OK, then, I'm going to ramble a little.
This comment by Danish caught my eye:
It struck me that many defenders of materialism here take this blanket view of those who maintain that materialism is false, namely that a consequence of that position is the belief that science is "wrong" or that materialism is "evil." I think this is a strawman.
On balance, and after reflecting on the arguments, thought experiments and facts concerning phenomenal consciousness, in some small detail, I've concluded that materialism is false. Others disagree with this conclusion, for a variety of reasons. I don't think that all those who hold materialistic positions are deluded or that all their arguments are absurd or that they are all in favor of a materialistic position out of some sort of ulterior motive, either nefarious or pathetic.
That being said, I do find some materialistic positions to be, well, a stretch, like eliminative materialism. And, what's more, I do find many here to be fairly unfamiliar with the geography of the issue, as it were, while still acting as if non-materialistic positions were facially absurd or wrong headed. Often times I'll see absolute certainty as to the falsity of dualism seemingly based on such, frankly, half-arsed objections as "that's an argument from ignorance" or, and this a frequent one, "you're assuming your conclusion." These positions have the unfortunate quality of being both smug and meretricious.
So, while finding the whole "you think materialism is evil" charge to be a strawman, I also think it's ironic, in that it would seem that the opposite is true: Many defenders of materialism think a belief in the falsity of materialism is evil, or perhaps (and maybe worse) obviously stupid, and that proponents of the falsity of materialism are acting out of some other motive than wanting to explain the world. Combined with this attitude is the implication that allowing the falsity of materialism is but one step removed from asking John Edwards to contact your loved ones on "the other side."
And that's frustrating.
Whcih brings me to this comment by Loki:
Well, no.
The implication, however, seems to me something akin to this: A property dualist position introduces a feature that can be compared to a "soul;" we know "souls" are bunk, or at least religious baggage; therfore, property dualism is bunk, or at least carries religious baggage.
To which I can only reply, to the extent that the baggage is there, you've brought it with you.
That being said, you can, of course, make an analogy between "souls" and phenomenal consciousness. For example, I think it can be argued that having phenomenal consiousness defines a "person" for the purposes of moral and ethical argument, like having a "soul" does. At the same time, nothing about phenomenal consciousness necessarily implies that one's phenomenal consciousness survives one's death, so the analogy breaks down.
In the end, while I guess the analogy between "souls" and phenomenal consciousness could be the basis for an exploration of folk ethics, most often it seems a polemical instrument.
Now, let me address the "coincidence" issue.
Do I think physical and phenomenal properties are coincidental? In the sense of happening at the same time, yes. Do I think they are coincidental in the stronger sense of the word, namely happening together "by chance?" From the point of view of the physical, yes. At the same time, I believe that there must be some reason for the coincidence, in the first sense, it just isn't a reason that can be explained with recourse to the physical.
Finally, let me address the idea that, because our brains don't have access to phenomenal consciousness, there's no point talking about phenomenal consciousness. All that the lack of our brain's access to phenomenal consciousnes implies is that, in some sense, the eliminativist position is tenable. For me, everything about you could be explained without reference to phenomenal consciousness. But for you, it can't be.
So, if we want to take phenomenal consciousness into account as a feature of the world, and because materialism is false, we make some foundational assumptions, and start developing a theory of the world that contains, and explains, phenomenal consciousness as an independent fundamental feature.
At the very far extreme, one could argue that the brain's lack of access renders our foundational assumptions suspect, and to avoid that, we must adopt a mysterian position. This, however, doesn't invalidate any of the arguments about the falsity of materialism.
And, what's more, I don't think it's necessary. We make other foundational assumptions in science. If we have to make some with regard to phenomenal consciousness as an irreducible, so be it.
Ultimately, the whole "if dualism is true, we don't know what we're talking about" line seems to me to be more often motivated by a desire to reach the conclusion, "so dualism is false," than to be concerned with the question of the basis for foundational assuptions.
This comment by Danish caught my eye:
It struck me that many defenders of materialism here take this blanket view of those who maintain that materialism is false, namely that a consequence of that position is the belief that science is "wrong" or that materialism is "evil." I think this is a strawman.
On balance, and after reflecting on the arguments, thought experiments and facts concerning phenomenal consciousness, in some small detail, I've concluded that materialism is false. Others disagree with this conclusion, for a variety of reasons. I don't think that all those who hold materialistic positions are deluded or that all their arguments are absurd or that they are all in favor of a materialistic position out of some sort of ulterior motive, either nefarious or pathetic.
That being said, I do find some materialistic positions to be, well, a stretch, like eliminative materialism. And, what's more, I do find many here to be fairly unfamiliar with the geography of the issue, as it were, while still acting as if non-materialistic positions were facially absurd or wrong headed. Often times I'll see absolute certainty as to the falsity of dualism seemingly based on such, frankly, half-arsed objections as "that's an argument from ignorance" or, and this a frequent one, "you're assuming your conclusion." These positions have the unfortunate quality of being both smug and meretricious.
So, while finding the whole "you think materialism is evil" charge to be a strawman, I also think it's ironic, in that it would seem that the opposite is true: Many defenders of materialism think a belief in the falsity of materialism is evil, or perhaps (and maybe worse) obviously stupid, and that proponents of the falsity of materialism are acting out of some other motive than wanting to explain the world. Combined with this attitude is the implication that allowing the falsity of materialism is but one step removed from asking John Edwards to contact your loved ones on "the other side."
And that's frustrating.
Whcih brings me to this comment by Loki:
Well, no.
The implication, however, seems to me something akin to this: A property dualist position introduces a feature that can be compared to a "soul;" we know "souls" are bunk, or at least religious baggage; therfore, property dualism is bunk, or at least carries religious baggage.
To which I can only reply, to the extent that the baggage is there, you've brought it with you.
That being said, you can, of course, make an analogy between "souls" and phenomenal consciousness. For example, I think it can be argued that having phenomenal consiousness defines a "person" for the purposes of moral and ethical argument, like having a "soul" does. At the same time, nothing about phenomenal consciousness necessarily implies that one's phenomenal consciousness survives one's death, so the analogy breaks down.
In the end, while I guess the analogy between "souls" and phenomenal consciousness could be the basis for an exploration of folk ethics, most often it seems a polemical instrument.
Now, let me address the "coincidence" issue.
Do I think physical and phenomenal properties are coincidental? In the sense of happening at the same time, yes. Do I think they are coincidental in the stronger sense of the word, namely happening together "by chance?" From the point of view of the physical, yes. At the same time, I believe that there must be some reason for the coincidence, in the first sense, it just isn't a reason that can be explained with recourse to the physical.
Finally, let me address the idea that, because our brains don't have access to phenomenal consciousness, there's no point talking about phenomenal consciousness. All that the lack of our brain's access to phenomenal consciousnes implies is that, in some sense, the eliminativist position is tenable. For me, everything about you could be explained without reference to phenomenal consciousness. But for you, it can't be.
So, if we want to take phenomenal consciousness into account as a feature of the world, and because materialism is false, we make some foundational assumptions, and start developing a theory of the world that contains, and explains, phenomenal consciousness as an independent fundamental feature.
At the very far extreme, one could argue that the brain's lack of access renders our foundational assumptions suspect, and to avoid that, we must adopt a mysterian position. This, however, doesn't invalidate any of the arguments about the falsity of materialism.
And, what's more, I don't think it's necessary. We make other foundational assumptions in science. If we have to make some with regard to phenomenal consciousness as an irreducible, so be it.
Ultimately, the whole "if dualism is true, we don't know what we're talking about" line seems to me to be more often motivated by a desire to reach the conclusion, "so dualism is false," than to be concerned with the question of the basis for foundational assuptions.
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