Interesting Ian
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Socrates said:
A very intelligent and insightful post.
Materialism
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A very intelligent and insightful post.
Socrates
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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
LOL!
Interesting Ian says what I wrote was, "A very intelligent and insightful post." Are you guys reading the same post?
Or, do you actually expect me to cut and paste the previous post, so you can read it again?
Love,
Socrates
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Interesting Ian said:
Thank you. It feels good to be appreciated.
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Socrates said:
Welcome to the thread, and to the board, Socrates.
Wow. Easy to get behind here.
A few comments. Stimpy, I realize I owe you a fuller response to your comments, which I'll get around to sometime soon. Sorry.
Now then. To clarify my property dualist position a little, with regard to the interaction of physical and phenomenal properties: Phenomenal properties have no effect on physical properties. A complete description of the physical world is possible which makes no reference whatsoever to phenomenal properties. Along with the behaviour of the more conventially considered physical world, every action, thought, belief, emotion or memory of a person can be explained, in principle, without reference to the phenomenal.
Why not just be an eliminative materialist, then?
For clarity's sake, let me point out that an eliminative materialist is not someone who holds that phenomenal properties just are physical properties. Rather, she denies their existence. It is for this reason that I say that the knowledge argument allows the truth of the eliminative materialist position. The knowledge argument suggests that reductive materialism is false.
To answer my question, the only reason not be an elliminative materialist is that you accept the existence of phenomenal consciousness as a feature of the world that requires explanation.
How do you know it exists? *You* know because *you* are in part defined by your phenomenal properties. Although my p-zombie twin would be doing, and believing, everything I am, nevertheless there is a difference between him and me, between his world and ours, namely the existence of phenomenal consciousness. The difference between our two worlds is the truth value of certain statements.
Now, Stimpy has suggested that, if "every observable phenomena is consistent with the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, then even if you assume that phenomenal consciousness does exist, you cannot infer anything about it from the physical observations." This, I believe, is not so. Imagine two theories, one which predicts the existence of phenomenal consciousness, as well as things about the phsyical world, the other which makes the same physical predictions, but does not predict a phenomenal world. Which is a better theory? Depends on whether you think phenomenal consciousness is a feature of the world.
Which brings me to the idea that observations are the only way to distinguish between competing theories. I also think that this is not so. We pick betwen theories of the world based on other considerations than confirmation by observation. Is the theory parsimonious, for example.
The idea that there are an infinite number of theories for any given set of observations, and we can have no position of which one is correct strikes me as wrong. There isn't an infinite number of good theories.
Which brings me to my final point, about instrumentalism versus realism in science. I think it necesssary (in the sense of desireable) that we accept that science is telling us something about the real world. To say that science is just a mechanism to make predictions about future observations, and beyond that makes no claim to be explaining the "real" world is to abdicate the point of science, which is to understand the world.
Instrumentalist positions, which dismiss as mere metaphysics the idea that our theories of the world are actually teliing us something about what it is "really like," are the legacy of a bankrupt positivism. In any event, it is not the case that to understand what science really is, or to have a scientific worldview, you have to be an instrumentalist, though many instrumentalists would make that claim.
A few comments. Stimpy, I realize I owe you a fuller response to your comments, which I'll get around to sometime soon. Sorry.
Now then. To clarify my property dualist position a little, with regard to the interaction of physical and phenomenal properties: Phenomenal properties have no effect on physical properties. A complete description of the physical world is possible which makes no reference whatsoever to phenomenal properties. Along with the behaviour of the more conventially considered physical world, every action, thought, belief, emotion or memory of a person can be explained, in principle, without reference to the phenomenal.
Why not just be an eliminative materialist, then?
For clarity's sake, let me point out that an eliminative materialist is not someone who holds that phenomenal properties just are physical properties. Rather, she denies their existence. It is for this reason that I say that the knowledge argument allows the truth of the eliminative materialist position. The knowledge argument suggests that reductive materialism is false.
To answer my question, the only reason not be an elliminative materialist is that you accept the existence of phenomenal consciousness as a feature of the world that requires explanation.
How do you know it exists? *You* know because *you* are in part defined by your phenomenal properties. Although my p-zombie twin would be doing, and believing, everything I am, nevertheless there is a difference between him and me, between his world and ours, namely the existence of phenomenal consciousness. The difference between our two worlds is the truth value of certain statements.
Now, Stimpy has suggested that, if "every observable phenomena is consistent with the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, then even if you assume that phenomenal consciousness does exist, you cannot infer anything about it from the physical observations." This, I believe, is not so. Imagine two theories, one which predicts the existence of phenomenal consciousness, as well as things about the phsyical world, the other which makes the same physical predictions, but does not predict a phenomenal world. Which is a better theory? Depends on whether you think phenomenal consciousness is a feature of the world.
Which brings me to the idea that observations are the only way to distinguish between competing theories. I also think that this is not so. We pick betwen theories of the world based on other considerations than confirmation by observation. Is the theory parsimonious, for example.
The idea that there are an infinite number of theories for any given set of observations, and we can have no position of which one is correct strikes me as wrong. There isn't an infinite number of good theories.
Which brings me to my final point, about instrumentalism versus realism in science. I think it necesssary (in the sense of desireable) that we accept that science is telling us something about the real world. To say that science is just a mechanism to make predictions about future observations, and beyond that makes no claim to be explaining the "real" world is to abdicate the point of science, which is to understand the world.
Instrumentalist positions, which dismiss as mere metaphysics the idea that our theories of the world are actually teliing us something about what it is "really like," are the legacy of a bankrupt positivism. In any event, it is not the case that to understand what science really is, or to have a scientific worldview, you have to be an instrumentalist, though many instrumentalists would make that claim.
Rusty_the_boy_robot
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Socrates said:
Well if I assert that there is such a particle or group of particles that give rise to consciousness (calling this particle or group the C-particle) then which seems more likely?
If I can modify your brain to elicit different emotions from you (prozac does this to millions every day), if I can modify your brain to eliminate or even change your memories, if I can modify your brain to render you un-consciouss, then what seems more likely? That consciousness is not produced by the brain or that it is?
The idea that the self = consciousness is to shaky to adequately defend, unless we give up distinct identity. Then what is the point of having a self.
Now the "agent" being the self is a much stronger argument, and I believe that it is (most likely) similar or the same argument that Win would put forward.
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Socrates said:
~~ Paul
We're reading the same post. How did you come to the conclusion that "the likelihood of mind arising from a Mindless Universe is slim to none"?
~~ Paul
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Win said:
~~ Paul
What does it mean to deny their existence? I found this definition:
That sounds nonsensical. What are they trying to say?
~~ Paul
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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
It is nonsensical. What it means is that materialism doesn't make sense.
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Gosh, UcE, do you think so? I'm trying to understand what they mean before I accept or reject the notion.
~~ Paul
~~ Paul
Paul:
I think the definition you found is somewhat misleading. An eliminativist accepts the existence of entities like beliefs, desires, and sensations in a psychological sense, which is to say as descriptions of functional components of the mind. What an eliminativist doesn't accept is that these entities have any phenomenal component, as folk psychology would suggest. So, once you've explained, say, what's going on in the brain, nervous system and body when you cut your finger, you've exhausted explanation. There's no point in asking, let alone explaining, what the pain feels like to you, because the phenomenal experience of the pain is an "illusion."
There's no such thing as phenomenal experience. We may think that there is, but we're mistaken, and an explanation can be provided for why we have this mistaken belief.
I think the definition you found is somewhat misleading. An eliminativist accepts the existence of entities like beliefs, desires, and sensations in a psychological sense, which is to say as descriptions of functional components of the mind. What an eliminativist doesn't accept is that these entities have any phenomenal component, as folk psychology would suggest. So, once you've explained, say, what's going on in the brain, nervous system and body when you cut your finger, you've exhausted explanation. There's no point in asking, let alone explaining, what the pain feels like to you, because the phenomenal experience of the pain is an "illusion."
There's no such thing as phenomenal experience. We may think that there is, but we're mistaken, and an explanation can be provided for why we have this mistaken belief.
Rusty_the_boy_robot
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Win said:
Wouldn't you have to conclude that beliefs are simply a side effect of a chemical reaction and do not exist either. I believe that is what is being asserted. You don't actually "believe" anything in a meaningful way, the "beliefs" are just side effects of the input/output processing taking place in the brain. Ditto for desires.
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Win said:
Now, about this phenomenal thing. Not to gripe
, but I looked up phenomenal experience in seven philosophy dictionaries. None had it. About half had phenomenal, but uniformly defined it as meaning sensory. We seem to be using it to mean the experience of memories or some such. What exactly do you mean when you say "... doesn't accept is that these entities have any phenomenal component"?
~~ Paul
Okay, two more questions. What you describe is what I thought reductive materialism is. What is it, then?
Now, about this phenomenal thing. Not to gripe
, but I looked up phenomenal experience in seven philosophy dictionaries. None had it. About half had phenomenal, but uniformly defined it as meaning sensory. We seem to be using it to mean the experience of memories or some such. What exactly do you mean when you say "... doesn't accept is that these entities have any phenomenal component"?~~ Paul
Interesting Ian
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Win said:
I find the instrumentalist vs realism debate extremely interesting. Would you say that subjective idealism is incompatible with realism for example? I certainly don't. Perhaps you could start a thread sometime in the near future exploring the realism/instrumentalism debate? Or perhaps I will although I suspect you'll probably know more about it than I do.
Interesting Ian
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UndercoverElephant said:
Well, eliminative materialism is utterly non-sensical, and I suspect that the vast majority of materilists on this forum would agree here. But this doesn't necessarily have any implications for other materialist positions eg reductive materilism.
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Rusty_the_boy_robot said:
Rusty,
Simply because beliefs are a "side effect" of chemical reactions, doesn't mean to say they don't exist!
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Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Paul,
I said the below in the other materialism thread. Don't know if it's entirely correct, but it's my understanding as I see it. No-one particularly commented on it in the other thread
In my opinon the various forms of materialism and property dualism are confusing and people tend to be very careless with these terms. I admit I have a far from perfectly understanding, and I'll need to do some reading, but this is my own interpretation so far.
As far as I am able to understand these things, it seems that astonishingly there are some people who maintain that conscious experiences do not exist! These people are termed eliminitivist materialists. If you're wondering how anyone can deny the existence of conscious experiences, then join the club! However most materialists would reject eliminitivist materialism. Rather they would embrace either reductive materialism or functionalism, both of which are very similar.
Now a reductionist materialist would either say that brain states and mind states are one and the same thing, or that mental states can be reduced to physical states. To say that they are one and the same thing is arguably not self-evidently absurd. For example, think about a pen you might hold in your hand. If you look at it lengthways, it will look completely different from looking at it end on. But nevertheless you are still looking at one and the same object! Alternatively they subscribe to the idea that mind is reducible to matter, in much the same way that water is really H2O, or heat is really only molecular motion , or light is really only electromagnetic radiation, and so on. Thus a glass of water just is, i.e. is identical with, a very great number of hydrogen and oxygen atoms composed into H2O molecules, and silicon and oxygen atoms composed into glass-molecules.
Now property dualism of which I think epiphenomenalism is the most popular sub-branch, maintains that the mind is to the body, as roughly a shadow is to an object casting that shadow. When physical matter is organized into a brain, it develops emergent properties, ie the mind, that cannot be explained by physical science . The mind is dependent on the brain, and it couldn't exist without a brain, but nevertheless it can't be explained by science. All we have is a correlation between brain states and mental states. But no explanation is possible to scientifically explain the existence of the mind in the same way we can explain and show that water is nothing but H2O.
Of course I reject all these positions as I emphatically reject the idea that consciousness requires a brain
But I hope that my explanations were of some use. And I certainly don't know if I got it all right . . after all I'm giving definitions of positions in the mind/body problem, all of which I think are ludicrous! But anyway Rusty:
Well, I don't think you can have it both ways, nor do I think that eliminativists try to. That is to say, if something is a "side effect," quite clearly it exists.
See my comment to Paul immediately following.
Paul:
The phenomenal component of consciousness, or phenomenal experience, is just what it feels like to you to have, say, a belief or a desire. We can contrast this with the psychological component of consciousness, which is a description of what beliefs and desires do or cause.
Eliminativists have no problem with the psychological component of consciousness.
So, what's the difference between an eliminativist and a reductionist? Reductionists accept that phenomenal consciousness exists, but argue that it is supervenient on, or logically entailed by, the physical.
I think it's an interesting question, too. I also think that it's been pretty conclusively settled in favour of realism. Instrumentalists, of course, disagree.
And no, I don't think idealism is incompatible with realism, in principle.
Well, I don't think you can have it both ways, nor do I think that eliminativists try to. That is to say, if something is a "side effect," quite clearly it exists.
See my comment to Paul immediately following.
Paul:
The phenomenal component of consciousness, or phenomenal experience, is just what it feels like to you to have, say, a belief or a desire. We can contrast this with the psychological component of consciousness, which is a description of what beliefs and desires do or cause.
Eliminativists have no problem with the psychological component of consciousness.
So, what's the difference between an eliminativist and a reductionist? Reductionists accept that phenomenal consciousness exists, but argue that it is supervenient on, or logically entailed by, the physical.
I think it's an interesting question, too. I also think that it's been pretty conclusively settled in favour of realism. Instrumentalists, of course, disagree.
And no, I don't think idealism is incompatible with realism, in principle.
The One called Neo said:
Completely specious reasoning! Water is H<sub>2</sub>O. You raised this issue before, I addressed it. I went on to address the question of emergent properties as well as the difference between object and process.
Cheers,