Consciousness question

[PixyMisa]

I don't have time to look out my child psychology textbooks, but other experiments beyond the red rouge on forehead/mirror experiment have been performed at only several weeks old to test if babies can differentiate between their mother and a stranger by either face or voice recognition.

Yes. Though this is already evident by observation if you have dealt with very young babies at all.

These experiments have been said to support the idea that a sense of self-awareness in relation to others and the environement is either genetically innate or develops much earlier than 18 months.

Some aspects of self-awareness are present in very young babies. Others are not. This means that self-awareness is something that develops.

Are you now saying you don't believe that any type of consciousness exists until there is self-consciousness?

No. If I was saying that, I would have said that.

 

[uruk]

Some aspects of self-awareness are present in very young babies. Others are not. This means that self-awareness is something that develops.

I've also heard that the developing brain of a child is also incapable of comprehending certain concepts because of the level of complexity in thier neural connections.
I've also read of a case where if language (and other form of nerual stimulus)is not learned by a certain age that the person will never develope higher language skills as well as other cognitive abilities. I believe it involved a girl who was tied to a high chair in a basement for the first thirteen years of her life.

We are obviously not born fully concious or cognitive. It is developed over time and by the input of stimulus. it's all in the neural connections

 

[PixyMisa]

But what I am trying to ascertain here is why western atheist-materialist skeptics (WAMS) will not accept that their view of consciousness, as an emergent property or epiphenomenon of matter, is not faith-based? If it were not faith-based, I believe that WAMS should be able to say exactly what causes (or is) consciousness quite explicitly.

Because (a) your categorisation of people is dishonest (because the ideas are not western, not atheist, not necessarily materialist, and only skeptical in the broadest sense of the term), (b) it isn't faith-based, but observation-based (the broadest sense of skepticism), and (c) we have explicitly stated what consciousness is and what causes it.

It seems that so far most WAMS in this thread have gone with the idea that consciousness is information processing. Thus the claims that toilet cisterns, thermostats and even micetraps are conscious. (But a thermometer also processes information, so I'm not sure why they are discounting that one.)

A thermometer does not process information.

You seem to believe that consciousness can be inorganic (as in computers and cognitive modelling programs). I'm curious to know your most basic real-world example. At hand, I have both a scientific calculator and a basic calculator (both of which have a memory function allowing calculations involving constants). Would you say these devices are ever conscious (presumably when turned on and performing a calculation), at however rudimentary a level, with the scientific calculator being more conscious?

I would.

I apologise if I'm asking you questions you've already answered, but it's kind of hard to keep up with everyone.

It's been some time since you asked a question that hadn't already been answered.

 

[HypnoPsi]

If I take that toy away from him, is he sad? Does he miss it?

Yes, dogs can get depressed.

Does he recall it at any time other than when it is again used as an environmental stimuli?

Yes, dogs have a functional memory and will seek out where they last left their favourite toy (though they'll sometimes check one or two places before finding exactly where they left it).

I can say this - he snores, he kicks, and he growls in his sleep. I can pretty safetly say that he dreams, even if it is different than how we experience it.

A science program on television a few years ago showed an experiment with a cat, whereby the experimenters suppressed the hormones that caused sleep paralysis. The cat had lived in a lab all its life and had never seen a bird or a mouse. Yet, clearly, within it's cage it was acting out hunting, etc.,. This program was actually about nature/nurture, but it is clear that cats (and dogs) dream.

I don't know about cats, but dogs can clearly behave in a way that suggests they are capable of lying. Years ago, when I was a kid, I once recall a friends dog lying on the floor in his bedroom as if nothing was wrong. It even got up to greet him, as dogs do, all quite innocently. Of course, my friend put his hand on his bed and it was still warm. The dog had gotten off the bed (where it shouldn't have been) and lay on the floor when it had heard us coming.
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HypnoPsi

 

[cpolk]

It seems that so far most WAMS in this thread have gone with the idea that consciousness is information processing. Thus the claims that toilet cisterns, thermostats and even micetraps are conscious. (But a thermometer also processes information, so I'm not sure why they are discounting that one.)

There are several issues here, so let's separate them.

If I choose to define the word "consciousness", in my thought process, as to equate to information processing, then I am not a WAMS, I am a person who has made the choice to define an unclear term in a way that I can use.

You are not whatever it is you think you are, because you are simply a person who has made a personal, individual choice to define an unclear term in a way that you can use.

For the sake of us having a conversation, either I will have to momentarily accept your term, you will have to momentarily accept mine, or we will both have to accept an altnerate term.

But what I am trying to ascertain here is why western atheist-materialist skeptics (WAMS) will not accept that their view of consciousness, as an emergent property or epiphenomenon of matter, is not faith-based? If it were not faith-based, I believe that WAMS should be able to say exactly what causes (or is) consciousness quite explicitly.

My definition of "awareness" is specifically intended to eliminate the need for faith-based explanations. It is a purely mechanical, natural, and in the case of you and me, biological process.

Would you say these devices are ever conscious (presumably when turned on and performing a calculation), at however rudimentary a level, with the scientific calculator being more conscious?

Something to consider is purpose - does a calculator need self-awareness? The automated toilets, which are self-aware in the respect that they can perform their own diagnostics, interact with their surroundings independently, distinguish between itself and the user, and communicate their needs in the form of diagnostic reports, are at least as much so as, say, insects, right?

It's not consciousness in what you are looking for, but for the sake of argument, what else would it need to do to be a self-aware toilet system?

Everything you're asking is dependent upon what level you are looking at it. Are you looking at it at a level of self-preservation? Something that is not alive will have no need for self-preservation or any emotions that offspring from that condition. This is part of evolutionary considerations.

This discussion is very philosophical at its root, and so we do need to identify differences in the needs of awareness between varying mechanical and biological constructs. Technically, or so I've heard, the cockroach is the most advanced creature on the Earth.

 

[HypnoPsi]

Have you actually bothered to read any of the posts in this thread?

Have some patience. I've had a lot of responses to this thread and nobody seems to quite agree with anyone else. It's hard to remember who stands where on what particular thingy being conscious.
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HypnoPsi

 

[Z]

OK, so you want to know if something is conscious or not?

According to my definition, determining a conscious state is fairly simple.

1) Does the object in question possess the means to process sensory input? That is, does the object have a means of sensing its environment, then converting that sensation into information to be analyzed, cross-associated, memorized, etc?

2) Does the object in question have an ongoing and continual sense of memory? Is data stored by some means for future reference, with a genuine sense of chronology?

3) Is the object in question aware of itself, as distinguished from things in its environment, including awareness of its own information processing?

4) Is the object in question capable of learning in any form? That is, can it be taught to modify its behaviors according to sensory information gained over time?

I would say, at a minimum, these are the four key questions to be asked when considering whether a thing is conscious or not. Obviously, rocks are not conscious, as covered in the very first question. It is questionable whether virii or bacteria are conscious, as covered by the second question. Certainly, most normal mechanical devices fail at question three, and only the most advanced computers have a hope of passing question four. Most humans, of course, pass all four questions as do most mammals, but some do not. Clearly, any machine which can pass these four questions must seriously be considered as at least partially conscious.

So obviously, thermostats, toilet cisterns, thermometers, etc. are not conscious, in accordance with the above questions; nor are simple electronics like scientific calculators or television sets. But when we get into the cutting edge of cybernetics, I certainly think some things we have built might well be conscious.

 

[HypnoPsi]

Hold on a minute, the only evidence YOU have that consciousness exists is your own consciousness. You have no evidence that other humans have consciousness:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=1463815&postcount=944

So how can you be absolutely certain animals are conscious.

We can't - but we are born as sensory interactive social beings and for some reason accept, to the point of it being 'truth' for us, that other people and most animals are conscious. There could be some psi-factor in recognising consciousness for all we know. But, again, I'm only asking about atheistic-materialism and why the materialist view of consciousness is not admitted as being simply 'faith-based'?

You are using two different definitions of consciousness, one that applies to you, and one that can be applied to the behavior of a goldfish or a budgerigar (from the UK?).

(Budgerigars have a different consciousness in the US?? (Yes, I'm in the UK.) But I don't see myself using two different definitions of consciousness at all! Look, that I don't believe moustraps, toilet cisterns and thermostats are conscious is beside the point. All I am doing is asking for the materialistic-atheist explanation of consciousness and for some real-world examples.

So far we've had the aforementioned and the claim that consciousness is information processing. So, is that the atheist-materialist explanation of consciousness? It's information processing and thus, wherever and whenever information is processed consciousness occurs? (If that is it, then I'm still not clear why some of you are discounting thermometers.)

This is the problem, are we talking about awareness of self, awareness of thought, awareness of ideas, awareness of feelings, awareness of surroundings, all of these combined, minimal levels of all of these, minimal levels of any of these . . .

I'm asking about your definition. Do you think there is any consciousness or awareness at all (at however rudimentary a level) when there is no concurrent self-awareness?
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HypnoPsi

 

[HypnoPsi]

That depends on how it is defined. Give me a clear definition that I can use to establish whether or not something has the type of conciousness that you are personally looking for, and then I will tell you what you already know.

I have given several examples of awareness in a functional mechanical sense, and you didn't accept that because it didn't fit your definition.

Stop. I don't believe that water cisterns and thermostats are conscious, that's correct. But I'm not saying that you shouldn't believe this if you are an atheist-materialist, no matter how odd-ball I might find such a belief. To my understanding you think that information processing is consciousness, yes? And for you, that seems to include, cisterns, mousetraps (at one specific moment) and thermostats.

Yet, to me, a thermometer is always processing information as well - the only difference from the aforementioned is that it is not effecting any change in anything except itself (the mercury/alcohol expansion/contraction and air pressure). I'm curious to know exactly why you have concluded that consciousness (in the materialists) requires effecting change in something else via the processing of information; which is to say, why have you discounted thermometers?
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HypnoPsi

 

[cpolk]

To my understanding you think that information processing is consciousness, yes?

No. That's just how I choose to define the term, so that I can circumvent the necessity for faith-based assumptions. My brain, like yours, is capable of looking at a subject from many angles, so I can redefine at will in order to maintain an intellectual conversation.

Does everyone wish to use Zaaydragon's definition, for the sake of this discussion, or do we need to start a new thread and "clear the air", so to speak?

 

[Z]

Whoa, now, not so hasty... I think I've mentioned before my definition might be missing something... Can we first make sure that definition covers consciousness (excluding this supposed 'feeling of what it's like to be conscious' that Ian harps about)?

 

[HypnoPsi]

And what you say lead us to what I was assuming about your ideas.

Hold on a second. I'm seeking the atheist-materialist explanation of consciousness and have tried to keep things on topic in that regard from the beginning. I don't want to influence anyone elses own explanation with my ideas. I want the raw atheist-materialist explanation. The only criteria I've offered is that consciousness means awareness (however rudimentary).

If someone thinks that the information for "self" and (something) "not-self" has to exist before any awareness occurs then it's up to them if they want to define things that way. While, for other materialist-atheists, even a mousetrap has a very brief and limited moment of awareness as it is activated.

Don't let the fact that I think you've all gone completely nuts stop you from explaining your views.

You do believe, in a way, that consciousness is as fundamental as space/time. Now, a next step is to realize if you also think that consciousness has a clear ontological status without a world "surrounding it".

Everything I percieve, know, think, feel, observe, etc., appears to me in consciousness. Leaving a ticking clock in a room and returning to find the time having changed, clearly proves to me that things occur when I'm not thinking about them. The noumenal world and everyone else within it clearly exists to me as real as real can be. But I don't claim to know anything about it's ultimate nature.

Just think of me as someone who is trying to gather and weigh-up all the evidence about consciousness either way.

That I consider conscoiusness fundamental is an effect of it being fundamental to me (to all of us). Can if be created and destroyed? There's no evidence for that, so I have no reason to believe it can - just as I have no reason to believe that matter can be created or destroyed. I do know that energy converts all the time into different forms (thermal, kinetic, chemical, potential, etc.,) and into matter E=mc^2 and back again m=E/c^2 (and also c^2=E/m, for 'fields' I think(?)).

Whatever consciousness is, it might convert also. Science teaches that there are other dimensions besides the familiar 4 of spacetime. It also teaches that parallel universes are a real possiblity. I see no reason to believe that consciousness can be created or destroyed until we know more about both the nature of consciousness and the nature of the universe. As to concluding it's all the result of some quantum strangeness, I leave that to the more new-agey and happily admit that I don't know the answers.
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HypnoPsi

 

[HypnoPsi]

Now, a next step is to realize if you also think that consciousness has a clear ontological status without a world "surrounding it".

A better question is do you think there would be a universe without anything to be aware of it?
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HypnoPsi

 

[Z]

A better question is do you think there would be a universe without anything to be aware of it?
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HypnoPsi

Not much of a question - evidence indicates that there was a universe, long before anything was aware of it.

 

[PixyMisa]

To my understanding you think that information processing is consciousness, yes?

No. Consciousness is information processing.

Yet, to me, a thermometer is always processing information as well

Yes, we know you think that. It isn't true.

the only difference from the aforementioned is that it is not effecting any change in anything except itself (the mercury/alcohol expansion/contraction and air pressure).

That's a direct physical reaction, not an information process.

I'm curious to know exactly why you have concluded that consciousness (in the materialists) requires effecting change in something else via the processing of information; which is to say, why have you discounted thermometers?

Because that's exactly what information processing is: Changing the state of a second system based on the state of the first system and some discriminatory logic. A thermostat performs information processing; a thermometer does not.

A thermometer looks like this:

Input --->  State

A thermostat looks like this:

Input  ---> State1 ---\
                       > Logic ---> Output
            State2 ---/

Or this:

Input  ---> State1 ---\
                       > Logic ---> Output --\
            State2 ---/     |                |
                            \----<----<------/

The two are completely different.

 

[cpolk]

Whoa, now, not so hasty... I think I've mentioned before my definition might be missing something... Can we first make sure that definition covers consciousness (excluding this supposed 'feeling of what it's like to be conscious' that Ian harps about)?

So far, I've got to admit that I don't like myself in this thread. I seem way more argumentative than I really am.

The problem is that we keep going over to semantics - redifinitions of what the meaning of "what" is. We end up asking rhetorical questions like, "Is a toaster aware? How about a skillet?", in order to try to understand the other person, but ultimately refuse to accept their opinions because they don't match the conversation we are trying to have.

Is it appropriate to say that a human who is blind and can never describe a Picasso or the color green is less conscious than an abled individual? Is an autistic person who cannot clearly differentiate between "self" and "surroundings" not conscious? Is a paraplegic less aware because he or she cannot open a can of food? Would an automated toilet system that included an ALICE learning chat-bot with speech recognition and synthesis count as awareness, even if conversations would be minimal and retarded?

Such questions of semantics I think we should avoid by accepting a clear starting point. Yours looks solid to me.

Anyone have anything to add?

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Whoa, now, not so hasty... I think I've mentioned before my definition might be missing something... Can we first make sure that definition covers consciousness (excluding this supposed 'feeling of what it's like to be conscious' that Ian harps about)?

I believe that this definition is accurate and one both sides can agree upon. The ability to be aware that one is processing data and be aware of what that process is doing (to at least some extent) does seem to cover the "feeling of what it is like to be concious" thing. After all, one must be able to have that awareness and I'm pretty sure that is in fact what that feeling is.

We've been working on at least 5 different definitions of conciousness and that's the problem.

Psi here seems intent on using two definitions at the exact same time without properly defining his own. Allow me to elaborate. This fellow first assumes us to be using the "can respond to stimulus" definition of consiousness (which by the way does NOT imply internal states at all, it is merely a definition, in the same way as I can define "green" as a dog and that does not in any way imply a specific color, it is just a definition I am at the time using). Once he establishes that by this definition, we consider a mouse trap to be conscious, he then suddenly switches it to say "Oh no you didn't! A mouse trap does not have internal representative states, it can't think!", even though the definition we had been using up to that point did not indicate that at all. So, he is attempting to strawman us by just getting us to use one definition and then suddenly saying we were using another definition.

So no, if you define conciousness as being internally aware of the self, a mouse trap is not concious. If you only define it as being able to respond, it is. That is all.

Which definition do you go by? We can provide whatever definition you want us to use, and the entire argument, our opinions, will change accordingly.

You define conciousness as "a tree", and we'll state that not even humans are concious, as we are not trees. Just don't suddenly shift it into conciousness being "a human" and saying "oh, so humans aren't humans any more?".

Just to add one more comment, here's the deal. Don't ask US to define the term and then suddenly make some statement that does not apply to that particular definition of the term. If you have objections to the term, don't play that game. State outright what you define consiousness as. If we say "okay with this definition, this is consious" don't say "that's silly, it isn't aware of it's surroundings in a way where it can reflect on it internally", because that isn't the definition we had agreed upon anyway. If we HAD gone by it you would have a point.

Basically what I've done is make the same point in two different ways for clarity.

 

[PixyMisa]

The problem is that we keep going over to semantics - redifinitions of what the meaning of "what" is. We end up asking rhetorical questions like, "Is a toaster aware? How about a skillet?", in order to try to understand the other person, but ultimately refuse to accept their opinions because they don't match the conversation we are trying to have.

Most of us here realise that we are operating on different definitions of consciousness, and that while Dennett's definition (for example) is a useful definition of something, we ourselves define consciousness as Dennett's definition plus X. For varying X, of course. And we can say, yes, based on such-and-such a definition a thermostat (pocket calculator, bacterium, goldfish, dog) is conscious, but by my definition which also requires X, it is not, because it clearly lacks X. Which is fine. I don't think you're being too argumentative; this is a valid point.

But crucially, we - most of us - have definitions, and we can relate to one another by finding the differences in our defintions. People who don't have definitions can't do that.

 

[HypnoPsi]

You are trying to classify what doesn't need to be classified instead of defining what needs to be defined.

Dogs and elephants are both mammals. If I make a statement with an elephant in mind, and you make an opposing statement with a dog in mind, you are missing the connection completely by saying, "You are an elephant mammalist and I am a canine mammalist."

Once we define that we are not talking about mammals on whole, but specifically either elephants or dogs, we can have a discussion. Until we reach such an agreement, discussion is pointless.

Edit: Yes, Kudo's for hanging in there.

Thank you, but I'm not too worried about differing degrees of awareness. Just the most fundamental example of consciousness from atheistic-materialism, which seems to be nearly all instances where information is processed.
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HypnoPsi

 

[Z]

There are some interesting questions here...

Is it appropriate to say that a human who is blind and can never describe a Picasso or the color green is less conscious than an abled individual?

I would say that, yes, they are less conscious, though the degree is slight. They are still processing sensory information, but lack a sense.

Is an autistic person who cannot clearly differentiate between "self" and "surroundings" not conscious?

Ah, you said 'clearly'. Implying, of course, that they have some differentiation, but not as much as we do. Yes, they are conscious, but to a lesser degree.

Is a paraplegic less aware because he or she cannot open a can of food?

Please note, that ability in action is not part of the defintion of consciousness. Now, if said person could not detect a can of food, although the can were within sight, then, yes, they would be less aware.

Would an automated toilet system that included an ALICE learning chat-bot with speech recognition and synthesis count as awareness, even if conversations would be minimal and retarded?

As near as I can tell, the ALICE systems are a poor substitute for conscious beings, and lack any self-awareness (beyond canned responses). Now, if the chat-bot and the automation systems were integrated, and were given an awareness of itself as well as an awareness of its thought processes, with an ability to modify its behavior according to what it learns... then, yes, it would be aware.