metacristi
Muse
- Joined
- Sep 17, 2002
- Messages
- 760
UCE
No intention to start a polemics I'm only trying to find the most rational position one could adopt in the problem of consciousness [and the relation with materialism/physicalism].
Materialism=the view that everything that actually exists is material.This definition is widely used but it is generally understood as implying the rejection of all metaphysical constructs [on this site too] .
Personally I think the most flexible definition of 'materialism' should encompass even constructs that are seen today as 'metaphysical'.Indeed no one has disproved yet vitalism [consciousness 'expanding' in 'other realms'-physical however-not probed yet by science] for example-the brain being only one component,a sort of 'co-processor' useful for action at our 'physical' level.
My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.
The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.Even if reductionism at the laws of nature were impossible.
The creators of 'Deep Junior' [a chess computer program] for example,whilst recognizing that it's 'raw' power of analyze was well under that of 'Deep Blue',claimed that it could easily overcome this drawback in its match against Kasparov by playing 'more like a human'.A thing which Kasparov openly recognized afterward:the machine suprised him on more occasions by playing more 'intuitively' exactly as human players [sacrificing figures to obtain the initiative only without the prospect recapturing them immediately afterwad].
The conclusion that many specialists drew after this match Kasparov-Deep Junior [3-3] was that machines can think as humans [and it's not too far the time when a human grandmaster will have to 'fight ' hard to even snatch a draw]...
That in spite of the fact that in other games [go] the computers still play only at an average level.
Probably that had in mind those who said that science indicates that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter.I agree this is an acceptable argument for their position.
However only if eventually it will be proved that consciousness is computable I think we will have sufficient reasons to conclude that materialism [usual version] is correct and all other views [idealism included] can be [safely] discarded.
Only if...till then all other positions are as acceptable as materialism [usual definition],at the level of belief of course.
Personally,in the light of today's knowledge,I am not at all sure that materialism [usual definition] is the only possibility left open to our today's science...I remain open at all possibilities.In spite of having my beliefs [preferences based on 'subjective' evidence too].
Yep, but every time you claim consciousness arises from the brain you are depending on materialistic assumptions rather than scientific evidence.
No intention to start a polemics I'm only trying to find the most rational position one could adopt in the problem of consciousness [and the relation with materialism/physicalism].
Materialism=the view that everything that actually exists is material.This definition is widely used but it is generally understood as implying the rejection of all metaphysical constructs [on this site too] .
Personally I think the most flexible definition of 'materialism' should encompass even constructs that are seen today as 'metaphysical'.Indeed no one has disproved yet vitalism [consciousness 'expanding' in 'other realms'-physical however-not probed yet by science] for example-the brain being only one component,a sort of 'co-processor' useful for action at our 'physical' level.
My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.
The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.Even if reductionism at the laws of nature were impossible.
The creators of 'Deep Junior' [a chess computer program] for example,whilst recognizing that it's 'raw' power of analyze was well under that of 'Deep Blue',claimed that it could easily overcome this drawback in its match against Kasparov by playing 'more like a human'.A thing which Kasparov openly recognized afterward:the machine suprised him on more occasions by playing more 'intuitively' exactly as human players [sacrificing figures to obtain the initiative only without the prospect recapturing them immediately afterwad].
The conclusion that many specialists drew after this match Kasparov-Deep Junior [3-3] was that machines can think as humans [and it's not too far the time when a human grandmaster will have to 'fight ' hard to even snatch a draw]...
That in spite of the fact that in other games [go] the computers still play only at an average level.
Probably that had in mind those who said that science indicates that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter.I agree this is an acceptable argument for their position.
However only if eventually it will be proved that consciousness is computable I think we will have sufficient reasons to conclude that materialism [usual version] is correct and all other views [idealism included] can be [safely] discarded.
Only if...till then all other positions are as acceptable as materialism [usual definition],at the level of belief of course.
Personally,in the light of today's knowledge,I am not at all sure that materialism [usual definition] is the only possibility left open to our today's science...I remain open at all possibilities.In spite of having my beliefs [preferences based on 'subjective' evidence too].