Sorry, Merko, we shall have to disagree about this. If I am making assumptions here, they do not include the assumption that morality exists, as I am not at all clear about what that phrase is supposed to mean in this discussion.
I'm arguing that the term 'morality', as used by philosophers and laymen alike presupposes the existance of 'moral facts'. I claim that there are no 'moral facts'.
What I have drawn attention to is the existence of a humdrum fact: moral disagreement. It is possible for Smith and Jones to disagree about the rights and wrongs of abortion: their utterances are logically inconsistent with each other. They are inconsistent in exactly the same way as " Food is always nourishing" and " Sometimes food is not nourishing".
If Smith says that something is (morally) right, and Jones says that the same thing is (morally) wrong, then this is only irreconcilable if there is such a thing as moral facts. If there are no moral facts, as the thread starter argues, and as I argue, then there is no way at all to say that either of these people are right or wrong, in fact their statements have no meaning, other than perhaps as an expression of personal preference.
Note that the thread starter uses movies and weather to illustrate this exact point, namely that it is only a matter of opinion if something is 'right' or 'wrong'.
This is not an isolated example. It is characteristic of moral utterances that they can stand in logical relationships to each other: contradiction, contrariety and the like. Moral arguments may be formally valid ( modus ponendo ponens, say) or invalid ( affirming the consequent, say). And the evidence for this, as I suggested in the lines immediately following those you quoted, is to be found in the practice of conducting moral disputes in everyday moral language.
Again, this presupposes what you are trying to prove. We could claim the same about arguments regarding what movies are the best. We could claim that if Smith says that romantic movies are the best, but Jones thinks that comedies are the best, then this is logically irreconcilable, because romantic movies and comedies cannot be best at the same time. But doing so presupposes that we think there are objective criteria for what movies are the best.
a) I empathise with others that my behaviour can make them feel good or bad,
b) My behaviour will in turn influence how others treat me, and
c) I have been raised to feel bad when I do something that is considered immoral by my community.
These three points constitute morality, and at its core is the reason why most people are essentially moral.
I would argue that these three points constitute
prudence, which is not the same as morality by any common definition.
Let us consider a person that does not empathise with others, who does not care to influence others by setting a good example, and who has not been raised to feel bad when hurting others. Additionally, this person is a pedophile and enjoys sex with small children. Assume that this person is given the opportunity to rape a child with no risk of getting caught.
Would it be
prudent for him to do so? Certainly, given the premises.
Would it be
moral for him to do so? I know of no one who would claim this.
It seems very likely that there are many atheists using the term 'morality' just like you do. In fact, I do it myself at times. But this is really just a form of fraud on our part. If we were psychopatic pedophiles, we would never get away with it. The only reason why we do get away with it is that we're not behaving sufficiently different from those believing in moral facts, that they will reveal us.
I may be missing something here, but I'm not sure the body of your post addresses the argument I put. If you can rephrase the point, perhaps that would help.
Presumably this is because I failed to understand your argument. Can you explain how the existance of orders, requests and questions would prove the existance of moral facts?
You only say that this would mean that belief in the existance of these things must be based on some form of 'metaphysical delusion'. Why?
I tried to give an alternate explanation of orders, requests and questions that do not require either moral facts or any metaphysical delusion. That said, I do believe that most people are deluded of course, when they believe in moral facts. But they don't have to be in order to 'believe in', or make use of, orders, requests or questions.