Human and Animal rights...the same thing?

[Dessi]

I think as soon as a species can reciprocate rights then they qualify for equal treatment under them.

By your own argument, as soon as infants reciprocate rights then they qualify for equal treatment under them. Until then, we only treat them well to make ourselves, as rational humans, feel better about ourselves. Since they can't, they have no rights greater or lesser than animals, and should be treated as such.

 

[Dessi]

Who makes the distinction between what is a mentally similar animal and what isn't? I've known horses that were pretty clever and some that were downright dumb animals. Does the smart horse have more rights than the dumb one or does the dumb horse get a pass because some horses are smart?

Rawr:

Ethical vegans almost universally hold the principle that, whatever morally relevant characteristics a being has should be taken into consideration. The key here is that most or all of these characteristics people hold (e.g. rationality, capacity to feel pain, pleasure, self-awareness, seeing one's self over time, ability to reason and use logic, practice moral reciprocity, etc etc etc) cross the species boundary, animals have many of the same imporant moral characteristics that people value in humans, so animals deserve moral consideration.

Although you acknowledge the fact above, you seem to indicate that animals have a lesser degree of whatever characteristics you value, and hence have a lesser degree of moral value. I reject your argument as irrational for the reasons mentioned above, but most importantly because they're inconsistent with the ethics you hold regarding the treatment of moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents can make moral decisions about their behavior, moral patients generally can't -- this does not automatically imply that moral patients have a lesser degree of value. Think of it this way:

- an infant and a rational human have the same capacity to feel pain, so they are moral equals with respect to pain.
- a rational human can take moral responsibility for their actions, but an infant cannot, so we may fault rational humans for the harm they cause without necessarily faulting infants.
- infants aren't capable of caring of themselves, so we have an obigation to paternalistic care toward infants that (in most non-emergency circumstances) doesn't carry over to adult humans.
- rational humans can be harmed for being deprived of voting, but infants have no conception elections or a capacity to make informed decisions even if they did, so there's not even a frame of reference to talk about the "harm" caused to infants by denying them the right to vote.

There's nothing controversial about these particular statements. Clearly moral agency is not a prerequisite for moral consideration, moral patients are considered equally with respect to their capacities. The trick is understand that non-human animals are moral patients too, and for the exact same reasons.

I think I'm routinely misunderstood on this point, but its not because of my ethics, just the ethics that societies instill from birth, like the ethic that someone is necessarily "superior" to someone else by virtue of being more rational or stronger or whatever. I generally reject the argument as irrational: if two people has the same capacity to feel pain, they're moral equals with respect to pain regardless of any intellectual or other differences between them.

In other words, mental and physical capacities don't translate directly into more or less moral value of anyone, just different ways to affected by some action. For example, a woman can be harmed if she's deprived of her right to have an abortion, it makes no sense to talk about a man being harmed in that way. Sometimes having a person's deficit can imply a greater obligation to them, such as the case where a child's suffering is obviously important, but children aren't able to care of themselves, so we have an argument to act paternalistically toward children in ways that generally don't apply to rational adults.

The key here is understanding that, whatever interests someone has, those interests should be considered fairly and equally when we make moral decisions that affect them. Perhaps a smart horse can be harmed in ways that a dumb horse cannot (maybe a smart horse enjoys music and is harmed when its deprived of music, a dumb horse may not be harmed or benefit from being deprived), but they're capacity to suffer is the same, so smart and dumb horses suffering matters equally and should be considered as such.

 

[Last of the Fraggles]

By your own argument, as soon as infants reciprocate rights then they qualify for equal treatment under them. Until then, we only treat them well to make ourselves, as rational humans, feel better about ourselves. Since they can't, they have no rights greater or lesser than animals, and should be treated as such.

The rights are conferred by society onto members of the society. Whether an individual is able to reciprocate or not is irrelevant provided society accepts them as members.

On a species level though animals do not participate in our human society.

Put it another way, Person X respects the rights of others because its the only way Person X can be relatively assured that society will respect their rights back. Its a trade, a contract. Animals can't enter that contract.

 

[sphenisc]

Dessi,

How do ethical vegans determine which individuals have biographical life and which don't? Why are ants out and worms in?

 

[Dessi]

I think as soon as a species can reciprocate rights then they qualify for equal treatment under them.

By your own argument, as soon as infants reciprocate rights then they qualify for equal treatment under them. Until then, we only treat them well to make ourselves, as rational humans, feel better about ourselves. Since they can't, they have no rights greater or lesser than animals, and should be treated as such.

The rights are conferred by society onto members of the society. Whether an individual is able to reciprocate or not is irrelevant provided society accepts them as members.

This argument flatly contradicts the principle Maus put forward.

Whatever the case, you may very well object to people being brutalized, even when societies do not recognize their rights. For example, 95% of Ugandas believe homosexuality is criminal and should be punished by the death penalty, you may find that outcome horrific regardless of the cultural norms in Uganda. If you agree with that much, your original premise, that rights depend on a person being accepted in society, is false.

Put it another way, Person X respects the rights of others because its the only way Person X can be relatively assured that society will respect their rights back. Its a trade, a contract. Animals can't enter that contract.

Non-rational humans cannot enter a social contract and do not have a concept of moral reciprocity. By your very own argument, non-rational humans have no more rights than animals, and should be treated as such.

If you disagree with that conclusion, then you necessarily reject the original principle you put forward, namely that rights depend on an ability to enter to the social contract, so a capacity to enter the social contract has no bearing on animal rights.

 

[Last of the Fraggles]

This argument flatly contradicts the principle Maus put forward.

Not to my mind it doesn't.

Whatever the case, you may very well object to people being brutalized, even when societies do not recognize their rights. For example, 95% of Ugandas believe homosexuality is criminal and should be punished by the death penalty, you may find that outcome horrific regardless of the cultural norms in Uganda. If you agree with that much, your original premise, that rights depend on a person being accepted in society, is false.

My society recognises their rights and recognises that those rights extend to Ugandan homosexuals just as much as to you and me. My society accepts Ugandan homosexuals as members of it. Your mileage may vary I guess.

Non-rational humans cannot enter a social contract and do not have a concept of moral reciprocity. By your very own argument, non-rational humans have no more rights than animals, and should be treated as such.

My social contract is not with non-rational humans, its with my society. If my society recognises and accepts the rights of non-rational humans then they get rights. Its not about the specific individual.

 

[applecorped]

Exactly! Live and let kill, as nobody ever says.

Somebody once said Live and Let Die. But I hear he's dead.

 

[icerat]

If plants have rights, just name their morally relevant characteristics and we can have a discussion on the subject.

Could you please clarify what you mean by "morally relevant characteristics"?

 

[Dessi]

Dessi,

How do ethical vegans determine which individuals have biographical life and which don't?

I think for most ethical vegans, having a brain is a good starting point. Certainly all vertebrates and maybe a few invertebrates like cephalopods have at least a rudimentary ability to feel pain -- in that they don't just react to painful stimuli, they experience it.

Why are ants out and worms in?

I don't think worms are really at a greater or lesser mental level than ants.

I seem to remember an interesting blurb on a species of burrowing wasp in a book by Richard Dawkins. This wasp, on capturing food, brings the food to its burrow, sets it on the ground, enters the burrow for a moment, comes back out, fetches the food, and re-enters for snackums. If, while the wasp in the burrow for the first time, a researcher moves the food a few inches, the wasp will fetch the food, set it on the ground, enter the burrow, come back out, bring the food back in -- its a very mechanical operation, so much that a researcher can move the bit of food 40 or 50 times or until he gets bored, and the wasp performs the same steps. Its like moving the dial back on a clothes washer, the machine doesn't care that its washed the same clothes, it just goes through cycle all over again.

Really interesting stuff. Much insect behavior seems to be mechanical in this way.

Regarding whether insects feel pain, they certainly don't behave as if they do. According to this and this, "An insect with a damaged foot doesn't limp. Insects with crushed abdomens continue to feed and mate. Caterpillars still eat and move about their host plant, even with parasites consuming their bodies. Even a locust being devoured by a praying mantid will behave normally, feeding right up until the moment of death." This is pretty consistent with the scientific consensus on the subject.

I don't know enough about insects to speak with any level of authority on the subject, but I imagine that they react in a similar way as humans who reflexively pull their hands away from hot stoves before having knowledge of the painful stimuli.

Perhaps they feel pain, so a more interesting question would be whether they have the corresponding emotional response of suffering that vertebrates have?

 

[Dessi]

Could you please clarify what you mean by "morally relevant characteristics"?

See bold part by this guy, p 496:

Although different philosophers have approached the issue from different philosophical traditions and viewpoints, it is possible to finnd a common thread in their arguments questioning the moral acceptability of invasive animal use. Drawing succor from society’s tendency during the past 50 years to question the exclusion of disenfranchised humans such as women and minorities from the scope of moral concern, and the correlative lack of full protection of their interests, these philosophers applied a similar logic to the treatment of animals. In the firrst place, there appears to be no morally relevant difference between humans and at least vertebrate animals, which allows us to include all humans within the full scope of moral concern and yet deny such moral status to the animals. A morally relevant difference between two beings is a difference that rationally justifies treating them differently in some way that bears moral weight. If two of my students have the same grades on exams and papers, and have identical attendance and class participation, I am morally obliged to give them the same ?nal grade. That one is blue-eyed and the other is brown-eyed may be a difference between them, but it is not morally relevant to grading them.

Philosophers have shown that the standard reasons offered to exclude animals from the moral circle, and to justify not assessing our treatment of them by the same moral categories and machinery we use for assessing the treatment of humans, do not meet the test of moral relevance. Such historically sancti?ed reasons as “animals lack a soul,”“animals do not reason,” “humans are more powerful than animals,” “animals do not have language,” “God said we could do as we wish to animals” have been demonstrated to provide no rational basis for failing to reckon with animal interests in our moral deliberations. For one thing, while the above statements may mark differences between humans and animals, they do not mark morally relevant differences that justify harming animals when we would not similarly harm people. For example, if we justify harming animals on the grounds that we are more powerful than they are,we are essentially affirming “might makes right,” a principle that morality is in large measure created to overcome. By the same token, if we are permitted to harm animals for our bene?t because they lack reason, there are no grounds for not extending thesame logic to non-rational humans, as we shall shortly see. And while animals maynot have the same interests as people, it is evident to commonsense that they certainly do have interests, the fulfillment and thwarting of which matter to them.

My perspective on the subject is as follows:

Every single important moral characteristic that makes a person's life valuable is tied directly to some mental level, like a capacity to feel pain, pleasure, have wants, expectations, make moral decisions, and so on. The only way reason we can even have a coherent conversation about morality in the first place is because people want or avoid certain things, they can prefer some experiences and outcomes over others. Without references to a person's preferences to avoid pain, there's no possible way to make a moral distinction between performing surgery on an unanesthetized person vs an anesthetized person; if a person has no such preference to avoid pain, which would be the case if they're a corpse, then their really isn't a moral distinction.

 

[Complexity]

The rights are conferred by society onto members of the society.

Nope.

Societies can go to hell.

There are no 'natural' rights and there is no authoritarian basis for any rights.

The only possible granter of a right is an individual, and it applies only to himself and how he chooses to interact with the rest of the world.

 

[Fine]

Dessi,

There's good evidence that insects do feel pain. HERE.

///

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

Ah, Wolfman, you made a big philosophy error with your "biological purpose" argument.

I believe people think I am being pithy, but I really think this conversation assumes that we agree that human rights exist, and they exist for the same reason. In this thread we are already seeing conflict on this.

Personally, I like to base ethics on compassion, which is based on suffering of the moral patient. Of course, we can parse each of those words five different ways, so I expect people to reply, "Duh," or, "You monster!"

 

[Puppycow]

Desi will call me "chauvinist" for this, I know...but humans are valuable to other humans for the simple reason that they are human. This is a biologically determined imperative which is, in fact, absolutely necessary for the survival of our species.

That argument doesn't seem to carry much weight when there are 7 billion people. The value of any random individual thus becomes negligible.

 

[slingblade]

Ah, Wolfman, you made a big philosophy error with your "biological purpose" argument.

I believe people think I am being pithy, but I really think this conversation assumes that we agree that human rights exist, and they exist for the same reason. In this thread we are already seeing conflict on this.

Personally, I like to base ethics on compassion, which is based on suffering of the moral patient. Of course, we can parse each of those words five different ways, so I expect people to reply, "Duh," or, "You monster!"

Duh! You monster!

 

[Roboramma]

I don't have the time (or admitedly the inclination) to really participate in this thread as much as I'd like to. But I would like to say thank you to Desi for the clarity of your posts and the effort you've put into making them.

My personal viewpoint is far from clear on this issue, but I think that any consistent moral system that can be viewed meaningful at all (ie. not just a justification of "what I want/what is good for me/what I like/etc. is right") includes a non-arbitrary definition of moral value. That is, "property X is morally meaningful" (X might be suffering, for instance).

I'm not sure how to go from that to a complete moral system, though I have some ideas. But "humans suffering/joy/etc. is valuable because it is human" strikes me as no less arbitrary than assigning that value to any other particular species. If we are to hold the view that suffering is meaningful regardless of race or class or political affiliation, then it strikes me that the exact same arguments should lead us to the view that it is the suffering itself that is meaningful, and not the genes of the being that undergoes it.

ETA: Just to be clear: I only wanted to give a short snippet of my personal viewpoint. I apologise in advance if I don't participate further in this thread.

 

[Weak Kitten]

I be being overly simplistic and this may already have been stated but here I go;

I think that the rights of any individual should be directly in proportion to their ability to accept the responsibilities related to those rights.

Some attention should be given to an individual's ability to accept responsibilities at a later date, for example in the instance of children. However in general I believe this rule works pretty well regardless of species.

 

[Number Six]

See here:


If plants have rights, just name their morally relevant characteristics and we can have a discussion on the subject.

Until then, it seems Wolfman's OP implies that people generally have a obligation to minimize the harm that they cause in the ways which are easy and practical to do so. Maybe we can't avoid stepping on all worms, but its certainly easy enough to avoid stabbing a cat in the eye, so we should be doing at least that much.

But it (the bit you pasted but that isn't above because it was from elsewhere) doesn't answer why that is the criterion (experiential) and where in that continuum is the line drawn (do worms get right or more generally, what is the lowest thing that gets right and the highest thing that does not).

Someone could say that plants are life and that's enough to give them rights. And someone else could say, no, that's not enough to give them rights. And both could come up with reasons.

 

[Last of the Fraggles]

Nope.

Societies can go to hell.

There are no 'natural' rights and there is no authoritarian basis for any rights.

The only possible granter of a right is an individual, and it applies only to himself and how he chooses to interact with the rest of the world.

Individuals can't enforce rights and if the rights can't be enforced then you don't have them.

Individuals can choose to participate or not in the societies which confer the rights, individuals can choose to treat other individuals in accordance to a different set of rights if they wish - but where it conflicts with society they will typically end up suffering for it.

If you don't believe me, try retracting your neighbour's property rights over his car or other possessions.

As for animals, there is no benefit to affording animal's rights (other than some self satisfaction for those who get that from affording animals rights) and that's why they generally don't have many of them.

 

[Last of the Fraggles]

That argument doesn't seem to carry much weight when there are 7 billion people. The value of any random individual thus becomes negligible.

Yeah, but the value of YOU is not negligible to you.

From a selfish perspective the idea that someone can't kill me, take all my stuff, hurt my family and eat my remains is of great value to me. If the trade for getting that protection is that I have to afford the same right to everyone else then it's not great loss.

If I have to afford rights to babies, people in comas, mentally ill people etc then I'm OK with that too, I might have a baby, I might end up in a coma or mentally ill one day. These things are valuable to me.

I'm NEVER going to be a cow. or a sheep. or a cat. Any benefit I confer to them is only a cost to me.

Selfish? Absolutely.