Materialism

[Soubrette]

And one last Loki

p-Sou doesn't look within and verify she has direct access to HPC - she can't - she doesn't have it, I do (evil maniacal laughter echoes in dark corridor). She intuitively assumes she does because her actual experience and mine is the same (apart from the HPC part which adds nothing to that actual experience)

Sou

 

[Guest]

AS:

Is the above question epitemological or ontological?

It is ontological. We do not require philosophy to tell us that qualia exist. All we need to do is wake up and smell the coffee.

Does cyberspace *exist*?

Yep, but cyberspace isn't qualia.

Isn't this really the point of departure between those who accept that the conceivability of p-zombies kills materialism and those who do not?

If cyberspace's existence can be seen so clearly as an ontological question explained in terms of 1's and 0's at the machine level, and dualists are perfectly willing to accept that answer, why is it so much harder to accept that HPC is explainable in terms of neurons firing in concert?

Is it the access to experience thing again?

Yep. We have no reason to believe cyberspace is self-aware. We have reason to believe humans are self-aware.

Well, don't you have access to the experience that cyberspace is "out there" where you can visit this website and that, complete with addresses and apparent different "locations?"

Why is one experience any more reliable than the other, from an epistemological perspective?

Because we know DIRECTLY that brains have an internal self-awareness. We do not need "epistemology" aka "the study of what is knowable" - because we already know. On the other hand, we can demonstrate clearly that not only do we not know whether cyberspace is self-aware - we can NEVER know.

You could ask this as, couldn't HPC really just be a very convincing illusion?

NO! Who or what is experiencing the illusion? It makes no difference whether you call the experience real or illusory because all that matters is that there is an experience.

If you are inclined to answer "no," then isn't this just an intuitive response, not an empirical one, as the dualists here seem to insist?

It is empirical. The existence of a 1st-person experience is an empirical fact. The theoretical inability to determine whether a computer (or cyberspace) has an internal 1st-person experience is also an empirical fact.

 

[Loki]

Sou (and Win),

Thanks, but no sale I'm afraid. I've travelled this line before, and reached the same terminus as before. Try as I might, I just don't seem to be able to conceive of a difference between my 'direct access' and pLoki's lack thereof. I think simple repetition of the same points is unlikely to bring a breakthrough, so for now I'll just go back to my previous position - just assuming that it's somehow possible to honestly believe you are internally accessing something that in fact you aren't - yet not understanding how such a thing could be. But thanks for trying...

 

[Guest]

Accepting that these are empirical facts rather than intuitive guesses was without doubt the most important philosophical insight I have ever grasped. It changed my whole perspective on existence. I am aware that the claim that materialism has been demonstrated logically flawed will continue to be resisted by some of the people here. It is resisted by those people for the same reasons that accepting it was world-changing for me. Before that acceptance it was a case of taking a deep breath, and preparing to re-evaluate everything I thought I knew. I went through 3 weeks of calling myself a nihilist. I do not underestimate the importance of whether or not these are empirically demonstrable facts or mere intuitions. In my mind I had to demonstrate to myself that materialism was false with 100% certainty, and I believe this has been done. I also believe it has been shown as such on this board many times. That 100% certainty was the key to opening up whole new vistas of intellectual and spiritual understandings. I get the impression that some of the materialists here will only accept materialism is false if they are spoon-fed a fully-formed alternative worldview to adopt. No such worldview is available. Rather than there being a quick answer, there is an entire new ball-game in the offing - a ball-game where both ends of the pitch are in use, instead of just half of it. Furthermore it is even possible to play that ball-game without forgetting science and skepticism. Indeed retaining science and skepticism in ones armoury makes the investigation of the non-materialistic realm potentially a lot more profound, since one can still reject any claims or perceptions which clash with science - or at the very least one is forced to find a way to make sense of both science and metaphysics together. There is life after materialism, even for the skeptic.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Hi I have a lot of questions, I do hope you will forgive my ignorance of certain terms.

Well, I may be usuing a different concept of 'consciousness' to you. I woudl say all of the above are mere zombie-functions being witnessed by consciousness. Maybe the Brahmans experience something higher, once the lower has been removed.

What are the Brahmans? I did a google search but got results for an video game.

I think if you could explain HPC clearly enough to her she would have to admit that she does not have that objective awareness of her experience that I do - otherwise a p-zombie would not be logically coherent.

First what is HPC? Now if we say that we can explain HPC 'clearly enough' to grant a complete understanding that is the materialist view. The dualist are the one who say you can explain it as completely as possible but that is always lacking, and it is lacking the true experience of it.

Loki:



I think you may be. Let's play it out a little.



Yes. But the issue isn't whether I am a p-zombie. The issue is whether you are.

The evidence doesn't come from what I tell you. Whether I am a p-zombie or not is irrelevant.



Why should you trust your certainty? You *know* that phenomenal consciousness exists because you have direct access to it. The p-zombie, while honestly believing he does, doesn't, and there is a qualitative difference between your experience and your p-zombie twin's experience, or rather lack of it.

The only evidence you'll ever have for the existence of phenomenal consciousness is your own.

The point of the p-zombie thought experiment is to show that it's possible to exhibit all the behaviours and have all the beliefs associated with having phenomenal consciousness and still lack it. But that doesn't justify saying, aha, if all the behaviours and beliefs are explained, that's consciousness explained. Because the qualia themselves are still left unexplained. And each of us knows that they exist.

Thanks for the explanation! I think I understand what is meant by the p-zombie argument before!

What is not important is whether p-zombies can ever exist or not.

What is important is that we can think of automitons that are functionally and physically identical but that lack consciousness. Because we can think that way it suggests that when we think of conscoiusness we are not thinking of anything physical. In our thoughts we are naturally attributing consciousness to a non-phsyical aspect, thereby providing evidence to suggest dualism.

But what if I assert that it is not possible for a human being to think of something that is completely physically identical to something else?

I change my mind, you have concinved me that p-zombie is a very interesting argument. Thank you.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Sou (and Win),

Thanks, but no sale I'm afraid. I've travelled this line before, and reached the same terminus as before. Try as I might, I just don't seem to be able to conceive of a difference between my 'direct access' and pLoki's lack thereof. I think simple repetition of the same points is unlikely to bring a breakthrough, so for now I'll just go back to my previous position - just assuming that it's somehow possible to honestly believe you are internally accessing something that in fact you aren't - yet not understanding how such a thing could be. But thanks for trying...

It's like the Mary in a black + white room, in a way.

This is Chalmers idea, (I think), but is not mine.

Mary lives in a black and white room wearing black and white clothes and painted black and white her entire life. Mary has never seen any colors before, she has only seen black and white. However, every day she reads in her black and white books about the color red. Every day she talks on her black and white phone to someone who explains the color red to her as completely as possible.

Mary knows eveything she can be taught and told about red. EVERYTHING. Mary can answer questions any questions about red that you ask her. If you were to show Mary a red, green, blue, yellow, and orange blocks Mary could tell you which one was red.

But one day someone brings Mary a red flower. Now Mary has the experience of Red. She did not have this before.

P-zombie is Mary in the black and white room. Conscious person is Mary that has actually seen Red.

Both can answer any question about red. But only one Mary has experienced Red.

 

[Guest]

Rusty

What are the Brahmans? I did a google search but got results for an video game.

The Brahmans are the highest spiritual class in Hindu society. They are 'buddhas', or hindu priests.

http://www.buddhistdoor.com/passissue/9704/sources/teach29.htm

First what is HPC?

Hard Problem Consciousness. The elements of consciousness that materialism can't explain. The experience of the content of the mind, as opposed to the content itself.

 

[AmateurScientist]

AS:

It is ontological. We do not require philosophy to tell us that qualia exist. All we need to do is wake up and smell the coffee.

But UCE, this is precisely what I'm asking about. You think qualia are so obvious, and I don't. Why is my doubt so unbelievable to you?

I'm asking about existence. What does it mean for qualia to exist? It does no good to merely assert that they do because we experience them. That is a naked assertion, just as you are so fond of labeling my arguments.

There are plenty of illusions we experience as real, but which are in fact illusions. Why can't the very existence of qualia be one of them?

Yep, but cyberspace isn't qualia.

But you experience cyberspace as a seamless web. It is analogous because although you experience cyberspace as a seamless web, it isn't really one. It's really an illusion created by a vast network of discrete computers linked by wires and electrical radiation.

Yep. We have no reason to believe cyberspace is self-aware. We have reason to believe humans are self-aware.

The question isn't about self-awareness. It's about existence in a meaningful sense.

Because we know DIRECTLY that brains have an internal self-awareness.

I understand self-awareness to be different from the concept of qualia. After all, the p-zombie is self-aware, right?

How do you know you have qualia? Because you intuit that you do? Doesn't the p-zombie intuit the same thing, albeit incorrectly?

Isn't this going around in circles? Aren't p-zombie argument proponents chasing their tails?

We do not need "epistemology" aka "the study of what is knowable" - because we already know.

Do we? Or are we relying too heavily on our intuition to tell us we have it? Can't this recursive feedback loop produce some bizarre results? The illusion of the existence of qualia, perhaps?

On the other hand, we can demonstrate clearly that not only do we not know whether cyberspace is self-aware - we can NEVER know.

Then you've just turned my ontological question into an epistemological one.

NO! Who or what is experiencing the illusion? It makes no difference whether you call the experience real or illusory because all that matters is that there is an experience.

Bingo! There *IS* the experience. Is this ontological or epistemological?

It is empirical. The existence of a 1st-person experience is an empirical fact.

It is no more empirical fact than the "empirical fact" of the hypochondric who has convinced himself that he has an undetectable form of terminal cancer. Is either "fact" more reliable than the other?

AS

 

[Soubrette]

Sou (and Win),

Thanks, but no sale I'm afraid. I've travelled this line before, and reached the same terminus as before. Try as I might, I just don't seem to be able to conceive of a difference between my 'direct access' and pLoki's lack thereof. I think simple repetition of the same points is unlikely to bring a breakthrough, so for now I'll just go back to my previous position - just assuming that it's somehow possible to honestly believe you are internally accessing something that in fact you aren't - yet not understanding how such a thing could be. But thanks for trying...

Hey - cheater - I just told you I like to argue and you pull the rug from beneath my feet

But p-Sou doesn't have direct access. She intuitively believes she does because there is no actual difference between my actual experience and hers.

It's a bit like the intuitive feel that many people get on that quiz choice question. Hobson's choice or something. There are three doors, one with a prize behind. You choose one and then one of the empty doors is opened. Do you switch to the other door?

Most people intuitively feel there is a 50/50 per cent chance of being right - so there is no point switching. They intuitively know this. And many argue this point fiercely and will keep arguing. Alot of people are never convinced by the argument - others are convinced only when they've done their own tests and played around with the scenario a bit *whistles and looks furtive*

But if you understand statistics properly then you will know you should switch and furthermore you will know that the other person is wrong - even though they are convinced they are right.

So I know because I have direct access to HPC. P-Sou knows because of her intuitive feelings - not because she has direct access.

And she has intuitive feelings because HPC adds nothing to the actual experience of seeing red. So she intuitively believes she experiences exactly the same as I do - because we have the same actual experience.

Oh and I like to have the last word too



Sou
(Edited for clarity)

 

[Guest]

AS :

But UCE, this is precisely what I'm asking about. You think qualia are so obvious, and I don't. Why is my doubt so unbelievable to you?

Because Qualia are the one things we do know exist. From qualia we infer the existence of a material world. To then claim that the material world exists but the qualia do not appears to me to be the ultimate in upside-down thinking.

I'm asking about existence. What does it mean for qualia to exist? It does no good to merely assert that they do because we experience them. That is a naked assertion, just as you are so fond of labeling my arguments.

Well, that is the question. They do exist. I think you know what my response is to "what does it mean for them to exist".

There are plenty of illusions we experience as real, but which are in fact illusions. Why can't the very existence of qualia be one of them?

Because qualia are the 'baseline' - they are the ground within which all illusions occur. Without them there can be no illusions, and no reality.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yep, but cyberspace isn't qualia.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But you experience cyberspace as a seamless web. It is analogous because although you experience cyberspace as a seamless web, it isn't really one. It's really an illusion created by a vast network of discrete computers linked by wires and electrical radiation.

Well, that is interesting with regard to the unity of systems which can be otherwise considered as distributed. This is interesting in its own right, but has little to do with the Hard Problem.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yep. We have no reason to believe cyberspace is self-aware. We have reason to believe humans are self-aware.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The question isn't about self-awareness. It's about existence in a meaningful sense.

It is certainly about different modes of existence. Both the physical world and qualia 'exist'. The question is how these types of existence are related. Materialism runs into trouble because once it accepts there are two different types of existence, and they are both real, it can't effectively put the genie back in the box and claim that consciousness is physical on any grounds apart from that it must do to protect materialism, and this is not convincing to a person who is willing to accept the reality of the perceived dualism of mind and matter and wishes to find an answer that actually makes sense. You don't find the truth by running away from awkward questions and inconsistencies.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because we know DIRECTLY that brains have an internal self-awareness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I understand self-awareness to be different from the concept of qualia. After all, the p-zombie is self-aware, right?

No. The P-zombie is not self-aware, any more than your toaster is.

How do you know you have qualia? Because you intuit that you do? Doesn't the p-zombie intuit the same thing, albeit incorrectly?

I know I have qualia because qualia are my means of detecting that I myself exist. Without qualia I would be aware of neither myself nor the Universe. The P-zombie is aware of nothing. It is an automaton.

Isn't this going around in circles? Aren't p-zombie argument proponents chasing their tails?

I don't think so, no. They are a bit like the schroedingers cat proponents. They are trying to highlight a problem, in order to be better able to understand the solution.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We do not need "epistemology" aka "the study of what is knowable" - because we already know.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Do we? Or are we relying too heavily on our intuition to tell us we have it? Can't this recursive feedback loop produce some bizarre results? The illusion of the existence of qualia, perhaps?

Again...what or who is experiencing this illusion. It is the existence of the "I" which is being decieved that matters, not the deception itself.

It is no more empirical fact than the "empirical fact" of the hypochondric who has convinced himself that he has an undetectable form of terminal cancer. Is either "fact" more reliable than the other?

Depends whether the cancer is as self-evident as qualia are.

I'm not sure what you mean by "qualia don't meaningfully exist". They are my whole world.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Hey UE when you say that qualia is the whole world, I am curious, do you mean qualia is your whole world because that is all you can percieve of the world, or do you mean that the world only exists through the qualia?

If you would prefer I will go start a new thread. I find this all very interesting

 

[The One called Neo]

There are plenty of illusions we experience as real, but which are in fact illusions. Why can't the very existence of qualia be one of them?

AS,

I wonder if you could tell me what the distinction is between declaring qualia to be "illusionary" and declaring them to be real? What I'm getting at is if they seem to exist, ie we appear to be directly apprehensive of qualia, than don't they exist by definition?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Here is the problem I see with Win's argument. Within dualism there is a dual meaning to "you" or "I". One meaning being the aspects of the mind which are physical brain processes, and the other being these other aspects which, according to Win, are not causally efficacious on the physical.

Win acknowledges that the brain does the thinking and remembering. So consider the statement "You know you have HPC because you have direct access to it".

This is really a non-sequitur. The first part "You know you have HPC" can only mean "you're brain knows you have HPC", since it is your brain that "knows" things. From what Win has said, the non-brain stuff is limited to the experiences themselves. This aspect is simply not cognitively equipped to interpret information, or draw conclusions. It is not meaningful to say that it "knows" anything.

But the second part, that you have direct access to it, is clearly false if you are talking about the brain. By definition, Win is claiming that the brain does not have direct access to it.

So what aspect of me knows that I possess HPC? If it is my brain, then how does it know it, and more importantly, how does it know it is right? If it is not my brain, but instead something that has "direct access to it", then how does it know anything? Where do the cognitive processes necessary for "me" to conclude from my direct access of HPC that I have it, come from?

And, of course, since it is Win's brain which is telling us all these wonderful things, from where does it obtain this information? The question "Why does Win's brain, which is not affected in any way by HPC, believe that Win has HPC" is dismissed by Win as some sort of coincidence. Why? Isn't it far more parsimonious to conclude that your brain believes you have experiences because it is, in fact, your brain which has direct access to them?

To assert that you brain knows something which is true, but that it has no way of knowing that it is true, is nonsensical.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Loki]

Sou,

I just told you I like to argue and you pull the rug from beneath my feet

Well, if you insist...

But p-Sou doesn't have direct access. She intuitively believes she does because there is no actual difference between my actual experience and hers.

Perhaps this is a way of asking the question - how can you be 'aware' of direct access, but not have it play a part in your thought processes? No, I don't think that helps....

It's a bit like the intuitive feel that many people get on that quiz choice question. Hobson's choice or something. There are three doors, one with a prize behind. You choose one and then one of the empty doors is opened. Do you switch to the other door?

The good old Monty Hall Problem - I like it a lot! And you're right - plenty of people refuse to accept the answer, even when it's explained. I just used this very same example in the Free Will thread with Rusty.

So I know because I have direct access to HPC. P-Sou knows because of her intuitive feelings - not because she has direct access.

And she has intuitive feelings because HPC adds nothing to the actual experience of seeing red.

But if it adds *nothing*, then how can you detect it's absence? You seem to be saying :

1. pSou is your average, garden variety Bristol P-Zombie, totally lacking HPC;
2. pSou suddenly 'gets' HPC via another of Dr Win's fabulous experimental devices ("the DeZombifier" -tm)
3. pSou suddenly says "damn - now I see what I was missing".

Surely, she can only say that phrase if she just gained something! Something that *does* impact on her thought processes.

Oh and I like to have the last word too.

Oh...then forget everything I just said

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rusty,

P-zombie is Mary in the black and white room. Conscious person is Mary that has actually seen Red.

Both can answer any question about red. But only one Mary has experienced Red

This doesn't help, because pMary will insist that she has in fact experienced red.

 

[Interesting Ian]

It's a bit like the intuitive feel that many people get on that quiz choice question. Hobson's choice or something. There are three doors, one with a prize behind. You choose one and then one of the empty doors is opened. Do you switch to the other door?

Most people intuitively feel there is a 50/50 per cent chance of being right - so there is no point switching. They intuitively know this. And many argue this point fiercely and will keep arguing. Alot of people are never convinced by the argument - others are convinced only when they've done their own tests and played around with the scenario a bit *whistles and looks furtive*

But if you understand statistics properly then you will know you should switch and furthermore you will know that the other person is wrong - even though they are convinced they are right.

If you understand statistics properly then you will know?? Oh yes, you think so do you? "Maria Vos-Savant", the person with the highest IQ in the world, was asked this question on some TV programme or other. She gave the correct response that one should switch. Subsequent to that there were howls of rage eminating from the academic community, especially mathematicians and physicists , deploring her understanding of probability! They also questioned the entire educational system that it should produce people with such a poor grasp of probability. One of them even mentioned that it must be something about womans brains making them unable to grasp simple logic!

This from f*cking daft mental retard tw*ts like Tez. Ok, I admit that I initially thought that the probability wouldn't change if I didn't switch. But after reading her explanation it was absolutely clear. And I have never ever studied anything on statistics or probability. So much for what education can do for you

It just reinforces my conviction that a lot of education (not all!) is a complete waste of time.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,


This doesn't help, because pMary will insist that she has in fact experienced red.

Exactly! She will insist she has and believe that she has, when she, in fact, cannot!

Therefore it appears that the ability of "experiencing" red is contained in something that is not "physical"!

 

[Loki]

Rusty,

Therefore it appears that the ability of "experiencing" red is contained in something that is not "physical"!

Or the ability of "experiencing red' is not what it seems;
Or P-Zombies are not conceivable.

 

[Guest]

Or the ability of "experiencing red' is not what it seems;

How can it not be what it seems? "What it seems" is all that matters - Qualia ARE "what reality seems to be". So long as you "seem to be experiencing red", then qualia exist. Your response is a bit like people who don't want to accept Bells theorem positing that logic might be wrong - i.e. posit anything to avoid accepting the 'unacceptable' but obvious.

 

[Guest]

Rusty :

Hey UE when you say that qualia is the whole world, I am curious, do you mean qualia is your whole world because that is all you can percieve of the world, or do you mean that the world only exists through the qualia?

Firstly, I have observed that all I can percieve about the world is qualia. Secondly, I think that if you follow the logic through that it is implied that the world only exists through qualia. Without qualia there is no world. In what way can a lifeless or zombie Universe be said to exist? How would such a Universe differ from, say, an unobserved mathematical fractal? Are they not both just 'potential'? Are they not both just 'unobserved information'? For me, the only solution to the Hard Problem is to understand that Qualia, i.e. consciousness, is the primary thing which it exists - it IS reality. The physical world is just a collective pool of information which different fragments of that consciousness access via structures embedded within this physical/information 'Universe' ("brains").

edited :

The first and biggest problem with grasping this is to do with time. The hurdle is that the materialist concieves of matter existing within a linear time-frame. They see the matter as pre-dating the consciousness. But this is also a misconception - because from the point of view of consciousness it is always "NOW", and the past and future are much like directions in space - continuing infinitely backwards and forwards from the present place of reference. You have to understand these two different ways of interpreting time to be able to see the two different ways of interpreting what reality is made of. Both interpretations are useful - and understanding the way reality works requires synthesising both views together.

 

[Peskanov]

Boiling down

It seems we are all playing the usual game of label changing here... First the question is "behaviour without consciousness", now is "behaviour without awareness".
Nobody seems to acknowledge our lack of understanding of mind activity (my sin also, I confess).

Well, I think we can boil down the problem of p-zombies to these 2 points:

1.- Is awareness an active part of the mind? Or a passive one?
If you say awareness is pasive, p-zombies are logically posible. But this does not make materialism false, only make awareness redundant in human behaviour. Here UCE could use the evolution argument...
If you say awareness is a key component in decisions, you must prove that this piece of the mind can be succesfully emulated to make p-zombies logically possible. I don't see it possible now.

2.- Does emulation prove anything about the true nature of the emulated object? If pzombies are posible, does it prove materialism is false?
I can use more than 7 different algor. to obtain a circle. If I can make a circle without using the sinus function, does my algor. tell something about the nature of sinus?
I think not!