Materialism

[c4ts]

The note helps, but one cannot tell if one is a p-zombie or not.

There are two doors. Behind one is certain death; the other, freedom.
Two fellows Jeoff and Jeon stand beside the doors, one always tells
the truth and one always tells a lie. What question could you ask in
order to safely pass through both doors? None that I can think of.

Simillarly, the p-zombie problem. Lets say Jeon has consiousness and
Jeoff does not. You examine both Jeon and Jeoff, ask questions, and
the like, you cannot tell one from the other. Even if you asked on about
the other you get an answer like, "I don't know."

In then end you cannot know if your a p-zombie,
because you give the same answer as a p-zombie.
Otherwise all p-zombies would answer or act otherwise.

P.S. I hope I got that arguement right.

What if you ask them to walk through a door? Wouldn't the one who refuses to enter be the one guarding certain death?

 

[Lord Kenneth]

DC

Just because you don't understand what one person is saying or just because you agree with someone else - it doesn't automatically make that person intelligent. That you think so reflects poorly on your own intelligence imo

Sou
(Edited to add - And AS - that was a general comment to DC - in no way am I implying you aren't intelligent - as if I'd dare )

Of course.

But AS does indeed to appear intelligent, unlike his... "competition".

 

[AmateurScientist]

There are two doors. Behind one is certain death; the other, freedom.
Two fellows Jeoff and Jeon stand beside the doors, one always tells
the truth and one always tells a lie. What question could you ask in
order to safely pass through both doors? None that I can think of.

Actually, there is a question you can ask either Jeoff or Jeon which will allow you safe passage.

Ask Jeoff (or Jeon--it doesn't matter which you choose) this question:

"If I ask Jeon (this has to be ther other guy, despite which guy you choose to direct your question to) whether I can safely pass through his door and live, will he tell me the truth?"

If Jeoff answers, "No," then you should go through Jeon's door. If he answers, "Yes," then go through Jeoff's door.

You cannot pass through both doors if one of them leads to certain death. I suspect you meant to say "the correct" door.

AS

[edited for clarity]

 

[AmateurScientist]

Of course.

But AS does indeed to appear intelligent, unlike his... "competition".

Thanks, DC. Of course, I could be a p-zombie and never know it. I could even be Win's sock puppet, engaged in a peverse, but amusing circus.



AS

 

[Win]

Loki:

Well, it seems to me that you are saying that Win and P-Zombie Win would both hold this 'qualia are real" position, and would both offer the same 'evidence' in support of their position. So, if the DIA evidence in this world leads to a 'true' conclusion, but the exact same evidence leads to 'false' in P-ZombieWorld, then the evidence doesn't actually tell us which world we're in, does it? How could it?

The source of confusion, I think, is that here, and later in your post, you seem to be suggesting that you need to take my word for it that I'm not a p-zombie, and that qualia exist.

You don't.

You know yourself that you have phenomenal experiences. You don't have to take anyone's word for that. Since you know that you have those phenomenal experiences, it is rational to suppose that other people have them, too.

So the evidence, your direct access to your own phenomenal consciousness, tells you that this isn't zombie world.

 

[AmateurScientist]

For some strange (to me) reason, a PZombie who has never had DIA, still tries to convince me that he has indeed had it. He gets frustrated as he tries to express in 3rd person terms the 1st person perspective he claims to have. He insists that there is "something it is like to be a bat", and "something it is like to be a humna", and that he knows this to be true because he has DIA. If I suggest to him that perhaps he doesn't have DIA, he scoffs and ridicules me, saying that if I'm stupid enough to deny such a basic fact of human existence then I'm just a dogmatic materialist who will never listen to anything that threatens my "need to believe". When I ask him what evidence can he provide to back up this claim, he gets really frustrated, and shouts "I just told you - I have direct internal access to qualia. What more do you want me to say!". And yet, the entire time, he in fact doesn't have DIA! Again, the question (for me) remains - why is the P-Zombie so passionately defending his DIA when it in fact isn't there? And this leads directly to "if the P-Zombie can be so wrong, yet so adamant, about DIA, then why should I trust Win (or Sou's) assertion that their claim of DIA is anymore reliable than the P-Zombie?"

A very good question. I have been asking essentially (although I don't think Win understands the meaning of the word "essentially") the same question, albeit phrased very differently.

I have not gotten a substantive response that reflects an appreciation for the insight behind the question. I don't suppose that you will get one that satisfies you either.

I could be wrong.

AS

 

[Loki]

Win,

...you seem to be suggesting that you need to take my word for it that I'm not a p-zombie, and that qualia exist.

No, that's not the confusion (I think - perhaps I'm confused about that?)

So the evidence, your direct access to your own phenomenal consciousness, tells you that this isn't zombie world.

But this is precisely the answer I get from the P-Zombie.

"I'm sorry, you're just a P-Zombie - you don't have direct access, you just think you do" I say.
"Well, you might think that, but I can assure you that I *know* for a fact that I do have direct access" replies the P-Zombie.

Why is he so sure he has it, since he doesn't ? If he can be just as certain as I am that he has it, then why should I discount his certainty, and trust my certainty?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Can someone define p-zombie in terms of other, well-defined concepts (not, e.g., consciousness)?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

.....why should I discount his certainty, and trust my certainty?

*I* think. Who cares what his problem is?

Ah, nevermind.

 

[Win]

Loki:

No, that's not the confusion (I think - perhaps I'm confused about that?)

I think you may be. Let's play it out a little.

But this is precisely the answer I get from the P-Zombie.

Yes. But the issue isn't whether I am a p-zombie. The issue is whether you are.

The evidence doesn't come from what I tell you. Whether I am a p-zombie or not is irrelevant.

Why is he so sure he has it, since he doesn't ? If he can be just as certain as I am that he has it, then why should I discount his certainty, and trust my certainty?

Why should you trust your certainty? You *know* that phenomenal consciousness exists because you have direct access to it. The p-zombie, while honestly believing he does, doesn't, and there is a qualitative difference between your experience and your p-zombie twin's experience, or rather lack of it.

The only evidence you'll ever have for the existence of phenomenal consciousness is your own.

The point of the p-zombie thought experiment is to show that it's possible to exhibit all the behaviours and have all the beliefs associated with having phenomenal consciousness and still lack it. But that doesn't justify saying, aha, if all the behaviours and beliefs are explained, that's consciousness explained. Because the qualia themselves are still left unexplained. And each of us knows that they exist.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

The point of the p-zombie thought experiment is to show that it's possible to exhibit all the behaviours and have all the beliefs associated with having phenomenal consciousness and still lack it. But that doesn't justify saying, aha, if all the behaviours and beliefs are explained, that's consciousness explained. Because the qualia themselves are still left unexplained. And each of us knows that they exist.

Why not say, instead, that consciousness is a content-free term? It's just a word we made up to encompass the mish-mash of self-awareness, sensory input, memory, and so forth, that make up our brains.

~~ Paul

 

[c4ts]

Win said:
Why not say, instead, that consciousness is a content-free term? It's just a word we made up to encompass the mish-mash of self-awareness, sensory input, memory, and so forth, that make up our brains.

~~ Paul

Becuase UCE says that isn't what he's talking about.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Okay, what if I amend my statement?

Why not say, instead, that consciousness is a content-free term? It's just a word we made up to encompass the mish-mash of self-awareness, sensory input, memory, higher-level function monitoring, and so forth, that make up our brains.

What, precisely, is this elusive consciousness that we spend so much time ruminating over? I'm not asking if it's a product of our brains or something outside our brains. I'm asking exactly what portion of our overall experience are we calling consciousness?

http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwphil/pctall.html

"The problem with the notion of "phenomenal consciousness" is that the term is so laden with ambiguities that we cannot trust it to pick out any one kind of mental state."

~~ Paul

 

[c4ts]

Does "intelligent perception of experience" help?

 

[Loki]

Win,

Yes. But the issue isn't whether I am a p-zombie. The issue is whether you are.

No, the issue is why is P-Zombie Win (pWin) so sure he's not a P-Zombie.

The evidence doesn't come from what I tell you. Whether I am a p-zombie or not is irrelevant.

Win to loki:
"The only evidence you'll ever have for the existence of phenomenal consciousness is your own. It is correct".

Win to pLoki
"The only evidence you'll ever have for the existence of phenomenal consciousness is your own. It is, unfortuantely, not correct".

Because the qualia themselves are still left unexplained. And each of us knows that they exist.

Yes, including pWin! He knows, just as well as you and I, that he has these qualia. Except he doesn't...

...and there is a qualitative difference between your experience and your p-zombie twin's experience, or rather lack of it

If I ask pWin (who doesn't know he's a P-Zombie) "is there a qualitative difference between your experience and your p-zombie twin" he will answer "yes, because the p-zombie doesn't have the same direct access I have - he's missing the 'quality' that I have access to". Now, you and I both snicker behind his back, because we know that poor old pWin is deluding himself - although he thinks and says he has this 'quality' aspect to his experiences, we know he doesn't.

Still, for me the question remains how can he talk so assertively (and honestly - by definition, he's not lying, unless you are also lying - after all, he's an exact replica of you!) about his direct access if he doesn't have it? And if he can be so completely fooled into believing that he has it, then why can't I be? You seem to be saying "you are correct to trust your own perception", and also "a P-Zombie is wrong to trust his own perception". Why the difference, unless you are just starting from the assumption that there is a difference (even if you can't explain the difference)?

Let me mix your thought experiments a little. We have a "DupliZombifier". I strap Win into the 'in' chair in room A. In rooms B and C we have 'out' chairs. I throw the switch, and instantly I get a 'true' copy of Win in one 'out' chair, and a p-Zombie copy of Win in the other 'out' chair (as a small offering to AmateurScientist, lets just say that the Win in the 'in' chair is vaporised after a moment (or two) of excruiciating pain - sorry Win, but I'm playing to the audience here and it's my thought experiment, okay?). Anyway, the DupliZombifier also includes a randomizer, so no one knows which room (B or C) contains the p-zombie.

So we sit down to interview our two potential Wins. Both answer the same to any question regarding qualia, direct access, and 'evidence'. Neither is lying. Both are at pains to express the 'quality' of their direct access. Both deny that it could be some sort of illusion. "I know what you're getting at", they both cry in stereo, "but you're wrong - I can assure you I'm not the p-zombie. Although I can't prove it to you, I have only to 'look within' to see that I do indeed have this extra 'experience' that marks me as the non-zombie." Of course, at least one of them is wrong. Why is it not possible they are both wrong?

 

[Soubrette]

Loki:

...snipped

Why should you trust your certainty? You *know* that phenomenal consciousness exists because you have direct access to it. The p-zombie, while honestly believing he does, doesn't, and there is a qualitative difference between your experience and your p-zombie twin's experience, or rather lack of it.

..snipped

Loki

I think this answers our question. If my HPC was sucked out of my body by some maliciously evil polymorph then I would know the difference.

So in your duplicate example - the duplicate Win without HPC would be aware of his loss - would be aware of the qualitative difference in his experience if you like before and after duplication.

P-Sou only assumes she has direct access because she never has. If she knew what it was like then she would know that she didn't have it - and there's a paradox to play around with

So p-Sou is sure that she is not a p-zombie because she has every physical aspect of an experience. Her neurons in her brain fire in exactly the same way mine do. To that extent her experience and mine are the same. So intuitively she tells me that of course she is experiencing the experience.

But she isn't *sharp intake of breath* she is having the experience. She is not experiencing it as well as having it (damn our crappy vocab though ) I on the other hand know that I have that experience of the experience because I both have access to both the having of the experience and the experiencing of the having of the experience.

So my experience is a two layered thing - hers is only one

Sou

 

[Guest]

Becuase UCE says that isn't what he's talking about.

'self-awareness' is exactly what I am talking about. I am talking about the awareness rather than the content that one is aware of.

Paul :

I'm asking exactly what portion of our overall experience are we calling consciousness?

It is all of it. Everything you experience you experience relative to "I". I am talking about that relationship itself - the relationship between "I" and "everything I am aware of." You are attempting to put "I" within the mish-mash of everything that "I" am aware of.

 

[Loki]

Sou,

I on the other hand know that I have that experience of the experience because I both have access to both the having of the experience and the experiencing of the having of the experience.

So my experience is a two layered thing - hers is only one

But the problem (for me) still remains - pSou will answer exactly as you have just done. PSou assures me that she does in fact have the two layers. When I tell her she's mistaken, and in fact she isn't really having the experience of having the experience, she looks at me slightly strangely, starts to move slowly towards the nearest exit, and politely attempts to change the topic of conversation. In her eyes, I'm some sort of idiot that simply refuses to be told what to her is an obvious and self evident truth - she *does* have these two layers.

How can pSou be so adamant that she :
(a) totally understands the difference between 'having the experience' and 'having the experience of having the experience';
(b) she understands this because she can "look within" and verify for herself that these 'two layers' are in fact present.

Yet, she doesn't have the two layers. If she can be so sure yet so wrong, why can't you be so sure yet so wrong)?

 

[Soubrette]

All quotes originally posted by Loki
Sou,


But the problem (for me) still remains - pSou will answer exactly as you have just done. PSou assures me that she does in fact have the two layers. When I tell her she's mistaken, and in fact she isn't really having the experience of having the experience, she looks at me slightly strangely, starts to move slowly towards the nearest exit, and politely attempts to change the topic of conversation. In her eyes, I'm some sort of idiot that simply refuses to be told what to her is an obvious and self evident truth - she *does* have these two layers.

Pfft if she's anything like me (and I understand she's almost an exact duplicate) then she'll be enjoying the argument - although let's hope she never finds out she's wrong because pouty Sou lacks dignity

I think she won't actually believe she has the two layers (don't tell Win though ). And I'm willing to confess that here I'm groping on my own and without Win's help. I think if you could explain HPC clearly enough to her she would have to admit that she does not have that objective awareness of her experience that I do - otherwise a p-zombie would not be logically coherent. But the fact that she would believe she does would be a huge hurdle to overcome - because everytime you tried to describe the experience she would say that yes she does experience that, and probably roll her eyes a little just to tease

How can pSou be so adamant that she :
(a) totally understands the difference between 'having the experience' and 'having the experience of having the experience';
(b) she understands this because she can "look within" and verify for herself that these 'two layers' are in fact present.

Yet, she doesn't have the two layers. If she can be so sure yet so wrong, why can't you be so sure yet so wrong)?

She's adamant because our actual experience is the same apart from HPC and that adds nothing to the actual experience.

She understands it because when she looks within she knows she is having an experience. She knows it. she feels it. Just like you and I. She is mistaking her knowledge of the experience for the objective experience of the experience.

And for me this is one of the strengths of the p-zombie argument. You don't understand why she can be so adamant that she has those two layers - it's because she is mistaken. And she is mistaken because HPC adds nothing to the experience. So her description of an experience and mine would be the same.

Sou

 

[AmateurScientist]

For anyone who cares to answer:

(Let me assume my best enigmatic hammekg voice):

Qualia *exist*?

(Or is that, "*Qualia* exist?")



***************

Is the above question epitemological or ontological?

(Think about it--it just might be a more sophisticated question that you initially think)


***************

Does cyberspace *exist*?

***************

Isn't this really the point of departure between those who accept that the conceivability of p-zombies kills materialism and those who do not?


If cyberspace's existence can be seen so clearly as an ontological question explained in terms of 1's and 0's at the machine level, and dualists are perfectly willing to accept that answer, why is it so much harder to accept that HPC is explainable in terms of neurons firing in concert?

Is it the access to experience thing again? Well, don't you have access to the experience that cyberspace is "out there" where you can visit this website and that, complete with addresses and apparent different "locations?"

Why is one experience any more reliable than the other, from an epistemological perspective?

You could ask this as, couldn't HPC really just be a very convincing illusion?

If you are inclined to answer "no," then isn't this just an intuitive response, not an empirical one, as the dualists here seem to insist?

AS