God On The Brain

[Guest]

I don't see Qualia definition saying that it is more than information. Where is that said?

Well, physicalists have done their best to try to argue that "Qualia ARE information", because they have to. But it doesn't actually make any more sense than saying they "are brain processes". I do not believe the burden of proof can lie on a person who states that qualia are not information, for the simple reason that qualia and information are described as totally different things. You can store all the information you like about the physical aspects of 'red' - but you never know what it is like to actually see red until you experience the qualia. It simply does not answer the question - it just attempts to side-step it.

Probably you are asumming that awareness is more than an information process.

It isn't really an "assumption". If this difference (between information process and qualia) existed anywhere else then no-one in their right mind would claim thme to be the same. The materialist just accepts they "must be" the same, and that it is a bit of a mystery. I find it a little dishonest. Why shouls I have to prove that two apparently different things are actually the same? Why should it be called an "assumption" to treat them a being different things, when they are actually described very differently? Something here isn't quite right.

But again, we don't have evidence of it.

THis really does seem from my perspective to be a claim that "we don't have evidence that X isn't Y" when X and Y are only equated to protect that persons belief system. We don't have any evidence that they are the same. They appear to be close correlates, not the same thing.

If you accept that being aware is processing an information, there is no more problem with qualia.

And if I accept that the Bible is true then there is no problem with literalist Christianity.

Also, note that this materialistic model solves perfectly the mental experiments your link provides; I will elaborate if you want, but I think as a programmer you can also see it easily.

I can see nothing but an attempt to side-step an apparently unsolvable problem because the alternative requires a major belief-system change. I do not understand why "information" are "qualia" unless they have to be (because no other explanation can save materialism).

I spent years parroting the line "consciousness is information". I never really understood what it really meant. I never felt comfortable that it actually answered the question. But I couldn't see any other way of answering the question logically at all.

 

[Guest]

How red something is can be determined by the wavelength of the light. How bright something is can be determined with how much light the object emits. How much pain something feels can be determined by looking at brain and nerve activity. How salty something tastes can be determined by salt content and the reactions of taste buds...

The question is "what does red look like?"

How do you describe what red looks like to a person blind from birth?

If it could be described physically, then the blind person could receive a meaningful description. No such description is possible. A best attempt would be something like "Red looks like a trumpet sounds".

 

[billydkid]

stuff, stuff and more stuff

It has been clearly demonstrated, repeatedly. Materialism runs into very serious problems when the discussion centres on qualia. Materialism has been repeaedly shown to either be forced to state that "there are no such thing as qualia" or that "Qualia ARE brain processes" without being able to define what is meant by "IS". The Hard Problem is very real.

Well, I guess we have different definitions for the word "demonstrate". In what way would qualia differ from any other idea formed in the brain? How are they not ideas? Typically we think of ideas in terms of language, but clearly we have all sorts ideas or notions that flit by without ever formulating them into sentences. Can you begin to imagine how unwieldy consciousness would be if we were inclined to put every mental notion into language form? In fact, I would suggest that most of our thoughts never take the form of language. One rarely ever thinks to themselves "Well, I guess I'll get up and go out into the kitchen and make a sandwich." I think you are not uncomfortable with the idea that ideas are brain phenomena. Why are qualia distinctly different?

All over the place, yes.

Yes, similar to tales of alien abduction.

We are talking about the difference between physics and metaphysics. They are different sorts of phenomena and they manifest in very different ways. It is a different level of reality being discussed. It is like the difference between the operation of 4-d space-time and the operation of a branching many-worlds interpretation of QM. One we can see. The other we can't. Both affect us.

Physics is a process by which we assertain and describe the behavior of the universe. Metaphysics, well, that is I don't know what. But either way, both are contrivances of man. Do you think nature makes this distinction? That it has a bunch of obvious aspects on the one side and on the other it has a bunch of other aspects that are only discernable (or, more accurately, only exist) if your brain is operating in the right mode? So plain old space time effects us (affects us?) and so does this "branching many-world interpretation" of the universe? Was does it mean to effected if you can not discern the effect?

Depends who you listen to. You said yourself that the core of these beliefs pops up all over the place. And it always has done. You just don't happen to believe it and haven't happened to experience it. You are assuming that because it doesn't happen to you that it doesn't happen to anyone.

I will grant you, if it did happen to me I would be more inclined to believe it, but I don't disbelieve it merely because it has not happened to me. I disbelieve it because there no good reason to believe it and it would not be the neutral position to "open minded" about extraordinary or paranormal claims. Mostly I disbelieve it because it doesn't make any sense for there to be a fundamental, experiencable aspect of the universe that the vast
majority of human kind has never and will never experience. The fact that the notion has been around forever means nothing.

I believe NOTHING except for what I can logically demonstrate or have actually experienced.

Sort of a catch-22 situation here. You claim that in order to experience the paranormal one must first believe in it. Yet, you claim to have been a skeptical materialist until you had your mind changed through a paranormal experience. So is believing a prerequisite to experiencing the paranormal or is it not? (and, again, I can verify that "being open" to the possibility does ensure that one will be able to encounter such an experience.)

I might add that I find it helpful to avoid the use of arcane sorts of philosphical lingo. I find, in general, that taking this approach one is less inclined toward obfuscation and I have always believed that there is nothing that is true (truly technical discussions aside) that can not be expressed in ordinary language. However, the overiding reason for this is that I prefer not having to go running to the dictionary in order to try to decipher what is trying to be communicated. Both the social "sciences" and philosophy are great offenders in this regard - the tendency to cloak ideas in jargon which serves no real purpose except to obscure and render inaccessable. It is a great way to make stupid arguments sound brilliant.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

The question is "what does red look like?"

How do you describe what red looks like to a person blind from birth?

If it could be described physically, then the blind person could receive a meaningful description. No such description is possible. A best attempt would be something like "Red looks like a trumpet sounds".

This simply does not follow. What does it mean to explain to a blind person what red looks like? You are asking for an explanation that would somehow allow a blind person to experience what the sighted person is experiencing. This is nonsensical, even under materialism.

The simple fact is that the experience of seeing red is a physical process occurring in your brain. Nobody else's brain is physically capable of performing the process your brain performs when you see red.

You are dismissing materialism based on ridiculous claims that materialism simply does not make.

If it can be described physically, then it certainly is possible for a blind person to receive a meaningful description (although I would suspect that the shear amount of information necessary to constitute a meaningful description would be far more than any human being could deal with). But that in no way implies that the blind person is going to be able to experience seeing the color red, based on that information. To think that it does is to completely misunderstand how the brain works.

A Pentium processor can be made to emulate a Motorola processor, by providing it with the information necessary to describe the functioning of the Motorola processor. But the Pentium processor will never be about to physically perform the processes actually occurring in the Motorola processor. Likewise, even if I could provide your brain with every physical fact about my brain, and even if your brain was somehow capable of coping with that information, you could still not experience my experiences.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Guest]

Re: stuff, stuff and more stuff

Sort of a catch-22 situation here. You claim that in order to experience the paranormal one must first believe in it.

You have to believe it is possible. Materiaism renders most of it impossible.

Yet, you claim to have been a skeptical materialist until you had your mind changed through a paranormal experience.

The initial changes were to do with understandings about mathematics and consciousness. The paranormal experiences occured considerably later.

I have to go to the pub now....

 

[LucyR]

What is a 'hard atheist'? I thought an atheist was someone who does not believe in the existence of any god. Are there degrees of atheism? Are there 'soft atheists'? Or is it a sexual reference?

Perhaps this question has already been answered, in which case I apologize.

 

[Lord Kenneth]

What is a 'hard atheist'? I thought an atheist was someone who does not believe in the existence of any god. Are there degrees of atheism? Are there 'soft atheists'? Or is it a sexual reference?

Perhaps this question has already been answered, in which case I apologize.

This is a good question, actually.

A hard atheist asserts under no possible conditions a god could exist. That a god is a pure impossibility.

A soft atheist does not believe in a god because of the nature of the claim, the evidence provided (NONE), and the apparent plausibility of it.

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Re: Re: stuff, stuff and more stuff

You have to believe it is possible. Materiaism renders most of it impossible.

If materialism really is correct, then you are just delusional and/or are fooling yourself.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

LucyR,

What is a 'hard atheist'? I thought an atheist was someone who does not believe in the existence of any god. Are there degrees of atheism? Are there 'soft atheists'? Or is it a sexual reference?

Perhaps this question has already been answered, in which case I apologize.

As with anything, there are a variety of definitions often attached to the term "atheist".

The most general definition is simply "lack of belief in God". This is often referred to as "soft atheism", and is usually accompanied with agnosticism. That is, a person may lack belief in God due to the lack of supporting evidence, but may not go so far as to assert that no sort of God could possibly exist.

Hard atheism is usually used to refer to somebody who asserts that their are no Gods at all. This could be due to a set of metaphysical beliefs which exclude such a concept, such as Platonism, or to a religious belief which excludes Gods, such as Buddhism.

Also, sometimes a person will say that he is a soft atheist with respect to the general conception of God, but a hard atheist with respect to the various conceptions of God that mankind has invented throughout history. That is how I would describe myself, for example.

Of course, by that reasoning, any theist is a hard atheist with respect to all Gods other than his own.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Oh yes, with Stimpy's (better) response I realized there is a possibility I forgot (for "soft atheist")...

A soft atheist, as well, may simply not have been exposed to the concept of god.

Also, is saying "doesn't believe in a god" the same as saying "lacks a belief in a god"?

Of course, if you lack something, you don't have it, and if you don't have it, you lack it... of course, the average person may take "doesn't believe" as "denies entirely it exists"...

 

[LucyR]

This is a good question, actually.

A hard atheist asserts under no possible conditions a god could exist. That a god is a pure impossibility.

A soft atheist does not believe in a god because of the nature of the claim, the evidence provided (NONE), and the apparent plausibility of it.

Really? I must say this is new to me. Does anyone have access to the OED (the only dictionary I take seriously), or to any other reputable source that might agree with these definitions?

I should also state that I have never met, or indeed even heard of anyone, who makes the dogmatic assertion contained in the first definition. The concept of god is simply to vague.

 

[Peskanov]

Ian;

----
quote:
I have no idea what you're talking about. What does saying information is a catagory mean?? A catagory of what?? As I said, saying qualia is information is like saying a banana is an elephant. Why is it a false analogy?? I don't care what you describe information as being. What I want to know is what sense can be made saying that it is the very same thing as qualia?
----

A category of phenomena.
How would you define a piece of news, or a rumour?
Them are phenomena related with information; the physical channel (sound, visual, etc...) it's meaningless.


----
quote:
Qualia has absolutely nothing to do with information. Nothing to do with anything physical.
----

That's your claim. Give me some evidence.
I can tell you why I say it is information. Qualia brings me new knowledge. In my book, this is information. The key in materialism is defining which kind of information it is.
Of course, you can argue that there is more than information in Qualia.
About the relation of information with physics; current physics seems to assume all information has to have a physical base. Anyway, I think this is not very interesting defining Qualia.

----
quote:
Then you are presuming the correctness of materialism. Materialism is self-evidently absurd. Like saying a banana is numerically identical to an elephant.
----

Why don't you read the thread?
UCE says materialism has trouble defining Qualia. I just did my part as a materialist advocate: try to define it.

 

[LucyR]

Stimpson J. Cat,

Thanks for your reply. I'd say that the distinction between agnosticism and soft atheism is too subtle to be useful.

As far as the definition of hard atheism is concerned, it contrasts with my own understanding of the term atheism, in that I think you have associated it with notion of the impossibilty of the existence of god.

 

[Guest]

Re: Re: Re: stuff, stuff and more stuff

If materialism really is correct, then you are just delusional and/or are fooling yourself.

If it is, then I am.

 

[Guest]

Stimpson J. Cat,

Thanks for your reply. I'd say that the distinction between agnosticism and soft atheism is too subtle to be useful.

As far as the definition of hard atheism is concerned, it contrasts with my own understanding of the term atheism, in that I think you have associated it with notion of the impossibilty of the existence of god.

You appear to be saying both terms are useless - that soft atheists are really agnostics and hard atheists are extremists.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian;

----
quote:
I have no idea what you're talking about. What does saying information is a catagory mean?? A catagory of what?? As I said, saying qualia is information is like saying a banana is an elephant. Why is it a false analogy?? I don't care what you describe information as being. What I want to know is what sense can be made saying that it is the very same thing as qualia?
----

A category of phenomena.
How would you define a piece of news, or a rumour?
Them are phenomena related with information; the physical channel (sound, visual, etc...) it's meaningless.

As far as I can tell you're defending functionalism. The mind is to the brain as software is to hardware in a computer. Is that correct?

----
quote:
Qualia has absolutely nothing to do with information. Nothing to do with anything physical.
----

That's your claim. Give me some evidence.

I've already explained this with my banana elephant analogy. I have nothing more to add from what I said in my post above. If you still don't understand then there's nothing I could conceivable say now which would help.

I can tell you why I say it is information. Qualia brings me new knowledge.

It is not possible for qualia to give you new knowledge or information. Only physical facts can do that, otherwise it wouldn't be materialism.

In my book, this is information. The key in materialism is defining which kind of information it is.
Of course, you can argue that there is more than information in Qualia.

I repeat, qualia have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with information. Information is what the physical world is.

 

[Peskanov]

UCE,

----
quote:
Well, physicalists have done their best to try to argue that "Qualia ARE information", because they have to . But it doesn't actually make any more sense than saying they "are brain processes".
----

If you look at the definition of information, you will see it makes a lot sense. Another question would be to consider it insufficient.

----
quote:
I do not believe the burden of proof can lie on a person who states that qualia are not information, for the simple reason that qualia and information are described as totally different things. You can store all the information you like about the physical aspects of 'red' - but you never know what it is like to actually see red until you experience the qualia. It simply does not answer the question - it just attempts to side-step it.
----

When you see color red, you get knowledge; yes, intuitive knowledge, not reason knowledge. This is information.
It's not side-stepping nothing. The qualia problem you keep mentioning asumes that all knowledge is the same kind of knowledge, which is a totally unsupported assumption. If I remenber correctly, Kant already observed this difference between intuition and reason.

----
quote:
It isn't really an "assumption". If this difference (between information process and qualia) existed anywhere else then no-one in their right mind would claim thme to be the same. The materialist just accepts they "must be" the same, and that it is a bit of a mystery.
----

You keep forgetting the study of the brain. This is part of the materialist knowledge. Materialism found that the brain is composed of bricks called neuron which deals with information.
Materialism does not "accept" as you say; it proposes it, using prior knowledge as base.

----
quote:
I find it a little dishonest . Why shouls I have to prove that two apparently different things are actually the same? Why should it be called an "assumption" to treat them a being different things, when they are actually described very differently? Something here isn't quite right.
----

The intuitive description of things like mind, conciousness, awareness, memory, etc... are very fuzzy to say the least. Thanks to materialism studies, some of these definitions are better enclosed now (for example memory).

----
quote:
THis really does seem from my perspective to be a claim that "we don't have evidence that X isn't Y" when X and Y are only equated to protect that persons belief system. We don't have any evidence that they are the same. They appear to be close correlates, not the same thing.
----

If you don't accept counterintuitive definitions, why does you even bother to look at things like the theory of relativity?
The physical description of the memory on the brain doesn't seem related to my subjective experience. But empiric proof shows me otherwise. So I just accept it: that's the description of memory.


----
quote:
And if I accept that the Bible is true then there is no problem with literalist Christianity.
----

What I am saying is: the problems you see with Qualia and materialism exist because you don't accept some parts of materialism.
Materialism is consistent with itself, and Qualia can be defined inside this system. If you define some part of the mind to be non-physical, then you are already presupossing materialism is false.

----
quote:
I can see nothing but an attempt to side-step an apparently unsolvable problem because the alternative requires a major belief-system change.
----


I am not side-stepping anything. I say that the mental experiments proposed to show that qualia is not physical can be explained in the materialist framework. All these confussions come from mixing knowledge comming from different sources.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpson J. Cat,

Thanks for your reply. I'd say that the distinction between agnosticism and soft atheism is too subtle to be useful.

As far as the definition of hard atheism is concerned, it contrasts with my own understanding of the term atheism, in that I think you have associated it with notion of the impossibilty of the existence of god.

As far as I understood "hard atheism" is the positive assertion that there is no god. Soft atheists merely claim that they lack a belief in a god. The former case, being a positive assertion, requires that a person claiming to be a hard atheist to present appropriate evidence or compelling reasons to support his or her case. The latter would claim they do not need to do this as they are not making any positive existential assertions, but are simply stating that there is insufficient evidence, or indeed any evidence for a god. Therefore it is rational not to assent to any belief in any god. Basically the approach here is to say that one ought not to subscribe to the existence of X (whatever X might be), unless there is any evidence in support of the existence of X.

Of course I think the distinction is flawed. It rests upon a misunderstanding of what many theists are actually asserting.

 

[c4ts]

What is the distinction of a hard athiest? Does the hard atheist say there is no proof of God's existence, or does he say there is proof of God's non-existence?

 

[Lord Kenneth]

What is the distinction of a hard athiest? Does the hard atheist say there is no proof of God's existence, or does he say there is proof of God's non-existence?

Well, a religion, such as Buddhism, is based on of course faith, so proof isn't the factor.

But given those two choices, the hard atheist would probably say both... if there is proof of a god's non-existence, then there is no proof of his existence.