Materialism

[Jethro]

The content of a human mind is clearly dependent on the physical state of the brain, at least partially. The debate isn't about the content but about the awareness of the content. This is what the Philosophical-zombie formulation of the argument is about. Materialism can only provide evidence that there is a close correlation between the brain state and the subjective experience - it's fatal problem is explaining why the subjective experience exists at all. To understand the situation you need to think carefully about the relationship between what you call "I" and what you call "what I am experiencing". This is all meaningless to the materialist because he is unable even to provide usable definitions to work from - for the materialist the brain state IS the mental state, even though this statement makes no apparent sense.

Why not?

The materiaist is forced to argue that the P-zombie is an incomprehensible thing which cannot exist

Assuming I understand what you mean by the p-zombie, I assert no such thing. Have you ever been mostly asleep, and had someone talk to you? To them you are completely aware of the situation and you respond as one would expect, but later when they talk to you about said experience, you have absolutely no recollection of it whatsoever. It's kinda like the conciousness part of your brain hasn't woken up yet.

[snip stuff that sounds at least somewhat fair.]
5) When it is explained that assuming your conclusion is not acceptable the materialist will then try to claim that the anti-materialist has done the same thing - that he has "assumed" that materialism is false at the start of his argument. But this is not true because the logical arguments against materialism always start with the observation that subjective consciousness does indeed exist and contains "things" which aren't objectively describable (qualia).

When I see red, what has happened is a photon impinges on a receptor cell in my eye. This triggers a nerve cascade and finally a section of my visual cortex is stimulated. Where's the qualia come in?

So the mentalist/dualist has assumed nothing at all. He starts what he directly knows to exist exists - he starts with the mental reality which is the very thing which are ultimately trying to explain the existence of.

What it boils down to is that the reality we are ultimately trying to explain the existence of is a mental reality but that the only model which allows science to provide an answer is a model of a physical reality. Therefore accepting the glaringly obvious truth that reality is actually mental implies acceptance that materialistic science cannot fully explain consciousness. Most materialists find this impossible to accept and point blank refuse to do so.

Well, when I see the door, feel the door, taste the door, smell the door, and hear the door (as my head bangs against it) I begin to suspect that there actually is a door. While it is true that I can only learn about this door through qualia, that does not make the door any less real, does it?

 

[Guest]

Steps again, because you must be an evil clone who really wasn't here for the argument that has been going on since I got here..

And the rest.

This argument has been going on for about 2 years now. Very slowly it creeps forward from time to time.

HPC exists if we accept materialism.
Evidence suggests that perhaps materialism is not true.
UE offers alternative belief system.

Everyone on this board refuses to accept what UE says, disagrees with it out of obstinance, and refuses to allow their own belief systems to adapt.

Not everyone, fortunately. But the arguments tend to be dominated by those who can't/won't adapt.

I have no idea how he has the constitution to continue posting here. He must enjoy being frustrated.

I have tried to walk away....something keeps drawing me back....masochism maybe.

 

[Guest]

Jethro :

This is all meaningless to the materialist because he is unable even to provide usable definitions to work from - for the materialist the brain state IS the mental state, even though this statement makes no apparent sense.[/quoteWhy not?

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Why not?

Examine what "IS" is supposed to mean in this context. Does it mean "is identical to"? If so, then the materialist is asserting that X is identical to Y even though their descriptions bear no resemblance to each other. If X is not identical to Y then there is a difference between them which materialism cannot even meaningfully define, let alone explain. Arguing that because materialists can't define the problem means it isn't a problem is also a flawed response.

5) When it is explained that assuming your conclusion is not acceptable the materialist will then try to claim that the anti-materialist has done the same thing - that he has "assumed" that materialism is false at the start of his argument. But this is not true because the logical arguments against materialism always start with the observation that subjective consciousness does indeed exist and contains "things" which aren't objectively describable (qualia).
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When I see red, what has happened is a photon impinges on a receptor cell in my eye. This triggers a nerve cascade and finally a section of my visual cortex is stimulated. Where's the qualia come in?

In the model you just descibed? NOWHERE!

The qualia is "When I see red." The problem is that "the redness of red" appears nowhere in the physical model, not in the object which appears to be red, not in the wavelength of the light, not in your eye, or in your optic nerve, and not in your visual cortex either. 'Red' only exists in your mind, and your mind is nowhere to be found in that model - all you can say is that certain physical events, existing in our physical model, seem to correlate with the actual experience of red in your mind. We all know the correlations exist. Materialism somehow must account for two things which 'correlate' and are simultaneously identical to each other. If they are identical then they are synonyms, not correlates, but you cannot seriously justify a claim that "brain process" and "mind" are synonymous. If they merely correlate then they must be different. Materialism claims they are the same!

Well, when I see the door, feel the door, taste the door, smell the door, and hear the door (as my head bangs against it) I begin to suspect that there actually is a door. While it is true that I can only learn about this door through qualia, that does not make the door any less real, does it?

Depends what you mean by 'real'. It exists. The question is whether it is a self-existing physical reality which is actually "out there" or whether it is made only of information. Think about quantum non-locality and the 'spooky faster-than-light connections" of quantum entanglement. Somehow two particles becomes entwined in a more fundamental level of reality and even when they are on seperate sides of the Universe they are instantly dependent on each other. Materialists have no explanation for this, even though it is a mathematical theorem which has been subsequently experimentally confirmed. It is just 'a mystery'. Here you have evidence writ large that this 'physical reality' our minds construct isn't really out there i.e. it is non-local. Does that make it any less real? What do you think?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Given that our true existential situation is that the only reality we know is mental and that physics/matter is quite definately an abstract model we have created, how do you justify your claim that "there is no reason not to believe that physics/matter is the true reality and the mental realm is a model."

This simplistic statement sounds weighty, but it's not the statement you're supporting. The critical additional observation is that multiple entities appear to perceive the world in the same way. How do we account for this?

Both the materialistic and mentalistic viewpoints require something else to account for the commonality. Materialism proposes that there is an external material reality that we are perceiving. Mentalism proposes that there is a global mind that governs how each individual mind builds reality. At first blush, the latter proposal sounds cool, because it can eliminate all the difficult problems.

But the latter proposal is vapid. There is no way to verify that the solutions to all the difficult problems are in any way "correct." It's just a giant hand-wave. If you start investigating the latter proposal in a logical and verifiable way, you'll end up with science. Then the question of materialism vs. mentalism becomes purely philosophical and irrelevant. What experiments can we perform to distinguish between the two proposals?

Obviously there is no way for us to know if the British Home Secretary pictures the world the same way we see it. I very much doubt he sees color. Our minds are capable of creating an infinite number of physical world illusions, only one of which matches reality; I just don't see why that's evidence for your position.

The reality you know of, and are trying to explain is a mental experience. It is as much a mental experience as your thoughts are. It is physics, matter, space and time which are THE MODEL. These things are abstract concepts invented by humans to describe the behaviour of their mental experiences. We already know which one of these things is a model and which is the thing being modelled.

I think you mean "We already know which one of these things is a model and which is the thing doing the modeling." In any event, this statement sounds compelling, but it is not an argument for the fundamental reality of the mind. It might be the case that our brains are just struggling to understand an external reality. Occam's Razor doesn't favor either one right now, because neither theory explains all the facts.

I'm annoyed that you won't give me a link to a logical argument against the possibility of mind being an emergent property of the brain. I've read many of the links posted here, but none of them present such as argument.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

The qualia is "When I see red." The problem is that "the redness of red" appears nowhere in the physical model, not in the object which appears to be red, not in the wavelength of the light, not in your eye, or in your optic nerve, and not in your visual cortex either. 'Red' only exists in your mind, and your mind is nowhere to be found in that model - all you can say is that certain physical events, existing in our physical model, seem to correlate with the actual experience of red in your mind.

I challenge you to reword this in a meaningful way. What exactly is "the redness of red" other than a string of four words? Why is it anything more than an association between some portion of the visual cortex and the concept of red? Why is it not explained by the simultaneous triggering of a bunch of red-related areas of the brain: visual cortex, the word red, the definition of red, the letters r-e-d, memories of red things, and so forth? Compel me to realize that redness is more than just the sum of these parts.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Paul, the way I'd try to explain is:

For materialists, HPC is a conundrum.

For dualists, just consider the view, if it effects (or even affects)the material realm, it *is part of* the material realm; i.e. not logical. Ergo, materialism=dualism=HPC.

Yet, *I* think, the one, objective, data point any of us have.

Re brain & human consciousness, science continues to demonstrate a very intimate link -- probably a necessary condition -- that perceived complexity of a human brain is needed to allow *I think* to perceive a *me* & the rest of "what is".

My 2cts anyway...

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

HPC exists if we accept materialism.

This is not true. Every argument I have ever seen for the existence of the "Hard Problem" presupposes dualism in some way. There is no Hard Problem of consciousness under materialism. Consciousness is just another unsolved problem which we are working on.

Evidence suggests that perhaps materialism is not true.

Nobody has ever presented such evidence. Not unless you consider arguments which presuppose the falseness of materialism to be evidence against it.

UE offers alternative belief system.

Yes, him and more than 5 billion other people.

Everyone on this board refuses to accept what UE says, disagrees with it out of obstinance, and refuses to allow their own belief systems to adapt.

This is not true. I, for one, do not disagree out of obstinence. I disagree because just about everything UCE has ever said on this board (with respect to philosophy) has been either logically inconsistent, false, incoherent, or blind speculation. Why should I accept such nonsense?

I have no idea how he has the constitution to continue posting here. He must enjoy being frustrated.

I am inclined to agree.

Perhaps the so-called "materialists" should accept that their are problems with their belief systems (such as no free will) and modify them accordingly.

You may consider the lack of free-will (as you define it) to be a problem. I do not.

No one says it's all or nothing. No one says you either have to have your physicalism or UE's idealism. But UE does say there are problems, and physicalism needs to deal with them.

He can say that there are problems all he wants, but if he wants to convince anybody, then he needs to explain what those problems are. So far, all of the so-called problems he has described are not actually problems with physicalism, but rather with various forms of dualism and ontological materialism, which nobody here is defending.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If external reality is a product of, or constructed by, the mind, then why can't I picture something I've never sensed? For example, why can't I close my eyes, picture a scene, and "see" all the colors in the visual spectrum, along with, say, the infra-red? What mechanism of the metamind restricts my internal visualization to things that my senses are capable of?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul :

This simplistic statement sounds weighty, but it's not the statement you're supporting.

It is absolutely the statement I am supporting. This is what all of the 'logical proofs' boil down to.

The critical additional observation is that multiple entities appear to perceive the world in the same way. How do we account for this?

Sure, this is the next question. It is usually dismissed with "that is solipsism". In fact nobody is actually proposing solipsism.

Both the materialistic and mentalistic viewpoints require something else to account for the commonality. Materialism proposes that there is an external material reality that we are perceiving. Mentalism proposes that there is a global mind that governs how each individual mind builds reality. At first blush, the latter proposal sounds cool, because it can eliminate all the difficult problems.

There's nothing 'cool' about it. It is cold hard logic. It does eliminate all the difficult problems.

But the latter proposal is vapid. There is no way to verify that the solutions to all the difficult problems are in any way "correct." It's just a giant hand-wave.

You seem to be suggesting that this solution is "so simple it can't be right.". Why not, Paul? That is the very hallmark of the truth. The beautiful thing about Darwinism is that it is so d*mned simple that one always wonders why nobody thought of it before. Same with flat-Earth/round-Earth

If you start investigating the latter proposal in a logical and verifiable way, you'll end up with science. Then the question of materialism vs. mentalism becomes purely philosophical and irrelevant. What experiments can we perform to distinguish between the two proposals?

There are no experiments. All we have is logic. It goes like this:

Given that our true existential situation is that the only reality we know is mental and that physics/matter is quite definately an abstract model we have created, how do you justify your claim that "there is no reason not to believe that physics/matter is the true reality and the mental realm is a model."

You are now claiming that there is no 'default' position as to which is the model and which is the reality, on the grounds that there is commonality between our experienced world. That has got nothing at all to do with it. You can posit a materialist explanation for that commonality or you can posit a mentalist explanation. There are no tests. All there is is the brute fact that the only sort of existence we know exists in mental and the concept of matter we know to be a model. I ask you again, how do you justify assuming the opposite is true? Pointing out that physical reality is common between minds is totally irrelevant since both materialism and mentalism can explain this and no test can distinguish between the explanations.

quote:
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The reality you know of, and are trying to explain is a mental experience. It is as much a mental experience as your thoughts are. It is physics, matter, space and time which are THE MODEL. These things are abstract concepts invented by humans to describe the behaviour of their mental experiences. We already know which one of these things is a model and which is the thing being modelled.
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I think you mean "We already know which one of these things is a model and which is the thing doing the modeling."

I meant what I said. I meant that physics, matter space and time are all parts of an abstract mathematical model. I also meant that thing being modelled can only be our experiences of a physical world.

I'm annoyed that you won't give me a link to a logical argument against the possibility of mind being an emergent property of the brain. I've read many of the links posted here, but none of them present such as argument.

What is wrong with description of the problem I am giving here, now? Experience leads me to believe that simply presenting logical arguments about this leads to the same circular defence based upon an assumption of materialism and an invalid accusation that the anti-materialist has assumed materialism is false. I am bypassing the circular argument and explaining why materialism cannot be reliably assumed as a default position. The default position must be an existential one - it must start from the existence we actually know, not from an assumption that is deemed to be required in order for science to be able to verify the answer.

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
I challenge you to reword this in a meaningful way. What exactly is "the redness of red" other than a string of four words?

It's the thing the four words represent.

Why is it anything more than an association between some portion of the visual cortex and the concept of red?

What is a 'concept'?

Why is it not explained by the simultaneous triggering of a bunch of red-related areas of the brain: visual cortex, the word red, the definition of red, the letters r-e-d, memories of red things, and so forth? Compel me to realize that redness is more than just the sum of these parts.

I can't do that. It's your free will.

 

[Guest]

If external reality is a product of, or constructed by, the mind, then why can't I picture something I've never sensed?

I don't know. I've seen all sorts of things I've never sensed. Perhaps it was the drugs......

For example, why can't I close my eyes, picture a scene, and "see" all the colors in the visual spectrum, along with, say, the infra-red? What mechanism of the metamind restricts my internal visualization to things that my senses are capable of?

It is your own level of creativity which restricts it, if anything does. What you are saying is close to the crunch though - I would argue that many of the techniques handed down to us from religious-philosophical traditions of the past are in part intended to increase ones ability to internally visualise realities greater than our 3-dimensional home.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,


You may consider the lack of free-will (as you define it) to be a problem. I do not.

Dr. Stupid

Then come on over to the free will thread and refute my valid arguments.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

UcE said:
I challenge you to reword this in a meaningful way. What exactly is "the redness of red" other than a string of four words? Why is it anything more than an association between some portion of the visual cortex and the concept of red? Why is it not explained by the simultaneous triggering of a bunch of red-related areas of the brain: visual cortex, the word red, the definition of red, the letters r-e-d, memories of red things, and so forth? Compel me to realize that redness is more than just the sum of these parts.

~~ Paul

Mary has never seen red, but has learned everything there is to know about red.

When Mary see's red she still 'learns' something new about red.

How can she learn something new when she has learned everything about red?

OH ◊◊◊◊.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Sure, this [commonality of experience] is the next question. It is usually dismissed with "that is solipsism". In fact nobody is actually proposing solipsism.

It's not just the next question, it's the critical question. Science works because we all appear to perceive a similar external environment. Mental monism needs to explain why that is so, with more than just a hand-wave to the metamind.

You seem to be suggesting that this solution is "so simple it can't be right.". Why not, Paul? That is the very hallmark of the truth. The beautiful thing about Darwinism is that it is so d*mned simple that one always wonders why nobody thought of it before.

I'm not saying it can't be right. I'm saying that it provides no means to verify itself. Evolution does.

We already know which one of these things is a model and which is the thing being modelled.

I still don't understand this statement. Those sound like the same thing to me.

What is wrong with description of the problem I am giving here, now? Experience leads me to believe that simply presenting logical arguments about this leads to the same circular defence based upon an assumption of materialism and an invalid accusation that the anti-materialist has assumed materialism is false.

It's not a logical argument why consciousness cannot arise from the brain. This entire masturbatory exercise is based on that assumption, but I've seen no logical argument that convinces me that I need to reject materialism, other than "gee, consciousness is tough."

I can't do that [convince me that qualia are special]. It's your free will.

Perhaps I'm qualia handicapped, although you'd think that people would notice.

I don't know. I've seen all sorts of things I've never sensed.

So have I, but they were mostly obviously products of my imagination.

It is your own level of creativity which restricts it [ability to picture infra-red], if anything does.

Nonsense. If people could picture infra-red in their minds, they'd know it. It would feel as real as picturing red or smooth or garlic. Something in the metamind restricts my mental abilities to match my physical sensory abilities. What and why? You've got problems to solve!

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

Mary has never seen red, but has learned everything there is to know about red.

When Mary see's red she still 'learns' something new about red.

How can she learn something new when she has learned everything about red?

OH ◊◊◊◊.

The Knowledge Argument is busted. Mary hasn't learned all the facts about red. She has not learned the facts gathered when red light enters her eyes. If somehow she could book-learn these facts, she could probably visualize red just fine.

The KA is a giant argument against mental monism. If Mary's mind creates her external reality, why does she need to learn anything about red to visualize it? It's all there in the metamind for her to enjoy, free of charge.

~~ Paul

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty said:
The Knowledge Argument is busted. Mary hasn't learned all the facts about red. She has not learned the facts gathered when red light enters her eyes. If somehow she could book-learn these facts, she could probably visualize red just fine.

The KA is a giant argument against mental monism. If Mary's mind creates her external reality, why does she need to learn anything about red to visualize it? It's all there in the metamind for her to enjoy, free of charge.

~~ Paul

I will restate:

Imagine Mary has learned EVERYTHING about red. Do you see that word now? EVERYTHING.

If we assume your physicalism is true then she has to be able to book-learn all the facts about red. If she can't then your physicalism is not valid in it's current form.

So now when we imagine this Mary she still learns something new when she see's red.

This argument suggests a problem with physicalism. I've been told that this problem is called the HCP. Higher Consciousness Problem. Or something like that


A better counter argument is to say that Mary doesn't learn anything new about red, what she does is learn something new about having the experience of seeing red.

Then we counter by saying that the experience still should not provide something new, and the fact that it does basically PROVES qualia, and qualia suggest the HCP.

 

[hammegk]

This is not true. Every argument I have ever seen for the existence of the "Hard Problem" presupposes dualism in some way. There is no Hard Problem of consciousness under materialism. Consciousness is just another unsolved problem which we are working on.

Ok. Let's go for the "easy problem", life. Can you propose a thought experiment that would prove anything other than "perceived by humans material", in such and such a configuration, is a Sufficient (rather than Necessary) condition for life? I think not.

Once you sort that out, we can worry about your "proof" of material Sufficiency rather than Necessity for human consciousness.

Meanwhile *I* (absolutely & objectively) think, and so do you.

.... So far, all of the so-called problems he has described are not actually problems with physicalism, but rather with various forms of dualism and ontological materialism, which nobody here is defending.

Dr. Stupid

Do you honestly believe your failure to name the ontological basis of materialism makes that ontological commitment disappear?

 

[Guest]

Paul

It's not just the next question, it's the critical question. Science works because we all appear to perceive a similar external environment. Mental monism needs to explain why that is so, with more than just a hand-wave to the metamind.

Mental monism can explain this. Berkeley explained it. Hegel explained it. This is not a critical question because both mentalism and materialism can both explain it. It is irrelevant.

quote:
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You seem to be suggesting that this solution is "so simple it can't be right.". Why not, Paul? That is the very hallmark of the truth. The beautiful thing about Darwinism is that it is so d*mned simple that one always wonders why nobody thought of it before.
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I'm not saying it can't be right. I'm saying that it provides no means to verify itself. Evolution does.

But materialism does not. We cannot experimentally determine between ontologies.

quote:
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We already know which one of these things is a model and which is the thing being modelled.
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I still don't understand this statement. Those sound like the same thing to me.

We KNOW that our experiences exist. We KNOW that the materialist model is a model. What is there to misunderstand?

quote:
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It is your own level of creativity which restricts it [ability to picture infra-red], if anything does.
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Nonsense. If people could picture infra-red in their minds, they'd know it. It would feel as real as picturing red or smooth or garlic. Something in the metamind restricts my mental abilities to match my physical sensory abilities. What and why? You've got problems to solve!

Those problems have been addressed many times by philosophers ancient and modern. Solutions to them exist, and none of them are being contested. You can argue that we cannot objectively distinguish which solution is correct, but there are solutions. None of which really matters - the core of your argument seems to be that mentalism is 'just too much of a cop-out - too easy'. Then in the next breath you argue that it has 'problems to solve'. I think we need to concentrate on the issue about what is a model and what we KNOW exists, specially if you are saying you don't understand this statement.

edited :

I want to understand the real reasons why you choose to assert that the matter is base reality and the qualia are a model. You have said twice that it is because there is a common shared reality. I have now replied twice that both materialism and mentalism can provide an explanation for this. Is there some reason why this reply is invalid or is there some other reason why you cannot accept that the consciousness is what we actually know exists and that matter is a conceptual model?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

Imagine Mary has learned EVERYTHING about red. Do you see that word now? EVERYTHING.

Okay then, we'll assume she has book-learned all the facts accumulated by physically experiencing red, in addition to all the objective facts.

If we assume your physicalism is true then she has to be able to book-learn all the facts about red. If she can't then your physicalism is not valid in it's current form.

Nonsense. Who said that experience can't produce subjective facts not attainable from book learning?

So now when we imagine this Mary she still learns something new when she see's red.

On what basis do you claim that she learns something new when she leaves the room?

A better counter argument is to say that Mary doesn't learn anything new about red, what she does is learn something new about having the experience of seeing red.

This contracdicts your first assumption that she has learned everything about red.

Then we counter by saying that the experience still should not provide something new, and the fact that it does basically PROVES qualia, and qualia suggest the HCP.

Again, what is this new thing you claim the experience provides, if we are assuming she has learned everything about red?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul :

Okay then, we'll assume she has book-learned all the facts accumulated by physically experiencing red, in addition to all the objective facts.

Here is the problem with the model and the reality. Everything that Mary can book-learn about red is the model. The experience of red is the brute reality. Given these things (and I think if you look at them closely you will find that they MUST be true) then what have you just claimed that it is possible to place into the model the thing which is being modelled. The problem is that this cannot be done. So you have attempted to refute the knowledge argument by assuming something which cannot be done in real life (the book-learning of the experience of seeing red) but which must be do-able for materialism to be defended. The point is that in reality it is impossible to book-learn the experience of seeing red, therefore materialism must be false. If it were possible to book-learn red then the KA would fail.

edited :

I might add that at the same time you are claiming it is possible to "book-learn the experience of seeing red" you are also claiming that the mind cannot emulate in dreams sensations it has never experienced, which effectively refutes the claim it is possible to book-learn red.