Lord Muck oGentry
Graduate Poster
Merko,
Thanks for the latest post and apologies for the delay in replying.
As your comments about moral facts seem to be at the heart of matter, let me deal with them briefly here.
Are we agreed, leaving aside for the moment questions of justification, that, as a matter of fact about language-use, people routinely assign truth-values to moral statements and that they take those statements to be consistent, inconsistent or the like with other such statements? Assuming that we are...
Moral facts come into it because one group ( call them realists) insist that moral facts really exist and provide a justification or foundation for these practices.
A second group ( antirealists) say that no such facts exist and that consequently the practice is unjustified and should be abandoned.
It's easy to urge, against the realists, that they haven't had much luck in finding these special facts: at best, they are likely to come up with " moral facts " that are what moral statements, when true, state [ tip of the hat to Strawson]. And these are too obviously reformulations of what is in dispute to provide independent support to the practice.
Does that leave us only with antirealism? Not in my view. What is wrong with that is precisely the insistence that the linguistic practices that go to constitute and define moral discourse stand in need of external justification. Why should they?
We might, of course, try persuading people to give up those practices. But if we succeed, we shan't have illuminated the nature of moral discourse: we shall merely have changed the subject. In much the same way, we might try giving the knight in chess a different move: but then we wouldn't be playing chess.
I expect to be busy tonight and possibly over the next day or so, and I can't promise a quick reply to your next post. However, I look forward to it.
Thanks for the latest post and apologies for the delay in replying.
As your comments about moral facts seem to be at the heart of matter, let me deal with them briefly here.
Are we agreed, leaving aside for the moment questions of justification, that, as a matter of fact about language-use, people routinely assign truth-values to moral statements and that they take those statements to be consistent, inconsistent or the like with other such statements? Assuming that we are...
Moral facts come into it because one group ( call them realists) insist that moral facts really exist and provide a justification or foundation for these practices.
A second group ( antirealists) say that no such facts exist and that consequently the practice is unjustified and should be abandoned.
It's easy to urge, against the realists, that they haven't had much luck in finding these special facts: at best, they are likely to come up with " moral facts " that are what moral statements, when true, state [ tip of the hat to Strawson]. And these are too obviously reformulations of what is in dispute to provide independent support to the practice.
Does that leave us only with antirealism? Not in my view. What is wrong with that is precisely the insistence that the linguistic practices that go to constitute and define moral discourse stand in need of external justification. Why should they?
We might, of course, try persuading people to give up those practices. But if we succeed, we shan't have illuminated the nature of moral discourse: we shall merely have changed the subject. In much the same way, we might try giving the knight in chess a different move: but then we wouldn't be playing chess.
I expect to be busy tonight and possibly over the next day or so, and I can't promise a quick reply to your next post. However, I look forward to it.