean that our language treats these actions, these behaviors that we do, as nouns, but does not differentiate between types of nouns. A noun that is an abstract category of behaviors looks just as concrete as, well, concrete, when a sentence makes the claim that we "see" it. I see a concrete block; I see qualia; I see dead people (oops, got carried away there). I have a computer; I have a walk.

Well, linguistic existence as the existence of concepts (shemata, prototypes, templates, narratives, etc.) used as tokens in a person's thought processes. Which serves to reify processes. And which reduces the chaos of reality into discrete units -- which makes thinking about reality less: complex, time consuming, and mental energy devouring.

But even concrete is just a process -- if we choose to reduce it to such things. Concrete must cure to strengthen; this is an ongoing process which partially determines what humans attribute to the category we call "concrete". Atoms must swirl around in a semi-permanent fashion for the matter (the particular piece of matter humans can categorize as an instance of concrete) to be sensed in the way that it is sensed.

So if I understand your comment (and I certainly may not), no I do not mean that we create the concepts within our brains. These concepts have their only claim to actual existence in the fact that they are nouns. They are nouns only having snuck in the back door. Of course, we are completely comfortable with treating them as nouns. In fact, the only time treating them as nouns gets us into trouble is when we then decide we need to look for them, examine them, describe them, and see what they can do.

Are you saying that we could not "look" for a particular category (type) of walking? Are you saying that we could not examine and describe a "walk" in choreographic terms? Are you saying that we cannot see what a, for example, sexy walk can do? Or that a particular walk can get us to cross a room faster than another?

Only then do we find out that there appears to be something special about "qualia" since they cannot be described, only experienced. Well, my "walk" can only be experienced, too. When I sit down, where did my walk go?

Well, when a piece of concrete is demolished and turned to sand, where does the concrete go?

The "way" we experience the event is, of course, terribly important; it is the context of our action. Our actions can only be best understood when we do examine them in context; any dissection of "running", say, is incomplete until we see the context of running for a bus, running from an attacker, or running for exercise. The context of seeing is likewise important, and sheds light on the qualia issue as well. The context of seeing must include what it is we are looking at (or imagining, which can be seen as seeing without the thing present), our history with that thing, and our current reasons for looking at that thing.

In that sense, "catching sight" of someone can add to the contextual description, I agree. But I meant to emphasise "sight" in that phrase--we see the person, we do not see the sight of that person. So perhaps you are quibbling over a point I did not intend.

I really don't understand what you mean here. Catching sight does not generally mean "seeing the sight of the person". And of course, "sight" is somewhat ambiguous in the quoted phrase in the sentence before this one.

More of the above--the full context of tasting sugar will of course depend on context--whether you are stirring it into coffee or licking it off a supermodel's abs....(just give me a moment here...) but my intent was to simplify the example to just the taste part. Of course, the same argument applies to all the rest of the context. If part of this experience is remembering the last time you licked sugar off Laetitia Casta, you are remembering doing that, you are not remembering the memory of doing that.

Well, you may as well say "the remembering of the remembering of doing that" since memories do not exist without the action/process of remembering.

By now, it should be plain that the two sentences here are completely different contexts. Either way, we are not "experiencing the experience", but merely (if "merely" can ever apply to love) loving or being loved.

Sure, but do you disagree that most native speakers of the English language would interpret the phrase "experiencing the experience" as redundant -- and equivalent to "experiencing". So both - the redundant and simple form of the idea - really mean the same thing to most of them. And, we can re-experience the experience later, as a part of the process of remembering the experience.

 

[Q-Source]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...

Stimpson, why don't you go to Philosophy Forums and have a chat about your "scientific materialism" with the people over there?. The thing that Ian, Geoff and I have pointed it out to you is that you insist on attributing to Science some methaphysical (or epistemological ) beliefs that are exclusively held by materialists.

Q-S

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

csense,

If something interacts with other physical things, in what sense can you meaningfully say it is non-physical?
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What of time

What about it?



Q-Source,

You, Q-Source, our old friend UCE...
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Stimpson, why don't you go to Philosophy Forums and have a chat about your "scientific materialism" with the people over there?. The thing that Ian, Geoff and I have pointed it out to you is that you insist on attributing to Science some methaphysical (or epistemological ) beliefs that are exclusively held by materialists.

I still don't know what it is that you think I am attributing to science that should not be attributed to it.

In any event, I do not know of any belief that is "exclusive" to materialists. It seams to me that no matter how you define materialism, you could take one or more specific beliefs, and incorporate them into some other framework which is different from materialism. That is, unless you just define materialism to be "any framework which holds that x is true".

You still have not explained to me what you think the assumptions of materialism and science are, and how they differ. That makes it very difficult for me to address your claim that they make different assumptions.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Mercutio]

Well, linguistic existence as the existence of concepts (shemata, prototypes, templates, narratives, etc.) used as tokens in a person's thought processes. Which serves to reify processes. And which reduces the chaos of reality into discrete units -- which makes thinking about reality less: complex, time consuming, and mental energy devouring.

But even concrete is just a process -- if we choose to reduce it to such things. Concrete must cure to strengthen; this is an ongoing process which partially determines what humans attribute to the category we call "concrete". Atoms must swirl around in a semi-permanent fashion for the matter (the particular piece of matter humans can categorize as an instance of concrete) to be sensed in the way that it is sensed.

So now, rather than trying to claim a concrete existence of qualia, you try to define concrete as a process. Forgive me if I think this has the feel of a philosophical grasping at straws. Perhaps I don't quite see it--certainly, actions are extended in time, and objects exist for extended periods of time, but to equate actions and objects in the manner you do strains credulity.

Are you saying that we could not "look" for a particular category (type) of walking? Are you saying that we could not examine and describe a "walk" in choreographic terms? Are you saying that we cannot see what a, for example, sexy walk can do? Or that a particular walk can get us to cross a room faster than another?

I have said it was a useful category. I have also said it does not exist without the members of the category. I challenge you to pick out a sexy walk in a group of seated individuals. I challenge you to say which walk gets you across the room quicker, given that you don't engage in the actual action of that walk. The usefulness of a category does not mean that it has any existence whatsoever independent of its parts. [quoteWell, when a piece of concrete is demolished and turned to sand, where does the concrete go?[/quote] Oh, come on. Are you saying you can point to the component parts of an action like walking in a seated person? Please demonstrate.

I really don't understand what you mean here. Catching sight does not generally mean "seeing the sight of the person". And of course, "sight" is somewhat ambiguous in the quoted phrase in the sentence before this one.

Again I was merely trying to explain the specific usage of sight in one example. Any usage of any word may be unique, and so ambiguous if you try to apply another definition to it. That is why words are best defined by their usage, rather than by relationship to some ideal.

Well, you may as well say "the remembering of the remembering of doing that" since memories do not exist without the action/process of remembering.

and their existence is the action/process. Just as with any other qualia. This was my point.

Sure, but do you disagree that most native speakers of the English language would interpret the phrase "experiencing the experience" as redundant -- and equivalent to "experiencing". So both - the redundant and simple form of the idea - really mean the same thing to most of them. And, we can re-experience the experience later, as a part of the process of remembering the experience.

And each separate usage is a separate instance, which is why we have categories...and the redundancy is my point. seeing a sight is redundant. Remembering a memory is redundant. Experiencing a qualia is redundant.

 

[scribble]

OOooooh, scribble, you are not going to like this--for the last two posts, I agree more with Ian than with you!

You're right. I don't like it. You can't be my friend anymore. Go away.

Scribble's claim that the indirect description of a private event can render it publicly observable is another no-no. What is publicly observable in that case is verbal behavior. Since you cannot tell whether I am descibing accurately or lying, we had best not consider it an indirect observation of private experience. Certainly we can (and must) rely on verbal reports to study our private behaviors (and we have much success with this), but that is not the same as rendering the private public.

Point well taken.

As for your discussion on information--both of you--at this point I'm going to have to give the victory to the pinot grigio, and call it quits.

Ian, you care to address my questions on the information portion of your post?

-Chris