Materialism

[Win]

Chuckie:

If you can come up with a thought experiment where we can separate the learning process from the "experiencing" process, then we could stop this scientific inquiry and return to our regularly scheduled philosophical discussion. But I think it will be very difficult because the way we learn to differentiate is by exposure to stimulus. Is there a way out of this box?

Maybe this will help.

Imagine a simple artificial intelligence whose "brain" is about as complex as a dog's. It has the same abilities of sensory discrimination that we have. That is to say, it can pick out red things, blue things and so on.

Does it experience anything at all? Is it's experience of red the same as yours?

We built it. We know all the physical facts about it, yet we don't know, can't know the answers to these questions. The knowledge argument highlights this problem in a way equivalent to Nagel's famous question: What is it like to be a bat?

The knowledge argument demonstrates most of all the non-supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical. Knowing all the physical facts about any given cognitive system can't answer our questions about what it's like to be that system. The phenomenal facts aren't logically entailed by the physical facts.

Failure of supervenience leads to the falsity of materialism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

PLEASE read my definitions and tell me what is wrong with them.

None of those definitions matter to my question. I want to know whether we are assuming that Mary has learned enough to have a physical brain state equivalent to the one she would have had if she had seen light all her life. It's a simple question about the meaning of the first premise of the KA. We are assuming physicalism in that premise, so we don't have to worry about any complex metaphysical concepts.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

First entail, now supervenience. Sigh.

Win, perhaps you'll be the one do to us the favor of pointing out a definition of physicalism that requires us to be able to experience the mind of another entity. As far as I can tell from reading about 20 statements of the KA, it is the supposed fact that Mary learns something new that refutes physicalism, not merely that we don't know if she does.

~~ Paul

 

[ChuckieR]

Chuckie:
Maybe this will help.

Imagine a simple artificial intelligence whose "brain" is about as complex as a dog's. It has the same abilities of sensory discrimination that we have. That is to say, it can pick out red things, blue things and so on.

Does it experience anything at all? Is it's experience of red the same as yours?

Yes, I understand that to be the question that philosophers are trying to answer. All I'm saying is that the colorblind scientist thought experiment, as presently stated, does not shed any light on this subject.

We built it. We know all the physical facts about it, yet we don't know, can't know the answers to these questions. The knowledge argument highlights this problem in a way equivalent to Nagel's famous question: What is it like to be a bat?

What we can determine objectively is whether the robot will be able to differentiate between colors. I seriously doubt that Mary will be able to. So where does that leave the argument? It becomes much less interesting.

The knowledge argument demonstrates most of all the non-supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical. Knowing all the physical facts about any given cognitive system can't answer our questions about what it's like to be that system. The phenomenal facts aren't logically entailed by the physical facts.

Failure of supervenience leads to the falsity of materialism.

I think we all agreed on parts of this a couple hundered posts ago No one hear thinks that you will be able to distinguish between colors by reading about how the brain processes colors. You need the proper physical brain wiring in order to distinguish colors. You acquire this brain wiring by exposing yourself to different colors in childhood. Mary will not have this wiring, so this particular thought experiment does not address the philosophical issue at hand.

 

[Win]

Paul:

First entail, now supervenience. Sigh.

I try to keep my posts here relatively jargon free. Some words are, however, unavoidable. If A supervenes on B, the full set of facts about B determines the full set of facts about A.

Win, perhaps you'll be the one do to us the favor of pointing out a definition of physicalism that requires us to be able to experience the mind of another entity. As far as I can tell from reading about 20 statements of the KA, it is the supposed fact that Mary learns something new that refutes physicalism, not merely that we don't know if she does.

Strictly speaking, the KA demonstrates the non-supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical. Given this, most kinds of materialism (the reductive kinds) are false, because they require supervenience. You can still be a metaphysical materialist, though. And you can be an eliminative materialist by denying that Mary learns anything new.

Nobody here has ever made the argument for metaphysical materialism, however.

What reductive materialism requires is that the facts about what it's like to see red, or whether red is experienced at all, be derivable from the full set of physical facts. So Mary, having the full set of physical facts, won't learn anything when she leaves the room because she's already knows, from the physical facts, exactly what "seeing red" is like, that is to say, she has a full description of the factual content of the experience.

 

[BillHoyt]

We built it. We know all the physical facts about it, yet we don't know, can't know the answers to these questions. The knowledge argument highlights this problem in a way equivalent to Nagel's famous question: What is it like to be a bat?

Argumentum ad ignorantiam.

Cheers,

[edit: corrected spelling error - bh]

 

[davidsmith73]

Davidsmith73,

I am arguing from the perspective of the logical basis of the scientific method.

Well try following what I am saying from the perspective of my assumptions. This way you will not run into any problems that aren't there.

I can step out of this idea (a separate objective reality), so long as you realize that the scientific method, as it is formally defined, does not exist there.

I knew that anyway. However, it may exist in a different form. A form that does not take anything away from its ability to operate but one that brings new meaning to what it is describing.

I already said that they could continue to perform these methods. The point is that they would no longer have any logical justification behind those methods. Science would cease to be a logical framework, and would just become an art, practiced a certain way out of tradition.

No. The justification behind the methods would be the same. Specifically, that observation and theory agree. What the theory relates to and the reasons for its limitation in fully describing what it refers to would have changed.

Why? When you understand why scientific evidence allows us to logically draw conclusions from our observations, you will understand why it could no longer do so under solipsism.

Yet again, you have jumped back into your materialist position. What you are really saying above is:
When you understand why scientific evidence allows us to logically draw conclusions about an objective reality from our, you will understand why it could no longer do so under solipsism.

Of course this is true! Because I have assumed that qualia are the reality that we are describing. Objective reality is not there to draw conclusions from.

The problem is that you are already thinking of science as some heuristic algorithm, so eliminating the axioms of science is no big deal for you.

Whether I think its a big deal is not relavant. I don't know what you mean by heuristic algorithm.

What you fail to understand is that without those axioms, science is no longer logically coherent.

Only with respect to assuming there is an objective reality.

David: Your observations do not behave exactly as though the assumptions of objective reality were true.

Stimpy: Of course they do.

They clearly do not. Give me an example of an observation that behaved exactly as though the assumptions of objective reality were true. Every observation contains a degree of inexactness to these mathematical relationships.

I have no idea what you mean by "true knowledge".

As I have said before, it is knowing the nature of qualia - the redness of red. I can't put it in more simple terms.

David: You have not demonstrated at all how science is not going to work under my philosophy.

Stimpy: You are confusing two things: Science, and the scientific method.

Science does not exist under your philosophy at all. You could still use the scientific method under your philosophy, and it will still work. The reason it will still work is because the axioms of science are true, and they remain true regardless of whether you choose to believe in them or not.

Ahem. You said this earlier on in the very same post:
"I can step out of this idea, so long as you realize that the scientific method, as it is formally defined, does not exist there."

So the scientific method doesn't exist and Science doesn't exist under my philosophy, yet somehow I will be able to work out F=ma !

 

[Win]

Bill:

Argumentum ad ignorantium.

You obviously missed the "can't."

While cheap references to the latin names of fallacies might amuse the peanut gallery, they're pretty empty of any serious content.

Why not sit back, read and try to learn something instead of exposing your own supercillious ignorance?

 

[Win]

Chuckie:

Yes, I understand that to be the question that philosophers are trying to answer. All I'm saying is that the colorblind scientist thought experiment, as presently stated, does not shed any light on this subject.

I'm reminded of the joke about the economist trapped at the bottom of a well. How does he get out? Well, first assume a ladder.

The point of the thought experiment is not to ascertain whether Mary will have a well developed ability to distinguish between colors. The question is whether she'll have any new experience at all. We can agree that her ability to see color will be faulty. But if she can make out colors at all, she's learned something new, regardless of how incohate those sensory experiences might be.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

What reductive materialism requires is that the facts about what it's like to see red, or whether red is experienced at all, be derivable from the full set of physical facts. So Mary, having the full set of physical facts, won't learn anything when she leaves the room because she's already knows, from the physical facts, exactly what "seeing red" is like, that is to say, she has a full description of the factual content of the experience.

I'm going to ask one more time: Can you point me to a definition of reductive materialism or physicalism that states this requirement. Here's two that don't:

http://www.pbs.org/faithandreason/gengloss/reduc-body.html

http://www.hfac.uh.edu/phil/garson/IMNotes5.htm

Are you assuming that Mary's full set of physical facts includes the neural connections established when a normal person sees color?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

But if she can make out colors at all, she's learned something new, regardless of how incohate those sensory experiences might be.

Wait a minute. Just because she can make out colors doesn't mean she's learned anything new. Of course she is going to see colors when she hasn't seen them before, by definition. The question is whether the experience feels novel or not.

~~ Paul

 

[Win]

Paul:

I'm going to ask one more time: Can you point me to a definition of reductive materialism or physicalism that states this requirement. Here's two that don't:

They sure do. Read more carefully.

Are you assuming that Mary's full set of physical facts includes the neural connections established when a normal person sees color?

No. Look, I think there's been a serious misunderstanding at work here. When Mary sees red for the first time, if reductive materialism is true, she'll say, yeah, yeah, nothing surprising here; I already knew exactly what this would be like.

Wait a minute. Just because she can make out colors doesn't mean she's learned anything new. Of course she is going to see colors when she hasn't seen them before, by definition. The question is whether the experience feels novel or not.

That's true, if reductive materialism is correct. But it's our intuition that she has, in fact, learned something new. The contradiction of that intuition and the requirements of reductive materialism is what the thought experiment is supposed to highlight.

 

[ChuckieR]

Chuckie:
I'm reminded of the joke about the economist trapped at the bottom of a well. How does he get out? Well, first assume a ladder.

The point of the thought experiment is not to ascertain whether Mary will have a well developed ability to distinguish between colors.

It isn't? But if she can't distinguish between colors, then what does it mean to see red, or blue, or green? If red, blue and green all look the same to her, then I would have to say that she definately does not experience something new when she sees red, but not for any interesting philosophical reason. Only because her brain does not have the hardware required to distinguish between colors.

Hold up a red filter in front of your eyes (I have a nice translucent red clipboard that I use here). Look at something green. Now look at something blue. Can't tell the difference, eh? That's what it's like to be colorblind. That's what it will "be like" for Mary. Not very interesting philosophically, and competely physically explainable.

The question is whether she'll have any new experience at all. We can agree that her ability to see color will be faulty.

I am positing that it will be nonexistant, not just "limited". She won't have the proper brain wiring to distinguish between different colors.

But if she can make out colors at all, she's learned something new, regardless of how incohate those sensory experiences might be.

Agreed. So now I think we completely agree, except that you still believe that she will be able to distinguish between colors when she leaves the room, I do not believe that. But that is a scientific question, and not a philosophical one.

 

[ChuckieR]

No. Look, I think there's been a serious misunderstanding at work here. When Mary sees red for the first time, if reductive materialism is true, she'll say, yeah, yeah, nothing surprising here; I already knew exactly what this would be like.

And what I'm saying is that when she looks at something red she will say "Gee, it doesn't look any different to me than white. I expected something more. This is nothing new. In fact, the world still looks black and white to me. Everything I read about colors says that normal people can tell red objects from blue objects, but I can't! What a letdown. I guess that bit I read about early childhood development was true, which explains why I dont' see anything different."

So then we have not answered any long-standing philosophical question. We have only verified that if you raise someone in a non-colored environment, they will never be able to see color.

That's true, if reductive materialism is correct. But it's our intuition that she has, in fact, learned something new. The contradiction of that intuition and the requirements of reductive materialism is what the thought experiment is supposed to highlight.

It may be your intuition that she learns something new. It is my intuition that she does not. But, again, not for any interesting philosophical reason, but for a simple, physical, completely understandable and explainable reason: her brain does not have the proper wiring to be able to distinguish between.

 

[Win]

Chuckie:

It isn't? But if she can't distinguish between colors, then what does it mean to see red, or blue, or green? If red, blue and green all look the same to her, then I would have to say that she definately does not experience something new when she sees red, but not for any interesting philosophical reason. Only because her brain does not have the hardware required to distinguish between colors.

The ability to distinguish between colors isn't the same thing as the experience of color. Lacking the ability to discriminate, she still gets some new information, namely that blur of color.

The ability to discriminate is easily distinguishable from the experience of color, simpliciter. Imagine a "red detection machine." It can distinguish between colors. Does it experience red?

Agreed. So now I think we completely agree, except that you still believe that she will be able to distinguish between colors when she leaves the room, I do not believe that. But that is a scientific question, and not a philosophical one.

No, I don't. I think she'll have a new experience that contains color, incohately. That content is the something new she learns.

 

[BillHoyt]

Peanut Gallery,

We note, with amused irony, that Win is unable to stay within his own assertions. He wishes us to believe that we can't ever know about a bat's experience of being a bat, a mechanical dog's experience of being a mechanical dog or, by extension, BillHoyt's experience of being BillHoyt. Yet he delivers this post (numbers added by me):

1.You obviously missed the "can't."

2. While cheap references to the latin names of fallacies might amuse the peanut gallery, they're pretty empty of any serious content.

3. Why not sit back, read and try to learn something instead of exposing your own supercillious ignorance?

Now number 1 presumes knowledge about what I experienced, doesn't it? It also evinces a misunderstanding of argumentum ad ignorantiam. To argue from ignorance is to claim:
o that if something hasn't been proven true it must be false or
o that if something hasn't been proven false it must be true.

Here is what Win previously asserted:

We know all the physical facts about it, yet we don't know, can't know the answers to these questions.

Even if we accept that we don't yet know something about the dog, that does not imply that we can't know about it in the future.

Number 2, of course, presumes I don't anything about logical fallacies or that I am posing by using latin. Win, of course, knows he was down this road once before with me and was spanked severely. I suggest to Win that he stop the ad homs and debate the issues.

Number 3 is another argumentum ad hominem, and another demonstration of his own disbelief in his claims. Once again, he presumes to know that I (a)haven't previously been reading, and (b) am superciliously ignorant.

That's one 'l' on supercilious, Win. Thought you'd like to know.

Cheers,

 

[Win]

Bill:

If you can't know X, then reasoning from this epistemological closure isn't an argument from ignorance.

Understand now?

Thanks for the speling tips.

 

[Guest]

ChuckieR

I think I can now state this in a single statement that sums up my objection to this particular thought experiment: We cannot separate learning how to see red from experiencing red. (except by some difficult surgery which simply wires our brain as if we had already learned how to see red, but this is trivial and uninteresting).

If you can come up with a thought experiment where we can separate the learning process from the "experiencing" process, then we could stop this scientific inquiry and return to our regularly scheduled philosophical discussion. But I think it will be very difficult because the way we learn to differentiate is by exposure to stimulus. Is there a way out of this box?

Let's change it completely. Instead of learning everything about red, Mary learns everything that can be known about sounds and about musical theory. However, she is deprived of all sounds that were created as artistic works, including poetry. She knows how to communicate with speech though. We have now eliminated the need to learn how to interpret auditory signals.

Then we play her Beethovens 5th symphony, Amazing Grace played on the bagpipes and finish off with 'A Day in the Life" by the Beatles.

Has she learned anything new?

 

[ChuckieR]

Chuckie:

The ability to distinguish between colors isn't the same thing as the experience of color. Lacking the ability to discriminate, she still gets some new information, namely that blur of color.

Well, I'd say if she is lacking the ability to discriminate, that there would be no "blur" of color. Try the red filter experiment and tell me if you see a blur of blue or a blur of green. If it is a good red filter, you won't (if it is a wider-band filter, then you may still see blue and green differently, but that is a technical issue). Try wiggling the VGA connector on the back of your computer and try to "disconnect" one or two color guns. If you leave only the red color gun on, blue and green objects will be black. All you will have are shades of red. I'm not arguing that "I know what it's like for everyone else when they see red". I'm arguing that Mary won't be able to distinguish red from blue from green, so this particular thought experiment is not very interesting in relation to KA.

The ability to discriminate is easily distinguishable from the experience of color, simpliciter. Imagine a "red detection machine." It can distinguish between colors. Does it experience red?

Well, no. A camera that is only sensitive to red will not be able to distinguish between blue and green. Blue and green will just look "black" because the camera is not sensitive to blue and green. So it can only tell the difference between red (bright) and not red (dark). It can tell you when something reflects/emits red, but it can't in any other way distinguish between colors. Again, no philosophical question addressed here.

If you want the machine to be able to distinguish between blue and green, then you have to give it more color receptors.

No, I don't. I think she'll have a new experience that contains color, incohately. That content is the something new she learns.

Okay, then we have a scientific disagreement which could be answered by actually performing the experiment. Only if she did in fact "see red" differently from blue and green could we then go on to have a philosophical discussion.

Hasn't someone already done this experiment in animals? Maybe a quick Google could answer this...

 

[BillHoyt]

Bill:

If you can't know X, then reasoning from this epistemological closure isn't an argument from ignorance.

Understand now?

Thanks for the speling tips.

Thank you so much for the clarification. So you are now simply in the midst of circular reasoning. How is that any better?

Cheers,