• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Materialism

DavidSmith said:
Subjective and objective are certainly not meaningless descriptions under my view. As descriptions, they are relationships between qualia. The stable relationships we derive mathematical relationships from. This process is science.
How do you decide which relationships are stable and is that decision-making process part of science?

~~ Paul
 
UndercoverElephant said:
Paul
A physical fact is a part of the objective model of reality built upon the tenets of physicalism. Physicalism starts with a declaration that there exists an objective reality made of atoms/strings/waves/energy and that everything which exists can be explained in terms of this model. Physicalism requires that ALL THINGS are ultimately derived from this proposed objective reality i.e. that all things which exist are ultimately objective. That is why Stimpson claims that his mind does not only exist for him.

They are not per-person. Anyone can slice your brain open and verify it for themselves.
I think we should be careful to not mix up "the brain" and "the functioning of the brain". You cannot slice up a working brain and still have it working. You can examine the connections in the brain which control how it works, but this is not the same has somehow being inside the working brain.

Here's what is I'm sure a tired example: What is a song? It is certainly not the sheet music. It is not the instruments. It is not the performers. It is not even the encoded bits of a performance on a CD. The song only exists as it is being listened to. Everything else is just descriptions of the song or devices used to produce the song. Is a song "objective"? I'm not sure what that would mean (but I'm sure there are some philosophers who have answered this question - maybe you have a good answer already?).

Likewise, the mind only exists when the brain is properly functioning. I think this is why it is so hard to get a handle on. I don't pretend to completely understand it, but I think it is a potentially understandable process.
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
The things that we perceive objectively exist. We describe them in terms of our perceptions. Those descriptions are information. The things being described are not. Is that clear enough?

So neither our perceptions, nor the information entering our senses, is constitutive of the thing itself, but rather is somehow representative of the thing itself? And yet you make no ontological commitments :rolleyes:
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:

How do you decide which relationships are stable and is that decision-making process part of science?

~~ Paul

How close they fluctuate around/agree with/adhere to the mathematical descriptions. I think we have this decision making process as part of science in the form of statistical analysis.
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
Rusty,



Surely you are not going to assert that Physicalism claims that everything is information? That the description is the reality?

That position is easily refuted, and you don't need Mary to do it. You are attacking a strawman here. Physicalism only claims that everything can be mathematically described in terms of our perceptions.



No I am not asserting that physicalism claims everythign is information. I am asserting that the reduction process reduces everything to the point where I will call it information. I did this to define information because you did not. This was in response to you claiming that perceivable things are not knowledge.

So things that are mathematically described are not information?

Yes.



Wrong. The memory was not included in the book. A description of the memory was included in the book. You can no more include the memory in the book than you could include Mary's brain in the book. The book only contains descriptions.

Physicalism states that the totality of everything that is the memory can be reduced to a state where it can be perceived. We all of that down and we have written down everything that memory is.

If we cannot write it all down then physicalism is rendered false.

Again, to make it clear, physicalism asserts that everything is reducable to a state where it is perceived.

We can write down everything we perceive.

We can write down everything about that memory. Everything that it is.

Do you acknowledge that there is a difference between a thing, and the description of that thing? Do you acknowledge that Physicalism does not claim that things are equivalent their descriptions? If you do not acknowledge these two points, then we have nothing to discuss.

Physicalism claims that everything can be reduced to the point where it can be perceived. Everything.

So the reduced state (which I am calling information) must be equal to the original state, otherwise we have not included everything!

I understand that physicalism does not claim that things = information. I am claiming that if you have the totallity of information about a thing then it logically follows that you have all the information that there is about that thing.

So how can Mary gain more?

I have already answered this question. All you are doing is phrasing it in a counter-intuitive way, so that it sounds contradictory.

It is really simple. Mary cannot learn everything there is to know about seeing red by reading a book. This fact does not contradict Physicalism, because Physicalism in no way claims that she should be able to. Physicalism only claims that a complete description of the process of seeing red should be possible. It in no way implies that knowing that description is equivalent to knowing what it is like to see red.

Uh, no actually we already agreed that physicalism claims that everything is reducable to the point where it can be perceived. We can write down what we perceive. Everything about red can be written down in the book. Mary learns everything in the book. Mary learns everythng about red.

It's all very simple.


You keep using the word "reduced" as though it somehow implied that the brain state is magically transformed into information, and stored in the book. All it means is that the change in her brain is described in the third book.

Yes, it implies that the brain state is transformed into information. We then store it in the book.

I would say knowledge but you reserved that word for another definition so now I say information.

She can learn it. She just can't learn it by reading a book. The book only contains a description of the brain state. For her to learn it, she must acquire that brain state. Physicalism only requires that we be able to describe the brain state. It does not require that we be able to give somebody that brain state.

No, the book contains all the perceivable information about the memory. All the perceivable information is in the book. All of it. And everything is reducable to perceivable information.

[quote[
Do you understand that for me to perceive Mary's knowledge of what it is like to see red is not the same as me knowing what it is like when Mary sees red?[/quote]

You defined knowledge as the physical state of the brain. So what you are asking me is this:

"Do you understand that to perceive Mary's physical state of her brain when she see's red is not the same as to have the physical state of Mary's brain when she see's red."

Correct. But everything is reducable to perception, and if you have all of that perception then you have the thing.

If Mary's "knowledge" consists of 5 brain dots, and you gain a perception of those 5 brain dots, then you gained Mary's "knowledge". If Mary's "knowledge" is more then the 5 brain dots in any way that cannot be reduced to a perceivable state then physicalism is false.

In the first case, I am able to perceive her brain state. The "reduction" that you are talking about is nothing more than a description of her knowledge of what it is like to see red in terms of that brain state.


Again, you defined knowledge as brain state. So let us re-write your sentance to see what you are truly saying:

"The "reduction" that you are talking about is nothing more than a description of her brain state of what it is like to see red in terms of that brain state."

According to physicalism there can be nothing more then that brain state. So if I fully learn and understand a description of everything there is then how can I learn MORE when I see the thing?

In the second case, I would have to actually have that brain state. This is impossible.

You are attributing things to Physicalism that it does not say, because you are misunderstanding what it means to say that everything is reducible to a state where I can perceive it. This only means that I can, in principle, describe everything in terms of my perceptions.

No we still agree. It means that we can describe EVERYTHING. So we reduce and describe everything about red, memory of red, knowledge Nth of red, etc.. Mary learns and understands it all. She has now learned and understood everything about red etc.. but when she see's red she learns something MORE.

We still agree, you are just realizing that physicalism is false.

This is not what any person who calls himself a physicalist is claiming. You are attacking a nonsensical strawman. No physicalist would claim that you can transform a dog into perceivable information. They would only claim that you can provide a description of the dog in terms of perceptions.

Exactly, a complete description of everything that dog is. So if we replace dog with red and say that we can provide a complete description of everything that red is then Mary learns that description of what red is then how can she learn something more when she see's red.

The things that we perceive objectively exist. We describe them in terms of our perceptions. Those descriptions are information. The things being described are not. Is that clear enough?

The descriptions are information. Correct. As you progress through your rebuttal we agree again.

Mary possesses all the information about red etc.. but see's red and gains something more. Hence we must discard physicalism.

I only objected when you made it clear that by "reduced to a physical fact" you meant something more than just "described in terms of physical facts".

Wait, now you are saying that a description of the physical fact is different from a physical fact? Those two are the same thing.

It's a fact that my toes are yellow.
It's a description that my toes are yellow.

The same.

The fact that my toes are yellow, however, is not the same as my toes.

Different.

I object to your use of the word "reduced". You are clearly using it to mean something different than what physicalists mean by it.

No I mean what physicalists mean.

Reduced = Rendered

Reduced to a state where any human can perceive = Rendered to a state where any human can perceive.

This is clearly going nowhere. From now on, I am not going to use the word "reduced". It is ambiguous and unclear. I hereby deny that Physicalism claims that anything can be reduced to physical facts, in the sense that you are using the term.

You are changing physicalism! Ok, now we need to come up with something that will allow a non-physical "agent".

I, of course, am using physical to mean both caused and causal.

Physicalism only claims that everything can be described in terms of our perceptions. It does not claim that objects can be transformed into perceptions, or that objects are perceptions, or that objects are information.

Yes, exactly. It is the claim that everything can be 'described'. It is described by rendering it to such a state that it can be perceived. We describe the perceptions.


No. Our brains can turn information into abstract knowledge. It cannot turn information into empirical knowledge.

So there are two types of knowledge? Are they both brain-states?

Only into abstract knowledge.



Into abstract knowledge. She only has the abstract knowledge. The only (natural) way for her to get the empirical knowledge is to actually see red. In principle, it may be possible to artificially give her this empirical knowledge, but reading a book isn't going to do it.

If knowledge is a brain state and the brain state can be completely described and placed in the book then she can gain that knowledge by learning and understanding the description in the book.

If you can only gain the knowledge by seeing red then you can not reduce that knowledge to a complete description.

Changing the terminology will not somehow make physiclism true.

Wrong. Physicalism does not claim that anything more than the description can be put into the book.

Exactly.

You are not using the word "reduced" the way it is used in the definition of Physicalism. You are attacking a strawman.

No, you are changing physiclism which is exactly what I want to do. Hooray.

I never agreed with that. I just foolishly assumed that when you gave the definition for physicalism, you actually understood that was meant by it. I cannot imagine how anybody could seriously maintain that Physicalism claims what you say it is claiming. Do you really think that Physicalists are that stupid?

Is the information in that book a dog? Do you think that is what Physicalism implies?

Why? Are you not aware that the word "subjective" is used in both Psychology and Neurobiology the way I defined it, all the time? Who decided that the dualists should be the final arbiters on what constitutes proper usage of the English language?

First two paragraphs have been covered.

Subjective is used differently in philosphy.

Just like I can say we have the same car if we both drive Honda Civic's but in philosphy that would mean we have the same identical car. It is the way the word is used. This is a different argument, anyway.

No more tangents, let us redefine physicalism so that the "agent" that does exist can be accepted into our belief structures.

Both of those words mean only what they are defined to mean. Not everybody defines them the way you do.



You use it that way. Not everybody does.



Fine with me. Nothing is subjective. Subjective facts do not exist. This does not change the fact that our only source of information is our experiences.

Yes, physiclism requires that subjective facts do not exist.

I'll tell you what, just for clarity, I will use the term pseudo-subjective when referring to things which exist as processes in the brain.

ok

Just to reiterate. I claim that everything can be described in terms of our observations. I call this claim Physicalism. you can assert that physicalism claims that everything can be transformed into information. I agree with you that such a claim is nonsensical. What I don't understand is why you would assert that this is what physicalism claims?

It is what you are claiming.

Anything + perception = description.

Anything can be rendered into a description.

Descriptions are information.

Anything can be rendered into information.

It seems awfully conceited for you (who are not a physicalist) to be deciding what Physicalism means, and to be telling other people that they are not physicalists because they don't believe what you say they should.

Did it ever, even once, occur to you that maybe you have misunderstood the definition of Physicalism? That maybe the physicalists who wrote down that definition meant something different by it than what you originally thought?

Did it ever occur to you, when you realized that what you thought it meant was incoherent, to ask the physicalists to clarify what they meant, rather than just assuming that they did mean something incoherent?

Dr. Stupid


Yes, we are redefining physicalism. I will continue to press for the redefinition of physiclism until it is such that it will accept the "agent".
 
Interesting Ian said:
Stimp,

So not all knowledge is information. In addition to all possible (physical) information, we need to have particular brain states to know what phenomenological redness is (redness as experienced). Presumably this would apply not only to the experience of redness but to absolutely all qualia.

But this then implies the redness quale, and all other qualia, is within the brain state. It cannot exist independently of your brain state, otherwise the totality of physical information regarding the world would include it; which it doesn't otherwise Mary wouldn't learn anything new in first experiencing red. And remember, the external world in abstraction from any brain states is purely informational (All physical facts = all information from third person perspective + knowledge only existing from the perspective of brain states)

But if all our qualia are not constitutive of the external world this means that all our perceptual experiences are a lie. It also seems to be idealism you are advocating (albeit not subjective idealism) rather than any sort of materialism. What say you to this?

Exactly :)

I figured out how to unblock you btw, sorry about all that tiff and such.

Stimpson certainly is no longer a physiclist in the classic sense.
 
Paul:
Again, you will not acknowledge that subjective physical facts exist.
UCE:
Well, until today I hadn't heard anyone propose such an idea....

Maybe I can state this differently. Think again about how the eyes rotate left 20 degrees when the head rotates right 20 degrees. There is essentially a "gain factor" between the rotation sensors in my ear and the eye muscle control. I am not aware of that gain factor. I cannot directly control that gain factor. In that sense it is subjective.

Yet, someone could go poking and proding in my brain and determine that in fact that gain factor exists, and could show the physical process that the neurons perform to implement that gain factor. In that sense it is objective.

So you cannot "self reflect" on this gain factor (treating your brain as a "black box"), yet it is absolutely scientifically accessable (it is objective).

Does that clarify it?
 
ChuckieR said:
Paul:
Again, you will not acknowledge that subjective physical facts exist.
UCE:
Well, until today I hadn't heard anyone propose such an idea....

Maybe I can state this differently. Think again about how the eyes rotate left 20 degrees when the head rotates right 20 degrees. There is essentially a "gain factor" between the rotation sensors in my ear and the eye muscle control. I am not aware of that gain factor. I cannot directly control that gain factor. In that sense it is subjective.

Yet, someone could go poking and proding in my brain and determine that in fact that gain factor exists, and could show the physical process that the neurons perform to implement that gain factor. In that sense it is objective.

So you cannot "self reflect" on this gain factor (treating your brain as a "black box"), yet it is absolutely scientifically accessable (it is objective).

Does that clarify it?

It certainly clarifies that you don't know what subjective and objective mean.

Subjective does not require that you 'directly control' something.

There are many things I do not directly control, have they all become subjective?
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
Rusty
You can reduce everything about the dog into information and put all that information in the book. If there is any part of the dog that can not be reduced then we must reject physicalism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Stimp
Is the information in that book a dog? Do you think that is what Physicalism implies?

There seems to be a lot of confusion and talking at cross purposes here. The information isn't literally the dog. That the mistake central state materialism makes (identity theory). Rather the dog is a function of that information. The information entails the dog. Once you are acquanited with that information, and if you're a functionalist (which most materialists are), it should in principle be possible to work out what the dog looks like, and is thinking, purely from the information. Is that correct?
 
Re: Re: Re: Dammit

Rusty_the_boy_robot said:


Yes, I do hope that one day when we discover more about the brain such an experiment would be possible. I hope I live to that day.
[/B]


Are you alive now?


Physicalism claims that everything about red can be reduced to the point where it can be perceived.


So if it can be perceived then we can write it down.



The second statement doesn't follow but I agree that we can codify it. That was my computer example.


Everything was reduced, perceived, then written in the book.


Forget about the book. what is wrong with my example in wich I can perceive the redness using only physical information?


You did not follow my example.

Everything is reducable to a state where it can be perceived. We can write down what we perceive. We reduce everything about red to what we perceive and write down everything about red. Mary learns everything about red.

Mary see's red. Mary learns something new.

How could she learn something new if she already learned everything about red?


Again that is a claim you invented. I stated the requerimentys of physicalism (codificaction of information and replication in a pure physical way)

We did not continue the story about the 'brain augmenting' case. If we say that Mary's brain is augmented such that she believes she has seen red then we are going beyond what the Mary and the black/white room thought experiment does.

You can not force Mary to posses a false belief without doing something different then the though experiment we are discussing.

Please elaborate
 
Davidsmith73,

David: the process we call science would be a method for describing relationships between different qualia that have a stable manifestation. The process of eliminating subjective bias and constructing descriptions of underlying mathematical principles would not have to change at all.

Stimpy: They would be rendered meaningless. All of the methods for controlling for subjective bias are logically based on the assumption that reality is objective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You are arguing the inconsistencies of my case from your perspective. If you do this, then of course there are going to be problems.

I am arguing from the perspective of the logical basis of the scientific method.

You have to step out of your idea of a separate objective reality for a moment.

I can step out of this idea, so long as you realize that the scientific method, as it is formally defined, does not exist there.

The various methods for controlling for subjective bias used by scientists for the last couple of hundred years have been followed through carrying the assumption of objective reality. However, my point is that they may not need to use this assumption. Just because it has been done one particular way in the past doesn't mean that no other way can be found.

I already said that they could continue to perform these methods. The point is that they would no longer have any logical justification behind those methods. Science would cease to be a logical framework, and would just become an art, practiced a certain way out of tradition.

Sure, a solipsist can go through the motions of the scientific process, and it will still work, but if you do this, then science is no longer a logical framework for understanding the world. It is simply a heuristic method for which you have no logical reason for believing should be reliable.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. It is reliable in the sense that it will provide predictions about my observations (qualia) under certain conditions (also qualia).

Why? When you understand why scientific evidence allows us to logically draw conclusions from our observations, you will understand why it could no longer do so under solipsism.

I make some observations (qualia) and construct a mathematical description. I get F=ma. My description (qualia) is reliable in the sense that it will provide predictions about how the qualia it refers to can be described further, i.e, under different conditions.

The problem is that you are already thinking of science as some heuristic algorithm, so eliminating the axioms of science is no big deal for you.

What you fail to understand is that without those axioms, science is no longer logically coherent.

I realize that within your metaphysical framework, you can invent ad-hoc explanations for why the scientific method should give useful results, and go on using it, but this is not scientific, nor is it logical.

Your observations do not behave exactly as though assumptions of objective reality were true.

Of course they do.

This is the meaningful sense in that mathematical relationships are not true knowledge about something other than their own existence (qualia).

I have no idea what you mean by "true knowledge".

You have not demonstrated at all how science is not going to work under my philosophy.

You are confusing two things: Science, and the scientific method.

Science does not exist under your philosophy at all. You could still use the scientific method under your philosophy, and it will still work. The reason it will still work is because the axioms of science are true, and they remain true regardless of whether you choose to believe in them or not.

You are just objecting to the meaning of the mathematical descriptions. I thought there was no room for meaning in materialism.

I have no idea where you got that idea.

Ian,

So not all knowledge is information. In addition to all possible (physical) information, we need to have particular brain states to know what phenomenological redness is (redness as experienced). Presumably this would apply not only to the experience of redness but to absolutely all qualia.

The qualia are brain states. Clearly you must have the brain state to have the qualia.

But this then implies the redness quale, and all other qualia, is within the brain state. It cannot exist independently of your brain state, otherwise the totality of physical information regarding the world would include it; which it doesn't otherwise Mary wouldn't learn anything new in first experiencing red.

Your brain state is a part of the totality of the physical world. The information about your brain state is a part of the totality of the information regarding the World.

And remember, the external world in abstraction from any brain states is purely informational (All physical facts = all information from third person perspective + knowledge only existing from the perspective of brain states)

I do not agree with that statement.

But if all our qualia are not constitutive of the external world this means that all our perceptual experiences are a lie.

The qualia are brain states, and those brain states are a part of the external World. You are a part of the World, not something separate from it.

It also seems to be idealism you are advocating (albeit not subjective idealism) rather than any sort of materialism. What say you to this?

That it is not an accurate representation of my position.

The things that we perceive objectively exist. We describe them in terms of our perceptions. Those descriptions are information. The things being described are not. Is that clear enough?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

So neither our perceptions, nor the information entering our senses, is constitutive of the thing itself, but rather is somehow representative of the thing itself? And yet you make no ontological commitments

Exactly.

Dr. Stupid
 
Oh my gosh, yet another one: entail. Ian said:
There seems to be a lot of confusion and talking at cross purposes here. The information isn't literally the dog. That the mistake central state materialism makes (identity theory). Rather the dog is a function of that information. The information entails the dog. Once you are acquanited with that information, and if you're a functionalist (which most materialists are), it should in principle be possible to work out what the dog looks like, and is thinking, purely from the information. Is that correct?
Which of the following definition of entail from Webster's are you using?

"1 : to restrict (property) by limiting the inheritance to the owner's lineal descendants or to a particular class thereof
2 a : to confer, assign, or transmit as if by entail : FASTEN *entailed on them indelible disgrace Robert Browning* b : to fix (a person) permanently in some condition or status *entail him and his heirs unto the crown Shakespeare*
3 : to impose, involve, or imply as a necessary accompaniment or result *the project will entail considerable expense"

I suspect you might be able to work out what the dog is like, but I doubt you could experience what it's like to be a dog.

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Oh my gosh, yet another one: entail. Ian said:
Which of the following definition of entail from Webster's are you using?

"1 : to restrict (property) by limiting the inheritance to the owner's lineal descendants or to a particular class thereof
2 a : to confer, assign, or transmit as if by entail : FASTEN *entailed on them indelible disgrace Robert Browning* b : to fix (a person) permanently in some condition or status *entail him and his heirs unto the crown Shakespeare*
3 : to impose, involve, or imply as a necessary accompaniment or result *the project will entail considerable expense"

I suspect you might be able to work out what the dog is like, but I doubt you could experience what it's like to be a dog.

~~ Paul

In which case what it is LIKE to be a dog cannot be derived from the totality of physical facts about the world. If it cannot be derived how can you therefore claim reductive materialism is true?
 
Ian said:
In which case what it is LIKE to be a dog cannot be derived from the totality of physical facts about the world. If it cannot be derived how can you therefore claim reductive materialism is true?
Please point me to the definition of reductive materialism you are using, just so I can see if I agree with it. Also, please define "what it is like to be." You can use E-prime if it helps. While you're at it, perhaps you could define ontology using E-prime.

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Ian said:
Please point me to the definition of reductive materialism you are using, just so I can see if I agree with it. Also, please define "what it is like to be." You can use E-prime if it helps. While you're at it, perhaps you could define ontology using E-prime.

~~ Paul

Paul,

E-Prime is UcE's hobby horse. Last go-round on it, he had a horrendous time following the rules. He still maintains that people writing e-prime can't disagree.

Cheers,
 
Aw dang, I so much wanted to hear "what it is like to be" defined with E-prime.

People using E-prime can't disagree? I think he means people drinking good beer can't disagree.

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Ian said:
Please point me to the definition of reductive materialism you are using, just so I can see if I agree with it. Also, please define "what it is like to be." You can use E-prime if it helps. While you're at it, perhaps you could define ontology using E-prime.

~~ Paul

E-Prime eliminates both the so-called verb "To Be" and Ontology at the same time. If forces all descriptions of 'things' to explicitly refer to their relationships rather than assigning one thing to be another thing. If you really want to get to the bottom of this problem then I might suggest that instead of trying to have this discussion in E-Prime, you try to determine why it is that E-Prime is so effective at reducing the confusion caused by these issues.

The primary meaning of "to be" is "to exist".

Everything you can name exists in some way or another, otherwise it wouldn't have name. E-Prime forces you to define the relationships of everything which exists with respect to everything else which exists. So the question is what is the relationship between subjective experiences and physical brain processes? What is the relationship between the physical world and the mental world? Specifically is that relationship a side-by-side relationship (dualism) or does one of the realms encompass the other (monism), and how do you reach a conclusion as to which encompasses which?
 
BillHoyt said:


Paul,

E-Prime is UcE's hobby horse. Last go-round on it, he had a horrendous time following the rules. He still maintains that people writing e-prime can't disagree.

Cheers,

They can't disagree about ontology, because ontology is about the nature of Beingness and E-Prime stops you using to be. You are prevented form assuming things about the nature of being.
 

Back
Top Bottom