Materialism

[Guest]

Re: Boiling down

It seems we are all playing the usual game of label changing here... First the question is "behaviour without consciousness", now is "behaviour without awareness".

To be fair, "awareness" was always the problem. That is the way the 'Hard Problem' is defined. "Consciousness" and "thought" are ambigious words that cause lots of problems.

Nobody seems to acknowledge our lack of understanding of mind activity (my sin also, I confess).

Well, up till now it has been difficult to formulate the correct questions for understanding mind activity. I believe that to do so we have to understand the relationship between the analytical activities of the mind and the awareness of those activities. I don't think it is possible to frame the correct questions with a materialistic model because materialism forces us to think of consciousness in ways that do not really match up with our experience of consciousness. At the middle of the whole debate lies this "I" thing. I see. I feel. I hear. What am "I"?

In my biased way, I believe that the whole body of religious-philsophical literature has as its central goal the expansion of the awareness of consciousness, and the improvement of understanding of how the different parts of consciousness inter-relate.

Well, I think we can boil down the problem of p-zombies to these 2 points:

1.- Is awareness an active part of the mind? Or a passive one?

Your posts always seem to me to be asking exactly the wrong questions. Awareness is passive by its very nature. The agent of awareness, when active, becomes will.

If you say awareness is pasive, p-zombies are logically posible.

Awareness is passive, the agent of awareness is not passive because it is also responsible for will. I don't understand how either of these things make any difference to p-zombies. The awareness need only exist, it need not be passive. A p-zombie has no awareness at all. It has self-referentiality, but then so does a computer program.

If you say awareness is a key component in decisions, you must prove that this piece of the mind can be succesfully emulated to make p-zombies logically possible. I don't see it possible now.

Now you have lost me, can you re-phrase in terms of my above response regarding will.

2.- Does emulation prove anything about the true nature of the emulated object? If pzombies are posible, does it prove materialism is false?

Yes. The possible of existence of p-zombies is just one of the manifestations of the 'hard problem'. There are many others - and they all lead to materialism being false.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Are there any books you might suggest I pick up? I'm going into the city soon and will be placing an order for some books. I *think* we have very similar ideas, possibly even the same idea, but I (unfortunately) do now know a great deal about this metaphysical argument.

I suppose I will look up 'Daniel Dennet' and 'David Chalmers' because they seem to be popular around here. Do you have any suggestions?

Thanks again,

Rusty :



Firstly, I have observed that all I can percieve about the world is qualia. Secondly, I think that if you follow the logic through that it is implied that the world only exists through qualia. Without qualia there is no world. In what way can a lifeless or zombie Universe be said to exist? How would such a Universe differ from, say, an unobserved mathematical fractal? Are they not both just 'potential'? Are they not both just 'unobserved information'? For me, the only solution to the Hard Problem is to understand that Qualia, i.e. consciousness, is the primary thing which it exists - it IS reality. The physical world is just a collective pool of information which different fragments of that consciousness access via structures embedded within this physical/information 'Universe' ("brains").

edited :

The first and biggest problem with grasping this is to do with time. The hurdle is that the materialist concieves of matter existing within a linear time-frame. They see the matter as pre-dating the consciousness. But this is also a misconception - because from the point of view of consciousness it is always "NOW", and the past and future are much like directions in space - continuing infinitely backwards and forwards from the present place of reference. You have to understand these two different ways of interpreting time to be able to see the two different ways of interpreting what reality is made of. Both interpretations are useful - and understanding the way reality works requires synthesising both views together.

So what would you say grants self-identity? Would it be an "agent" that:

1) Can be causaully efficacious.
2) Is not subject to causaility from the "physical" world. A better way to say this here would be: Is not subject to causaulity from the world we perceive.
?

This is the "agent" that I have put forth in another thread.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Stimpy said:

Within dualism there is a dual meaning to "you" or "I". One meaning being the aspects of the mind which are physical brain processes, and the other being these other aspects which, according to Win, are not causally efficacious on the physical.

LOL. "Dualism," "dual meaning to..."

Exactly. Although you have explained the problem much more clearly and succinctly than I have, this is essentially the same point I have been trying to make.

In essence, then, the p-zombie conjecture involves assuming a dual nature to mind and brain (only it refers to "qualia" and their absence in p-zombies) in order to supposedly demonstrate that materialism is false.

Call it begging the question, call it equivocation, call it "Zork" for all I care, it's the same criticism of the argument.

I like yours better than mine. I fell victim to trying to explain it in the terms of the dualist philosopher, rather than sticking to terms and concepts with which I am more at ease. In other words, I allowed myself to play on their field rather than mine.

AS

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Stimpy said:



LOL. "Dualism," "dual meaning to..."

Exactly. Although you have explained the problem much more clearly and succinctly than I have, this is essentially the same point I have been trying to make.

In essence, then, the p-zombie conjecture involves assuming a dual nature to mind and brain (only it refers to "qualia" and their absence in p-zombies) in order to supposedly demonstrate that materialism is false.

Call it begging the question, call it equivocation, call it "Zork" for all I care, it's the same criticism of the argument.

I like yours better than mine. I fell victim to trying to explain it in the terms of the dualist philosopher, rather than sticking to terms and concepts with which I am more at ease. In other words, I allowed myself to play on their field rather than mine.

AS

I can't speak for Win. I don't know whether he asserts that the "mind" is not causaully efficacious on the "body" but I can tell you that you have misunderstood the p-zombie idea.

It is not some stunning evidence that will destroy materialism. It is another way to illustrate a problem that materialism has. Pretending the problem isn't there will not make it go away, either.

I can imagine a functional replica of myself that will do every single thing I do but does not posses consciousness. Now I can imagine a "physical" replica of myself that will do the same.

This 'suggests' that consciousness is not a "physical" thing.

This doesn't appear to be a very strong argument to me and fails in several ways, but it does suggest the problem.

I can address it in a different way, feel free to ignore me if this has already been debated:

What would you (AS) say makes you the same person I was arguing with yesterday?

You are not the same physically. Your brain is not the same physically. Some cells in your brain have died and been carried out of your brain through your blood. Other cells may have possibly been replacated.

So what makes you the same? What gives you your identity?

If I created a complete "physical" replica of myself would there then be two of me? Or would there be me plus another person who looks and possibly exacts exactly like me but is not me?

But "physical" really must be defined.

You appear to be using a definition such as: "Anything that exists is physical."

Which I (and most likely Win, UE, and everyone else) wouldn't have a problem with.

So are you simply using the word "physical" to replace the word "exists"?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

It [consciousness] is all of it. Everything you experience you experience relative to "I". I am talking about that relationship itself - the relationship between "I" and "everything I am aware of." You are attempting to put "I" within the mish-mash of everything that "I" am aware of.

What's the problem with that? All you need is another layer of brain to watch the lower levels. Then you've got the experience of self. Heck, you can add another layer to watch the watcher, and you've got a richer experience of meta-self. The fact that there are a finite number of layers might even explain why consciousness seems so mysterious: there is no layer to watch the top layer, thus rendering the top layer inexplicable through experience.

I think Austen Clark describes it well:

http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwphil/pctall.html

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

I can imagine a functional replica of myself that will do every single thing I do but does not posses consciousness. Now I can imagine a "physical" replica of myself that will do the same.

What part of the broad term consciousness won't it possess? Are you talking about self-awareness?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Rusty :

Are there any books you might suggest I pick up? I'm going into the city soon and will be placing an order for some books. I *think* we have very similar ideas, possibly even the same idea, but I (unfortunately) do now know a great deal about this metaphysical argument.

I suppose I will look up 'Daniel Dennet' and 'David Chalmers' because they seem to be popular around here. Do you have any suggestions?

Many suggestions, dependent on what you want to know.

1) The Taboo of Subjectivity : Towards a new science of consciousness (B Allan Wallace) :

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/t...f=sr_1_1/104-0657255-3736747?v=glance&s=books

This is probably the most comprehensive demolition of scientistic materialism ever written. It explains the historical reasons for why we are having this debate.


2) The Book On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are (Alan Watts) :

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/t...f=sr_1_1/104-0657255-3736747?v=glance&s=books

This is a book that was written in the late sixties, attempting to explain Vedantic philosophy to westerners.


3) The Ending of Time (David Bohm and J Krishnamurti) :

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/t...f=sr_1_2/104-0657255-3736747?v=glance&s=books

This is a book of dialogues between Bohm and Krishnamurti. Bohm acts as a scientist and Krishnamurti as a mystic. Bohm attempts to get to the bottom of what Krishnamurti is saying by seeking out inconsistencies in what K. is saying, and inconsistencies between what K is saying and what physics allows as possible.

4) Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World's Great Physicists (Ken Wilber)

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/t..._books_4/104-0657255-3736747?v=glance&s=books

If you only read one more book, then read this one.

So what would you say grants self-identity? Would it be an "agent" that:

1) Can be causaully efficacious.
2) Is not subject to causaility from the "physical" world. A better way to say this here would be: Is not subject to causaulity from the world we perceive.

Well, as you have framed it the question is tough. In fact 'self-identity' does not come from the agent of will and awareness. Far from it. That agent perceives self-identity but this is in fact an illusion. All of the information distinguishing your consciousness from my consciousness is derived from your own circumstances - your point of entry into the world and your genetics and brain. "I" think I am UCE. In fact "I" am just "I", and in order to make the sums add up this "I" turns out to be shared and collective - it has no self. The perception of individuality ("self-identity") is a very powerful illusion. However, without the "I" there is no awareness of anything at all, be it self-identity or pure collective 'beingness'.

 

[Guest]

I fell victim to trying to explain it in the terms of the dualist philosopher, rather than sticking to terms and concepts with which I am more at ease. In other words, I allowed myself to play on their field rather than mine.

That'll be the field with both ends rather than just one of them.....


Rusty :

So are you simply using the word "physical" to replace the word "exists"?

This is precisely what simplistic materialism does. Just as simplistic idealism defines existence as "mind". Both are useless, since they attempt to get rid of the other 'monism' by defining it into oblivion before the debate even starts. We have to be smarter than that. We have to work out how these two forms of existence are related. Are they equal partners? Does one exist within the other? If so which way around?

Paul :

What's the problem with that? All you need is another layer of brain to watch the lower levels. Then you've got the experience of self.

That would only be true if self-referentiality implied awareness.

Heck, you can add another layer to watch the watcher, and you've got a richer experience of meta-self. The fact that there are a finite number of layers might even explain why consciousness seems so mysterious: there is no layer to watch the top layer, thus rendering the top layer inexplicable through experience.

Well then you have another form of infinite regression, leading to the existence of Infinity, which is exactly what that top layer is.....

 

[hammegk]

To assert that you brain knows something which is true, but that it has no way of knowing that it is true, is nonsensical.

Dr. Stupid

The point is what data point is most certain, most nearly objective; that you *are*, or that you *think*?

For me the *think* part is the most certain, and the "exist, physically, *are*" part is the subset.

The Black & White room is an interesting analogy for the p-zombie problem, imo.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

That would only be true if self-referentiality implied awareness.

I presume you meant "of." I have no idea what you mean. Could you explain?

Well then you have another form of infinite regression, leading to the existence of Infinity, which is exactly what that top layer is.

There is no infinite regression. The brain is finite, with a finite number of levels. Because nothing is watching the top level, the top level seems mysterious from the viewpoint of self-experience. That is indeed a mystery, but it has nothing to do with consciousness or qualia (whatever they are). There is no reason to jump out of the brain and postulate some external additional layer that watches the brain.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

The Black & White room is an interesting analogy for the p-zombie problem, imo.

The woman in the room was missing objective data in her brain, namely the experience of perceiving color. A p-zombie would have that experience, wouldn't it?

Can someone enumerate exactly what the p-zombie is missing, without merely assigning the missing stuff a name?

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

I can imagine a functional replica of myself that will do every single thing I do but does not posses consciousness. Now I can imagine a "physical" replica of myself that will do the same.

This 'suggests' that consciousness is not a "physical" thing.

All it suggests is that as far as you know, it is possible that consciousness may not be a physical thing. The fact that you can imagine a physical replica of yourself that will behave exactly like you, but which does not possess consciousness, is nothing more than a reflection of the fact that you cannot logically deduce the existence of consciousness from what you know about your physical characteristics.

This doesn't appear to be a very strong argument to me and fails in several ways, but it does suggest the problem.

The only problem it suggests is that we do not yet know how to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical facts. It in no way implies that such a derivation is not possible. I cannot logically derive all of the chemical properties of a sugar molecule from then laws of Quantum Mechanics either. Indeed, I can imagine a molecule with the same atomic structure as a sugar molecule, but with different chemical properties. Does this mean that such a thing must necessarily be possible? Of course not.


Hammegk,

To assert that you brain knows something which is true, but that it has no way of knowing that it is true, is nonsensical.

Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The point is what data point is most certain, most nearly objective; that you *are*, or that you *think*?

What are you talking about? How can I think if I don't exist?

For me the *think* part is the most certain, and the "exist, physically, *are*" part is the subset.

My post was in direct reference to the issue of whether or not consciousness is a physical brain process or not. If you want to debate about whether the physical brain even exists at all, then you will have to find somebody considerably more out of touch with reality than I am.

Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

... My post was in direct reference to the issue of whether or not consciousness is a physical brain process or not. If you want to debate about whether the physical brain even exists at all, then you will have to find somebody considerably more out of touch with reality than I am.

Dr. Stupid

So was mine.

Your arguments have successfully -- for me at least -- made any form of dualism logically impossible.

And yup, *I* exist, as do *you*. You answer the "what exists" question with "matter"; I answer with "mind". Of course perception tells us that a "physical brain" exists; you say "matter makes consciousness", I choose the alternative.

Brahman=Atman would seem then most likely, imho. You of course also accept compatabilism as correct; my answer allows reasonable expectation for libertarianism. It also provides a possible "why" that 2nd Law is violated by everything interesting in the "perceived, physical" universe.

 

[AmateurScientist]

I can't speak for Win. I don't know whether he asserts that the "mind" is not causaully efficacious on the "body" but I can tell you that you have misunderstood the p-zombie idea.

I'll take this to mean what I have done is misunderstand the import of the p-zombie idea, rather than the idea itself. I think it quite clear from my discussion within this thread that I get what the conceivability of p-zombies is supposed to illustrate.

It is not some stunning evidence that will destroy materialism. It is another way to illustrate a problem that materialism has. Pretending the problem isn't there will not make it go away, either.

Well, the argument from conceivability is sometimes put forth as a proof that materialism must be false.

You are right that using it as an illustration that there exists a problem is a different animal.

I disagree that it illustrate anything at all other than the silliness that some philosophers can indulge in when they get carried away.

It is a flawed argument. It demonstrates nothing.

I can imagine a functional replica of myself that will do every single thing I do but does not posses consciousness. Now I can imagine a "physical" replica of myself that will do the same.

This 'suggests' that consciousness is not a "physical" thing.

It only suggests that you are engaging in the same sort of equivocation or question begging that everyone who seriously entertains the p-zombie argument does.

It suggests nothing about consciousness in the real world.

I can address it in a different way, feel free to ignore me if this has already been debated:

What would you (AS) say makes you the same person I was arguing with yesterday?

You are not the same physically. Your brain is not the same physically. Some cells in your brain have died and been carried out of your brain through your blood. Other cells may have possibly been replacated.

Yes, we did this discussion quite some time ago. I'm not ignoring you, but I don't feel like rehashing it at the moment.

But "physical" really must be defined.

Well, either this is semantics or it's merely a restatement that there exists a rift among materialists, dualists, and idealists.

I don't seriously entertain dualism because I find no reasonable argument compelling me to adopt it as a sensible worldview in keeping with what I know and have learned.

I'm beginning to get the idea that this is a little like arguing about a half-empty and a half-full glass. It really depends on one's perspective.

The materialist thinks the dualist indulges in a fiction by imagining a "mind" separate from the brain.

The dualist thinks the materialist daft for failing to see that obviously the mind exists, or he wouldn't be experiencing thinking about the question at all.

Shall we settle this with pistols at dawn?

AS

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
I presume you meant "of." I have no idea what you mean. Could you explain?

I meant "if". A 'daemon' on a computer is 'aware' of other processes. This isn't the same as 'awareness' in terms of consciousness. Self-referentiality alone does not equal qualia.

There is no infinite regression. The brain is finite,

Ah...but we are discussing mind, not brain....

with a finite number of levels. Because nothing is watching the top level, the top level seems mysterious from the viewpoint of self-experience.

"Nothing" is indeed what is watching.....

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

I meant "if". A 'daemon' on a computer is 'aware' of other processes. This isn't the same as 'awareness' in terms of consciousness. Self-referentiality alone does not equal qualia.

What do you mean by "awareness"?

And tell me about qualia.

• Is it the ability to see red without looking at a red object (something I cannot do)?
• Is it the ability to discuss redness without reference to a specific object?
• Is it the ability to associate red with the memory of an object?
• Is it the ability to pick red out of a pile of color swatches?

I think that having one layer of brain "watching" another layer would produce much more than just self-awareness. It might also produce "feelings" about the objects and concepts that the lower brain was working on, particularly if some of the output of the higher brain were fed back into the lower brain. Imagine what might happen if the higher brain watched the lower brain perceiving red, then passed some of its outputs to portions of the brain that process emotions.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

You are not the same physically. Your brain is not the same physically. Some cells in your brain have died and been carried out of your brain through your blood. Other cells may have possibly been replacated.

I don't see how this question argues for materialism or dualism one way or the other. If everything is material, then duplicating it produces the same results. If my mind is external to my brain, then duplicating my brain makes no difference. Either way, no difference.

~~ Paul

 

[Soubrette]

All quotes originally posted by Loki

Sou,

Well, if you insist...

I do, I do, I do (she says insistently )

Perhaps this is a way of asking the question - how can you be 'aware' of direct access, but not have it play a part in your thought processes? No, I don't think that helps....

Because I am saying there is a difference between the actual physical experience of seeing red (the one which fires your neurons and stuff) and the whole experience of seeing red which includes not only that actual experience but HPC as well. So it does play a part in my thought processes but it doesn't appear to interact with my actual experience - it just adds a layer behind it (or on top of it, or however you'd like to express that )

The good old Monty Hall Problem - I like it a lot! And you're right - plenty of people refuse to accept the answer, even when it's explained. I just used this very same example in the Free Will thread with Rusty.

Now that is spooky - I honestly didn't know that Or otherwise I'd have gotten the name right

But if it adds *nothing*, then how can you detect it's absence?

It adds nothing to the physical experience - the one that seems to be explicable due to brain mechanics (neurons firing etc )

However it adds another layer to my experience. I am aware of being aware that I am experiencing something

You seem to be saying:
1. pSou is your average, garden variety Bristol P-Zombie, totally lacking HPC;
2. pSou suddenly 'gets' HPC via another of Dr Win's fabulous experimental devices ("the DeZombifier" -tm)
3. pSou suddenly says "damn - now I see what I was missing".

Surely, she can only say that phrase if she just gained something! Something that *does* impact on her thought processes.

I think that HPC doesn't impact on the experience but it does impact on thought processes. I have this objective awareness that I am experiencing something. P-Sou (two a penny round here) is experiencing something without that objective awareness.

Oh...then forget everything I just said

In your dreams

And don't forget that all analogies break down in the end. Rusty's Mary in a room scenario is a different way of looking at the same problem. It is not something that is to be slotted into the p-zombie analogy.

As I read it (and I like it) the big difference is that Mary knows she's never experienced red. If you asked black and white Mary and full on technicolour Mary if she has ever seen red then one of them will say yes - the other no.

The analogy there then, is merely illustrating that someone can know everything there is to know about an experience and still not have had the experience.

P-Sou knows everything there is to know about the experience but has not actually experienced the experienced

I feel that her intuitive feelings that she has HPC is nothing to do with the Mary analogy imo

Sou

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sou said:

As I read it (and I like it) the big difference is that Mary knows she's never experienced red. If you asked black and white Mary and full on technicolour Mary if she has ever seen red then one of them will say yes - the other no.

That's not the only big difference. The other is that black and white Mary has never experienced red light entering her visual system. She has not had the physical experience and she knows she has not had it.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

What do you mean by "awareness"?

I mean a direct knowledge of Being. I mean "Being aware of existence."

And tell me about qualia.

Is it the ability to see red without looking at a red object (something I cannot do)?

Is it the ability to discuss redness without reference to a specific object?

Is it the ability to associate red with the memory of an object?

Is it the ability to pick red out of a pile of color swatches?

None of the above. Qualia are not abilities at all. Whether or not one has qualia certainly affects one abilities. Certainly the first two in your list would not be possible for an entity which lacked qualia. The third and fourth could be acheived by a correctly programmed automatic machine.

For me it is so d*mned obvious what qualia are I can't really understand why anybody has to ask. Qualia are the 'raw feel' of consciousness. Qualia are what happen in your mind - the redness of seeing red. This is so easily distinguishable from the associated brain process (which has an entirely different description) that I cannot understand the source of the confusion.

I think that having one layer of brain "watching" another layer would produce much more than just self-awareness.

Why?

All operating systems and software work like this. Layer on top of layer on top of layer. It makes not the slightest difference how many layers you add, or how complex they are, all you have are lots of layers of information which refer to each other. If you want to claim that qualia result you have to explain what it is about the brain that suddenly causes this entirely new sort of phenomena to appear. Layers alone do not suffice.

It might also produce "feelings" about the objects and concepts that the lower brain was working on, particularly if some of the output of the higher brain were fed back into the lower brain.

What is it that is having the feelings?

The top layer?

If so, why is the top layer any different to all the others?

Imagine what might happen if the higher brain watched the lower brain perceiving red, then passed some of its outputs to portions of the brain that process emotions.

I still see absolutely no reason why qualia should result. I see no reason why the whole shebang you just described would not act like a computer system with lots of software layers, even with the feedback. I don't see what turns it from a zombie into something with qualia. All I see is a mixture of "Consciousness arises out of complexity" and "Consciousness arises out of information", but with no explanation why or how except for self-referentiality and feedback.

Here is some self-referential information :

10 Print "Hello"
20 Goto 10.

Here is some self-referential information with feedback :

Run_Layer()
{
printf("this is getting deeper\n");
Run_Layer();
}

Layers and self-referentiality may well explain many of the characteristics of consciousness, but they fail to answer the root question of why it exists at all.