Materialism

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,



Perhaps we are finally making some progress. I do not believe that free-will, as you have defined it, exists. On the contrary, I think that the logical argument you have presented, whereby you explain that Libertarian free-will requires the existence of an agent which is neither deterministic nor random, serves as an indirect proof that Libertarian free-will does not exist.


Dr. Stupid

So you wish to redefine free will? Then do so and I will argue about the definition of free will. Perhaps you can read the thread where I state my definition over and over again and request any counter-definitions.

I'll head over there now.

 

[Guest]

Jethro

A link, a repost, a listing, something please.

If you knew how many times I have been around this merry-go-round with materialists then you'd know why I have to get off. No logical proof will satisfy the materialists - it bounces off them like a little rubber ball. Yet the problem is written all over philosophy, manifests at all the boundaries of physics, and the answer has been known since the dawn of time. Seek and you shall find that the Truth has always been staring you in the face, had you the eyes to see it.

Before you put the lid back on the box.....

Too late. Nothing personal. Franko has gone. It is time for me to leave also.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Aw UcE, don't leave.

Rusty, the p-zombie arguments don't do much for me, since the term p-zombie is so poorly defined.

Now let's get back to Mary. I don't understand your last post, so let's start over.

Are we assuming that Mary can (a) book-learn absolutely every objective and subjective fact about red, or (b) only the facts we might reasonably believe she could learn from books? An example of facts that aren't included in (b) are the neural connections formed when red light enters her eyes.

While you're at it, you might define physicalism, particularly with respect to what it says about book learning.

~~ Paul

 

[Jethro]

What if Mary is colorblind, does this render physicalism true?

Okay, Mary cannot learn everything about the color red and said experience until she herself experiences it. Why does this eliminate the possibility that said experience is purely physical in nature? The photon hits the retina triggers the nerve activates the visual cortex is interpreted by the frontal lobes.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

Objectively speaking this appears to be a valid argument. Here it is in premise -> conclusion form:

1. Mary learns everything there is to know about the color red.
2. Mary learns everything there is to know about the experience of seeing the color red.
3. Mary has never seen the color red.

4. Mary sees the color red, and gains something she did not have before.

This argument reneders physicalism false in it's current form.

If we are to assume (as the above argument implies) that it is possible for Mary to learn everything there is to know about the experience of seeing the color red, without ever having had the experience, then clearly Mary would not gain anything she did not have before when she actually does see red.

The implication would be that she is somehow able to imagine exactly what red would look like, based on the information she has.

Of course, physicalism does not hold that it is possible for Mary to learn everything that there is to know about the experience of seeing red, without having the experience. On the contrary, what we know about neurophysiology would tend to suggest that this is not physically possible. This renders the argument null and void, since it takes as a premise that something physically impossible has happened.

Counter argument:

4. Mary gains the knowledge that she has seen the color red.

Counter-counter argument:

Not only does she gain that knowledge, but she gains some kind of fundamental understanding of the color red that she is unable to learn from books.

THIS RENDERS PHYSICALISM FALSE.

Only if you think that Physicalism implies that it is possible to gain that knowledge from a book. I do not see why you think this is the case.

There is nothing metaphysical about this. It is just a reflection of the fact that the part of your brain that processes abstract information, is not the same as the part of your brain that processes visual input. No amount of book learning is going to teach your visual cortex how to process the color red. The visual cortex can only learn how to do it by doing it. Likewise, no amount of abstract knowledge is going to teach a crippled man how to walk.

Imagine a person who has been crippled from birth. Imagine now that an operation fixes the problem, and is even able to fix up the muscles, so that his bones and muscles are as good as a healthy person. Do you think that any amount of abstract knowledge is going to allow him to simply stand up and walk?

Of course not. He needs to learn how to do it. Likewise, a person who has suffered a stroke can "forget" how to walk. He still has all the abstract knowledge. He still remembers walking. He still knows in theory how it works. But he simply can't get the muscles to do what he wants them to do. A new part of his brain must learn how to control the muscles. This is not abstract knowledge, but it is still a purely physical process occurring in the person's brain.

Perhaps we are finally making some progress. I do not believe that free-will, as you have defined it, exists. On the contrary, I think that the logical argument you have presented, whereby you explain that Libertarian free-will requires the existence of an agent which is neither deterministic nor random, serves as an indirect proof that Libertarian free-will does not exist.

Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So you wish to redefine free will?

Not really. I am happy to say something along the lines of "we don't really have free will, but must behave as though we do". I am also happy with the compatibilist view, which simply defined the term to refer to something that we can meaningfully say we have, even if it is not what we would intuitively think of as free-will.

For me, it is pretty much a non-issue. Reality is the way it is. Consciousness is what it is. I am interested in finding out as much about it as I can. I am not interested in trying to make what I find out fit into some preconceived view that my intuition or social conditioning has given me.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Guest]

Aw UcE, don't leave.

Republic

§32. Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

§33. To be sure, he said.

§34. And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

Who am I to loose the prisoners?

Who am I to [attempt to] liberate those who have no wish to be liberated?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ah, the old prison gambit.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Ah, the old prison gambit.

~~ Paul

 

[Q-Source]

Who am I to loose the prisoners?

Who am I to [attempt to] liberate those who have no wish to be liberated?

This is priceless, UCE.

Do you feel a kind of Messiah?

 

[hammegk]

This is priceless, UCE.

Do you feel a kind of Messiah?

Just another prisoner who has gazed on the sun.

Each of us makes his own choice; words, picture & discussions do not show the exit, or walk oneself through it.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,



If we are to assume (as the above argument implies) that it is possible for Mary to learn everything there is to know about the experience of seeing the color red, without ever having had the experience, then clearly Mary would not gain anything she did not have before when she actually does see red.

The implication would be that she is somehow able to imagine exactly what red would look like, based on the information she has.

Of course, physicalism does not hold that it is possible for Mary to learn everything that there is to know about the experience of seeing red, without having the experience. On the contrary, what we know about neurophysiology would tend to suggest that this is not physically possible. This renders the argument null and void, since it takes as a premise that something physically impossible has happened.



Only if you think that Physicalism implies that it is possible to gain that knowledge from a book. I do not see why you think this is the case.

There is nothing metaphysical about this. It is just a reflection of the fact that the part of your brain that processes abstract information, is not the same as the part of your brain that processes visual input. No amount of book learning is going to teach your visual cortex how to process the color red. The visual cortex can only learn how to do it by doing it. Likewise, no amount of abstract knowledge is going to teach a crippled man how to walk.

Imagine a person who has been crippled from birth. Imagine now that an operation fixes the problem, and is even able to fix up the muscles, so that his bones and muscles are as good as a healthy person. Do you think that any amount of abstract knowledge is going to allow him to simply stand up and walk?

Of course not. He needs to learn how to do it. Likewise, a person who has suffered a stroke can "forget" how to walk. He still has all the abstract knowledge. He still remembers walking. He still knows in theory how it works. But he simply can't get the muscles to do what he wants them to do. A new part of his brain must learn how to control the muscles. This is not abstract knowledge, but it is still a purely physical process occurring in the person's brain.

Of course you know I would disagree. Physicalism states that everything is reducable to a causally binding law, and that those laws can be percieved by humans. Hence it is possible, although improbable, that someone could learn exactly everything they needed to do to be able to instantly walk.

What is the cripple doing with the experience other then learning it?


For the definition of physicalism I am using:

All things are physical. Physical means all things are reducable ultimately to a material that interacts as both a cause and effect with other things. If something does not interact this way it is not physical, and hence is reducable further still to a point where it will interact in such a way.

So physicalism states that ultimately everything about red is reducable to a material that acts as both a cause and effect, and the law that governs these cause and effects are TLON (or TLOPP if you prefer), and we can perceive these.

So we teach Mary everything about red, then she knows everything about red. Seeing red should not make a difference.

Of course you can claim that seeing red causes a chemical reaction in the brain that forms some bond. But what is this doing? Are we saying that the brain already 'knows' red but the bond doesn't form until we see it?

Mary and the black/white room still illustrates the point. Much better then pzombies, imho.

Not really. I am happy to say something along the lines of "we don't really have free will, but must behave as though we do". I am also happy with the compatibilist view, which simply defined the term to refer to something that we can meaningfully say we have, even if it is not what we would intuitively think of as free-will.

For me, it is pretty much a non-issue. Reality is the way it is. Consciousness is what it is. I am interested in finding out as much about it as I can. I am not interested in trying to make what I find out fit into some preconceived view that my intuition or social conditioning has given me.

Dr. Stupid

That is a perfectly valid. It just does not work for me. So we would agree. I do hope that I'm correct, though, and that one day perhaps science will discover the laws of "agent" causation or some such.

 

[Guest]

This is priceless, UCE.

Do you feel a kind of Messiah?

Tell me what do you want? And who can you be?
And what do you find when you're looking at me?
Cos I'm just a blind man who thinks he can see,
And I'll never get caught cos I'll never be free.



If I'm a Messiah, then I'm the least effective Messiah there has ever been. But how can you know that the sun shines and not feel a need to tell those souls who remain convinced that the shadow-world is real? Some things never change, though. Plato's allegory is as true as it always was. The prisoners see the mystic as a madman. Perhaps this is the way it will always be.

Messiahs come to change the world. I am not trying to change the world. I did once, but not any more. Regime change begins at home.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Tell me what do you want? And who can you be?
And what do you find when you're looking at me?
Cos I'm just a blind man who thinks he can see,
And I'll never get caught cos I'll never be free.



If I'm a Messiah, then I'm the least effective Messiah there has ever been. But how can you know that the sun shines and not feel a need to tell those souls who remain convinced that the shadow-world is real? Some things never change, though. Plato's allegory is as true as it always was. The prisoners see the mystic as a madman. Perhaps this is the way it will always be.

Messiahs come to change the world. I am not trying to change the world. I did once, but not any more. Regime change begins at home.

I think I'm going to change my pants.

Please stick around though, I have been appreciating your comments since the second day I was here. I would appreciate them in the future. Probably best to stop running your head into a brick wall though. You might get an concusion.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

Of course you know I would disagree. Physicalism states that everything is reducable to a causally binding law, and that those laws can be percieved by humans. Hence it is possible, although improbable, that someone could learn exactly everything they needed to do to be able to instantly walk.

I don't see how this follows. The fact that the cripple will not be able to learn how to walk without actually doing it is not a limitation imposed by physicalism, but rather by the way the physical brain and body work.

Maybe this will clarify my position with respect to Mary. I will rephrase the thought experiment in such a way that the idea is the same, but it is actually physically possible.

Imagine that Mary has never seen red, and as a result, she has no memories of seeing red, her visual cortex is not equipped to distinguish red, and of course, she does not know what the experience of seeing red is.

Now imagine that we have a supercomputer, which knows all the physical facts about how visual perception works, and knows all the physical facts about Mary's brain. This computer controls a robotic surgeon, which is capable of performing micro brain surgery. For the sake of this thought experiment, imagine that it is capable of doing pretty much anything to the brain that is physically possible.

Now, imagine that our computer works out exactly what the physical state of Mary's brain would be if she had always been able to see red. Imagine that it also works out what the physical state would be if she had memories of having seen things in full color. The robot then goes in and modifies her brain. It creates the necessary neural connections in the visual cortex. It makes all the necessary connections to modify her memories. When Mary wakes up, she remembers having been able to see red, remembers what it is like to see red, can even visualize the red things she remembers having seen in her mind.

Now we fix Mary's eyes. For the first time ever, Mary actually has the experience of seeing red. According to physicallism, she will not gain anything new by this experience.

In other words, physicalism holds that the experience is a physical process, and that all the facts about the experience are physical. When we say that Mary has all the physical facts, we are not just talking about abstract information, we are talking about the physical state of Mary's brain. So in effect, we should be able to alter the state of Mary's brain is such a way as to give her all the facts about seeing red that somebody who has seen red would have, even though she has never seen red.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,


...................

In other words, physicalism holds that the experience is a physical process, and that all the facts about the experience are physical. When we say that Mary has all the physical facts, we are not just talking about abstract information, we are talking about the physical state of Mary's brain. So in effect, we should be able to alter the state of Mary's brain is such a way as to give her all the facts about seeing red that somebody who has seen red would have, even though she has never seen red.

Dr. Stupid

So you are saying that there is something about red that is not reducable to the point where human beings can percieve it? Or you are asserting that this thing about red that I have claimed is not reducable to being perceived but has to be experienced, is, in fact, reducable. But the only way to reduce it (other then having the experience) is to make a physical modification to the brain?

So then we are saying that the experience of seeing red causes something in our brain to make a physical modification to our brain and so this 'modification' is the thing we gain?

What does this 'modification' do to give me the 'extra knowledge' about red?

This argument still assumes that there is some part of the brain that already 'knows' red and just hasn't been connected to the rest of the brain.

So what does this part of the brain 'know' and how come we can't teach it to someone?


EDIT I am currently creating a new post so this one will make more sense.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

So then we are saying that the experience of seeing red causes something in our brain to make a physical modification to our brain and so this 'modification' is the thing we gain?

Regardless of what you think about the KA, you have to agree that seeing red causes physical changes in the brain's neural network and other components, right?

What does this 'modification' do to give me the 'extra knowledge' about red?

It changes your neural connections. That's what knowledge is, right?

This argument still assumes that there is some part of the brain that already 'knows' red and just hasn't been connected to the rest of the brain.

How does it assume that? Regardless, what you say is true. There is a "red portion" of the visual cortex that hasn't been exercised until red light is actually seen (or Stimpy's robot does his thing).

So what does this part of the brain 'know' and how come we can't teach it to someone?

For the same reason we can't teach some to be a world champion high jumper. You gotta practice.

You keep thinking off all knowledge/facts as book knowledge. Some knowledge is gained through doing/experiencing/sensing/acting.

~~ Paul

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Clarification on Mary and the black/white room:


We assume physicalism is true. Hence everything that exists can be reduced to a point where human beings can perceive it in it's relation as both a cause and an effect.

So the color red can be reduced to the point where it can be perceived by human beings as both a cause and an effect. If we reduce everything about the color red to the state where it is perceivable as both a cause and an effect and use this knowledge to write a book we will have a way we can learn all there is to know about the color red. This book is called Book of Red-osity.

There is a girl named Mary in a black and white room, with black/white clothes, and everything in the room is black/white. Including her skin. She has never seen any color.

Mary is provided with the Book of Red-osity and reads everything. She reads it all, learns it all, and understands it all. Mary now knows everything about the color red.

We then give Mary another book, the Book of Red-Knowledge-osity. This book contains all information about experiencing the color red. She reads, learns, and understands this as well. Mary now knows everything about the color red and the experience of the color red.

We then bring Mary a red rose. When Mary see's this rose she gains some kind of knowledge about red that she did not have before. What does she gain? We will call this thing qualia.

Their has been a counter argument that:

Mary doesn't gain qualia, she gains the knowledge that she has had the experience of seeing the color red. But, I say, she already had that knowledge because she read, learned, and understood the Book of Red-Knowledge-osity.

So they say that this knowledge causes a chemical reaction in the brain that causes a bridge to connect between two points. The brain is such that this bridge will not connect unless the experience of seeing red actually takes place.

I reply, how does this bridge give Mary any new knowledge about red? Unless the bridge connects to some part of the brain that already "knows" red, but it "knows" it in such a way that is not reducable under physicalism.


Now there is a new Mary. This Mary is Stimpson J. Cat's Mary, Mary so I will simply copy and paste his story:

Imagine that Mary has never seen red, and as a result, she has no memories of seeing red, her visual cortex is not equipped to distinguish red, and of course, she does not know what the experience of seeing red is.

Now imagine that we have a supercomputer, which knows all the physical facts about how visual perception works, and knows all the physical facts about Mary's brain. This computer controls a robotic surgeon, which is capable of performing micro brain surgery. For the sake of this thought experiment, imagine that it is capable of doing pretty much anything to the brain that is physically possible.

Now, imagine that our computer works out exactly what the physical state of Mary's brain would be if she had always been able to see red. Imagine that it also works out what the physical state would be if she had memories of having seen things in full color. The robot then goes in and modifies her brain. It creates the necessary neural connections in the visual cortex. It makes all the necessary connections to modify her memories. When Mary wakes up, she remembers having been able to see red, remembers what it is like to see red, can even visualize the red things she remembers having seen in her mind.

Now we fix Mary's eyes. For the first time ever, Mary actually has the experience of seeing red. According to physicallism, she will not gain anything new by this experience.

The first story of Mary established that Mary gains some kind of knowledge upon seeing red that she cannot gain from the Book of Red-osity or the Book of Red-Knowledge-osity. This means that the thing cannot be reduced under physicalism.

Let us accept the second story. Robo-Mary did not gain any new knowledge when she saw red. So somehow Robo-Mary gained this 'qualia' through a physical modification to her brain but regular Mary could not gain this through the books. Again, this is saying that there is something in the brain that already "knows" red but just has to be connected.

We can still ask what this part of the brain "knows" about red and how come it wasn't reducable and put into one of the books. This still remains a problem for physicalism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

We assume physicalism is true. Hence everything that exists can be reduced to a point where human beings can perceive it in it's relation as both a cause and an effect.

Here is the definition of physicalism from Websters:

"a thesis that the descriptive terms of scientific language are reducible to terms which refer to spatiotemporal things or events or to their properties"

I don't see anything about cause and effect, and I certainly don't see anything about these things all being learnable from books.

So the color red can be reduced to the point where it can be perceived by human beings as both a cause and an effect. If we reduce everything about the color red to the state where it is perceivable as both a cause and an effect and use this knowledge to write a book we will have a way we can learn all there is to know about the color red. This book is called Book of Red-osity.

We might be able to learn "all there is to know," but we probably can't learn the perceptual pathways.

. . .

We then give Mary another book, the Book of Red-Knowledge-osity. This book contains all information about experiencing the color red. She reads, learns, and understands this as well. Mary now knows everything about the color red and the experience of the color red.

She still can't consciously form the perceptual pathways.

We then bring Mary a red rose. When Mary see's this rose she gains some kind of knowledge about red that she did not have before. What does she gain? We will call this thing qualia.

She gains the perceptual pathways.

Their has been a counter argument that:

Mary doesn't gain qualia, she gains the knowledge that she has had the experience of seeing the color red. But, I say, she already had that knowledge because she read, learned, and understood the Book of Red-Knowledge-osity.

Assuming the knowledge that she has had the experience of seeing red is relevant, she did not get that from the books. If the books stated that, they were in error. She had not seen red yet.

So they say that this knowledge causes a chemical reaction in the brain that causes a bridge to connect between two points. The brain is such that this bridge will not connect unless the experience of seeing red actually takes place.

Yes, but that is not the knowledge that she has had the experience, but the experience itself.

I reply, how does this bridge give Mary any new knowledge about red? Unless the bridge connects to some part of the brain that already "knows" red, but it "knows" it in such a way that is not reducable under physicalism.

Now we are merely speculating. I can think of two interesting connections made when Mary actually sees red. First, a cascade of connections between her eye and her visual cortex. Second, a connection between the red portion of the cortex and the concepts of red that she has learned. Both of these are new knowledge.

The first story of Mary established that Mary gains some kind of knowledge upon seeing red that she cannot gain from the Book of Red-osity or the Book of Red-Knowledge-osity. This means that the thing cannot be reduced under physicalism.

Physicalism does not say that all facts can be learned from books.

Let us accept the second story. Robo-Mary did not gain any new knowledge when she saw red. So somehow Robo-Mary gained this 'qualia' through a physical modification to her brain but regular Mary could not gain this through the books. Again, this is saying that there is something in the brain that already "knows" red but just has to be connected.

What do you mean here? After Mary read the books, there was knowledge of red in her brain. The robot simply programs more knowledge, some of which is certainly connected to the book knowledge.

We can still ask what this part of the brain "knows" about red and how come it wasn't reducable and put into one of the books. This still remains a problem for physicalism.

Perhaps you're suggesting that our brains have knowledge about red even before we experience red or read anything about it. That is undoubtedly true, but why is it a problem?

~~ Paul

 

[Q-Source]

If I'm a Messiah, then I'm the least effective Messiah there has ever been. But how can you know that the sun shines and not feel a need to tell those souls who remain convinced that the shadow-world is real? Some things never change, though. Plato's allegory is as true as it always was. The prisoners see the mystic as a madman. Perhaps this is the way it will always be.

Yeah, some things never change.

Just a miserable tiny little piece of evidence would make a difference...

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty said:
Here is the definition of physicalism from Websters:

"a thesis that the descriptive terms of scientific language are reducible to terms which refer to spatiotemporal things or events or to their properties"

I don't see anything about cause and effect, and I certainly don't see anything about these things all being learnable from books.

If we assume soft-determined world (meaning that all effects stem from causes that are determined or random) then all effects lead to next effects. Effects go on and on and on. This is called a causal chain.

All things are reducable to 'terms' that allow human beings to perceive these things.
All things are 'spatiotemporal' things or events or properties.

Can a thing exist without being a cause, even if the cause neccesitates the event of doing nothing? Perhaps the rock on my desk is neccesitating that it remains on my desk over time. TLOP states that the rock sitting on my desk will not spontaneously explode, so the rock sitting on my desk is necessitated to not do many many things and only necessitated to do one thing. Perhaps that thing is to do nothing. So things all have causes.

Events are all causes.

Properties? You are claiming that all things are reducable to properties? You need to define this, because if I can reduce the "agent" down to it's properties and then my "agent" works with physicalism exactly as it works with materialism and renders physicalism into a 'weaker' statement.

We might be able to learn "all there is to know," but we probably can't learn the perceptual pathways.

. . .


She still can't consciously form the perceptual pathways.


She gains the perceptual pathways.

Here is one part of YOUR definition of physicalism put into my words:

All things are reducable to 'terms' that allow human beings to perceive these things.

So how come whatever these "perceptual pathways" do is not reducable to things we can perceive? You are killing your own view.

Assuming the knowledge that she has had the experience of seeing red is relevant, she did not get that from the books. If the books stated that, they were in error. She had not seen red yet.

Yes she had not seen red yet, she had only read the books. The books contained all knowledge reduced down to the point where she coudl perceive it and she learned and understood it. How can she then gain MORE knowledge about red when she see's it? Because not all things are reducable in this way.

Yes, but that is not the knowledge that she has had the experience, but the experience itself.


Now we are merely speculating. I can think of two interesting connections made when Mary actually sees red. First, a cascade of connections between her eye and her visual cortex. Second, a connection between the red portion of the cortex and the concepts of red that she has learned. Both of these are new knowledge.

How are they new knowledge? They have to be reducable, and if they are then they were put in the books. Mary read the books. But still Mary gains some new knowledge.

Physicalism does not say that all facts can be learned from books.

Yes it does. Which is why it works so well for science, and continues to work so well. But it must evolve, much like science. Unfortunately we do not know enough about the "agent" yet to make the correct modifications to physicalism. But do not forget that the HCP and the "agent" certainly and strongly suggest that physicalism contains a flaw.

What do you mean here? After Mary read the books, there was knowledge of red in her brain. The robot simply programs more knowledge, some of which is certainly connected to the book knowledge.


Perhaps you're suggesting that our brains have knowledge about red even before we experience red or read anything about it. That is undoubtedly true, but why is it a problem?

~~ Paul

No, that second part can be confuseding. If we have knowledge in our brains about red that is pre-existing (perhaps darwinian evolution caused it to be there) then it must be reducable via physicalism and hence would be in the books. This means that it would not be the new knowledge Mary gains from seeing red.