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Materialism

UCE

Yep, but every time you claim consciousness arises from the brain you are depending on materialistic assumptions rather than scientific evidence.


No intention to start a polemics I'm only trying to find the most rational position one could adopt in the problem of consciousness [and the relation with materialism/physicalism].

Materialism=the view that everything that actually exists is material.This definition is widely used but it is generally understood as implying the rejection of all metaphysical constructs [on this site too] .
Personally I think the most flexible definition of 'materialism' should encompass even constructs that are seen today as 'metaphysical'.Indeed no one has disproved yet vitalism [consciousness 'expanding' in 'other realms'-physical however-not probed yet by science] for example-the brain being only one component,a sort of 'co-processor' useful for action at our 'physical' level.

My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.
The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.Even if reductionism at the laws of nature were impossible.
The creators of 'Deep Junior' [a chess computer program] for example,whilst recognizing that it's 'raw' power of analyze was well under that of 'Deep Blue',claimed that it could easily overcome this drawback in its match against Kasparov by playing 'more like a human'.A thing which Kasparov openly recognized afterward:the machine suprised him on more occasions by playing more 'intuitively' exactly as human players [sacrificing figures to obtain the initiative only without the prospect recapturing them immediately afterwad].
The conclusion that many specialists drew after this match Kasparov-Deep Junior [3-3] was that machines can think as humans [and it's not too far the time when a human grandmaster will have to 'fight ' hard to even snatch a draw]...
That in spite of the fact that in other games [go] the computers still play only at an average level.

Probably that had in mind those who said that science indicates that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter.I agree this is an acceptable argument for their position.
However only if eventually it will be proved that consciousness is computable I think we will have sufficient reasons to conclude that materialism [usual version] is correct and all other views [idealism included] can be [safely] discarded.
Only if...till then all other positions are as acceptable as materialism [usual definition],at the level of belief of course.
Personally,in the light of today's knowledge,I am not at all sure that materialism [usual definition] is the only possibility left open to our today's science...I remain open at all possibilities.In spite of having my beliefs [preferences based on 'subjective' evidence too].
 
Q-Source said:


Interact means to have an effect upon each other [from Oxford English Dictionary]

You just said that "The physical world behaves objectively." It means exactly that, no more no less.

However, in the next breath you claim that the mental realm can interfer or interact with the physical realm, i.e. paranormal events. How is it possible?
If this is the case, then it should not be a problem for any of you to prove that your "observations" force the cat to be dead or alive.

Q-S

You can't prove any of the interpretations of QM, which is why they remain interpretations. There is no way to established whether the unobserved cat is both dead and alive because the very act of observation collapses the wave function and stops the cat from being both dead and alive. The same is true of most of metaphysics, which is why it remains metaphysics. There are certain ways of investigating some of these phenomena, which is what PEAR tries to do with statistical anlysis of many experiments where 'will' is used to attempt to influence 'random' events but this just scratches the surface. The problems are caused by the fact that we are trying to observe observation itself. You could only do this "objectively" by extricating yourself from the system and taking a 'Gods-eye' view, which is not possible for physicists to do.

Why can the mental realm just stay mental?, wouldn't it be the most logical conclusion?

In a way it does, since everything is ultimately mental, but I guess you won't like that answer. The nature of your questions seem to indicate that you are thinking about this from more of a dualistic rather than idealistic viewpoint. Dualism suffers from the problem of 'interaction'. Idealism doesn't really, since everything is mental. But there are two different levels of effects going on. The laws of physics are effect of the 'algorithm' which operates 'autonomously' within the Metamind. The laws of metaphysics concern the relationship between the agent of 'will' and 'observation' and the algorithm the thing you call "I". You can visualise it as the physical world operating like a simple repetitive algorithm iterating at the Planck time, and the thing called "I" being an Infinity which by interfaces with the algorithm by altering its own value 'at will'. This is the best way I can think of to describe it.

G
 
Hello metacristi

My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.

I understand this. But Chalmers 'Hard Problem' remains real, and causes us to be forced to make one exception to this rule when it comes to answering the quesiton of the fundamental relationship between mind and matter. Once you accept the Hard Problem exists then sciences epistemological privilege, with regard to this one specific question, must be forfeit. The Hard Problem renders materialistic science theoretically incapable of answering the question. Ever.

The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.

Often asserted. Never backed up. The Hard Problem remains, and it is no use trying to provide scientific responses to it. This is a question about the philosophy of science, not about science.

Even if reductionism at the laws of nature were impossible.
The creators of 'Deep Junior' [a chess computer program] for example,whilst recognizing that it's 'raw' power of analyze was well under that of 'Deep Blue',claimed that it could easily overcome this drawback in its match against Kasparov by playing 'more like a human'.

A human? Or an electronic p-zombie?

Probably that had in mind those who said that science indicates that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter.I agree this is an acceptable argument for their position.
However only if eventually it will be proved that consciousness is computable I think we will have sufficient reasons to conclude that materialism [usual version] is correct and all other views [idealism included] can be [safely] discarded.

But it is also theoretically impossible to ever prove that we have created artificial consciousness. We can never reach the point you speak of.

Only if...till then all other positions are as acceptable as materialism [usual definition],at the level of belief of course.
Personally,in the light of today's knowledge,I am not at all sure that materialism [usual definition] is the only possibility left open to our today's science...I remain open at all possibilities.In spite of having my beliefs [preferences based on 'subjective' evidence too].

Ultimately I think the answer is that materialism is correct, within its domain. The problem is that the scientific world has a tendency to treat it as the domain of 'everything'. The whole of materialistic science can be taken, intact, and placed within consciousness. Then you can see that from the two different perspectives both models can make sense. The answer to this question is the same as the answer to many other questions. You have X and Y which appear to be opposites but are in fact complementary halves of a deeper truth that can only be grasped by taking a step back. The relationship between idealism and materialism is similar to the relationship between 1 and -1.

swc.gif

SCIENCE WITHIN CONCIOUSNESS

From an article on the site :

http://www.swcp.com/~hswift/swc/vol07no1/lohrey71.htm

ABSTRACT
The proposal of this paper is that quantum physics is a science that is firstly, finding evidence of the conditions of consciousness and only secondly, discovering the nature of physics. The focus of the discussion is on the causal and architectural order of relations and how relations, not physical processes, are the self-causing building blocks of the physical world and of consciousness.


In 1982 Alan Aspect demonstrated, with the aid of a theorem of J. S. Bell, what others had previously proposed; a non-local order of reality existing at a quantum level (Bohm & Peat, 1989: 63 - 103). A non-local order is one that involves interconnection, that is, active information flows that are independent of time and space or the movement of particles at the speed of light.

Such an order of reality which by definition is a transcendent order, (transcendent of material reality) is highly controversial to most scientists and to what Goswami (1995) called in The Self-Aware Universe, the doctrine of material realism. This doctrine holds that everything is made of matter and matter can be reduced to elementary particles; the building blocks of the universe. This doctrine also accepts the principles of locality and separability. Locality is the principle that all interactions are mediated by signals traveling through space/time with nothing traveling faster than the speed of light. Separability is the injunction that particles are separate in space and time.

Contrast this conventional and classic view of the world with the growing body of evidence of a non-local order of reality, independent of space and time. Such a reality is metaphysical - beyond the physical. Such evidence presents classical science with the contentious prospect of a primary non-material order of reality that comes before, in a causal sense, the material universe. That prior non-material order, this ground state of the universe (Goswami says), is that of consciousness.
 
metacristi said:
My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.

Why do people keep repeating this idea that science somehow suggests or implies the correctness of materialism. It emphatically does not! Science does not vindicate materialism in any shape or form. Indeed science is vastly more consistent with idealism. I'm somewhat weary of repeating this point time after time after time.
 
metacristi said:
UCE

The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.



I think not.
 
UCE,

Impossible. One of the five must give.
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Fascinating. What if I can demonstrate there is a system where all five can be true?

You can't, but by all means, feel free to try.

Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.
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Well this is just part of your continual failure to understand the model being put forward. Peoples bodies are made of atoms, because everything in the material world is made of atoms. What you are saying would only hold if we claim that the material world does not exist. I am not claiming this. I am claiming it exists subordinate to consciousness. Surely you understand the difference between these two claims?

Notice the above emphasis. You believe that people's physical bodies are made up of atoms, but you also believe that people have a non-physical mind. That means that you do not believe that people are made entirely of atoms.

Your response is a classic strawman. You have tried to refute a position I do not hold.

How is it a strawman? Do you believe that people are made entirely of atoms? If so, then you must either believe that consciousness is physical, or that people do not possess it.

Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".
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Again, this problem disappears when it is explained what is meant by "people". People are indeed made of atoms. It is the ontological status of the atoms themselves which alters under idealism. The entire physical world still exists, and still behaves as it does under materialism, it just doesn't self-exist all on its ownsome - it exists in the form of information in a higher Mental Reality. People are made of atoms.

If you believe that mental states are non-physical, then you must assert that either people are not made entirely of atoms, or that people do not have mental states. No amount of word play is going to get you around this fact.

This is just the same old metaphysical speculation combined with strawman attacks against materialism that they have been spewing all over these boards for more than a year now.
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Well, you see, we aren't entirely convinced your refutations ever stood up to logical examination.

Perhaps if you tried reading up on formal logic, rather than wasting all your time with metaphysics, you would actually be able to logically examine my refutations.


hammegk,

One of the five must give. Under Idealism, I would say that the one that gives is the assertion that people are made of atoms. Since a person's consciousness is clearly a part of their "make-up", and Idealism holds that consciousness is not "made of atoms", it fallows that Idealists do not agree that people are (entirely) made of atoms.

Indeed, Idealists would say that Reality itself is made of consciousness. They would therefore argue that people are not made of atoms, but rather of consciousness, and that only a part of the person (their physical body) is made up of that subset of consciousness that we call "atoms".
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Although an Idealist might argue that *me* -- the perceived/sensory bag-o-bones is indeed atoms, and the real question is "what are atoms?".

The question of what, exactly, atoms are, is secondary to the issue, as long as you agree with the listed premise that atoms are entirely physical.

As one more closely examines via perception an "atom", there becomes less and less 'matter' and more and more 'nothing that could be called "material".

That is only true if you insist on the outdated and incoherent notion of ontological materialism. Such a concept has no place in science.

Assuming dualism is nonsense -- which I do -- which monism is more certain? *I* of course think.

It is not a question of which is more certain, but rather which is a coherent and reliable model for describing reality. Idealism is neither coherent nor reliable.

Dr. Stupid
 
uce,

Darwinism doesn't explain consciousness at all.
Why not? If conciousness improves survivability, then it will be selected for, won't it?

Darwinism works perfectly well for zombies. Consciousness is entirely unneccesary.
I suspect that not even Chalmers would agree with this. The obvious problem is that no one really believes that p-zombies are physically possible. You can certainly use p-zombies to wander off into a discussion of "logical necessity" and "supervenience", but p-zombies say very little, if anything, about Darwinism.
 
Ian,

What does it mean to say reality is objective or subjective?? What does "SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE" mean?
Having trouble keeping up, Ian?

"reality is objective" is a simple way of saying that if *all* consciousness in the universe was extinguished at midnight tonight, then the universe would still be there tomorrow morning.

"reality is subjective" (or "subjective existence") means that if all consciousness vanished, so would the universe.

Better now?
 
Stimpson

Notice the above emphasis. You believe that people's physical bodies are made up of atoms, but you also believe that people have a non-physical mind. That means that you do not believe that people are made entirely of atoms.

I am trying to describe two different conceptual levels. On a physical level people really are made of atoms, as is everything else. To say people are not entirely made of atoms is a dualistic way of thinking of it. The entire Universe, as you think of it, exists as a whole within consciousness. There isn't atoms AND consciousness. There is atoms WITHIN consciousness. Imagine an articifical world made of a certain sort of data structure. Entities within this world are made entirely of those data structures, but the structures themselves exist as a whole within a greater context.
 
Loki said:
Why not? If conciousness improves survivability, then it will be selected for, won't it?

The problem is that darwinism could produce a P-zombie without consciousness just as easily as a conscious human being. There does not need to be a subjective state. The objective brain process satisfies the needs of darwinism.

I suspect that not even Chalmers would agree with this. The obvious problem is that no one really believes that p-zombies are physically possible.

No-one? ;)
 
UndercoverElephant said:
All I can say is that according to the skeptics dictionary, my definition of materialism is the correct one. Your definition isn't materialism - it is ontological monism. Where did it come from?

It's just physicalism.

Please, we don't have to go through this all the time, do we?

I have a neat trick that helps, I think you and Ian could benefit from it ;)

Everytime you see Stimpson or basically anyone else on this board use the word materialism, just say 'physicalism' in your mind when you read it :D

I understand and agree that using the term materialism is slightly misleading, but come on, it's been gone through too many times already.

Some people here do hold onto the old school ontological materialism, it's true. Just ignore them ;)

Adam

this post has been returned to its original state now April Fool's day is over
 
uce,

The problem is that darwinism could produce a P-zombie without consciousness just as easily as a conscious human being.
Could it? Unless we are using different conceptions of P-Zombie, then I've never heard this expressed before. Chalmers argues that P-Zombies are "logically possible" This is not intended to be the same thing as "physically possible". In fact, it seems to me that the physical possibility of P-Zombies is essentially dismissed as "irrelevant and misleading" in the Chalmers argument.

Perhaps I have that wrong - can you point me to any information you have from people who are arguing that P-Zombies are either (a) physically possible, or even (b) physically likely? In the absense of this, it seems that mixing P-Zombies and Darwinism is a failure to understand the thought experiment that P-Zombies represent.

(loki wrote) : The obvious problem is that no one really believes that p-zombies are physically possible.

(uce wrote) : No-one?
Well, no one that I've read who seems to understand the P-Zombie argument. I'm open to having you explain how you (or anyone else) has determined that P-Zombies are in fact physically possible. You've seen one?
 
UndercoverElephant said:


The problem is that darwinism could produce a P-zombie without consciousness just as easily as a conscious human being. There does not need to be a subjective state. The objective brain process satisfies the needs of darwinism.

*snip*

This requires the premise that a complex biological brain and consciousness are discrete functions. I do not accept that premise. I hold it that consciousness is an objective brain process.

As for Darwinism, the adaptability and innovativity of Man could not exist without consciousness. And without these traits, Man could probably not have survived and certainly not become the dominant species on this planet.

Suppose you were a staff manager. Which kinds of job would you hire P-zombies for?

Hans
 
Loki said:
Ian,


Having trouble keeping up, Ian?

"reality is objective" is a simple way of saying that if *all* consciousness in the universe was extinguished at midnight tonight, then the universe would still be there tomorrow morning.

"reality is subjective" (or "subjective existence") means that if all consciousness vanished, so would the universe.

Better now?

This is a curious definition! Stimpy wouldn't even agree with that. :eek:
 
Loki said:
UCE
Darwinism doesn't explain consciousness at all.
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Loki
Why not? If conciousness improves survivability, then it will be selected for, won't it?

But are you disputing that Darwinism can only be said to explain consciousness once we assume a materialist based metaphysic?
 
slimshady2357 said:
Some people here do hold onto the old school ontological materialism, it's true. Just ignore them ;)

There is no distinction as I have already explained in this thread. Physicalists still have to believe in a reality in abstraction from consciousness otherwise their positions become incoherent. This of necessity introduces ontological suppositions of a dubious nature.
 
Why is everyone ignoring me??? :mad: I'm not going to contribute to these forums anymore if this continues.

Has everyone got me on ignore?? :mad:
 
Loki said:
uce,


Could it? Unless we are using different conceptions of P-Zombie, then I've never heard this expressed before. Chalmers argues that P-Zombies are "logically possible" This is not intended to be the same thing as "physically possible". In fact, it seems to me that the physical possibility of P-Zombies is essentially dismissed as "irrelevant and misleading" in the Chalmers argument.

Perhaps I have that wrong - can you point me to any information you have from people who are arguing that P-Zombies are either (a) physically possible, or even (b) physically likely? In the absense of this, it seems that mixing P-Zombies and Darwinism is a failure to understand the thought experiment that P-Zombies represent.


Well, no one that I've read who seems to understand the P-Zombie argument. I'm open to having you explain how you (or anyone else) has determined that P-Zombies are in fact physically possible. You've seen one?

For me, P-Zombies are a nonsense that are implied by materialism. They are logically possible. That is their only purpose. They do not need to actually exist, any more than Schroedingers cat.
 
MRC_Hans said:
This requires the premise that a complex biological brain and consciousness are discrete functions. I do not accept that premise. I hold it that consciousness is an objective brain process.

Well, with the greatest of respect, that is just materialistic dogma. It doesn't make any sense, there isn't any evidence. It is a neccesary consequence of some assumptions you have made that I think are demonstrably wrong.

As for Darwinism, the adaptability and innovativity of Man could not exist without consciousness.

Why not? Why do these things require a 1st-person subjective state as well as the 3rd-person objective physical process?

Suppose you were a staff manager. Which kinds of job would you hire P-zombies for?

ANY job.
 
Interesting Ian said:
Why is everyone ignoring me??? :mad: I'm not going to contribute to these forums anymore if this continues.

Has everyone got me on ignore?? :mad:

I'm not ignoring you, I just don't have a lot to disagree with.....

:)
 

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