Define Consiousness

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by hammegk

Why? It's a position that can at least be defended logically by ~idealists

I guess just because it is so... repulsive.

I remember the Beloff article now. Maybe there was a reference to it in the primary/secondary qualities thread? What triggered my recollection was this line:

"Although, as I have said, the evidence for PSI is extensive, much of it is of an inferior quality, some of it is definitely suspect and none of it is decisive.".

In other words, the evidence for PSI is lousy, but there's lots of it. Gotta love it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I guess just because it is so... repulsive.

Epiphenomenalism is repulsive? Well materialism is equally so.

I remember the Beloff article now. Maybe there was a reference to it in the primary/secondary qualities thread?

No, not so far as I recollect.

What triggered my recollection was this line:

"Although, as I have said, the evidence for PSI is extensive, much of it is of an inferior quality, some of it is definitely suspect and none of it is decisive.".

In other words, the evidence for PSI is lousy, but there's lots of it. Gotta love it.

Haven't got that far yet.

 

[Mr. E]

Someone who agrees with me is John Beloff. From here.
quote:
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We should note, at this point, that it is only in its derived sense that we can define or explicate what we mean by consciousness. In its basic sense it can no more be defined than any other primitive concept. With any primitive concept, either one understands what is intended or one fails to understand.[...]

I note the Beloff's old paper was not accepted for publication in the journal to which is was submitted. Does this mean that you are siding against the scientific community on this point when you cite it?

Is there a problem with starting with primitives? Either one understands if vaguely what is intended by "energy" or "momentum" or one doesn't proceed in Physics very far. If the two of you are saying simply that we can never fully know anything which passes for scientific knowledge, fine: "we all know perfectly what it is" becomes at best mere irony.

What we mean by consciousness is some result of the synthesis of what we mean by sensation (eg. sense organ outputs) with what we mean by awareness (eg. activatable memory). Whether qualia are a mere curious side-effect of consciousness or not, this itself is an/the epiphenomal point. What is clear is that consciousness depends on both sensation and awareness - without both "working" together the norms of conscious behavior and conscious experience each and both fail and we are left talking relative nonsense or speculative fiction.

ME

PS - any other continuation from our previous interaction?

btw, I recommend the Chesire Cat Demonstration for anyone endowed with two eyes who wonders about visual qualia. http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471115169.html

 

[Interesting Ian]

I note the Beloff's old paper was not accepted for publication in the journal to which is was submitted. Does this mean that you are siding against the scientific community on this point when you cite it?

Certainly I will side against the scientific community if they say clearly false things. They need to stick to science and forget the philosophy.

Is there a problem with starting with primitives? Either one understands if vaguely what is intended by "energy" or "momentum" or one doesn't proceed in Physics very far.

All mathematics. Just patterns in our perceptual experiences.


snip nonsense.

ME

PS - any other continuation from our previous interaction?

no

 

[hammegk]

I guess just because it is so... repulsive.

Or as II said, no more so than materialism or dualism.

What triggered my recollection was this line:

"Although, as I have said, the evidence for PSI is extensive, much of it is of an inferior quality, some of it is definitely suspect and none of it is decisive.".

In other words, the evidence for PSI is lousy, but there's lots of it. Gotta love it.

Is this comment in response to something I've said???

When PSI enter this discussion of consciousness? (Maybe as a dot product ? )

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by hammegk

Or as II said, no more so than materialism or dualism.

Ok, you have a point there.

Is this comment in response to something I've said???

No.

 

[Mr. E]

Or as II said, no more so than materialism or dualism.

Are all dualisms equally repulsive?

ME

 

[hammegk]

Are all dualisms equally repulsive?

ME

Repulsive, or meaningless vis-a-vis our empirical universe.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Or as II said, no more so than materialism or dualism.

I don't find interactive dualism repulsive at all. Any metaphysic which acknowledges that there is a self and we have free will cannot be that repulsive! However I think idealism is much superior.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I note the Beloff's old paper was not accepted for publication in the journal to which is was submitted.

A more recent paper of his is here

Don't imagine though that I agree with everything he says, just because I agree with some things. There are better refutations of materialism out there.

 

[Interesting Ian]

A more recent paper of his is here

Don't imagine though that I agree with everything he says, just because I agree with some things. There are better refutations of materialism out there.

Tell you what though, his writing is very accessible i.e relatively easy to understand.

 

[Mr. E]

I don't find interactive dualism repulsive at all. Any metaphysic which acknowledges that there is a self and we have free will cannot be that repulsive! However I think idealism is much superior.

That sounds like a value judgment. Superior for what purpose or to what end?

Also, I'm rusty on the terms here, "interactive dualism" for one. He seems to refer to that as "strong dualism" in: "the radical dualism or interactionism that we called our second solution."

Don't imagine though that I agree with everything he says, just because I agree with some things. There are better refutations of materialism out there.

Is your interest (in this thread) only in refuting narrow-minded materialisms?


ME

 

[Mr. E]

Repulsive, or meaningless vis-a-vis our empirical universe.

I'll take that as your personal opinion. You don't find some both repulsive and attractive together? That could make for an atomic "metaphysic" of some power.

ME

 

[Interesting Ian]

That sounds like a value judgment. Superior for what purpose or to what end?

A material world is ontologically superfluous. My brand of idealism is like interactive dualism, except it dispenses with such a material world, and supposes that the external world equates to our perceptual experiences or qualia.

Also, I'm rusty on the terms here, "interactive dualism" for one. He seems to refer to that as "strong dualism" in: "the radical dualism or interactionism that we called our second solution."

Interactive dualism = the material world effects the mind eg getting drunk, or a bang on head etc, and the mind in turn effects the material world eg I have desires and appear to be able to move my body to fulfil those desires eg I am thirsty so get up to get a glass of pineapple juice.

However, if certain events in the brain are not wholly determined by previous events in the brain plus input from the environment, this is a denial of Naturalism, and a fortiori is a denial of (reductive) materialism.

Is your interest (in this thread) only in refuting narrow-minded materialisms?

Yes.

 

[Mr. E]

quote:
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Is there a problem with starting with primitives? Either one understands if vaguely what is intended by "energy" or "momentum" or one doesn't proceed in Physics very far.
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All mathematics. Just patterns in our perceptual experiences.

Are you saying that all of Physics is mere mathematics, or that Consciousness can be similarly treated as physics is treated, via math starting with a minimal set of primitives? Pure math is not a matter of ordinary perception even tho' perceptual patterns play an important role in learning and "doing" math.

ME

 

[hammegk]

I'll take that as your personal opinion. You don't find some both repulsive and attractive together? ......
ME

No. The repulsion stems from the seductice yet illogical allure of dualism in lieu of examining to the best of ones' ability the implications of ones' choice of monism as a basis for all other decisions.

Your comments on the reality or lack thereof of mathematics is one fruitful avenue for thought, imo, in making that choice.

 

[davidsmith73]

Your comments on the reality or lack thereof of mathematics is one fruitful avenue for thought, imo, in making that choice.

I started a thread about the objective nature of logic a while ago. I remember that a few materialist monists were of the view that mathematics has no objective reality. In other words, logical rules do not co-exist along with the observed behaving "matter" from which the rules are derived. I think a materialist must be forced into one of two views if they are to have a truly monistic philosophy. One can't have logic and matter/energy co-existing objectively because this is a dualistic philosophy surely. So a materialist monist would have to concede that either transcendent logical rules/principles or matter/energy are the nature of objective reality. Granted, a materialist may never be able to know the full and true nature of this reality, but they must distinguish between the two if they are going to say anything about a monist philosophy.

I think this necessary materialist elimination must be considered when criticising such a philosophy as Ian's. Ian's monistic philosophy supposes that the external world equates to our perceptual experiences or qualia. A problem with this view from a materialist standpoint might be that you must still account for the ways in which qualia interact and how the illusion of the physical world emerges. This would seem to necessitate similar logical rules and principles as that constructed within a materialist framework and therefore introduce an objective element to a mental monistic philosophy. However, if materialists see no problem with not regarding logical rules as part of an objective reality then why should Ian's philosophy regard them as objective ?

 

[Mr. E]

No. The repulsion stems from the seductice yet illogical allure of dualism in lieu of examining to the best of ones' ability the implications of ones' choice of monism as a basis for all other decisions.

If your concern is that some people try to take shortcuts, jump to dualism prematurely, I have no argument as to that possibility. But if there is illogic in the world, any deep conception of the world must allow for it, preferably in a coherent fashion, seriously speaking.

Your comments on the reality or lack thereof of mathematics is one fruitful avenue for thought, imo, in making that choice.

One of my aims is to recognize how the logic of physics, the logic of language, and the logic of what passes for mind are intimately related in an effective meaningful fashion.


ME

 

[Anders]

[snip]One can't have logic and matter/energy co-existing objectively because this is a dualistic philosophy surely. So a materialist monist would have to concede that either transcendent logical rules/principles or matter/energy are the nature of objective reality. Granted, a materialist may never be able to know the full and true nature of this reality, but they must distinguish between the two if they are going to say anything about a monist philosophy.

Firstly, why would a dualistic philosophy be impossible? We do live in a world where many philosophies co-exist. You mistakenly take philosophy for a governing "force" which it isn't. Philosophy can at best describe and discuss the world.

Secondly, there is no ambiguity between logic and matter. I could give you examples, but they are all trivial.

I think this necessary materialist elimination must be considered when criticising such a philosophy as Ian's. Ian's monistic philosophy supposes that the external world equates to our perceptual experiences or qualia. A problem with this view from a materialist standpoint might be that you must still account for the ways in which qualia interact and how the illusion of the physical world emerges. This would seem to necessitate similar logical rules and principles as that constructed within a materialist framework and therefore introduce an objective element to a mental monistic philosophy. However, if materialists see no problem with not regarding logical rules as part of an objective reality then why should Ian's philosophy regard them as objective ?

Simple because we live in the real world, not in a world described by Ian's philosophy.

 

[Interesting Ian]

David
I think this necessary materialist elimination must be considered when criticising such a philosophy as Ian's. Ian's monistic philosophy supposes that the external world equates to our perceptual experiences or qualia. A problem with this view from a materialist standpoint might be that you must still account for the ways in which qualia interact and how the illusion of the physical world emerges. This would seem to necessitate similar logical rules and principles as that constructed within a materialist framework and therefore introduce an objective element to a mental monistic philosophy. However, if materialists see no problem with not regarding logical rules as part of an objective reality then why should Ian's philosophy regard them as objective ?
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Anders
Simple because we live in the real world, not in a world described by Ian's philosophy.

Just to make it clear, I do believe the world is governed by objective rules. In other words I believe in the existence of physical laws which govern the world. Both these laws and the qualia we experience could have their origin in an infinite mind. Thus the external world is constituted by qualia, even if the patterns exhibited by such qualia, and the source of qualia, owe their origin to an infinite mind.

On the other hand it might seem that materialists cannot believe in physical laws which govern since physical laws are not themselves physical i.e they merely dictate physical processes rather than being physical themselves. They need to believe "physical laws" simply describe. This of course makes it wholly mysterious why the world should continue to follow physical laws.