Materialism

[Guest]

Paul :

You suggested E-Prime. Why not finish what you started?

quote:
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We aim to discover whether the knowledge argument succeeds of fails to falsify materialism. To do this we must ask the following questions :
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Oh, it's not anywhere near that hard. All we have to do is agree on whether Mary can get her brain in the has-seen-red state by reading books and/or undergoing operations, then agree that if she can, we have no idea what happens when she walks out of the room.

Well, in order to establish whether she can gain knowledge of seeing red by reading books we need to answer my questions.

Any answer you like in E-Prime will do. You drive this, Paul. We will use your answers to the questions :

Do brain processes differ from qualia in any way?
If they do, then how do they differ?
By what means do we gain knowledge of facts about qualia?
By what means do we gain knowledge of facts about brain processes?

 

[Guest]

Paul :

All we have to do is agree on whether Mary can get her brain in the has-seen-red state by reading books and/or undergoing operations, then agree that if she can, we have no idea what happens when she walks out of the room.

This marginally changes the knowledge argument. Let us say that by means of a probe in Marys brain, stimulating her visual cortex, we can re-create perfectly the brain processes which usually result from stimulation from the optic nerve due to red light. Thus Mary gains the knowledge of red without leaving the room. But it makes no difference to the knowledge argument because you have just subsituted "leaving the room and experiencing red" with "having her brain stimulated to produce the experience of red". Either way she cannot gain the knowledge of seeing red without experiencing red qualia. If you are positing that it is possible to give her the knowledge of seeing red by means of an operation which does not replicate the brain processes associated with seeing red then you are suggesting we can create the memory of seeing red, without ever having actually seen red . If so I must ask you if "the memory of seeing red" differs at all from "the experience of seeing red". If, so then you gain 'new information' every time you experience red, and you lose it again whenever red goes out of view, in which case the knowledge argument still succeeds because all you can surgically replicate is the memory of the experience of red and not the experience of red itself. For your refutation of the KA to work you must posit that there is no difference between actually seeing red and possessing the memory of having seen red. If you close your eyes and try to remember seeing red, do you see red? I don't. Instead I have a feeling similar to "having a word on the tip of your tongue." You know you would recognise it if you could conjure it up, but you can't actually conjure it up. i.e. you know you have the memory of seeing red, but you can't actually see red, unless you are looking at something red or your brain is being stimulated to replicate the same physical processes that naturally produce red qualia.

 

[ChuckieR]

If so I must ask you if "the memory of seeing red" differs at all from "the experience of seeing red".

These are certainly different. The memory of seeing red is a static "stored" state. The experience of seeing red is an active process. The experience of seeing red creates the memory of seeing red.

If, so then you gain 'new information' every time you experience red, and you lose it again whenever red goes out of view, in which case the knowledge argument still succeeds because all you can surgically replicate is the memory of the experience of red and not the experience of red itself.

So then if I am not looking at something red, then I look at something red, I have just performed the KA experiment? I thought it was deeper than that?

The surgery can create the stored state of the memory of red. Artificial stimulation can can create the experience of red. One is a static "state" of matter, the other is an active process. I thought it was obvious that memory and experience are not the same thing. I don't see how this applies to the argument.

For your refutation of the KA to work you must posit that there is no difference between actually seeing red and possessing the memory of having seen red. If you close your eyes and try to remember seeing red, do you see red? I don't. Instead I have a feeling similar to "having a word on the tip of your tongue." You know you would recognise it if you could conjure it up, but you can't actually conjure it up. i.e. you know you have the memory of seeing red, but you can't actually see red, unless you are looking at something red or your brain is being stimulated to replicate the same physical processes that naturally produce red qualia.

Yes, I too cannot conjure up red (interesting, I can seem to "play back" songs in my head, though). But when I see red the next time, I realize that it is something I have seen before.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let's agree to talk in short sentences for awhile, okay?

First of all, let's assume Mary can obtain a brain state equivalent to that of a person who has seen red. I'm talking about brain-meat state only, not mind state, not qualia state, not dual or monist state, none of that. We all agree that Mary has a physical brain and that it has a state. Let's assume she can obtain that state through reading and/or surgery.

Let's also agree that, even with that brain state, she is not seeing red in the room, because there is no red.

Now she goes outside and sees red.

Does anyone want to claim anything one way or the other about whether the experience of seeing red would seem old hat or novel? I do not, because we do not know.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

For your refutation of the KA to work you must posit that there is no difference between actually seeing red and possessing the memory of having seen red.

I don't think this is what the KA is talking about, is it? It's talking about whether seeing red will feel novel or old-hat. It's not talking about whether Mary has actually had red light enter her eyes, which we agree she hasn't.

What Mary gets in the room are all the personal/subjective facts about red, including a complete activation of her visual pathways by the robot. Then, when she leaves the room, will red light feel entirely familiar or will she gain some knew knowledge about it? We can't say.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Not in E-Prime....

Having thought about this a little more (thankyou Paul) it doesn't actually matter whether we are talking about "the experience of red" or "the memory of the experience of red". Both can be demonstrated to be 'new information'. What matters is the context of our acquiring of that information. Mental and physical facts differ in the following way :

Mental facts, including both experienincg qualia and the subjective experience described as "remembering qualia" come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness.

Physical facts, including all brain states, come to us indirectly via means of reasoning and explanation concerning a group of related concepts we call physical reality. No physical facts ever come to us directly via phenomenal conscious - to us they are abstract concepts.

I hope we can agree on those definitions. We might also observe that we have an extremely clear cut division between subjective facts and objective facts here. The objective facts are objective for the simple reason that they exist within the context of a group of concepts (the physical model of the Universe) and that we all understand what those concepts are - they are shared and verifiable. The subjective facts are subjective for the simple reason that they come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness. Because they come us directly they cannot be specified in terms of the physical model because they are not abstract like the physical things - they just EXIST in their own right directly within our phenomenal consciousness.

Now to the KA :

The critical question is "Can Mary ever gain the knowledge of experiencing red (or the knowledge of the memory of red) without actually experiencing red (or experiencing remembering red)?"

Even if you surgically implant the memory of seeing red, Mary still gains knowledge of the memory directly into her phenomenal consciousness. Here is your dualism, and you cannot avoid it. :

All facts about the physical world must come to us via our reason and their meaning must be relative to the abstract model we have built of physical reality. These are objective, physical facts. They are meaningless in the abscence of the physical model.

All facts about qualia and phenomenal experiences must come to us directly via our consciousness. They do not have to be relative to the abstract model we have built of physical reality. Some of them do having meaning with respect to the physical model, but this meaning is always one of correlation i.e. there are some physical facts and mental facts which appear to be closely related even though the mental facts come to us directly and the physical ones indirectly.

"Subjective physical facts" are an oxymoron under these definitions. However, if you want to challenge my definitions of physical and mental facts then you will need to demonstrate why my observation that we have two different means of acquiring information is wrong, but I do not believe there can be even the slightest bit of confusion about this : There are facts which come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness. There are other facts which come to us via reasoning and learning about an abstract physical model. There can be absolutely no confusion between these two methods of gaining knowledge. One is direct and subjective. The other is indirect and objective. Subjective things cannot be physical because they come to us directly, rather than indirectly within the context of the physical model.

 

[Guest]

First of all, let's assume Mary can obtain a brain state equivalent to that of a person who has seen red. I'm talking about brain-meat state only, not mind state, not qualia state, not dual or monist state, none of that. We all agree that Mary has a physical brain and that it has a state. Let's assume she can obtain that state through reading and/or surgery.

Let's also agree that, even with that brain state, she is not seeing red in the room, because there is no red.

Now she goes outside and sees red.

Does anyone want to claim anything one way or the other about whether the experience of seeing red would seem old hat or novel? I do not, because we do not know.

~~ Paul [/B]

I don't think your question would provide us with a resolution of the problem, even if you could answer it. And you can't apparently answer it anyway. I think we need to look more closely at our means of gaining subjective facts and our means of gaining objective facts, and whether these things are fundamentally different ways of gaining knowledge.

 

[Guest]

I don't think this is what the KA is talking about, is it?

The KA is talking about the context within which different facts have meaning. Subjective facts about red only have meaning to Mary because they come to Mary directly. It does not matter how you create the situation where the subjective knowledge of red comes to Mary, all that matters is that it comes to her directly and not via the abstract physical model.

If it comes to her via the physical model then it is objectively verifiable and physical.

If it comes to her directly then is subjective (not objectively verifiable) and mental.

 

[BillHoyt]

We might also observe that we have an extremely clear cut division between subjective facts and objective facts here. The objective facts are objective for the simple reason that they exist within the context of a group of concepts (the physical model of the Universe) and that we all understand what those concepts are - they are shared and verifiable. The subjective facts are subjective for the simple reason that they come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness. Because they come us directly they cannot be specified in terms of the physical model because they are not abstract like the physical things - they just EXIST in their own right directly within our phenomenal consciousness.

THIS POST IS RATED MA - Mature Audiences Only

Merrily UcE marches from one absolutely trounced assertion to another. Notice that at no time does he stop to cart off the carcasses of his dead assertions. The above is yet another soon-to-be-trounced assertion. Those of you with weaker stomachs, please scroll quickly onto the next post. Be careful to avoid illogical body parts that may be scattered in the next few posts.

UcE, a few questions for you. Try not to cry as you rip your own fecal matter to shreds:

1. What started the first objective concept?
2. How does a new objective concept get into your little fortress?
3. I'm sure that, by now, you've already tried something lame like saying that a subjective fact starts to be shared. Please stop and try again, without the nonsense. Either that or restate your earlier nonsense excluding the nonsense about the clear cut distinction.

We now return you to Comedy Central's UcE Said It, It Ain't Right, but UcE Said it!, already in progress

Cheers,

 

[Loki]

ChuckieR,

Listen, I'm not an expert on the Knowledge Argument. Maybe there are some interesting arguments relating to it. But can't we all just agree that this particular example is a poor demonstration of why materialism is false?

From Ian's link about the KA :

So, if she learns something new, this something is nonphysical, and, therefore, materialism is false

1st Reply : Refuse to admit that Mary learns something new.
2nd Reply : Mary gains know-how, not knowledge of facts.
3rd Reply : Mary learns an old fact in a new way.
4th Reply : Deny that it is possible for Mary to learn all the physical facts about color and color vision while locked in the Black and White room.

Well, I'm still missing something. The problem is clearly stated above - if she learns, materialism is false. But the presentation then shows at least 4 possible replies that resusitate materialism. The first is "she doesn't learn anything new". WHy would we reject this possibility? What additional evidence makes anyone believe that Mary will learn something new? Nothing in the thought experiment seems to "force" the concluson that she learns, so what value does this experiment have?

As ChuckieR says, this seems a poor demonstration. Or am I missing something? Ian, you seem to think the link was good - can you expand on *why* Mary *must* learn something new?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE, I'd like to discuss this, I really would. But your posts are too long, with too many ideas, many of whose definitions I do not know. I have no idea what phenomenal consciousness is, for example, because I don't know what the definition of consciousness is.

Why can't we take it a step at a time? Let's try it from another direction. Can we agree that without the operation, Mary cannot learn all the physical facts about red, namely the personal physical facts gained when she sees red light? Without the operation, the first premise of the KA is bogus?

Can we agree to that?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Loki said:

The first is "she doesn't learn anything new". WHy would we reject this possibility? What additional evidence makes anyone believe that Mary will learn something new? Nothing in the thought experiment seems to "force" the concluson that she learns, so what value does this experiment have?

I think the question made sense to the original discussants of the thought experiment because they failed to realize that some physical facts result from seeing red light. It is these physical facts that they assume Mary will learn when she leaves the room, even though they don't realize that they are, indeed, physical facts that she should have stuffed in her head before she left.

I realize I'm being a pompous ass by belittling the discussants in this manner.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

UcE, I'd like to discuss this, I really would. But your posts are too long, with too many ideas, many of whose definitions I do not know. I have no idea what phenomenal consciousness is, for example, because I don't know what the definition of consciousness is.

I'm not short of time, Paul (I hope not anyway....).

All I mean by 'phenomenal consciousness' is the contents of your consciousness. You know the argument abut solipsism - everything comes to you via your mind. You might be a brain in a VAT. 'Phenomena' simply means that which comes to you directly. 'Noumena' is the proposed external world we reason exists. You MUST understand this difference because the KA depends on it.

I spent ages last night thinking about your posts and trying to restate the KA in terms that will make it clear to you why it works. It will only take you 10 minutes to read my posts, and I think they constitute a completely bulletproof specification of the KA, as well as a clear and easily defendable set of definitions for subjective, objective, physical and mental. Please read what I wrote. Next time I claim that materialism has been demonstrated false I will refer to this thread.

Why can't we take it a step at a time? Let's try it from another direction.

We MUST take it from this direction, because THIS is the problem. The KA is about Knowledge, and how we get it.

Can we agree that without the operation, Mary cannot learn all the physical facts about red, namely the personal physical facts gained when she sees red light? Without the operation, the first premise of the KA is bogus?

Can we agree to that?

I don't know what 'personal physical facts' are. I explained in last nights posts why 'subjective physical fact' was an oxymoron. Please read my posts. If you don't like the definitions then please explain why. Facts are subjective/mental or objective/physical because of the means by which those facts were gained. If you don't understand this then I am not surprised you think the KA fails (although your position now seems to be that you don't know if it fails).

Take all day if you like, but if you want to refute the Knowledge argument you must think about how we get the knowledge. Subjective/mental facts are gained directly. Physical/objective facts are gained indirectly. This difference is absolute, and it is the reason why the KA and all the other proofs against materialism work. Please go back and read my posts. We have been discussing this for over a year now, it would be a shame if we can't cover the final mile because you won't respond to what I have actually posted on the grounds 'it is too complicated'.

Geoff

 

[Guest]

THIS POST IS RATED MA - Mature Audiences Only

Merrily UcE marches from one absolutely trounced assertion to another. Notice that at no time does he stop to cart off the carcasses of his dead assertions. The above is yet another soon-to-be-trounced assertion. Those of you with weaker stomachs, please scroll quickly onto the next post. Be careful to avoid illogical body parts that may be scattered in the next few posts.

UcE, a few questions for you. Try not to cry as you rip your own fecal matter to shreds:

1. What started the first objective concept?
2. How does a new objective concept get into your little fortress?
3. I'm sure that, by now, you've already tried something lame like saying that a subjective fact starts to be shared. Please stop and try again, without the nonsense. Either that or restate your earlier nonsense excluding the nonsense about the clear cut distinction.

We now return you to Comedy Central's UcE Said It, It Ain't Right, but UcE Said it!, already in progress

Cheers,

Bill,

Ad Hominems = No response from UCE.



Geoff.

 

[Guest]

Loki said:
I think the question made sense to the original discussants of the thought experiment because they failed to realize that some physical facts result from seeing red light. It is these physical facts that they assume Mary will learn when she leaves the room, even though they don't realize that they are, indeed, physical facts that she should have stuffed in her head before she left.

I realize I'm being a pompous ass by belittling the discussants in this manner.

~~ Paul

The question made sense to the original discussants because they understood the nature of physical and mental facts. When Mary finally experiences red, for whatever reasons, then she gains facts about red directly via her own consciousness. Before she has experienced red (or the memory of red) she has gained facts about red still via her conciousness but **indirectly** since they must first be interpreted through her conceptual model of the physical world thus making them objectively verifiable. Please, please, please read my posts and try to understand this difference!

In fact....just read this one and concentrate on the difference between subjective and objective. What makes something objective? What makes something subjective? :

Mental facts, including both experienincg qualia and the subjective experience described as "remembering qualia" come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness (directly into your mind like qualia and emotions).

Physical facts, including knowledge of brain states, come to us indirectly via means of reasoning and explanation concerning a group of related concepts we call physical reality. No physical facts ever come to us directly via phenomenal conscious - to us they are abstract concepts.

I hope we can agree on those definitions. We might also observe that we have an extremely clear cut division between subjective facts and objective facts here. The objective facts are objective for the simple reason that they exist within the context of a group of concepts (the physical model of the Universe) and that we all understand what those concepts are - they are shared and verifiable. The subjective facts are subjective for the simple reason that they come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness. Because they come us directly they cannot be specified in terms of the physical model because they are not abstract like the physical things - they just EXIST in their own right directly within our phenomenal consciousness.

Now to the KA :

The critical question is "Can Mary ever gain the knowledge of experiencing red (or the knowledge of the memory of red) without actually experiencing red (or experiencing remembering red)?"

Even if you surgically implant the memory of seeing red, Mary still gains knowledge of the memory directly into her phenomenal consciousness. Here is your dualism, and you cannot avoid it. :

All facts about the physical world must come to us via our reason and their meaning must be relative to the abstract model we have built of physical reality. These are objective, physical facts. They are meaningless in the abscence of the physical model.

All facts about qualia and phenomenal experiences must come to us directly via our consciousness. They do not have to be relative to the abstract model we have built of physical reality. Some of them do having meaning with respect to the physical model, but this meaning is always one of correlation i.e. there are some physical facts and mental facts which appear to be closely related even though the mental facts come to us directly and the physical ones indirectly.

"Subjective physical facts" are an oxymoron under these definitions. However, if you want to challenge my definitions of physical and mental facts then you will need to demonstrate why my observation that we have two different means of acquiring information is wrong, but I do not believe there can be even the slightest bit of confusion about this : There are facts which come to us directly via phenomenal consciousness. There are other facts which come to us via reasoning and learning about an abstract physical model. There can be absolutely no confusion between these two methods of gaining knowledge. One is direct and subjective. The other is indirect and objective. Subjective things cannot be physical because they come to us directly, rather than indirectly within the context of the physical model.

I do not believe it is possible to understand the above information and still fail to see why the KA falsifies materialism. Respecifying the problem with garbled definitions of subjective, objective and physical just prolongs the confusion and allows people to go on claiming the KA doesn't work, even though it does.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Nobody is disputing that we have two types of knowledge: Abstract knowledge, and empirical (or subjective) knowledge.

Abstract knowledge is the information that we have encoded in our memories. The same information can be encoded in many different memories, and in many different ways. In fact, it is a well known psychological fact that encoding information in your memory in as many different ways as possible maximizes your ability to retain that information.

Empirical knowledge is the memory of the stuff we have directly experienced.

In effect, all memories contain both empirical and abstract knowledge. The empirical knowledge is the actual memory of the experience, and the abstract knowledge is the information that you can extract from the memory.

Physicalism has absolutely no problem with this. All that physicalism requires is that both forms of knowledge be physical.

Both forms of knowledge exist as memories, which are a physical structure in the brain. The only difference is the physical mechanism by which that knowledge gets there, and the way that the other parts of the brain interpret that knowledge.

None of this in any way falsifies physicalism, unless you make the assumption that some part of this process is non-physical. There is absolutely no reason to think that this must be the case.

Mary can only gain abstract knowledge by reading about red. The physical process of reading is not physically capable of causing the necessary changes to her brain for her to have the actual memory of seeing red.

Does Mary have all the information about red? Sure. When she sees red for the first time, she does not get any new information. She only gets the memory of having seen red. That memory is a physical structure in her brain, not information. That memory contains information about red, but she already has that information in abstract form elsewhere in her brain. The only new thing she gains is the physical memory of having seen red.

Why should this constitute a problem for physicalism?

Dr.Stupid

 

[Guest]

Somehow I knew this would act as bait for a Stimpson-fish......

Nobody is disputing that we have two types of knowledge: Abstract knowledge, and empirical (or subjective) knowledge.

Abstract knowledge is the information that we have encoded in our memories. The same information can be encoded in many different memories, and in many different ways. In fact, it is a well known psychological fact that encoding information in your memory in as many different ways as possible maximizes your ability to retain that information.

Empirical knowledge is the memory of the stuff we have directly experienced.

In effect, all memories contain both empirical and abstract knowledge. The empirical knowledge is the actual memory of the experience, and the abstract knowledge is the information that you can extract from the memory.

Okay....I can go along with this lot.

Physicalism has absolutely no problem with this. All that physicalism requires is that both forms of knowledge be physical.

Ah.

Well, this is where physicalism falls over then.

You are correct - physicalism claims that everything is physical, including the empirical (subjective) knowledge gained directly. Unfortunately this doesn't work. Let's have a look at the "brain process"/qualia situation. "Brain processes" are objective, abstract non-empirical things which fit naturally into the abstract physical model we have made of the world. Qualia are subjective, non-abstract, empirical things which do not fit naturally into the abstract physical model we have made of the world. Materialism TRIES to claim that qualia fit into the abstract physical model, but suffers fatal problems as soon as it tries to do this. Here's why. We have three options when faced with qualia :

------------------------
Option 1 (Battle of Little Bighorn defence of materialism) :

Claim that qualia don't actually exist. This is Synaesthesias position, which allows materialism to remain standing, but at the cost of denying that qualia exist. I don't know anyone else who prefers this position to abandoning materialism.

Option 2 EXAMINE THIS VERY CAREFULLY. :

Try to insert the qualia into the model with the statement "Qualia ARE brain processes". Materialism has a problem here because there is already something in the physical model taking the place where we would like to put the qualia. i.e. the brain process. So in order to claim that the qualia can go in the physical model the materialist must claim that the qualia and the brain process are the same thing. The trouble with this is that we already know that brain processes and qualia differ because knowledge of qualia can be gained directly and knowledge of brain processes cannot. ***Therefore Brain processes and Qualia CANNOT Be synonyms - they CANNOT 'be the same thing'***. In fact, if you want to claim that they are synonyms then the term 'qualia' is redundant and you are back to option 1.

Option 3 :

Option 3 is to recognise that brain processes and qualia differ, but also claim that they can both go in the physical model, kind of next-to-each-other in the 'slot' currently occupied by 'brain processes'. This is better than options 1 and 2 since it recognises qualia exist, recognises they differ and allows both to go in the model. However, it isn't materialism any more. It is Property Dualism.

---------------------------

I suspect you are going to try to defend option 2, which should be interesting.....

Now back to your post :

Both forms of knowledge exist as memories, which are a physical structure in the brain. The only difference is the physical mechanism by which that knowledge gets there, and the way that the other parts of the brain interpret that knowledge.

Since you are using 'physical' to mean 'everything' this part of your post is meaningless. It serves no purpose simply to define everything to be physical and claim that this is a bulletproof defence of materialism. The fact remains that knowledge of qualia come to us subjectively and knowledge of brain processes come to us objectively. I choose to define physical as objective. You choose to define physical as 'everything'. This serves no purpose.

You can use 'abstract' for physical/objective and 'empirical' for non-physical/subjective if you like, Stimp. It makes no difference to me or the KA.

None of this in any way falsifies physicalism, unless you make the assumption that some part of this process is non-physical.

I have not assumed anything, Stimpson. YOU have DEFINED EVERYTHING as PHYSICAL and you are then trying to use that definition to defend materialism. How about NOT ASSUMING anything at all, eh?

Since you have been good enough to recognise that there are two forms of knowledge we can dispense with this baloney.

How about we use two words for these forms of knowledge that everyone can understand? :

Direct knowledge : That which comes directly to your phenomenal consciousness.
Indirect knowledge : That which must be reasoned via the physical conceptual model.

Mary can only gain abstract knowledge by reading about red. The physical process of reading is not physically capable of causing the necessary changes to her brain for her to have the actual memory of seeing red.

Good. She can only get indirect knowledge by reading. She can only get direct knowledge by experiencing it directly.

Does Mary have all the information about red? Sure. When she sees red for the first time, she does not get any new information. She only gets the memory of having seen red.

What the h*ll are you talking about?

You just said "Mary can only gain abstract knowledge by reading about red." ***So how does she get the empirical/direct knowledge about red????****

That memory is a physical structure in her brain, not information. That memory contains information about red, but she already has that information in abstract form elsewhere in her brain. The only new thing she gains is the physical memory of having seen red.

Why should this constitute a problem for physicalism?

It is a problem for materialism because Mary can only gain empirical/direct/subjective knowledge about red by experiencing that knowledge. Please think carefully about options 1, 2 and 3 above. There is your proof that materialism is false. I have repeatedly tried to get you to tell me whether brain processes and qualia differ or do not differ. You have each time ignored the question. Answer it and I will prove to you that materialism fails. If they do not differ then qualia are redundant and you are an (option 1) eliminative materialist. If they do differ but both fit in the physical model then you are an (option 3) property dualist. What you THINK you are is option 2, but option 2 depends on brain processes and qualia being both different and the same simultaneously WHICH IS WHY YOU WILL NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION :

Do brain processes and qualia differ?

 

[Guest]

NB : I am starting a new thread. A poll to discuss these three ways of dealing with qualia.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

You are correct - physicalism claims that everything is physical, including the empirical (subjective) knowledge gained directly. Unfortunately this doesn't work. Let's have a look at the "brain process"/qualia situation. "Brain processes" are objective, abstract non-empirical things which fit naturally into the abstract physical model we have made of the world.

Hold it right there. You are confusing the map with the territory again. Brain processes are not abstract. Our description of them is.

Qualia are subjective, non-abstract, empirical things which do not fit naturally into the abstract physical model we have made of the world.

This statement simply assumes that physicalism is wrong. In keeping with the agreement I made with Rusty, I would assert that the qualia is not subjective. The qualia is an objective physical process.

Materialism TRIES to claim that qualia fit into the abstract physical model, but suffers fatal problems as soon as it tries to do this. Here's why. We have three options when faced with qualia :

I suspect you are going to try to defend option 2, which should be interesting.....

Now back to your post :

I have already told you that this is my position. I am asserting that the qualia is a brain process. If you want that in e-prime, then consider this formal logical statement:

Let set A be the set of all brain processes.

Let x be a qualia.

x is an element of set A.

Note that although I have used the word "is" here, it is perfectly legitimate, since its usage in formal logic is well-defined.

Now back to your post :

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both forms of knowledge exist as memories, which are a physical structure in the brain. The only difference is the physical mechanism by which that knowledge gets there, and the way that the other parts of the brain interpret that knowledge.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Since you are using 'physical' to mean 'everything' this part of your post is meaningless.

I have not defined the word "physical" to mean everything. Once again, you are confusing the definitions within physicalism with the assumptions.

I define "physical" to be everything that has an effect on me. I assume that these effects are empirically observable, and that they can be mathematically described in terms of my observations.

It is the assumptions of physicalism that are in question when you claim that physicalism is incoherent.

So what are you disagreeing with? The assertion that qualia have an effect on me, or the assertion that those effects can be observed, and mathematically described in terms of those observations?

It serves no purpose simply to define everything to be physical and claim that this is a bulletproof defence of materialism.

Nor do I do that.

The fact remains that knowledge of qualia come to us subjectively and knowledge of brain processes come to us objectively. I choose to define physical as objective. You choose to define physical as 'everything'. This serves no purpose.

So why do you do it? Why do you assert that my position is wrong if it only differs based on definitions?

But of course, it does not. You have just made an assertion: You have asserted that qualia come to us subjectively, after making it quite clear that you define subjective to be non-objective. Indeed, you have defined subjective in such a way that if anything is subjective, then physicalism is false.

Now all you have to do is demonstrate that there is anything which truly qualifies as "subjective", as you have defined it. Simply asserting that there are such things will not accomplish this.

You can use 'abstract' for physical/objective and 'empirical' for non-physical/subjective if you like, Stimp. It makes no difference to me or the KA.

It does make a difference, because "empirical" doesn't have the built-in dualistic baggage that "subjective" does. Saying that it is empirical just means that it is the result of having an experience. As long as the process of having that experience is compatible with physicalism, everything is fine.

Since you have been good enough to recognise that there are two forms of knowledge we can dispense with this baloney.

How about we use two words for these forms of knowledge that everyone can understand? :

Direct knowledge : That which comes directly to your phenomenal consciousness.
Indirect knowledge : That which must be reasoned via the physical conceptual model.

That's fine. This is perfectly compatible with physicalism, since phenomenal consciousness is a physical process in the brain.

Does Mary have all the information about red? Sure. When she sees red for the first time, she does not get any new information. She only gets the memory of having seen red.
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What the h*ll are you talking about?

You just said "Mary can only gain abstract knowledge by reading about red." ***So how does she get the empirical/direct knowledge about red????****

She does not have the direct knowledge of red before she sees it. You completely missed my point. knowledge is not information, although it can contain it. Before she sees red, she has all the information about red encoded in her abstract knowledge. She does not have direct knowledge of red, meaning the actual memory of having seen red. That memory is not information. The memory contains information, but she already has that information. What she doesn't have is the actual memory of having seen red.

That memory is a physical structure in her brain, not information. That memory contains information about red, but she already has that information in abstract form elsewhere in her brain. The only new thing she gains is the physical memory of having seen red.

Why should this constitute a problem for physicalism?
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It is a problem for materialism because Mary can only gain empirical/direct/subjective knowledge about red by experiencing that knowledge.

What makes you think that contradicts materialism?

Please think carefully about options 1, 2 and 3 above. There is your proof that materialism is false. I have repeatedly tried to get you to tell me whether brain processes and qualia differ or do not differ. You have each time ignored the question.

This is simply a lie. I have stated directly, and unambiguously, that qualia are a type of brain process.

Answer it and I will prove to you that materialism fails. If they do not differ then qualia are redundant and you are an (option 1) eliminative materialist.

That does not follow at all, and you know it. They do exist. They are a type of brain process. Why is that so difficult for your brain to grasp?

If they do differ but both fit in the physical model then you are an (option 3) property dualist.

Which is, of course, complete nonsense.

What you THINK you are is option 2, but option 2 depends on brain processes and qualia being both different and the same simultaneously WHICH IS WHY YOU WILL NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION :

In what sense are they different? Can you answer that question, without a-priori assuming a dualistic metaphysic?

Do brain processes and qualia differ?

Qualia are a type of brain process. Not all brain processes are qualia. The brain processes which are qualia clearly do not differ from qualia, because they are qualia. How much more explicit do you want me to be?

Dr. Stupid

 

[Guest]

Stimpson :

Most of your response is irrelevant. This is the important bit :

quote:
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Do brain processes and qualia differ?
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Qualia are a type of brain process. Not all brain processes are qualia. The brain processes which are qualia clearly do not differ from qualia, because they are qualia. How much more explicit do you want me to be?

So you are saying that qualia and brain processes both differ and do not differ at the same time. You have specified that there are two different types of brain process, one of which is objective/non-empirical/abstract and the other of which is subjective/empirical/non-abstract, but you are also claiming that the subjective/empirical/non-abstract brain processes are simultaneously objective/non-empirical/abstract. You are claiming that qualia are both subjective and objective at the same time, both abstract and empirical at the same time. THIS IS INCOHERENT.

You have already claimed there are two different sorts of knowledge. You are now claiming that qualia qualify as both sorts at the same time. You are a type 2 (incoherent) materialist.