Define Consiousness

[Filip Sandor]

"Consciousness is mysterious. Quantum mechanics is mysterious. If you find two mysteries, maybe they are the same."

This is what David Chalmers referred to as the 'Law of Minimization of Mystery'.

Sorry D, while I do see a 'selective resemblance' between this theory and what I said I assure you it does not fit the context of what I tried to point out in my previous post. I hope you didn't think I am of the opinion that all mysterious things are the same - I most certainly am not!

For the intelligent people who are still confused by what I mean: My emphasise on the deep misunderstanding we have of physical phenomena was meant to convince people that not all things physical necessarily fit our conceptual model of physical things; thereby falsifying our conceptual model and forcing us to reconsider what makes something physical as opposed to 'non-physical'.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Filip Sandor

while I do see the 'selective resemblance' between this theory that you describe and what I said I assure you it does not belong to the context of my previous post.

I made the assumption that your previous post was intended to fit into the context of the discussion re dualism. Invoking QM is a popular approach, but it never seems to go much beyond hand-waving, and even if it did, I don't see how it necessarily solves the problem. Dualism (interactive dualism anyway) still requires a bridge between the physical world and the non-physical world no matter what definition you are using for 'physical' (unless you suppose that QM could obliterate the distinction completely).

My emphasise on the deep misunderstanding we have of physical phenomena was meant to convince people that not all things physical necessarily fit our conceptual model of "physical things", thereby falsifying our conceptual model and forcing us to reconsider what makes something 'physical' as opposed to 'non-physical'.

My questions then are similar to those I put to davidsmith73 above. Would you say that things physical could fit any possible conceptual model? Would you say that conceptual models are physical things themselves?

 

[Filip Sandor]

I made the assumption that your previous post was intended to fit into the context of the discussion re dualism.

My post does fit the context of the debate on dualism, but my intention is not to make any radical claims in support of either side, if that was your impression then I apologize now for not being more clear.

Invoking QM is a popular approach, but it never seems to go much beyond hand-waving, and even if it did, I don't see how it necessarily solves the problem.

I agree whole heartedly on with you on this and I have a personal and profound disliking of 'scapegoat answers'.

Dualism (interactive dualism anyway) still requires a bridge between the physical world and the non-physical world no matter what definition you are using for 'physical' (unless you suppose that QM could obliterate the distinction completely).

If one is a dualist this naturally makes sense because both "phenomenon" are of a temporal nature.

 

[hammegk]

If one is a dualist this naturally makes sense because both "phenomenon" are of a temporal nature.

Umm. Physical and Not-Physical are both of temporal nature?

I state only one or the other -- but not both -- can possibly exist in a way that would allow any interaction. Where am I wrong?


Also, nature gets stranger and stranger. You mentioned the Aspect-Bell demo that proves space-wise separation at a specific time to be a fiction; my understanding is that the obverse is also true, and close to experimental demonstration. That is, time-wise separation at a specific location is also a fiction.

 

[Atlas]

Would you say that things physical could fit any possible conceptual model? Would you say that conceptual models are physical things themselves?

I am venturing into unknown territory with a simplistic paradigm.

I believe the brain has the capacity to be reflective. That's even a term used for an aspect of consciousness.

But as a conceptual model we might use a mirror which is a real physical device that reflects the depth and perspective of the real world in much the same way our senses do. That is, one side of the surfaces we see get "sensed".

The moving images of consciousness are like images floating across a TV screen.

I am just answering your question quoted above, the physical world models presenting images of the physical world using physical structures and light and electrons, DVDs can be memory for the TV device.

Anyway, I'm pretty attached to the physical world and don't believe that consciousness is the substructure of it but rather one of a myriad manifestations of it.

I wish I knew more philosophy - but hey, you guys can help.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Atlas

I wish I knew more philosophy - but hey, you guys can help

None of us knows jack. We're totally winging it.

No kiddin -- we really fooled ya?

 

[Filip Sandor]

Umm. Physical and Not-Physical are both of temporal nature?

I state only one or the other -- but not both -- can possibly exist in a way that would allow any interaction. Where am I wrong?

Maybe only in your wording - hehe, just buggin!

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Atlas

I believe the brain has the capacity to be reflective

I'm sure of it. What I'm no longer sure of is whether I know (or can ever know) very much about the nature or the extent of that capacity.

The moving images of consciousness are like images floating across a TV screen

I'd say that is the way most of us are naturally inclined to think of the situation. There are a couple of problems with this view, however. One is that the screen seems to need a location. Descartes took a stab at it (proposing the pineal gland), but modern neuroscience has failed to offer any very likely candidate.

Even if we could locate this 'Cartesian Theater', the show would still require an audience. We would need to find some coherent way to bestow 'observer' status upon some privileged neurons or groups of neurons, or outputs of neurons or something. To do this would involve what Dennett refers to as 'the bizarre category of the objectively subjective'. What a mess. This isn't a mirror, it's a hall of mirrors.

Anyway, I'm pretty attached to the physical world and don't believe that consciousness is the substructure of it but rather one of a myriad manifestations of it.

I agree, but I continue to find some of the arguments for the opposing position to be not only interesting, but surprisingly difficult to refute.

 

[Atlas]

...I'd say that is the way most of us are naturally inclined to think of the situation. There are a couple of problems with this view, however. One is that the screen seems to need a location. Descartes took a stab at it (proposing the pineal gland), but modern neuroscience has failed to offer any very likely candidate.

Even if we could locate this 'Cartesian Theater', the show would still require an audience. We would need to find some coherent way to bestow 'observer' status upon some privileged neurons or groups of neurons, or outputs of neurons or something. To do this would involve what Dennett refers to as 'the bizarre category of the objectively subjective'. What a mess. This isn't a mirror, it's a hall of mirrors...

Thanks for this post. Now I have something to think about for the rest of my life besides women's underwear.

It's kind of exciting. I wish I had some brains to slice into.

Objectively subjective... I like it.

It kinda stopped me. I started thinking of the sentence. "I am objective." So subjectively objective is ok but you're right. "Me is subjective" just sounds stupid.

I'll ponder all this and get back to you.... uh, don't wait up.

Thanks again.

(edit: If the screen is found and surgically removed, in what ways would the consciousness go dark? We would be internally blinded from our thoughts? That seems likely. Would we also lose all of our senses? Not exactly. We may still feel or see, but it would be as if someone else was having the experience, or if the pain was in the same room perhaps but we could not say that it was ours.)

 

[davidsmith73]

In this context then, what would a 'non-mathematical relationship' be? I know, I know. Sorry.

I think that term is a bit of an oxymoron in this context. In the context of talking about objective physical reality, we have experiences that form part of logical relationships, for example when we measure the length of objects or the velocity of a particle. These experiences we attribute to an objective reality because they behave according to mathematical principles (and the relationships are also accessable the third person - although I'm not sure if that is truly relavent here). Any other type of experience is not attributed to objective reality and can be grouped under the term "subjective", such as pain, emotions, hallucinations etc. It is the"subjective" experiences that I would say fall into the "non-mathematical relationship" category.

Things always start getting extra weird once we start talking about meta-qualia.

Meta-qualia?

Are there things besides qualia that one can identify the nature of simply by inspecting the contents of one's own consciousness?

I would say no because, by definition, qualia encompass all experiences one might have regardless of their particular variation. If one has identified something then you must have experienced it therefore it must be a quale.

Are there things that have natures completely independent of anything we could know about them?

Yes, its called objective physical reality! We can never know the true nature of objective reality.

If so, is the nature of qualia exempt from this limitation (and if so, why)?

Yes, I think qualia are certainly exempt from this limitation, but lets bare in mind that this limitation is only imposed if you assume objectivity exists. With respect to qualia, we can know the nature of the redness of red for example.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

(edit: If the screen is found and surgically removed, in what ways would the consciousness go dark? We would be internally blinded from our thoughts? That seems likely. Would we also lose all of our senses? Not exactly. We may still feel or see, but it would be as if someone else was having the experience, or if the pain was in the same room perhaps but we could not say that it was ours.)

Doesn't this happen in some neurological disorders or damage? So someone may actually do something and not "know" they've done it even though they have the memory of it, or the strange why people who have undergone "split-brain" operations react. I don't have any great links handy but this one discusses some of the changes in a "split-brain" person's consciousness. http://php.indiana.edu/~pietsch/split-brain.html

…snip…

PETER PIPER PICKED....
Over the years, this loss of speech has not been typical at all. As a matter of fact, the second patient coming out of anesthesia complain, "I have a splitting headache!" And when his nurse asked him how well he could talk, he smiled and answered: "Peter Piper picked a peck of pickle peppers!"
To the casual observer, the early split brain patients appeared perfectly normal. They could talk and read and had no problems recognizing the world about them. The seizures gone, they seemed happy, alert and healthy.
Then Gazzaniga made a startling discovery. If the patient held up something like a comb or a coffee cup in his left hand, he couldn't speak its name. Transferred to the right hand -- no trouble at all.
LOUSE IN LEFT FIELD
The same happened with words. If Gazzaniga held up a card with a printed word like LOUSE visible only in the patient's left visual field, he couldn't read it. Yet the left eye was fine. But Gazzaniga knew that the left visual field flashes only to the right side of the brain. And when Gazzaniga put the LOUSE in the right field, guess what happened. The patient immediately recognized it.

…snip…

 

[BillHoyt]

Doesn't this happen in some neurological disorders or damage? So someone may actually do something and not "know" they've done it even though they have the memory of it, or the strange why people who have undergone "split-brain" operations react. I don't have any great links handy but this one discusses some of the changes in a "split-brain" person's consciousness. http://php.indiana.edu/~pietsch/split-brain.html

You've just identified one of the key knowledge areas that begins to expose the consciousness-as-nonmaterial claim errors: the facts simply do not support these metaphysical musings. From the simple fact of anaesthesia to the recorded studies of brain damage, to the recorded effects of various brain surgeries, it is absolutely clear that, as magical as it appears to be, consciousness is firmly rooted in organic function. Why so many continue to wander in a metaphysical fog about this is beyond me.

 

[hammegk]

Doesn't this happen in some neurological disorders or damage?

Yup, and if you liken the wetware-as-perceived to an info processor, so what?

 

[davidsmith73]

You've just identified one of the key knowledge areas that begins to expose the consciousness-as-nonmaterial claim errors: the facts simply do not support these metaphysical musings. From the simple fact of anaesthesia to the recorded studies of brain damage, to the recorded effects of various brain surgeries, it is absolutely clear that, as magical as it appears to be, consciousness is firmly rooted in organic function. Why so many continue to wander in a metaphysical fog about this is beyond me.

Bill,
While the neurological disorders such as blindsight and visual neglect are interesting, they don't address the philosophical issues such as the hard problem, as we've been talking about. They just highlight the idea that as "matter" changes, so does experience. The important question is whether matter itself is experiential.

 

[Atlas]

You've just identified one of the key knowledge areas that begins to expose the consciousness-as-nonmaterial claim errors: the facts simply do not support these metaphysical musings. From the simple fact of anaesthesia to the recorded studies of brain damage, to the recorded effects of various brain surgeries, it is absolutely clear that, as magical as it appears to be, consciousness is firmly rooted in organic function. Why so many continue to wander in a metaphysical fog about this is beyond me.

When you say "beyond me" I'm sure you mean "totally illogical". It's obvious that the majority stumble through this doorway as an attractive alternative to the death of self. Consciousness implies God implies I'm going to live forever in heaven.

In the minority there are folks like hammegk, who refuse to live in the paradox they see and so throw pragmatism down for illusion. Well, to be fair, pragmatism to me implies a comfort level with dualism in that notion it espouses as "common sense" - but it would be foundationless without an assumption of a real material world. Which brings me to...

Yup, and if you liken the wetware-as-perceived to an info processor, so what?

I'm never sure if you're thumnailing or nutshelling. Does Objective Idealism accept that human consciousness is an aspect of a unified higher consciousness that is not dependent upon *I* but also that reality is unreal, unphysical, simultaneously created and apprehended by higher consciousness and it's aspects? I still don't like you destroying my world. One of us is a windmill, the other is Don Quixote.

 

[BillHoyt]

Bill,
While the neurological disorders such as blindsight and visual neglect are interesting, they don't address the philosophical issues such as the hard problem, as we've been talking about. They just highlight the idea that as "matter" changes, so does experience. The important question is whether matter itself is experiential.

Just how, exactly, are "qualia" to be falsified, davidsmith73? Please be specific and indicate, very specifically, how the concept of "qualia" is to be refuted.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

If one has identified something then you must have experienced it therefore it must be a quale.

And your experience of the quale is a meta-quale (a TIC term, BTW).

With respect to qualia, we can know the nature of the redness of red for example.

Wait...

---------me-------------
Are there things that have natures completely independent of anything we could know about them?
------------------------

---------you------------
Yes, its called objective physical reality! We can never know the true nature of objective reality.
------------------------

---------me-------------
If so, is the nature of qualia exempt from this limitation (and if so, why)?
------------------------

---------you------------
Yes, I think qualia are certainly exempt from this limitation
------------------------

But qualia are subjective! I wouldn't have thought it possible to come up with anything even more bizarre than 'objectively subjective', but you appear to have done so by proposing its complement: a new category, the 'subjectively objective'. Nice work.

Are we having fun, or what?

 

[hammegk]

In the minority there are folks like hammegk, who refuse to live in the paradox they see and so throw pragmatism down for illusion. Well, to be fair, pragmatism to me implies a comfort level with dualism in that notion it espouses as "common sense" - but it would be foundationless without an assumption of a real material world.

I only retort dualism is illogical, and in fact nonsense. I do agree an objectve reality exists.

Which brings me to... I'm never sure if you're thumnailing or nutshelling. Does Objective Idealism accept that human consciousness is an aspect of a unified higher consciousness that is not dependent upon *I* but also that reality is unreal, unphysical, simultaneously created and apprehended by higher consciousness and it's aspects? I still don't like you destroying my world. One of us is a windmill, the other is Don Quixote.

In a way, although human consciousness is a red herring. Thought is the existent. What's human got to do with it? Our perceived wetware. plus consciousness, equals a human.

 

[Filip Sandor]

Even if we could locate this 'Cartesian Theater', the show would still require an audience. We would need to find some coherent way to bestow 'observer' status upon some privileged neurons or groups of neurons, or outputs of neurons or something. To do this would involve what Dennett refers to as 'the bizarre category of the objectively subjective'. What a mess. This isn't a mirror, it's a hall of mirrors.

D,

What is the hall of mirrors supposed to be??

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Filip Sandor


What is the hall of mirrors supposed to be??

I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.