Define Consiousness

[Jeff Corey]

...On the other hand it might seem that materialists cannot believe in physical laws which govern since physical laws are not themselves physical i.e they merely dictate physical processes rather than being physical themselves. They need to believe "physical laws" simply describe. This of course makes it wholly mysterious why the world should continue to follow physical laws.

This is part of the problem. On one hand you state that materialists believe that "physical laws are not themselves physical i.e. they merely dictate physical processes...", whereas materialists do not believe they dictate anything. They are the best approximations of our description of how things work and are subject to modification in accord with new evidence.

 

[hammegk]

They are the best approximations of our description of how things work and are subject to modification in accord with new evidence.

You mistake mathematical maps with Reality's terrain.

Unless you are suggesting that modifying a mathematical model does change Reality's terrain. That BTW could be an interesting area of enquiry; I don't buy it, but it is an arguable thesis imo.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

On the other hand it might seem that materialists cannot believe in physical laws which govern since physical laws are not themselves physical i.e they merely dictate physical processes rather than being physical themselves

davidsmith was talking about logic:

"One can't have logic and matter/energy co-existing objectively because this is a dualistic philosophy surely."

You made the shift to physical laws so smoothly I hardly noticed it at first. I don't necessarily object, but reserve the right to do so later on.

As Jeff pointed out, 'laws' in this context are descriptive, rather than prescriptive. In practice, it isn't as simple as that; they are aquired by induction, and applied by deduction. This is perilous, but it's all we've got.

But these laws aren't the true laws anyway; they are what hammegk refers to as 'maps'. If the world doesn't follow them, we just edit the map. What is really at issue is whether our maps ultimately reduce to fundamental laws which are truly prescriptive (which does seem to lead to some form of dualism).

I would expect most mathematicians, if pressed, to deny mathematical Platonism in order to avoid the slippery slope of Platonism in a broader ontological sense. But that doesn't mean they might not act 'as if' they believed in mathematical Platonism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

davidsmith was talking about logic:

"One can't have logic and matter/energy co-existing objectively because this is a dualistic philosophy surely."

You made the shift to physical laws so smoothly I hardly noticed it at first. I don't necessarily object, but reserve the right to do so later on.

David Smith said this:

"A problem with this view from a materialist standpoint might be that you must still account for the ways in which qualia interact and how the illusion of the physical world emerges. This would seem to necessitate similar logical rules and principles as that constructed within a materialist framework and therefore introduce an objective element to a mental monistic philosophy".



So what I was saying is that I do not think there is any problem with my metaphysic. There is no problem because of the objective existence of physical laws plus the existence of an infinite mind.

As Jeff pointed out, 'laws' in this context are descriptive, rather than prescriptive.

Yes, I know that materialists tend to say so, which creates a problem for why the world continues to proceed according to such laws.

In practice, it isn't as simple as that; they are aquired by induction, and applied by deduction. This is perilous, but it's all we've got.

We have no reason or evidence to suppose induction works since it states something about the future by inferring from the past. But we have zero reason to suppose the future will resemble the past unless we suppose physical laws govern rather than merely describe.

But these laws aren't the true laws anyway; they are what hammegk refers to as 'maps'. If the world doesn't follow them, we just edit the map. What is really at issue is whether our maps ultimately reduce to fundamental laws which are truly prescriptive (which does seem to lead to some form of dualism).

No, our theories are the map. Physical laws simply approximate roughly to the pattern of our perceptual experiences, so they can't themselves be a "map".

But I maintain that although theories are the "map", there is no reality corresponding to the map, so to speak. This doesn't mean that our "maps" can't get more accurate, or even completely change ( 2 scientific theories might explain the course of our perceptual experiences equally adequately, but such theories might utilise quite distinct scientific entities). Also you should be aware that I'm not just talking about scientific theories. Even seeing the world in 3D is a implicit low level theory we hold to explain the correlations between visual and tactile sensations.

 

[Jeff Corey]

You mistake mathematical maps with Reality's terrain.

Unless you are suggesting that modifying a mathematical model does change Reality's terrain. That BTW could be an interesting area of enquiry; I don't buy it, but it is an arguable thesis imo.

I don't see where I made that mistake.

 

[Atlas]

... Yes, I know that materialists tend to say so, which creates a problem for why the world continues to proceed according to such laws.

No, our theories are the map. Physical laws simply approximate roughly to the pattern of our perceptual experiences, so they can't themselves be a "map".

But I maintain that although theories are the "map", there is no reality corresponding to the map, so to speak.

Just to make it clear, I do believe the world is governed by objective rules. In other words I believe in the existence of physical laws which govern the world. Both these laws and the qualia we experience could have their origin in an infinite mind. Thus the external world is constituted by qualia, even if the patterns exhibited by such qualia, and the source of qualia, owe their origin to an infinite mind.

In terms of Hammegk's map, the Copernican revolution and the changeover from Euclidian/Newtonian concepts to Einsteinian and even the demon theory of illness being replaced by germ theory all represent map updates don't they?

I still don't understand your sense of the"objective" Ian and I wonder if you believe the advances in the thinking patterns of men correspond to some kind of shift in the Infinite Mind. My personal bias, I do believe there is a reality corresponding to the map, I do believe that the physical laws that we define are theories describing the interactions of the underllying reality, and that currently there is no "good" theory of how life and thought arise through those physical interactions but that a real objective material universe is clearly the best assumption to start with.

 

[Mr. E]

You mistake mathematical maps with Reality's terrain.

Unless you are suggesting that modifying a mathematical model does change Reality's terrain. That BTW could be an interesting area of enquiry; I don't buy it, but it is an arguable thesis imo.

An aside -- It's obvious from history that changing the math map changes the terrain. Transistors for one example came from the shift to the math of quantum physics from classical physics. But I'm not claiming at this point that modifying math models changes Reality in general, only its terrain and our perceptions of the terrain, aka the material world, via actions in that world based on the new maps.

ME

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

But we have zero reason to suppose the future will resemble the past unless we suppose physical laws govern rather than merely describe

Either way, I think our reason for supposing that the future will resemble the past is at least non-zero.

I think the main problem is in using 'physical laws govern' as if it were all one word. The word 'law' carries certain connotations that are essentially legacies of a feudalistic era. Why can we not assume that the most fundamental laws of nature (if they are discovered) cannot simply be descriptions of the way things do work (which does not presuppose dualism), rather than mandates dictating how things must work (which does)?

Even seeing the world in 3D is a implicit low level theory we hold to explain the correlations between visual and tactile sensations.

Agreed. Darwinism would seem to reinforce Kantian intuition by offering an avenue for the inductive aquisition of our innate notions regarding space, time, and cause/effect. It is interesting to attempt to conceptualize what the alternatives might have been.

 

[Atlas]

... I think the main problem is in using 'physical laws govern' as if it were all one word. The word 'law' carries certain connotations that are essentially legacies of a feudalistic era. Why can we not assume that the most fundamental laws of nature (if they are discovered) cannot simply be descriptions of the way things do work (which does not presuppose dualism), rather than mandates dictating how things must work (which does)?

[/QUOTE] This conversation has me thinking about mass attraction. It governs the movements of the heavens. It is amazing to me to think of an Infinite Mind who would find it easier to implant ongoing shifting perspectives on moving objects that offer predictabilty to many different observers rather than utilize a physical reality to offer those perspectives autmatically. It's a bias that is difficult to put aside.

But that mass attraction that we quantify the effects of is one of our most demanding laws: the law of gravity. It's difficult to imagine oneself an outlaw. Still it is only a theory and the graviton remains elusive.

I think for my universe I'm comfortable saying that forces, energies, particles and interactions exist but no "laws" except in the same sense that numbers and math exist; as inventions of conscious entities that aid survival in the material universe. I do have trouble catagorizing something like Time - so even in discussing these topics I'm seldom sure of what I know.

 

[Filip Sandor]

I will argue that it doesn't exist. It is a rubric under which many other things are attributed.

I would argue that the more precise our definition of consciousness in terms of the physics in the brain gets the more elusive the answer to what it is will be.

As for why this is so, I think the answer to this question lies somewhere in the intuitive realm - if not the logical.

 

[davidsmith73]

This is part of the problem. On one hand you state that materialists believe that "physical laws are not themselves physical i.e. they merely dictate physical processes...", whereas materialists do not believe they dictate anything. They are the best approximations of our description of how things work and are subject to modification in accord with new evidence.

This is an interesting notion then. Lets examine precisely what you have said. You say that physical laws are good approximate descriptions of how things work. I assume the word "things" is a reference to objective reality. Would you say that you can separate the objective existence of behaving matter on the one hand and logical rules on the other? In other words, are our logical descriptions a description of "matter" or an approximation to an objectively existing fundamental rule or principle, albeit ultimately unknowable ? It seems to me that if its the latter then there really is no room for "matter" in a materialist monist philosophy.

 

[davidsmith73]

there is no ambiguity between logic and matter. I could give you examples, but they are all trivial.

Could you explain your reasoning here?

It seems to me that if matter must behave in a logical manner, then matter can be defined by its logical relationships. If matter is not, in reality, simply a logical (ergo physical) process, then what is it? I'm not saying that the logical descriptions of objective reality that we construct are anything more than maps of the territory, but the territory surely must be logical in nature.

 

[Jeff Corey]

This is an interesting notion then. Lets examine precisely what you have said. You say that physical laws are good approximate descriptions of how things work. I assume the word "things" is a reference to objective reality. Would you say that you can separate the objective existence of behaving matter on the one hand and logical rules on the other? In other words, are our logical descriptions a description of "matter" or an approximation to an objectively existing fundamental rule or principle, albeit ultimately unknowable ? It seems to me that if its the latter then there really is no room for "matter" in a materialist monist philosophy.

No, that's not what I said, even by implication.

 

[davidsmith73]

Why can we not assume that the most fundamental laws of nature (if they are discovered) cannot simply be descriptions of the way things do work (which does not presuppose dualism), rather than mandates dictating how things must work (which does)?

In other words, you are saying that laws of nature do not exist objectively. Rather, there is some other nature to objective reality, which we label as matter. Is this your view ?

 

[davidsmith73]

No, that's not what I said, even by implication.

Well, can't you help me out by answering some of my questions?

 

[Filip Sandor]

Yes, I know that materialists tend to say so, which creates a problem for why the world continues to proceed according to such laws...

...We have no reason or evidence to suppose induction works since it states something about the future by inferring from the past. But we have zero reason to suppose the future will resemble the past unless we suppose physical laws govern rather than merely describe.

Ian,

I think this is more of an intuitive interpretation than a logical one - although it might be logical if you dig a little deeper than the physical level.

Allow me to explain what I mean by my first remark.

When we say that something is 'governing' physical phenomena we are naturally assuming (even if we don't notice it) that if for any reason this governing force stopped to work then planets would suddenly fly away from stars, as gravity stopped working and matter would crumble and disperse into chaotic soup throughout the Universe, as nuclear forces would fail. Basically what I am saying is that by assuming certain laws are 'keeping things together' we are assuming that there are other forces at work that are literally trying to 'break things apart' in a sort of 'war' with the first set of laws which don't agree on what matter should do.

This seems to be more of a intuitive notion than a scientific inference since we as individuals are naturally under the impression that we have the ability to go 'against' the forces of nature by our free will and we tend to see the 'forces' as working against us, but is this really so in physics? Does matter have a mind of it's own that tells it what to do when 'the laws aren't watching' the way we seem to have a mind?

I don't disagree that your theory might contain some truth, but from a scientific point of view, there is really no good reason to assume that things are being made to be the way they are rather than things just being the way they are unless you believe there is another force at work that is trying to break everything apart, but what physical evidence do we have of such a force, appart from our intuition?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

In other words, you are saying that laws of nature do not exist objectively.

When we observe something acting in a certain way, our observation includes the intuitive (and often tacit) assumption that there are other ways it might act; this leads us to conclude that it is observing some law.

Rather, there is some other nature to objective reality, which we label as matter.

Other than what?

 

[davidsmith73]

When we observe something acting in a certain way, our observation includes the intuitive (and often tacit) assumption that there are other ways it might act; this leads us to conclude that it is observing some law.

which prompts the question - does the law objectively exist.

Other than what?

logical rules

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

which prompts the question - does the law objectively exist.

Which prompts the question - what is meant by 'law'?



------------------------
Rather, there is some other nature to objective reality, which we label as matter.
------------------------
Other than what?
------------------------
logical rules

I'm sorry, I still don't understand what you are asking.

 

[Atlas]

David and Dynamic,

Does the law objectively exist? Pick one specifically. The facts seem to exist objectively. But the law is subjective, is it not?
Earlier I said.

But that mass attraction that we quantify the effects of is one of our most demanding laws: the law of gravity. It's difficult to imagine oneself an outlaw. Still it is only a theory and the graviton remains elusive.

I use theory in the "mental construct" sense. I think all laws are like this. Even criminal law. Murder exists. Mass attracts mass. But our "existing" laws are subjective appreciations of the underlying reality.

Sorry to interrupt. Back to the quibble.