Materialism

[Win]

Q:

Is it a fact?

Yes.

IMO (unless I am misunderstanding), the problem has nothing to do to with accepting that phenomenal consciousness exists but with the explanation or description of its cause and origin.

My exchange with you has been within the context of explaining eliminative materialism. Eliminative materialists, as I've explained, don't accept that phenomenal consciousness exists.

Reductive materialists, of various stripes, do accept that it exists, and maintain that it supervenes on the physical, one way or the other.

Metaphysical materialists accept that phenomenal consciousness exists, and that it does not supervene on the physical, but maintain that, as a consequence of strong metaphysical necessity, it's physical anyway.

Property dualists accept that phenomenal consciousness exists, and that it doesn't supervene on the phsyical, reject metaphysical materialism and maintain that therefore phenomenal consciousness is an additional fundamental feature of the world.

What answer does dualism give to explain by which means physical and phenomenal states correlate?

As a consequnce of further laws of nature.

Paul:

Of course there is. All the brain processes that occur when I see red are the physical experience of red. I guess you don't like using the word experience here, but what else is it? I suppose we could call it the physical processing of red.

Yes, we could. And I do.

I'm focusing specifically on having had the phenomenal experience of red before. When I see red again, or think about red, I get the sense that I've had the feeling of red, the redness of red, the emotion of red, before.

As a consequence of having the physical correlate, the physical memory, of having sen red before.

If you don't think that the phenomenal experience of red can be explained by the brain alone, then I do not see how you can claim that the memory of having had these phenomenal experiences can be explained by the brain alone. Phenomenal consciousness must have memory.

You have no "memory of the phenomenal experience." Rather, you have a memory of the information processing. Experiencing the memory contains an experience of familiarity that comes from the physical correlate.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win, so what you seem to be saying is that the entire phenomenal experience of red is simply an "interpretation" of my physical memories and other neural connections. Phenomenal consciousness adds nothing new to the equation, it just interprets all the little details stored in my brain. The interpretation generates no new information stored anywhere. Somehow, all the myriad nuances of redness really are stored in my brain, including all the nuances that seem to be part of the phenomenal experience of red, not simply facts about red.

I do not see what a separate phenomenal consciousness does that a separate chunk of brain couldn't do. The idea doesn't enlighten me about the functioning of consciousness. Indeed, it doesn't seem to present any explanation of consciousness at all, although it certainly does add a facet of mystery to the project.

~~ Paul

 

[Win]

Paul:

Win, so what you seem to be saying is that the entire phenomenal experience of red is simply an "interpretation" of my physical memories and other neural connections. Phenomenal consciousness adds nothing new to the equation, it just interprets all the little details stored in my brain. The interpretation generates no new information stored anywhere. Somehow, all the myriad nuances of redness really are stored in my brain, including all the nuances that seem to be part of the phenomenal experience of red, not simply facts about red.

Well, yes and no. I wouldn't say that "all the nuances of redness" are already stored in your brain. In fact, all the facts concerning the phenomenal realization of realization, for example "what red looks like," aren't stored there at all.

I do not see what a separate phenomenal consciousness does that a separate chunk of brain couldn't do. The idea doesn't enlighten me about the functioning of consciousness. Indeed, it doesn't seem to present any explanation of consciousness at all, although it certainly does add a facet of mystery to the project.

Bear in mind that we've only been discussing the answer to your question, "why aren't we surprized to be having phenomenal experiences, moment to moment." The complete property dualist position is a little more expansive than that.

As to the mystery, I agree. But the universe is a mysterious place, as it were. Not that I'm a mysterian, though, which is another position on consciousness.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

Well, yes and no. I wouldn't say that "all the nuances of redness" are already stored in your brain. In fact, all the facts concerning the phenomenal realization of realization, for example "what red looks like," aren't stored there at all.

Oh my. What is "phenomenal realization of realization"? What are these facts and where are they stored? How do these facts effect the phenomenal experience of red?

How can we even talk about this? If the phenomenal experience of red doesn't affect my brain in any way, how can I even remember that I had the phenomenal experience and talk about it here? Perhaps even though my brain isn't affected by phenomenal consciousness, it knows that there is such a thing and that PC experiences redness and enough about what that experience is like to discuss it intelligently?

~~ Paul

 

[c4ts]

I thought qualities belonged to the objects themselves, not the observers. An object will have qualities regardless of whether or not these qualities are percieved. A green sign seen only by colorblind people is still green, even though nobody can see that it's green.

 

[Win]

Paul:

Sorry. Not paying attention. That should read, "phenomenal realization of red ..."

How can we even talk about this? If the phenomenal experience of red doesn't affect my brain in any way, how can I even remember that I had the phenomenal experience and talk about it here? Perhaps even though my brain isn't affected by phenomenal consciousness, it knows that there is such a thing and that PC experiences redness and enough about what that experience is like to discuss it intelligently?

Even though your brain isn't affected by phenomenal consciousness, you are. Because you can be sure that you are phenomenally conscious, we have a basis for having this conversation.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

Even though your brain isn't affected by phenomenal consciousness, you are. Because you can be sure that you are phenomenally conscious, we have a basis for having this conversation.

But the part of me that is on the far side of the brain/phenomenal consciousness line has no way to influence my brain here on the near side, so I can't think about phenomenal consciousness or talk about it. I can't get my tongue to move and form words about it. I can't type about it.

Both sides must know about what the phenomenal experience is like. The brain side must know enough to have this conversation. But does it know everything about it? If not, then my phenomenal experience might actually be different from what we are discussing. Perhaps what we're discussing is only the brain side of the puzzle, and we can't talk about the phenomenal experience at all.

~~ Paul

 

[DanishDynamite]

Win said:
But the part of me that is on the far side of the brain/phenomenal consciousness line has no way to influence my brain here on the near side, so I can't think about phenomenal consciousness or talk about it. I can't get my tongue to move and form words about it. I can't type about it.

Both sides must know about what the phenomenal experience is like. The brain side must know enough to have this conversation. But does it know everything about it? If not, then my phenomenal experience might actually be different from what we are discussing. Perhaps what we're discussing is only the brain side of the puzzle, and we can't talk about the phenomenal experience at all.

~~ Paul

Ahhhh. You have reached one of the interesting points regarding Win's dualism. His answer to this question is that it is coincidental! Although your brain knows nothing about phenomenal experiences and although it is your brain which is controlling your fingers as you type, it is just coincidental that what your fingers type regarding phenominal experiences is right! And I am not kidding.

 

[Solitaire]

Huh?

Let's look at those lines again.

Being and non-being produce each other.
Difficulty and ease bring about each other.
Long and short delimit each other.
High and low rest on each other.
Sound and voice harmonize each other.
Front and back follow each other.

Imagine for a moment you have a pile of bricks. The pile of bricks
exists as a form of being. Now imagine assembling those bricks
into a house. The house exists as a form of being. What happened
to the being form of bricks? It became non-being whilst the house
became being. This process of change from one form into another
answers in part the question of how something can come from
nothing and the question of how something can turn back into nothing.

P.S. Mostly, the rest of the poem is a meditation on the nature
of opposites and how one defines and needs the other.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Synchronicity:

This process of change from one form into another answers in part the question of how something can come from nothing and the question of how something can turn back into nothing.

Thanks for reminding me. I seem to recall that UCE said somewhere upstream that he had problems with Something coming from Nothing. Well, as usual, science is on the job and has (or is close to having) the answer. Please see inflationary theory as explained by its inventor.

An extract:

This borrowing of energy from the gravitational field gives the inflationary paradigm an entirely different perspective from the classical Big Bang theory, in which all the particles in the Universe (or at least their precursors) were assumed to be in place from the start. Inflation provides a mechanism by which the entire Universe can develop from just a few ounces of primordial matter. Inflation is radically at odds with the old dictum of Democritus and Lucretius, "Nothing can be created from nothing" If inflation is right, everything can be created from nothing, or at least from very little. If inflation is right, the Universe can properly be called the ultimate free lunch.

 

[Win]

Danish:

You probably know you're misconstruing my position on the coincidence of phenomenal and physical properties through a combination of equivocation and oversimplification, so I'll restrict myself to commenting on your poor understanding of creation ex nihilo and the infaltionary cosmological model. Clearly, the something from nothing comment in your excerpt (presumably by Alan Guth, although by no means clear from your post or link) is tongue in cheek.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Danish:

You probably know you're misconstruing my position on the coincidence of phenomenal and physical properties through a combination of equivocation and oversimplification, so I'll restrict myself to commenting on your poor understanding of creation ex nihilo and the infaltionary cosmological model. Clearly, the something from nothing comment in your excerpt (presumably by Alan Guth, although by no means clear from your post or link) is tongue in cheek.

Hi Win.

No, I wasn't trying to misconstrue your position. Admittedly it's been a while since we've had this discussion or, in fact, since I've engaged in 'ism debate here, so it may be my memory isn't quite accurate as to your view. Please correct me, if this is the case.

And no, my posting of a link by Guth (follow the Previous links to see that it is in fact written by him) was not tongue in cheek. At least not much. If the total energy - matter plus gravitational - is in fact zero, then I think it is fair to say that Something came from Nothing. I realize that some may ask: Yes, but the properties of the Nothing, which made the Something possible, are in their own way a Something. Fair enough. Science has more to do and is on the job.

 

[Win]

Hi Danish:

Well, I'll get into the specifics of how "it's all just a coincidence, ha, ha" doesn't quite capture my position, probably tomorrow.

And I didn't mean to suggest that your posting of Guth's comments was tongue in cheek; I meant that Guth's comments were. Getting something from almost nothing isn't the same thing as getting something from nothing, and Guth explicitly qualifies his remarks to take that into account. And as far as I know, the inflationary model doesn't require total energy for the universe to be zero. In any event, the inflationary model isn't intended as an answer to the problems of creation ex nihilo.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Synchronicity:Thanks for reminding me. I seem to recall that UCE said somewhere upstream that he had problems with Something coming from Nothing. Well, as usual, science is on the job and has (or is close to having) the answer. Please see inflationary theory as explained by its inventor.

An extract:

Personnally I have no problem with the idea that something can come from nothing, wholly acausally as it were (or not acausally if we take Stimpy's definition of "acausal"). But is this somehow supposed to vindicate materialism?? Or do you have another point which I haven't grasped?

 

[Loki]

Win,

You'll probably cover this, but...

Well, I'll get into the specifics of how "it's all just a coincidence, ha, ha" doesn't quite capture my position, probably tomorrow.

Both you (a long time ago) and Neo ahve used the 'shadow' analogy. Staying within this analogy (and hoping it's not about to collapse), the problem I have, and which Paul seems to be getting at, is that the shadow may exist but you simultaneously want to say that :

(a) The 'physical brain processes' cannot see the shadow
(b) The *I* which is my total consciousness *can* see the shadow
(c) My 'physical brain processes' can discuss the shadow

When we try to explore "(b)" you say "direct access" is the way in which *I* see the shadow. Yet this access in no way changes or adds to the physical brain processes. This seems to say that a person's "*I*" (the totality, and that which does the "accessing" in direct access) is at least partially non-physical. Haven't we just introduced a 'soul' (for want of a better word)?

 

[DanishDynamite]

Win:

Well, I'll get into the specifics of how "it's all just a coincidence, ha, ha" doesn't quite capture my position, probably tomorrow.

Looking forward to it.

And I didn't mean to suggest that your posting of Guth's comments was tongue in cheek; I meant that Guth's comments were. Getting something from almost nothing isn't the same thing as getting something from nothing, and Guth explicitly qualifies his remarks to take that into account.

Yes and no. What he says is:

During inflation, while the energy of matter increases by a factor of 10^75 or more, the energy of the gravitational field becomes more and more negative to compensate. The total energy - matter plus gravitational - remains constant and very small, and could even be exactly zero.

Notice my highlighting.

And as far as I know, the inflationary model doesn't require total energy for the universe to be zero.

It doesn't require it, that's true. However, it allows it.

In any event, the inflationary model isn't intended as an answer to the problems of creation ex nihilo.

Correct. It is intended to solve other outstanding questions. The fact that it allows for answering the question of Something for Nothing, is just a bonus.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Personnally I have no problem with the idea that something can come from nothing, wholly acausally as it were (or not acausally if we take Stimpy's definition of "acausal"). But is this somehow supposed to vindicate materialism?? Or do you have another point which I haven't grasped?

No, it doesn't vindicate materialism. I was just responding to a comment by UCE, regarding all the outstanding questions which the evil materialism/science hadn't answered.

 

[Guest]

No, it doesn't vindicate materialism. I was just responding to a comment by UCE, regarding all the outstanding questions which the evil materialism/science hadn't answered.

There is nothing evil about materialism or science.

 

[DanishDynamite]

There is nothing evil about materialism or science.

Glad to hear you agree. One occasionaly gets the impression that certain posters have a distinct disliking of materialism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I was about to suggest that one way the brain could talk about phenomenal experience is because it has enough hardwired knowledge about it to carry on a seemingly intelligent discussion. However, then I realized that no such knowledge could evolve, or that would violate the assumption that phenomenal consciousness has no way to affect the brain.

I suppose we could assume the hardwired knowledge just appeared by magic, but that isn't very satisfying.

Standing by for Win . . .

~~ Paul